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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis seeks to study in depth the influence of al-Ghazäli's life, in 
particular his search for true knowledge, on his theories concerning the 
psychological dispositions of man, and attempts to clarify the distinctive 
contribution of his psychological ideas to an understanding of the human 
personality. 
The first chapter presents a discussion of al-Ghazali's life against the 
background of the religious milieu of his time. The second chapter examines 
his a1-Mungidh min al-dalil. The third chapter attempts to provide a general 
outline of al-Ghazäli's teachings and a summary of the approach he adopts in 
his magnum opus Ihys' `u/tun a/-din. In the fourth chapter, an assessment is 
made of the theories of soul of three major Greek philosophers; Plato, Aristotle 
and Plotinus. This is followed by Islamic theories of soul: those found in the 
Qur'an, those of al-Färäbi and Ibn Sinä, and finally al-Ghazäli's theory of soul. 
The final chapter examines briefly al-Ghazäli's concept of happiness and 
attempts to analyse the spiritual dynamic inherent in al-Ghaza f's theory of the 
soul and how this is related to his views on the human personality. 
While much other research has been done on al-Ghazäli's ideas 
concerning the psychological dispositions of man, this study attempts to show 
by detailed argument that al-Ghaz@i's psychology has distinctive features 
which declare his originality. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
This study focuses on the psychological ideas of al-Ghazäli, examining 
also the theories of soul of the Greek philosophers Plato, Aristotle, and 
Plotinus and those of the Muslim philosophers al-Färäbi and Ibn Si: nä. This 
study hopes to clarify the relationship between these theories and to finally 
demonstrate their importance for a coherent view of the human personality, 
revealing particularly the uniqueness of al-Ghazal 's understanding of the 
human personality. 
Al-Ghazälf was an important and outstanding Muslim scholar of the 
medieval period. He was born in 450 A. H/1058 A. D at Tüs in Khurasan and 
died in 505 A. H. /1111 A. D. Al-Ghazälf was one of the religious reformers of 
the Islamic community in the fifth century of the Hifrah. He made important 
contributions in all fields of Islamic teaching: jurisprudence, theology, 
philosophy and Sufism. His works have been spread throughout the world and 
translated into many languages including English, Urdu and Malay. He is 
celebrated in the Islamic world as a scholar and thinker, and his works are 
considered as standard references for Islamic teachings. As this study will 
show, the development of his thought is intimately related to the events of his 
life. It is important to closely examine this relationship in order to discover 
and demonstrate its significance for al-Ghazälf's thought. 
Although many studies have been carried out on the various aspects of 
al-Ghazali's thought, including his philosophical teachings, no systematic 
examination of the psychological aspects of al-Ghazäli s thought has been 
structured in the same way as this study. A major concern of this thesis is to 
explore and describe the extent to which. his own experience influenced his 
psychological theories. To address this question, this study also seeks to 
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discover and demonstrate the similarities between other theories of man as 
regards both their methods of arguments and their ideas and al-Ghazal 's 
psychological theories. This provides a rationale for this study. 
There are indeed several aspects from which the thought of al-Ghazäli 
may be studied: the philosophical, the juristic, the theological, and the 
sufistical. Their various contributions to the teachings of al-Ghazali and to the 
development of his psychological ideas are extremely important. 
The greatest influence on his philosophical teachings has been said to 
be that of the Greek philosophers. Despite this general scholarly opinion, there 
are many aspects which are peculiar to al-Ghazäli, in particular his 
psychological notion of the human soul. What makes his psychology of human 
nature unique is that it is a combination of Greek theories and Qur'anic 
teachings. However, most of the philosophical themes considered by al- 
Ghazäli had already been developed by Greek philosophers. It is important, 
therefore, to research this relationship, to discover and to show the influence of 
Greek theories of soul on al-Ghazäli. 
However, there are distinct differences between al-Ghazälf's notion of 
soul and those of the Greek or even other Muslim philosophers. Indeed al- 
GhazälF criticises the influence of Greek philosophers on Muslim philosophers 
such as al-FäribT and Ibn Si nä. One aim of this thesis is, therefore, to explore 
and clarify the differences between al-GhazälPs notion of the human soul and 
Greek and other philosophers' concerns. In doing so, however, this thesis will 
also highlight and present an analysis of relevant material in order to examine 
the extent to which al-GhazälF's ideas are derived from others. 
The central question here is the extent to which al-Ghazäli departs 
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from the teachings of the Greeks. To address this question, this study will 
compare their methods and their opinions on identical or similar problems. 
There are several aspects from which the thought of these philosophers 
may be studied: the psychological, the political and the metaphysical. Their 
contribution to psychology is extremely important in the development of the 
understanding of the human soul, particularly the perception of the human 
personality. Al-Ghazal played an important role in this respect by combining 
philosophical and doctrinal approaches and by allying rational argumentation 
with revealed knowledge. 
Al-Ghazal sometimes uses similar methods to those of the Greek 
philosophers when discussing problems of psychology. Some of these 
similarities are slight, some great, but on the whole his method is unique and 
his conclusions are sometimes distinctive. With this in mind, this study will 
attempt to discover which aspects of his work best show the distinctiveness of 
al-Ghazal f. It will deal with problems related to the concept of soul such as the 
relationship of body and soul, reason, knowledge, disciplining the soul, 
happiness and the like, examining the relationship of the psychological notion 
of the human being to the perception of human personality, so that the 
importance of the idea of the human soul for the understanding of the 
personality may be comprehended. Thus al-Ghazäl's originality and the 
distinctiveness of his thought will. be made clear. 
This study is structured in the manner of a guide to the understanding 
of various views on soul primarily in order to show the great difference 
between the Islamic perception of the human personality and other, secular, 
concepts of it. Al-Ghaz .l can be considered as an important 
figure in 
understanding the Islamic personality. Emphasis is placed on his concept of 
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soul and his concept of knowledge and how they are combined to form his 
concept of human personality. 
MODERN SCHOLARSHIP ON THE SUBJECT: (Secondary Sources) 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no recent systematic study of at- 
Ghazäl's theory of soul in the manner and on the scale presented in this thesis. 
The various discussions to be found are somewhat summary and may serve to 
provide a background to the study of the thought of al-Ghazal on 
psychological matters. 
In 1970 Majid Fakhry published his excellent A History of Islamic 
Philosophy, in which he includes a discussion on al-Ghazäif's refutation of 
Neo-Platonism. The section begins with a discussion on al-Ghazälf's 
autobiography, al-Mungidh min al-dal. The purpose is to introduce the 
intellectual and spiritual problems which al-Ghazälf had to contend with 
throughout his life. Fakhry then proceeds to the way al-Ghazälf deals with 
Neo-Platonism in his Tahäfut al-falisifa. This shows that al-Munqidh can 
serve as an introduction to the whole of al-Ghazälf's intellectual production. 
A. S. Tritton, in his very useful article on Man, 'Nafs, Rüh, `Aql, which 
can be found in the Bulletin of The School of Oriental and African Studies, 
volume 34,1971,2 includes a paragraph on al-Ghazali's use of the terms rüli, 
nails and galb. He discusses al-Ghazäl%'s use of these terms in different 
contexts. He also devotes a few lines to al-Ghazili's account of a child's 
1 Majid Fakhry, A History Of Islamic Philosophy In Islam, New York and London, 1970. 
Second edition, New York and London, 1987. 
2 A. S. Tritton, "Men, Nafs, Rüh, `AqP, Bulletin Of The School Of Oriental And African 
Strxliesy vol. 34, London, 1971, pp. 491-495. 
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development. 
Mehmet Aydin wrote a significant thesis in 1972 on the subject of 
sa `äda (happiness) according to al-Faräbi and al-Ghazali This thesis deals 
with the meaning and significance of the term in the selected works of the two 
writers. The study begins with an analysis of the meanings and significance of 
the term in pre-Islamic literature, the Qur'an and Tradition. This merely serves 
as a background for the main subject. The term sa `äda is then examined from 
psycho-cosmological, ethico-political and eschatological standpoints. In 
analysing the term as used by al-Färäbi and al-Ghazali, some references are 
made to Greek and Neoplatonic sources. Regarding al-Faräbi, sa`äda is 
examined from the psychological, ethical and social points of view. Discussing 
al-Ghazälf's views, sa`i da is examined in relation to ma`rifa (knowledge), 
ethics and politics, and its opposite, shaqiwa (misery), is also examined. 
In 1975 Hava Lazarus Yafeh brought out her Studies In AI-GhazziIZ4 
This book yields a great deal of information on al-Ghazali. It does provide a 
good background for further study, as it Includes all the major aspects of al- 
Ghazäli studies. This book's main purpose is to show the relationship between 
words and ideas, and to ascertain how much insight into a particular man's 
doctrine can be gained from the study of his style and the literary character of 
his writings. 
A certain amount of information. about al-Ghazäli's concept of man can 
be found in a book written by Muhammad Abul Quasem in 1975 called The 
3 Mehmet Aydin, The Term Sa `ada In The Selected Works OfAI-Firäbi And A! -Gbazil, 
PhD Thesis, Edinburgh University, 1972. 
4 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-GhaaeG, Jerusalem, 1975. 
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Ethics of AI-Gbaz s The discussion concentrates on al-Ghazäli's view of 
human nature and includes a few comparisons in the notes with the views of 
others regarding the nature of man. This is a valuable book on al-Ghazäli's 
ethics that takes into consideration al-Ghazali's psychological ideas. 
Another discussion of al-Ghazäli's ethical concepts can be found in a 
book by Mohamed Ahmed Sherif. His Ghazärs Theory of Virtue, published in 
1975,6 is a valuable contribution to an important aspect of Islamic ethics. The 
author explores in detail the treatment of virtue in al-Ghazali's ethics. Drawing 
on two primary works of al-Ghazäli on ethics, Mizsn a! - `aural and the I iysP 
'ulüm al-din, the author studies al-Ghazäli's theory of virtue from various point 
of view, including the philosophical, the religious-legal, the theological and the 
mystical. In thus dividing al-Ghazäli's virtue, the author necessarily relates the 
discussion to al-Ghazäli's psychological view of the human soul. This book has 
been of great use to the present study. 
Abul Hasan `Ali Nadwf includes a chapter on al-Ghazälf in the first 
volume of his Saviours oflsiamic Spirit, 1976.7 This chapter focuses mainly on 
al-Ghazälf's life with the interpolation of various significant pieces of 
information, among which are a few pages on ethical philosophy and al- 
Ghazälf's critique of self. With regard to the ethical philosophy of al-Ghazälf, 
the author writes a few lines to the effect that al-Ghazälf's ethical philosophy 
discerns the "mysteries of head and heart" and exhibits an acute insight into 
the eternal values of life. Nadwi also devotes a few important pages to the 
Jhyi', agreeing that it is a masterful treatise on ethics in which al-Ghazälf 
S Abul Quasem Muhammad, The Ethics Of A1-Ghazsli, Selangor, Malaysia, 1975. 
6 Mohammed Ahmed Sheriff A1-Ghar. +ilfs" Theory Of Virtue, New York, 1975. 
7 Abul Hasan `Ali Nadwi, Saviou s Oflslamic Spirit, vol. 1, Lucknow, 1976. 
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examines the innate psychological dispositions and impulses actuating ethical 
behaviour. Nadwi's view has been influential on the present thesis, stimulating 
its author to devote a chapter to the Il yä'. Nadwi's purpose is to show that the 
nature of the Ihyä' is actually psychological. As in the pages on the critique of 
self, the author reproduces a long quotation from the Ihys' expounding al- 
Ghazäli's view ofnafs(self). 
M. S. Stern wrote an article Notes On The Theology of Al-Ghazzilt's 
Concept of Repentance which can be found in The Islamic Quarterly, volume 
23, number 1,1979.8 This article's main purpose is to clarify al-Ghazali's 
concept of repentance. Stern touches on other matters related to repentance 
such as salvation, the nature of man, faith and action. He asserts that these 
matters must be properly understood in order to grasp the place of repentance 
in al-Ghazäli's conception. The article shows that al-Ghazäli's psychological 
ideas are a vital element in order to understand his many other conceptions. 
This article shows that repentance is the necessary first (and continuing) stage 
in the quest for personal salvation. 
In 1983 Muhammad Abul Quasem wrote a valuable book entitled 
Salvation of the Soul and Islamic Devotions. 9 In this work, he has justly 
combined both concepts, for the way to salvation is through both faith and 
practice. He devotes more than half of the book to a discussion on the most 
correct methods to perform the devotional acts. The discussion on salvation of 
the soul is based on the Qur'an and Tradition. 
M. S. Stern, "Notes On The Theology Of A1-Ghaual 's Concept Of Repentance", ed. By 
M. A. Zaki Badawi, The Islamic Quarterly, vol. 23, nwn. 1, The Islamic Cultural Centre, 
London, 1979. 
9 Muhammad Abut Quasem, Salvation Of The Soul And Islamic Devotions, London, 1983. 
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In 1984 Sheila McDonough published a study on Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
and Maulani Maudüdi entitled Muslim Ethics and Modernity, A Comparative 
Study of the Ethical Thought ofSayyid Ahmad Khan and Maul-wa Maudfdi10 
In this book she devotes a few pages to al-Ghazäli's ethics. Throughout her 
discussion on both Khan and Maududi she cites al-Ghazali's views for the 
purpose of comparison, and in so doing highlights certain significant points in 
al-Ghazäli's ethics. 
Chapter six of a recent book, Ethical Theories in Islamtt by Majid 
Fakhry, is entitled The Synthesis: Al-Ghazäli (D. 1111). In this chapter Fakhry 
critically and systematically connects al-Ghazäli's ethics to his psychological 
views. He includes a discussion on the soul, happiness and God. Appendix C is 
entitled The Mystical Ideal, or the Quest of God- AI-Ghazni which is a 
translation of the concluding chapter of al-Ghazäli'slizan al-`amal. 
Mohd Zaidi Ismail has written an analytical article on al-Ghazäli's 
theory of certitude, 12 in which he identifies three different levels of certitude in 
al-Ghazält s theory, according to their order of priority. The level of the 
highest degree of intensity is that of the gnostics (al-`arifinn). This level 
consists of two groups, namely al-mugarrabuin and al-, viddigfn. This level 
which involves the state of unveiling (al-mukksha ah), and of spiritual tasting 
(dhawq), is that of the transcendental prophetic spirit (al-rfih al-qudsi al- 
nabawl). But according to al-Ghazält , the 
intensity of individual experience at 
this level varies. The second level is that of the theologians. This level involves 
10 Sheila McDonough, Muslim Ethics And Modernily, A Comparative. Study Of The Ethical 
Theory of Sayyid Abroad Kban And Maulana Maudbdi, Canada, 1984. 
!1 Majid Fakhry, Ethical Theories In Islam, New York, 1991. 
12 Mohd Zaidi Ismail, "Logic In A1-Ghazäli's Theory Of Certitude", AI-Shajarah, vol. 1, 
nos. land 2,1996, pp. 95-125. 
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reasoning (istidläl) and the use of syllogism (giyäs) regarding the possibility of 
such mystical states. Finally, the lowest level of certitude according to al- 
Ghazalf's theory is that of the common people, which is faith (imam). Ismail 
relates these levels of certitude to the internal conflicts in al-Ghazälf's life. 
Ismail also shows that, in al-Ghazalf's framework, knowledge, certitude and 
truth are synonymous. This article is a comprehensive, analytical and critical 
survey of al-Ghazälf's theory of certitude. 
The most recent article regarding al-Ghazäli's epistemology is by 
Mustafa Mahmoud Abu Sway. 13 It concerns the development of al-Ghazäli's 
theory of knowledge, and details the different stages in al-Ghazäli's 
epistemology covering the years from al-Ghazäli's student days until the end 
of his life. This article tries to prove that al-Ghazäli's epistemology is 
consistently ýüff in essence. Al-Ghazäli always acknowledged the limited 
capability of reason and held that 'unveiling' (k8sh4 is the only means of 
attaining indubitable transcendental knowledge. According to Sway, this can 
be seen in al-GhazälPs various works, among which he particularly mentions 
the Ihyä , Bidäyat al-hidäya, Jawshir al-Qur'an, al-Risäla a1-laduniyya, and 
Mishkit al-anwar. This article tries to argue that the claim that al-Ghazali 
abandoned Sufism as the path to true knowledge and adopted the method of 
the traditionalists during the last years of his life is questionable. Sway 
contends that at-Ghazal[ continued to accept the superiority of stiff knowledge 
over that which is attained by conventional means, bringing forward as 
evidence those works written during the last stage of al-Ghazäli's life, such as 
a/-Durrah al-fakhirah, IJjsm a! - `awwäm an `Jim al-kalim, and 
Mirrhai al- 
`ibidtn. The writer of this article concludes that those who claim that al- 
Ghazäli abandoned Sufism in his final days have little basis for their argument. 
13 Mustafa Mahmoud Abu Sway, "The Development in al-Ghazäli's Epistemology", 
Intellectual Discorose 1994, voL 2, No. 2, pp. 167-176. 
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Another recent article on al-Ghazäli has been written by Massimo 
Campanini. 14 This article attempts to assess al-Ghazal 's place in the history of 
Islamic Philosophy. In this article, Campanini brings together several points 
from various works of al-Ghazali. These relate to strictly philosophical 
questions and are highlighted and analysed. Campanini finds common ground 
between them and connects them with al-Ghazäli's general philosophical 
inquiry. This article provides much information on al-Ghazäli's conception of 
rationality in two major areas: the philosophical and the mystical. Campanini 
also includes a few well-considered lines regarding the Ihyä' `uhim al-Xin in 
this article. 
SOURCES: 
This research is based mainly on primary sources which are in printed 
form. Regarding al-Ghazali himself, this thesis relies on his published works. 
a) AI-Munqidh min a1-da/i1 was written in about 502 A. H. / 1108 A. D. It is 
not, precisely speaking, an autobiographical work and it has been argued that it 
is not an accurate chronological record of events. Its contents, however, are 
arranged schematically according to the development of al-Ghazäli's thought. 
In the introduction al-Ghazäli writes that his intention was to answer the 
questions asked of him by his community. His aim was to show them the 
inmost nature of the Islamic Sciences and the perplexing depths of the 
religious systems. He explains how he tried to free himself from second-hand 
faith (tagrd) and describes the difficulties he faced in his search for truth 
caused by the confusion of contending sects. 
14 Massimo Campanini, "A1-Gha2mli ", History OfIslamfc Philosophy edited by Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman,, vol. 1, Part 1, London, 1996, pp. 258-274. 
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b) Ih-i' `ulrfm al-&n, the major work of al-Ghazäli, was written in about 492 
A. H. / 1098 A. D. This is his greatest work in respect of its length, the 
importance of its contents, and its influence. Al-Ghazäli divides the Ihyä' into 
four volumes devoted to different themes. The first volume deals mostly with 
religious practices (`ibidah), the second specifically considers social customs 
( `ädit), the third concerns those vices or faults of character that lead to 
perdition (muhlikst), and the fourth discusses the virtues or qualities leading to 
salvation (munjy t). Each volume contains ten books which are divided into 
chapters (sing. bib) and subdivided into expositions (sing. bayen). Thus the 
lhys'contains forty books in four major volumes. However this thesis mostly 
draws on books `Ajä'ib al-qalb and Riyädat al naA., which deal specifically 
with the subject of the research. 
c) Bidiyal al-hidiyah was written during al-Ghazälf's period of retirement 
between the years 488-499 A. H / 1095-1106 A. D. It is considered as an 
introduction to the Ihyi. This is because it covers one aspect of the teachings 
that can be found in the Ihyi. This book contains what is necessary for all 
Muslims concerning social customs and religious practices. 
For al-Ghazili's views on the psychological dispositions of man, three of his 
published works have been consulted. These were also written during al- 
Ghazili's retirement. 
d) Kimiys-i sa `ädah was written originally in the Persian language. The 
contents of this book are similar to those of the Ihys, and so the Kimiyä is 
sometimes regarded as al-Ghazäli's own translation of the Ihyä' into Persian. 
This thesis refers only to the first part of this book, which specifically concerns 
the psychological aspect of the human being and the ways to gain happiness. 
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e) AI-Risäla al-laduniyya is a short treatise in which can be found al-Ghazali's 
theory of knowledge. It includes al-Ghazali's discussion on `ilm al-ladun7 that 
is, knowledge that comes from above. He relates the discussion on nafs with 
knowledge. 
f) Mishkät a/--anwär discusses the proposition that happiness only can be 
achieved by dedicating sincerely both `i/m and `amal to God. Al-Ghazal 
gathers in this book certain verses of the Qur'an and traditions of the Prophet 
(p. b. u. h. ), as well as the sayings of the saints and the scholars. He infers from 
all these what must be done to bring human hearts to obey and yearn towards 
God, declaring that, in order to achieve the state of tranquility regarding God, 
man has to abandon the pleasures of this world and strive towards the joys of 
the hereafter. 
Almost all of al-Ghazäli's views on the psychological dispositions of man can 
be found in these three books, all of which make some use of the methods of 
philosophical discussion. 
Although the complete range of al-Ghazali's works has also been 
consulted in order to glean more detailed information, the above list comprises 
the main sources used in the study. 
In order to discuss the Greek theories of soul, the major works of each 
philosopher have been consulted: Plato's Republic, Phaedo, Epinomis, Meno, 
Timaeus, Republic, Laws, Philebus, and Phaedrus, Aristotle's De Anima, Dc 
Generation Animalium, Nrchomachean Ethics, and Politics, and Plotinus' 
main work Enneads The major works of the Muslim Neoplatonists have also 
been consulted: they are al-Färäbi'sAri' ahl al-madinah al-15dlla and Ibn Si na s 
Kitib al najit. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. A1-Ghazäli's Background 
A short consideration of the historical context of al-Ghazäli's life is 
needed in order to gain an insight into his background. The subsequent 
discussion of three major elements i. e. the political and social aspects, and his 
early education, is significant for a better understanding of this study. His way 
of thought owed much to these issues, and al-Ghazäli's life reflects the 
development of his thought. Hence, it is vital to probe deeper into his 
background in order to witness the development of his thought processes and 
also to see how he finally reaches his discussion on soul. 
1.1. Political Background 
Al-Ghazäli's life spanned an era of great political turmoil during the 
fifth Century of Hijrah. His birth came just three years after the Turkish 
Saljügs had come to power in 447 A. H. /1055 A. D. ' The Saljügs were a 
powerful dynasty whose rule was to heavily influence the life and eventual fate 
of al-Ghazäli. Another dominating factor over his life, was the magnetism of 
the Vizier of Alp Arslan (Toghril Begs' successor) named Nizäm al-Mulk (d. 
408-485 A. H. 11018-1092 A. H. ). As a man with great respect for knowledge, 
he relied on the fugahä' (scholar jurists) and Islamic leaders in daily matters. 
He was well acquainted with the ýüff ý and their mystical Islamic beliefs and 
practices in which Muslims seek to find divine love and knowledge through 
direct personal experience of God. Further discussion on the derivation of the 
Dominique Sourdel, Medievallslam translated by J. Montgomery Watt, p. 151. See also, 
Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and The Age of the Calipbate: ý p. 349. 
2 Ibn Khallikän, Klub wafayät aba`yan vol. 1, p. 212. 
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word "Sufism" will follow in the next chapter. He was also a known supporter 
of the Sunnite branch of Islam. 
3 The period of al-Ghazäli's scholarship was 
greatly affected by long disputes between the Shiites and the Sunnites, 
especially during the Buyid period (334-451 A. H. /A. D. 945-1059). 4 Problems 
were also apparent created by the Ash'arites and the 1; Ianbalites, especially at 
the beginning of the Saljüq periods, and later by the Isma'ul s whose 
disruptions actually outlived al-Ghazäli himself. 
With regard to theology, Nizäm al-Mulk supported and promoted the 
Ash'arite creed. 6 However prior to the Saljnq conquest, Baghdad was under the 
rule of the Shiite Buyid Sultans and during this period, the Sunnite scholar 
jurists found themselves lacking in influence and power. This dependency on 
rulers and government persisted and remained so after the 447 A. H. /1055 A. D. 
conquest, bringing with it the inevitable consequence of the submission of the 
scholar jurists to the politicians' disease of worldliness and materialism. 7 Al- 
Ghazälf later became a known critic of this secular influence. 
As a leading scholar of his time, al-Ghazalf campaigned for the return 
of people to the teaching of the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad 
(p. b. u. h. ). He studied the Ismi'ili s' doctrines and tried hard to find the 
knowledge of truth from them, but was persistently unable to accept their 
3 The Shifi'ite legal school. See Dominique Sou del, Medievallsla i translated by J. 
Montgomery Watt, p. 45. 
4 Buyid was a major dynasty in medieval Islamic History which flourished in Persia and 
Iraq between 320/932 and 454/1062. Ethnically they were Daylamites; religiously they 
were Shiite, possibly of the Zaydi persuasion. The Buyids entered Baghdad in 334/945 
and held a sway there until the advent of the Saljtgs in 447/1055. See Ian Richard 
Netton, A Popular Dictionary in Islam, pp. 60-61. 
S Dominique Sourdel, Medievallslam, translated by J. Montgomery Watt, p. 184. 
6 Ibid, p. 45. 
7 W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim lotelle+ctuai p. 132 
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beliefs. His explanation of this can be found in his book al-Munqidh min al- 
daisiwhich will be further investigated in Chapter Two together with further 
study into the opinion that he was effecting an affiliation between Sunnite 
legalism and s5ri mysticism! 
1.2 Social Background 
During al-Ghazali's lifetime, the social fabric of Baghdad was a 
complex mixture of races including Arabs, Persians, Turks and Kurds. At this 
time, the city experienced a period of great educational prosperity specifically 
among the people of Baghdad, but also more generally throughout the Muslim 
World. The development in education covered various fields of study such as 
tafsir (exegesis), hadith (tradition), figh (Islamic jurisprudence), philosophy 
and logic. Schools were built, including two famous ones in Baghdad9 and in 
Ni shäpür. The individual behind this development of knowledge was Ni? am al- 
Mulk10 the previously mentioned Vizier appointed by Alp Arslan in 455 
A. H. /1063 A. D. Through the education system, the Sunnite creed was upheld 
and propagated. " 
Despite this development of knowledge, the problem of worldliness of 
the scholar jurists persisted as did increasing incidents of individuals using 
religion as a tool to gain influential positions in government and society. To 
y ofMedievallslaw, p. 160, p. 197. J. J. Saunders, A Ilistor 
9 The Nizimiyya was the first school in Baghdad. See Dominique Sourdel, Medievallslam 
translated by J. Montgomery Watt, p. 151. It was the most well known of schools and 
institutions at that time and was named after Nizim al-Mulk to whom it was dedicated 
in 1067 A. D. See J. J. Saunders, A History ofMedievallslam, p. 151. 
10 Dominique Sourdel, Medieval Islam, translated by J. Montgomery Watt, p. 148. See also, 
Ibn Kballikän, vol. 1, p. 212. 
1 J. J. Saunders, A History ofMedievallslams p. 151. 
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some extent this negative environment affected al-Ghazali, who remained 
preoccupied and more concerned with the internalisation of religion. He 
abandoned his career as a scholar jurist and opted for total seclusion, a decision 
which is justified in his criticism of the scholar jurists in his book 1#yä' 'uhun 
al-din. Pious people, especially among the sf s, have always disparaged 
scholar jurists for their concern with the external elements of Islamic Law. A 
good indication of this centres around the debate pertaining to levels of 
concentration during prayer whereby physical requirements may be fulfilled 
but a satisfactory answer cannot be provided to questioning about levels of 
sincerity and hypocrisy. They were also known to provide unnecessary details 
when consulted about issues surrounding divorce. 12 
1.3 The Background of al-Ghazäli's Education and His Life: 
Al-Ghazali's full name was Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Muhammad 
b. Ahmad, al-Imrim al-Kabir Abü Hämid al-Ghazäli Hujjat al-Islitn. He was 
born in Tüs, a small town in Khurasan, in the year 450 A. H. /1058 A. D. 13 He 
had one brother, Alunad14, who later became a distinguished mystic and 
several sisters. Al-Ghazäli came from a scholarly and intellectual family; due 
to his cousin and the paternal uncle of his father, who taught law (figh) to al- 
Farmädhi (d. 477 A. H. / 1084 A. D. ), later to become al-Ghazälf's teachers 
Al-Ghazal-Ps father was a poor and pious Muslim, who despite not 
12 Abu- Himid al-Ghiizi , Kitib al -`ih J yi"Uhin &a1-oz; voL 
1, p. 32, Eng. trans. by 
Nabih Amin Faris, TheBook ofKnowledge, pp. 50-51, see also, W. Montgomery Watt, 
Muslim, p. 113. 
13 Al-Sublä, Tabagät, voL 6, p. 193. 
14 For some of his writings, see the next chapter. 
15 Al-Sublä, Tabagat, voL 4, p. 89. 
17 
being a scholar himself, regularly attended lectures in the mosques. He worked 
in the market at Tus16 as a wool seller and some authors also claim as a wool 
spinner. According to W. Montgomery Watt in his book, Muslim Intellectual, 
this information can be discredited as it is based on an inference of the less 
probable spelling and derivation of the named Ghazali 7 Furthermore, there 
has been much discussion relating to whether his nisba should be Ghazili or 
Ghazzili 18 
Although his father died when he was young, al-Ghazali's mother was 
still alive and living in Baghdad to observe her son's success as a famous 
scholar. This success can be partially credited to the foresight of his father who 
was anxious to ensure that his sons benefited from a good education and to this 
end he entrusted part of his estate to a ý56 friend to secure this 19 
Under this *üfi guardianship, al-Ghazal received an early education on 
the Qur'an, hadth, stories of ýüfii saints and their spiritual states? ° It is likely 
that from this trustee al-Ghazäli received his first knowledge about Sufism. 
As youngsters, al-Ghazäli and his brother attended a free school. While 
Ahmad's interest lay in mysticism, al-Ghazäli initially concentrated more on 
ftgh, learning from Ahmad al-Radhkani at Tus? ' At a later date he went to 
Jurjän and studied under al-Imäm Abu Nasr-Isma'ili (d. 487 A. H. /1094 A. D. ) Z2 
16 Ibid, vol. 6, p. 193. 
17 W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim; p. 20. 
is For details see ibid, pp. 181-183. 
19 Al-S ubki , Tabagit, vol. 
6, p. 193-194. 
20 Abul Quasen, The Ethics ofAI-Ghazuli, p. 16. 
21 Al-S ubki , Tabeget, vol. 
6, p. 195. 
22 Ibid 
is 
It was here that he was married at the age of twenty. (His wife's name is not 
known). On his return from Jurjän, al-Ghazali associated himself with a süfi 
at Tüs named Yüsuf al-Nassäj. 24 
In 470 A. H. /1077A. D., al-Ghazäli travelled to Ni shäpur to attend a 
series of lectures by Abu Ma`i al-Juwayni (d. 478 A. H. / 1085 A. D. ), who 
was also known as Imam al-Haramayn (The Imam of the Two Sanctuaries, i. e. 
Mecca and Medina) 25 A renowned scholar of this time, al-Juwayni and his 
fellows soon recognised the genius of al-Ghazhli . 
His high level of intelligence 
enabled him to understand various sciences and theories relating to theology, 
logic, philosophy, dialectics and jurisprudence, particularly those from the 
Shaft ite school. However, it was al-Juwayni who introduced al-Ghazäli to the 
theology of the Ash `ante school. 
Whilst referring to al-Ghazali's vast understanding and knowledge of 
issues, the Imam described him as "a sea to be drawn into". 26 It was during his 
time as a student of al-Juwayni, that al-Ghazal began to deeply consider the 
controversial and theological questions of Islam. He initially started to 
question himself about the knowledge of truth27 as he learned about mysticism 
23 Margaret Smith, Al-GbazW the Mystic, p. 55. 
24 W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim, p. 133. 
25 Al-Subki, Tabaget, vol. 6, p. 196. 
26 Ibid. 
17 As al-Ghazili drew near the age of adolescence, he began to question the truth about 
knowledge. He defined a true knowledge as'Imowledge in which the object is disclosed 
in such a fashion that no doubt remains along with it, that no possibility of error or 
illusion accompanies it, and that the mind cannot even entertain such a supposition. 
Certain knowledge must also be infallible; and this infallibility or security from error is 
such that no attempt to show the falsity of the knowledge can occasion doubt or denial, 
even though the attempt is made by someone who turns stones into gold or a rod into a 
serpent. ' See, Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, aI Mungldh min al-dalit pp. 58-59; tr. by W. 
Montgomery Watt, The Faith And Practice ofAl-Ghazal, pp. 19-20. 
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from a professor of jurisprudence, al-Farmädhi, at Ni shäpüg but his 
scepticism was restrained by the influence of his devoted Miff teacher al- 
Juwayni. After whose death in 478 A. H. /1058 A. D, al-Ghazali headed to the 
camp-court of Nizim al-Mulk, the powerful Vizier of the Turkish Sultan, who 
ruled the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad 29 
He was welcomed with honour and respect by Ni-Tarn al-Mulk, 3o who 
supported Sunni Islam and remained under his favour for about six years, 
during which time he became well known among scholars for his excellence in 
disputation and expression in Islamic Sciences. This recognition of talent and 
his superiority led to his appointment in 484 A. H/1091A. D., as a Professor at 
Nimiyya College in the capital Baghdad . 
31 He taught in the college for four 
years32 and his lectures were well attended even by students from outside the 
capital. It was at this time that he experienced a two month period of absolute 
scepticism in his search for the knowledge of truth in his awareness of various 
doctrines. 
In order to discover the method of knowing the Truth, his study became 
centred around four focal points: the theologians (who maintain the dogmatic 
theology as founded by al-Ash`an'j; 3, the philosophers, the Ta`rmites [the 
28 Abul Quasem, The Ethics ofA1--Gbh p. 17. 
29 Al-Sublä, Tabagit, vol. 6, p. 196. 
30 Ibid, p. 205. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, p. 197. 
33 Al-Ash`ari, Abu 3-Hasan `Ali, famous theologian who belonged to the Shill `i Madbbab. 
He was born at Basra in the year 260 A. H. (873-874 A. D. ). He spent the closing 
years of his life in Baghdad and died there in the year 324 A. H. (935 A. D. ). Al-Ash`ari 
enjoys the credit of having overcome the antipathy of the older Muslim scholars to 
dialectic in articles of faith by his successful utilisation of it to combat the 
Mu`tazilites and the chiefs of other sects who were suspected of heresy. He composed a 
large number of works of a dogmatic and polemic nature but only a few of them have 
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party of authoritative instruction (ta`Iim) also known as the Bätinites or 
Ismi`i lisr4 and the snfi s. He finally concluded with the beliefs of Sufism and 
was convinced of its ways in seeking for truth. 35 
It was during his spiritual crisis, that al-Ghazäli also fought with his 
desire. He was caught in a struggle between the voice of his imrin (faith), 
calling for him to abandon his worldly life and the whispering of evil desire not 
to lose it. This conflict lasted for six months and his scepticism affected his 
health so badly that he was unable to give lectures because his speech had 
become obstructed. His illness was exacerbated with his stomach's inability to 
digest food and physicians could give no medical diagnosis for his ailment. 
Instead they claimed that the problem was centred around his heart, which held 
the only solution to a successful cure. Eventually, al-Ghazäli prayed to God, 
the Almighty with total submission and finally God convinced him to abandon 
his worldly position. 36 
been preserved. The work al-Ibiaa `an uszil al-diyina was printed with three 
supplements at Haiderabad in 1321 A. H. (1903 A. D. ) or 1348 A. H. His other famous 
work is the Risila fi istihsan al-khawd fi 7-Kali Hyderabad, 1979. See W. 
Montgomery Watt, "Al-Ash`ari, Abu 7-Hasan `Ali", in the Encyclopaedia of Islamr, vol. 
1, pp. 694-695. His other books of theology are Kiteb al-Luma`B 7-radd `ala ahl al- 
zaigh w. 0-bids', Beirut, 1952 and Magelit al-Islimiyyiq Istanbul, 1928. The 
translation and the Arabic text for the Risela 17istihsin and Kitäb al-Lana` can be 
found in the book by Richard J. McCarthy, S. J., The Theology ofAl-Ash `ad, Beyrouth, 
1953. He translated the Risila under the title A Vindication of the Science ofK, lim and 
the Luna` under the title Highlights ofthe Polemic Against Deviators And Innovators. 
The "jib al--ibäna was translated by W. C. Klein, The Elmidation oflslamic 
Foundation, (American Oriental Series, 191 American Oriental Society, New Haven, 
Connecticut, 1940. There is an extended review of this translation by William Thomas, 
"Al-Asha`ari And His AL-Ibiinah", The Moslem World, xxxii (1942), pp. 242-260. 
34 They held the belief that truth is to be attained not by reason but by accepting the 
declarations of the infallible Imim. See W. Montgomery Watt, Introduction to The 
Fait4 p. 13. 
The Faith and Practice ofAl-Gbiziff is the translation of both al-Mtmgidh and Bidiyat 
al-hidiyab wa tabdh b an-nufus bi 1-adib al-shad'& The latter presents one angle of 
teaching in the Ihyi; namely religious practice and conduct in social relationships which al- 
Ghiziif set up as an ideal. 
)S Abu- Hämid a1-Ghli, al-Mimgidr p. 55; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, p. 17. 
36 Abu- iiämid a1-Ghäzi , al-Mungid4 
(MR) pp. 60-61; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
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Al-Ghazäli responded to this call and left for Damascus in 488 
A. R. /1095 A. D, although some writers claim he first went on haj 37 His initial 
reason for giving up teaching was thought to be due to the fear that he could 
not avoid living in the same worldly environment of other scholar jurists of his 
time. So, leaving enough money to support his family, (he had only daughters 
and nothing is known about his wife or wives)38 he abandoned all of his 
properties and possessions and devoted his life fully to the practice of Sufism. 
He disappeared into the minaret of the mosque at Damascus to be alone to 
perform prayers and for contemplation. He lived in poverty as a ýllfl 
39 whilst 
writing his greatest work, the J yä' 40 and it was during this period that he 
visited Jerusalem and then he went to Mecca to perform pa-(j. 41 
In 499 A. H. /1106 A. D. he returned to Ni shäptr largely due to the 
realisation that it was his responsibility to teach the knowledge of God to man. 
He resumed his position at the Ni? amiyya College after accepting the 
Faith, pp. 60-61. 
37 Al-Subkf, Tabagit, vol. 6, p. 197. 
38 Al-Ghazsli was a father but nothing is known about the exact number of his children. In 
the'kunyd Abu- Hämid suggested that he had at least a son. See Margaret Smith, Al- 
Ghaz ll the Mystic, p. 57. He was outlived by three daughters and a wife. See Margaret 
Smith, Al-Ghazef the Mystic, p. 59-60. In al-Mungidh min al-4lalel (Deliverance From 
Error) al-Ghaz7ali sometimes mentioned his children. This suggests that he was very 
concerned for his children. Before he departed from Baghdad to Damascus, after the 
decision to retire, he stated that he had reserved some money for himself and for the 
sustenance of his children. See Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, al-Mungidh, p. 100; tr. by W. 
Montgomery Watt, TheFaith p. 61. Again, while he was in Hijäz during his 
retirement, he said that the call of his children was one of the reasons that drew him 
back to his country. See Abu- liiimid al-Gbazeli, al-Mrmgidb, p. 101; tr. by Watt, The 
Faith, p. 62. 
39 A1-Subki, Tsbagit, vol. 6, p. 197. 
40 Ibld, p. 206. 
41 Abi Hämid aI-Gbazäli, al-Mungidh, pp. 100-101; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Fai14 p. 62, see also al-Sublä, Tabagit, vol. 6, p. 200, see also W. Montgomery Watt, 
Muslii pp. 144-147. 
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invitation of Fakhr-al-Mulk (the son of Nizäm-al-Mulk), who was the Vizier of 
Sanjar, as well as the Saljukid ruler of Khuräsän. His teachings were largely 
centred around the subjects discussed in the Ihyi Al-Ghazäli has told us 
about his return in a! -Mungidh. He wrote: 
I believed that it was permissible for me in the 
sight of God to continue in retirement on the 
ground of my inability to demonstrate the truth 
by argument. But God Most High determined 
Himself to stir up the impulse of the sovereign 
time, though not by any external means; the 
latter gave me strict orders to hasten to Naysabur 
(N shäpür) to tackle the problem of this 
lukewarmness in religious matters. So strict was 
the injunction that, had I persisted in disobeying 
it, I should at length have been cut off! I came to 
realise, too, that the grounds which had made 
retirement permissible had lost their force. 'It is 
not right that your motive for clinging to 
retirement should be laziness and love of ease, 
the quest for spiritual power and preservation 
from worldly contamination. It was not because 
of the difficulty of restoring men to health that 
you gave yourself this permission' 42 
Ai-Ghazäli referred his dilemma to his fellow ,s 
ifi s who encouraged him to 
come out of retirement. It was his consistent belief that religious knowledge 
42 Abu- Hämid aI-Ghazäli, sl-Mungidli p. 114; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFaita 
pp. 80-81. 
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was fundamental for the achievement of salvation, which brought al-Ghazäli 
back to teaching in order to fulfil his responsibility. He would have had to be 
careful at this time, to avoid seeking worldly gain from religious knowledge, 
especially after spending this period of retirement as a devout ýdff . This can 
be 
traced from his writings on the matter in his Ihye 
An additional reason for his return can be explained by al-Ghazäli's 
conviction, that he was a renewer of the next new century, that is the Sixth 
Islamic Century. He himself described this conviction in his al-Mungidh: 
My resolution was further strengthened by 
numerous visions of good men in all of which 
alike I was given the assurance that this impulse 
was a source of good, was genuine guidance, and 
had been determined by God Most High for the 
beginning of this century; 43 
This belief was further substantiated by the saying of the Prophet 
Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ), that God would send a reviver of religion (mujaddid) at 
the beginning of the new centuryAlthough to some extent, this could be 
what caused him to resume teaching, his main conviction remained to be his 
realisation of the importance of knowledge that made him feel obliged to come 
back. 
Finally, he returned to his hometown, Tüs, where he founded a school 
or madrasa for the scholars of fiqh and also a hostel (khangäh) for ýitfi 
43 Abu- Hämid at-Ghazäli, al-Mwgidh, p. 81; tr. by Watt, The Faith p. 115. 
44 See Abn Dawod, Sulaymän ibn al-Ash` ath, Sam AbI Diwud, Klub a! -ma/Wm, bib 
(category) 1, voL 3, p. 113. 
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disciples. His teachings centred round theoretical and practical ways of süfi 
life and his time was divided between discussions with scholars, meeting with 
ýiff s and worshipping God45 He proceeded with this kind of life until his final 
day. After his death on Monday, the fourteenth of Jumädä II, 505 A. H. /18 
December 1111 A. D. at Tns he was buried at or outside Tabran, the citadel of 
Tus46 
Al-Ghazali left a massive intellectual legacy. Although he wrote 
approximately one hundred books, the greatest work was Ihyä' `alum al-din, 
which was published in four volumes. This title is renowned among today's 
Muslims for its complete guide to devotion, encompassing every aspect of 
religious life. Most of his books have been translated into various languages 
such as English, Spanish, Malay, French and German. 
Many Western Scholars have become interested in his works, and 
among them an appreciation for his work as a philosopher has developed. This 
interest is particularly centred round two titles, Magasid ai-falasifa (The Aim 
of the Philosophers) and the Tahafut al-falasifa. The first book contains 
explanations on topics such as philosophy, logic, metaphysics and physics, 
whereas Tahäfut al-falsifa proffers rejections and critiques of the 
philosophers' doctrines that appear in Magäsid al-falisifa. These rejections can 
be summarised in three major doctrines of the philosophers: the assertion that 
the world is everlasting, the denial that God knows particulars and the denial 
of bodily resurrection which will be further discussed in Chapter Two. 
45 A1-Subin, Tabagt!, voL 6, p. 210. See also, Ibn Khatlikin, Kittb wafayit alba'yin, voL 1, 
p. 650. 
46 Al-Sublä, Tabagit, voL 6, p. 211, see also Duncan McDonald, The Life ofa/-Ghazi1, p. 
107. 
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Tahsfut al-faläsifa was later criticised by Ibn Rushd (520-595 
A. H. /1126-1198 A. D. ) in his book titled Tahäfut al-tahsfut. 47 Ibn Rushd 
suggests how al-Ghazäli wrongly misinterpreted the doctrines of the 
philosophers. Al-Ghazäli in his approach to the science of philosophy actually 
emphasised the feeling of hissiyat as being beyond reason or the rational. Al- 
Ghazali: admitted the role of a "light from God" (hidiyah) in order to reach the 
truth. He portrayed the limit of reason and its inability to comprehend the 
absolute and the infinite. Al-Ghazäli was also preoccupied with the philosophy 
of Socrates and Aristotelian logic. He described the science of logic in detail 
and organised the science of kaum in a distinctive way that illustrated his 
high intelligence. He also attempted to decrease the negative influences of 
Aristotelianism and excessive rationalism. Al-Ghazäli regarded philosophy as 
having six sciences, namely mathematics, logic, natural sciences, theology (or 
metaphysics), politics and ethics. 48 Al-Ghazäli, in his struggle with philosophy, 
actually succeeded in giving theology a philosophical foundation. With regard 
to filth, he was able to include logic in his examination of legal issues and with 
his clarity of thought and validity of argument, he was able to create a balance 
between religion and reason. Factors including his explanation of the benefits 
of the acts of devotion will be further explained in Chapter Three. 
Al-Ghaziili was a trained theologian and scholar jurist and indeed he 
engaged in teaching Bqh while he was staying in Baghdad. However in his 
quest for truth during his period of scepticism, he abandoned his career as a 
41 Tabifut al-tabslul (ed. by Dr. Sulaimin Dunya, Dir a1-Ma`irif, 1964) was written by 
Abn'l-Wai d Muhammad Ibn Abmad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Rushd, famous among Westerners 
as Averroes. He was born at Cordoba in 520 A. H. /1126 A. D. and died at Marrakech in 595 
A. H. / 1198 A. D. Ibn Rushd was a scholar of the Qusanic sciences and the natural sciences 
(physics, medicine, biology, astronomy), theologian and philosopher. There is a translation 
in German by Horton, M. Max, Tablfut al-tahifut (German), Marcus and Webers, 1913. 
49 Abn Hämid al-Ghazäli, a1-Mtmgidb (MR), pp. 38-44; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Fait& pp. 33-39. 
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scholar jurist and in his writings Ihye' `uhim al-ifin criticised other scholar 
jurists of this time, who were willing to work under worldly rulers. Al-Ghazäli 
in Ihys' tried to show how implicitly the science of law (figh) actually dealt 
with the hereafter. 
Concerning the science of kau m (theology), al-Ghazalf recognised the 
Ash `ante creed but also agreed with the mutakallimün, whose defence of the 
creed of ahl al-senna was based on the Qur'an and Sunnah. However, the 
science of kalrim could not help him to explain the truth that he was seeking, 
due to its understanding of reason and the way that the rationality of people 
can differ accordingly. He also studied the creed of the Ismä'f lis in order to 
familiarise himself with their doctrines and satisfy his opinion that they were 
in conflict with Sunnite Islam. He was then better able to refute them. 
Al-Ghazali's final move to Sufism came after he was unable to find 
suitable answers from his study of theology, philosophy and the Isma' lis. 
However, this discovery and realisation of Sufism as the way for Truth did not 
make him abandon other branches of science, so much as make him realise 
their limitations. 49 To substantiate this view, al-Ghazali was known to have 
used Aristotelian logic that he had learned from the theological works of Ibn 
Sfnä, suggesting that he encompassed a philosophical methodology to some 
extent. He realised that theology was a guard for the true faith but in order to 
learn the sweetness of closeness to God, and know the ultimate truth, Sufism 
was the best way as it represented both theoretical and practical teachings. 
According to al-Muagidlr, al-Ghazäli began his study of Sufism after 
completing his studies in theology, philosophy and the Ismä`ilis50 However, 
49 W Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, p. 118 
so Abü Hamid al-Ghazi , sl-Mungidh, p. 
95; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 
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we now know that al-Ghazäli was familiar with Sufism as a child. We can 
trace this back to his early years, when al-Ghazäli and his brother Almad were 
left under the supervision of a ýüfi guardian after their father's deaths' It is 
also widely accepted that while he was a student at Tüs, he used to meet with 
his spiritual director, Yüsuf al-Nassäj to whom he narrated his dreams 52 
In Nishäptir, al-Juwaynr was a theologian and a süfi and his 
Jurisprudence lecturer, al-FarmädhF was a recognised snfi leader also at 
NFshapür53 Al-GhazälF was probably not a practising s at that time and it 
was not until after his breakdown that his devotion became a süfr reality. We 
can infer this from the writing of his largest work the Jhyä'which was written 
during his retirement. In it he taught that the observances of the inner sufi stic 
meanings of all the duties prescribed in shari'a law are the foundation of real 
sufi stic practices. 
Al-Ghazäli was more inclined towards jurisprudence or sha 'a law 
during his early education, most probably because he was not a real practising 
ýüfi' at this time. A reading of the Mungidb can lead us to the conclusion that 
perhaps during this time, he did not consider all the inner aspects of shad 'a law 
in his conduct. This essentially caused the fear of his worldliness that led to his 
abandonment of his professorship at the Nizämiyya College after the nervous 
breakdown incident This point will be further discussed in Chapter Two. 
56. 
si A1-Subkf, Tabagit, vol. 6, p. 193. 
52W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim, p. 133. 
53 lbid, p. 134. 
54 Al-Gbazslf realized that his activities in teaching did not contribute to the attainment of 
eternal life. His motive in his teaching was not purely for God, rather it was the desire for 
an influential position and public recognition. See Abu Himid al-Ghazal f, abMungidl, 
(MR), p. 59; it by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, pp. 
58-59. 
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When al-Ghazäli turned to Sufism, he approached it from an 
intellectual angle in the hope of studying in greater depth. He began by reading 
the works of great ýüfi's such as Abi Talib al-Makkir (d. 386 A. H. /996 A. D. ) 
and al-Harith a1-Mubasibi (d. 243 A. H. /857 A. D. ), various anecdotes about al- 
Junayd (d. 298 A. H. /910 A. D. ), al-Shibli (d. 334 A. H. /945 A. D. ) and Abu 
Yazid al-Bislami (d. 261 A. H. /875 A. D. ). When he reverted to Sufism, he 
realised that both knowledge and action must go hand in hand. He admitted 
that theory was easy for him55 compared to practice. As he said: 
The intellectual belief was easier to me than the 
practical activity. I began to acquaint myself with their 
belief by reading their books, such as The Food of the 
Hearts by Abu- Talib al-Makki (God have mercy upon 
him), the works of al-Härith al-Mo sibi, the various 
anecdotes about al-Junayd, ash-Shibli" and Abu- Yazi d 
al-Bistäm% (may God sanctify their spirits), and other 
discourses of their leading men. I thus comprehended 
their fundamental teachings on the intellectual side, 
and progressed, as far as is possible by study and oral 
instruction, in the knowledge of mysticism. It became 
clear to me, however, that what is most distinctive of 
mysticism is something which cannot be apprehended 
by study, but only by immediate experience (dhawq- 
literally 'tasting'), by ecstasy and by a moral change. 
He then found the answer he was looking for by becoming a practising 
55 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, &I-Memgidh, p. 95-96; tr. by W. Montgomery Walt, The Faith, 
p. 57 
56 Abn Hsmid al-Ghaziff, &I-Mtmgidk pp. 95-96; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, 
pp. 56-57, see also, W. Montgomery Watt, Muslin; p. 135. 
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süfi and claimed that practical activities consisted of a disconnection of the 
heart from worldly affairs, enabling the heart to remember God ceaselessly. He 
said that the most distinctive element of Sufism was something that could not 
be comprehended by study, but only through immediate experience (dhawq - 
literally 'tasting'), through ecstasy and by moral change. Al-Ghazäli believed 
that moral perfection could only be attained by following the example of süfis 
and by becoming a practising ý5fi himself, he desired first hand experience of 
this. He argued that the true scholar could not be satisfied with the result of 
other people's findings, and thus made every effort to discover truth for 
himself. He became convinced that true religion had to be a matter of personal 
experience, hence the significance of al-Ghazüli's thought which formed the 
basis of his book al-Munqidh min al-da/u. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. Al-Mungidb min al-Va1il(Deliverance from Error) 
Moving on from the general background of al-Ghazäli's life, more 
information about him particularly on his intellectual development can be 
found in his al-Mungidh min al-41a1ä1. This chapter will show how al-Ghazäli 
described the development of his thought. In a! -Mungidh al-Ghazali 
emphasises the importance of personal experience for the attainment of 
certainty. AI-Munqidh also represents al-Ghazäli's inner development. This is 
the significance of a survey of this book. 
(A) A Survey of aJ-Mungidb 
AI-Mungidh min al-daläl wa 1-muw"sil i1s dhi I- `izza wa 1-faul (The 
Deliverer from Error and The Connector to the Possessor of Power and Glory), 
was written by al-Ghazälf when he was over fifty, ' while he was teaching at 
Nfshapür after returning from his retirement. This is clear from his references 
to his other books such as Tahifut al-faläsifa, al-Qistäs al-mustagim, al- 
mustazhir% Maqksid al-falisifa and others. Al-Munqidh tells us much about al- 
Ghazälf, especially his spiritual development: he recounts how he tried to 
search for absolute knowledge or al-`Jim al yagin from the various seekers who 
will be mentioned later. This is what makes it particularly important among al- 
Ghazälf's works. To fully understand al-Ghazälf's teaching the story of his life 
is important, for both his life and his thought can be considered as rooted in his 
own personality. This is why, when he wrote, it was from his own experience. 
Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, al-Maagidh, p. 57; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faitk p. 
18. 
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Al-Ghazäli's experiences affected his way of thinking: by looking at 
his story as set forth in al-Muagidh min al-dalsl, one can see the development 
of his thought. For instance, his journey (rihlah) undertaken early in his life for 
his education, his spiritual crisis stemming from his doubt of the possibility of 
certainty, his solitude and spiritual exercises during his retirement also 
affected his way of thought. His works were the reflection of his past. From his 
early years until his last day, al-Ghazili lived in a scholarly environment. His 
life was busy and devoted to epistemological discussion. The numbers of his 
works show that he never ceased to write and even during his retirement he 
produced his Ihyi'. 
2.1. What Type of Work Is It? 
The Mungidh has been regarded as al-Ghazali's autobiographical work, 
the one that reveals his own experience. He also included his arguments that 
there is a mode of apprehension beyond the intellect. The first sense to be 
created in the human being is touch, followed by sight, hearing, taste, the 
power of distinguishing things (tamyiz) and then the intellect 3 So, according 
to al-Ghazair, the lowest form of human apprehension is the sense of touch 
2 There is a story about al-Ghazi and his note-books. It was recorded that on his way 
back from Jurjan to Tüs, his party was attacked by highway robbers. The robbers took 
from the party everything they had, including al-Ghaz ff's note-books. AI. Ghazi then 
went after the robbers for his note-books, though warned by the chief of the brigands of 
the danger. AI-Ghazili begged the robbers to return his note-books, which could be of 
no value to them. The robbers' chief asked al-Ghazäli : "What are your note-books? " 
Al-Ghazilº explained that they contained notes of lectures he had recently heard and 
represented his knowledge of them. The robber laughed and said, "How can you lay 
claim to this knowledge when we have taken it from you? Being separated from your 
knowledge, you remain without it. " Then he ordered his men to return the note-books to 
al-Ghazälf. Al-Ghazi took the words of the robber as divine guidance. When he 
reached T5s, he devoted himself for three years to study and memorize all the contents 
of his note-books, so that he could not be deprived of his learning again. See A1-Subki, 
Tabagit, vol. 6, p. 195, see also Margaret Smith, A -Ghazsri the Mystic, pp. 13-14. 
Abu- Hämid al-Ghazeli, al-Mtmgidh, pp. 105-106; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, pp. 67-68. 
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(mudrakat al--bass) and the highest is the sense of prophethood (mudrakat an- 
nubuwwah). 
At this stage a person can see what is unseen and know what will 
happen in the future by the will of God. This is the proof of the nature of 
prophecy, that God reveals what will come to the prophet. Al-Ghazäli referred 
to dreams as something, identical with this special faculty of prophecy, which 
God gives to all human beings: in dreams one can see and hear things that are 
actually unseen. He also referred to the experience of ý5ffs when they reach the 
point where they can see what others cannot as the verification that there is 
form of human understanding beyond the intellect, showing that all men have 
the potential ability to attain this state. All these arguments show the 
possibility of prophecy. 4 
Even though al-Mungidh is generally considered as the autobiography 
of al-Ghazali, some have said it is not strictly autobiographical. W. 
Montgomery Watt contends that "a close study shows that al-Ghazäli does not 
always observe strict chronology, but has schematised his description of his 
intellectual development". 5 M. S. Stem describes al-Mungidh as semi- 
° See Abu- Humid al-Ghazälf, a! -MLwgidh, pp. 106-109; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, pp. 68-73. See Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Dreams from Alläh, ' The Way (January 2000), 
pp. 51-9: In the body of hadith literature - which recounts many sayings and acts of the 
Prophet Muhammad - sections are assigned specifically to dreams. These normally endorse 
the view that there is benefit to be derived from good dreams and that the Prophet himself 
approved of them and wished the Islamic community to take them seriously as a source of 
guidance. According to one widely cited tradition, the Prophet declared that prophecy had 
ended with him and that there would be no later messenger from God. The people were then 
in despair, until he told them that they would still receive good tidings through the Muslim's 
dream. This led to the popular belief that the pious believer would be the one expected to 
have access to true dreams from Allib, although the dreams of all Muslims were worthy of 
careful sifting and analysis. ' For this hadith and other relevant hadiths, see A. J. Wensinck 
and J. P. Mensing (eds), Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane (Leiden: EJ Brill, 
1936-64), vol 2, p. 205 (r. '. y. ). 
5 W. Montomery Watt, the introduction to The Faith, p. 10. 
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autobiographical 6 But in the introduction of the Munqidh, the editors wrote 
that there are only a few books in the world of a kind similar to al Mungidh. 7 
One of them is al-Ayysm by Tähä Husayn, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Dominique Sourdel in her book Medieval Islam contends that even if 
the Mungidh does not describe real events, it nonetheless constitutes a 
'spiritual journey' characteristic of the preoccupations of the scholars of the 
medieval period. 8 This supports the present necessity to study al-Mungidh in 
order to understand al-Ghazäli's inner development. 
In al-Munqidh al-Ghazäli tells us how he started to study, one by one, 
the four groups of the seekers after truth: the theologians, the philosophers, the 
Ismä`ilis and lastly the süf s. One may argue that the account is not authentic 
since al-Ghazäli had gained a knowledge of Sufism before his spiritual crisis. 
He had indeed had contacts with su-ff s even during his childhood. But al- 
Mungidh gives the general impression that he had no connection at all with 
Sufism before he finished studying the ideas of the Isma'ilis; he seems to claim 
that he only started to study Sufism at that point. But here al-Ghazäli most 
probably means that only then did he begin to study Sufism fervently and in 
depth in order to look for the answer to his profound questioning. So he began 
to study Sufism again with a new sense of purpose. 
The same reasons possibly apply to the other three groups. For 
example, al-Ghazäli writes that after be finished studying theology he spent 
6 M. S. Stern,, "Notes on the Theology of Al-Ghazzäf's Concept of Repentance', lslamic 
Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 95. 
7 Jamil Saliba and Kämil `Iyid, in the Introduction to al-Mungidh, p. 7. 
s Dominique Sourdcl, MedievalIslarq translated by J. Montgomery Watt, p. 96. 
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less than two years completing his studies in philosophy, examining the books 
of philosophers on his own during his spare time, for he was then very busy 
teaching the religious sciences to three hundred students in Baghdad. 9 Some 
scholars have claimed that al-Ghazäli had acquired a knowledge of philosophy 
before studying theology, for his description of his scepticism (as described in 
the Mungidh) seems consistent with a knowledge of philosophical questions. '° 
For instance he doubted the reliability of the senses and was looking for 
infallible knowledge. 
On the other hand, according to the account in al-Munqidh, al-Ghazäl% 
had already undertaken a broad study of theology. Al-GhazälPs studies were 
supervised by the famous theologian Imam al-Juwayni when he was at 
Nishapür. A1-Ghazäli himself writes in al-Mungidh that he had composed some 
works of theology. ' 
So, al-Ghazäli arranges all these events in an orderly way in his al- 
Mungidh, possibly to show to the reader that he had come to study again, in 
depth, all four groups in order to look for certain and true knowledge. He 
perhaps intended to make it easy for the reader to understand his spiritual 
development by putting them in a clear chronological order. In doing so he also 
made clear to his readers the arguments of each, showing what was lacking in 
their reasoning. His method drew on the true facts and experiences of his life, 
and since al-Mungidh was written when al-Ghazäli had reached his fifties, it is 
the product of mature age, with a good style, wide vocabulary, and clear 
9 Abu- iiämid al-Ghazäli, al-Mimgidb, pp. 69-70; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Falh$ p. 29. 
W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim, p. 51. 
11 Abu- Hamid a1-Ghazäli, aI-Mungidh, p. 22; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 
27. 
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explanations, 
2.2. Reasons for the writing of al-Mtmgidh: 
Al-Ghazal[, in his introduction to al Mungidh, writes as if he had been 
asked to produce this particular work by fellow Muslims. He wrote the book as 
the answer to their many questions, as the following passage makes clear. 
You have asked me, my brother in religion, to 
show you the aims and inmost nature of the 
sciences and the perplexing depths of the 
religious systems. You have begged me to relate 
to you the difficulties I encountered in my 
attempt to extricate the truth from the confusion 
of contending sects and to distinguish the 
different ways and methods, and the venture I 
made in climbing from the plain of naive and 
second-hand belief (tagrd) to the peak of direct 
vision. You want me to describe, firstly what 
profit I derived from the science of Theology 
(kaum), secondly, what I disapprove of in the 
methods of the party of to `rm (authoritative 
instruction), who restrict the apprehension of 
truth to the blind following (tagrd) of the Imam, 
thirdly, what I rejected of the methods of 
Philosophy, and lastly, what I approved in the 
Sufi way. of life. You would know, too, what 
essential truths became clear to me in my 
manifold investigations into the doctrines held by 
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men, why I gave up teaching in Baghdad 
although I had many students, and why I returned 
to it at Naysabur (Nishäpür) after a long interval. 
I am proceeding to answer your request, for I 
recognise that your desire is genuine. In this I 
seek the help of God and trust in Him; I ask His 
succour and take refuge with Him. 12 
AI-Ghazäl% wrote al-Mungidh while he was at Nishaptir, where he had 
returned to teach after his retirement, simply to answer other Muslims' 
questions. AI-Mungidh then is not a work of theology or philosophy or 
Ismä`ilism or Sufism, nor does it adopt one particular approach; rather it is a 
description of al-Ghazäli: 's spiritual experience. It contains only a general view 
of the four groups. For example, his philosophical thought is set out in greater 
detail in both the Tahafut and the Magäsid. Al-Ghazäli may have intended to 
clarify again, in a more simple manner, his views on these four groups by 
writing about them in one book, since the reader might by this method find it 
easier to quickly comprehend their differences. Thus the reader of al-Mungidh 
discovers a spiritual autobiography, in which the events of a life form a search 
for truth. 
2.3. The Contents of al-Mungidb: 
In &I-Muagidh al-Ghazali describes his mental and intellectual crisis, 
which he attributes to his quest for certainty and truth. The book recounts the 
development of his thought and his exploration of different sciences before he 
12 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Mrmgidh, pp. 25-26; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFait4 
p. 17. 
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reached certainty, which he attained through his encounter with Sufism. He 
explains why the other three groups could not satisfy him. He goes on to give 
the reasons for his retirement from teaching at Baghdad and for his return to 
Nishapür, writing as if in earnest conversation. The book is suitable for 
thoughtful, critical readers who want to be freed from tagfla as al-Ghazäli 
himself sought to be independent of its limitation; he was looking for the 
answer to his doubt, which in the end was healed by the ways of Sufism. 
In aI-Mungidh al-Ghazäli tried to describe his own experiences as a 
seeker for absolute knowledge. He tried to do this in a simple way by putting 
them in chronological order. Al-Ghazäli's spiritual crisis while he was teaching 
at Baghdad lasted for two months. He realized that his actions were not 
sincerely dedicated to God. He had the opportunity to gain all the worldly 
advantages that a scholar of that period could grasp, but inside himself he 
knew that what he was doing was not the right thing. Before his decision to 
retire al-Ghazäli had tried to find the truth by examining the four groups 
mentioned in al-Mungidh, namely the theologians, the philosophers, the 
IsmaTis and the ýüfi's 13 Knowing his historical background, one can see why 
al-Ghazälr considered that there were only four types of seekers after truth. 
These four groups were the most important during his lifetime. Al-Ghazäli's 
criticism of scholar jurists explains why he did not include them among the 
seekers of truth. 
He said that the truth that he was looking for must lie within the 
teachings of these four groups. He started with the science of kalsm. As 
mentioned before, al-Ghazili learned most of his theology from his teacher, the 
Ash'arite theologian Imim al-Haramayn Abü'1-Ma`äli al Juwayni . 
Under his 
13 See also next discussion regarding four seekers of truth. 
'NY 
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guidance al-Ghazäli adopted the main principles of Ash'arite kalam. The 
Imam al-Haramayn allowed full freedom of thought and expression to his 
pupils. They were encouraged to engage in debates and discussion. At this 
point al-Ghazalt showed his ability in critical thinking. He himself sometimes 
lectured to his fellow students. During this time al-Ghazal started to free 
himself from taglld (bondage of authority). He became impatient of dogmatic 
teaching and even showed signs of scepticism. This suggests that his 
scepticism began before he started studying kaMin, philosophy, Ismaili 
teaching and Sufism in depth. 14 
Al-Ghazält writes that he started to study the science of kaum by 
reading works by the sound mutakallimun, and that he himself wrote a few 
works on kalam. W. Montgomery Watt however, argues in Muslim 
Intellectual that al-Ghazal 's works on kalern were written only after his study 
of philosophy. He refers to the notable work The Golden Mean. 15 But al- 
Ghazäli's reference to his writings on kaum may indicate that he wrote them 
at that time for teaching purposes or to refute views that he felt must be 
criticised. 
When he finished studying `ilm al-kah-un, al-Ghazäli found that the 
science was unable to provide the answers he sought. He said that 'Am a/- 
kalam uses only reason to prove the truth, and that it might satisfy other 
people but not his questions. He felt dissatisfied with the speculative system of 
the scholastic theologians. `11m al-kalfun can help to establish a firm faith but 
the foundations of this belief must be laid in one's childhood. For someone new 
to Islam the disputations of 'Am al-kalim may not be the best way to confirm 
11 W. Montgomery watt, mwft p. 107. 
15 Ibid, p. 117. 
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or strengthen their belief; rather a firm faith can be obtained from the 
understanding of the Qur'an and the tradition. The science of kau mm is also 
important as a means to defend the orthodox creed against heretical 
innovations. A1-Ghazal i writes in a1-Mungidh, 
It is true that, when theology appeared as a 
recognised discipline and much effort had been 
expended in it over a considerable period of time, 
the theologians, becoming very earnest in their 
endeavours to defend orthodoxy by the study of 
substances and accidents with their nature and 
properties. But, since that was not the aim of 
their science, they did not deal with the question 
thoroughly in their thinking and consequently did 
not arrive at results sufficient to dispel 
universally the darkness of confusion due to the 
different views of men. 16 
Al-Ghazäli meant that the only way to know God is revelation, because human 
reason is too weak to grasp the supreme reality. 
The mutakalllmün are the group of people chosen by God in order to 
perform the task of defending and preserving the creed derived from the 
Qur'än and prophetic traditions. They try to argue with their opponents and 
criticise them. They formulate arguments based on their opponents' premises 
or on the consensus of the community or the bare acceptance of the Qur'än and 
16 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, &I-Mungidk pp. 67-68; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFait4 
p. 28. 
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sunnah. " 
The study of `ilm al-kaläm is important in order to defend the orthodox 
creed from the deviations of heretics. Al-Ghazäli argues that God has sent the 
true faith and the Qur'an and traditions by means of His messengers. These 
contain the basics of human welfare in religious and secular matters. However, 
Satan also has been given permission to create teachings and practices which 
are contrary to this true faith, usually in the form of heresies. 's 
Men tended to accept his19 suggestions and 
almost corrupted the true creed for its adherents. 
So God brought into being the class of 
theologians, and moved them to support the 
Sunnah (traditional faith) with the weapon of 
systematic arguments by laying bare the 
confused doctrines invented by the heretics at 
variance with the accepted Sunnah (traditional 
or orthodox belief) 20 
Thus the mutakallimun could reinforce the handed-down faith and 
refute heretical teachings. This argument explains the origin of theology and 
theologians, and therefore the use of `ilm al-ka1ijn by Imim al-Ghazäli . `Jim 
al-kaläm is recommended as long as it is used to prove the existence of God 
"Abu- Hämid a(-Ghazn(i, sl-Mamgidh, p. 67; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, pp. 
27-28. 
18 Abii Hämid al-Ghazeli, al-Mungidly p. 66; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TbeFeitl; p. 
27. 
19 'His' here refers to Satan. 
20 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Mwgidh, pp. 66-67; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, 
p. 27. 
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and free Him from the attributes of His creations. 
Al-Ghazali adhered to most of the Ash'arite kau m, especially the 
emphasis on Tawhid (The Unity of God). He also accepted the reality of the 
attributes of God, the belief in the eternity of the Qur'än, of the Qur'änic 
apparently anthropomorphic descriptions of God in terms of sight, hearing and 
body. But cannot know the modality of all this (bill kayfah). Other topics from 
al-Ash'aris' kaum are the conviction that all the blessed will see the face of 
God in Paradise and the acknowledgement that the succession of the four 
Rishidffn caliphs is legitimate. 
This is how `ilm al-kalrim was used during the early period but 
afterwards many approaches were used. Some people came to use `ilm al- 
kahim for their own sectarian interests and not truly for religious purposes. 21 
After finishing his study of `ilm al-kalam, al-Ghazali turned to the 
science of philosophy. He said that in order to point out the defects of any 
science one should have an equal or greater knowledge than a scholar of that 
particular science. He said that so far he had not come across any Muslim 
scholars who engaged devotedly in the study of the science of philosophy. So 
he started to study the science in depth by reading works of philosophy on his 
own, during his spare time after his lectures to his three hundred students in 
Baghdad. He mastered the science in less than two years by the will of God. 
After completing his study of the science he spent one year reflecting on what 
he understood from his reading in order to clarify the defects, the truths and 
the confusions of the science. He concluded that there were various groups of 
philosophers: some of them were infidels, some irreligious and some close to 
21 See also the next discussion regarding the four seekers of truth. 
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the truth. 22 
Al-Ghazalf believed philosophers constitute three major groups, namely 
the Dahdyun (Materialists), Tabi `lyfn (Naturalists) and the Iliblyiin (Theists). 
The Dahriycm are the earliest philosophers. They denied the Creator and 
Disposer of the world, omniscient and omnipotent, and held that the world is 
everlasting and exists by itself without any creator. The animals too are 
everlasting. They come from seed and themselves generate seed. This situation 
is eternal and without end. Al-Ghazali considers them as Zansdiga P 
(irreligious people) 24 
The second group is the Tabi'iy& who constitute the main body of the 
philosophers. They engaged in miscellaneous researches into the world of 
nature and the wonderful variety of animals and plants and put much effort 
into the dissecting of animals' organs. As a result they admitted the wonders of 
God's creations and acknowledged the wisdom of God. But this group of 
philosophers, despite admitting the rule of God, took the view that what they 
called character has a great influence in constituting the powers of animals. 
The intellectual power in man depends on this character and when this 
character is corrupted so is the intellect, which then ceases to function, and 
when something ceases to function it becomes non-existent, and it is 
inconceivable for non-existence to exist again. Thus, they deny the future life, 
heaven, hell, resurrection and judgement. There is no reward or punishment. 
22 Abu Himid al-Ghazä(i, a! -Mrmgidb, pp. 69-70; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TbeFsitA 
pp. 29-30. 
23 Plural of zind'rq. Term of opprobrium in mediaeval Islamic history, often rendered as 
'free-thinker', 'unbeliever', 'heretic', 'dualist'. The word derives from Persian. See, Ian 
Richard Netton, A Popular Dictionary offslaw p. 265. 
24 Abü Hamid al-Ghazi , al-Mungidly p. 71; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 
30. 
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Al-Ghazäli placed these philosophers among the irreligious because they deny 
the Last Day even though they believe in God and His attributes. 
The final group is the Ilahiyrm. Al-Ghazäli focuses particularly on this 
group's teachings. It contains the more recent philosophers and includes 
Socrates, his pupil Plato and Plato's pupil Aristotle, who was responsible for 
organising the sciences. This group generally attacked the two previous groups 
of philosophers and unveiled their defects. Indeed, Aristotle even attacked both 
Plato and Socrates and tried to free himself from all influences. But al-Ghazali 
writes that Aristotle never succeeded in freeing himself totally: something of 
his unbelief remained. Therefore al-Ghazäli holds all these philosophers and 
their followers to be unbelievers, including Muslim philosophers such as Ibn 
Sinä (A. H. 369-428/A. D. 979-1037) and al-Färäbi (A. H. 256 (7)-339/A. D. 870- 
950) who were responsible for transmitting the philosophy of Aristotle. 
Despite this, al-Ghazäli acknowledges both Ibn Sinä and al-Faräbi as the only 
Muslim philosophers who had succeeded in transmitting the philosophy of 
Aristotle clearly. 26 Because of the problems which arose from changes and 
interpolations in some translations of Aristotle's works into Arabic, al-Ghazäli 
chose the translations and commentaries of both al-Färäbi and Ibn Sinä as the 
basis of his refutations of Aristotle's philosophical thought in his Tahifut al- 
faläsifa. Al-Ghazäli regarded both al-Färib and Ibn Sinä as the most faithful 
translators of and the most original commentators on Aristotle's works among 
the Muslim philosophers. 27 Al-Ghazäli contended that the philosophy of 
Aristotle falls within three categories: what must be counted as unbelief; what 
25 Abi Himid al-0haziff, a! -Mungidb, pp. 71-72; It. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Fait4 
pp. 30-31. 
26 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, aI-Mtmgidb, pp. 72-73; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, 
pp. 31-32. 
27 Abii Hamid al-Ghazäli, TabaPut, p. 40; tr. by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, AI-Ghazal'i's 
Tabalut, pp. 4-5. 
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must be counted as heresy; and what is undeniable. 28 
Furthermore, al-Ghaz .l considers the various philosophical sciences as 
being six in number: mathematics, logic, natural science, theology, politics and 
ethics. 29 He then discusses them in detail in order to show what must be 
rejected. He explains what danger might threaten someone who rejects them 
and what danger might threaten someone who studies them. 
Firstly, mathematics consists of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, 
which are unconnected to religious matters. There are however, two problems 
arising from mathematics. The first is that every student of mathematics 
admires its precision and the clarity of its demonstrations. This leads him to 
believe that the philosophers who concern themselves with the sciences 
produce work which has the precision of mathematics. Such a person will 
become an unbeliever, accepting these philosophers as absolute authorities. 
Furthermore, he will imagine that, since they are so precise, they could not fail 
to acknowledge religion if it were really true. So he follows them in denying 
religion. AI-Ghazil argues that a person who excels in one particular science 
will not necessarily be competent in another. This is why one involved in 
mathematics has to be careful not to let himself be infected by the corruption 
of the philosophers, for mathematics belongs to the foundations of the 
philosophical sciences. 
The second problem may affect the person who is loyal to Islam but 
ignorant. He believes that all the sciences related to philosophy have to be 
28 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, a/-Mungidh, pp. 72-73; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Fei[h, 
pp. 31-32. 
29 Abü Himid al-Ghazili, al-Mtmgidl, p. 73; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faitb pp. 
32-33. 
45 
rejected. This is dangerous for it can give the impression that Islam is based 
on the denial of proof. For example, there is mathematical truth in the theory 
regarding the eclipses of sun and moon. One cannot reject this; rather he has to 
take it as a sign of God. 30 
Secondly, there is logic, which also is not relevant to religion. Al- 
Ghazal defined it as 'the study of the methods of demonstration and of 
forming syllogisms, of the conditions for the premises of proofs, of the manner 
of combining the premises, of the conditions for sound definition and the 
manner of ordering it'. Knowledge then comprises tasawwur (the concept), 
which is understood by definition and taadq (the assertion), which is 
demonstrated by proof. These are the methods used by the mutakallimim. The 
philosophers may differ from the mutakallimFw with respect to the expressions 
and the technical terms that they use and in their greater elaboration of 
explanations and classifications. For example, the formulation: if all men are 
animals, then some animals are men. Al-Ghazäli argues that this has no 
connection to the essentials of religion and it should not be denied, because if 
someone does so, then logicians will conclude that such a person is weak in 
intelligence, and suppose that his religion is based on that denial. Therefore 
such rejection or denial is to be considered unnecessary and dangerous. 31 
However, logic is dangerous because logicians tend to be satisfied with 
mere demonstration. So, if religious matters cannot be subjected to 
demonstration they will not believe. Frequently these admirers of logic will 
hasten to accept the infidel doctrines (aI-kufriyyät) of the philosophers because 
30 Abi Hamid al-Ghazili, al-Mtmgidh, pp. 75-76; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFait4 
pp. 3435. 
31 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazili, a/-Mrmgidl; pp. 76-77; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith 
pp. 35-36. 
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they believe that these doctrines are supported by logical demonstration, 2 
Thirdly, natural science or physics deals, according to al-Ghazäli, with 
the investigation of the heavens and anything related to their changes. This 
science is only to be rejected on the basis that all natures are subject to God's 
commands and none of their activity comes from their essence 33 
Fourthly is theology or metaphysics which, al-Ghazali holds, contains 
most of the errors of the philosophers. They differ from one another and cannot 
prove the conditions they set forth in terms of logic. Their errors are twenty in 
number. Three of them make their adherents infidels and the other seventeen 
make them heretics. Al-Ghazäli deals extensively with these twenty points in 
his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers. The three errors that make them 
infidels are the denial of bodily resurrection, the assertion that God knows only 
the universal and the belief in the eternity of the world. 34 
On points such as the denial of the attributes of God and that God 
knows by His essence rather than by knowledge, al-Ghazäli said their position 
is the same as the Mu'tazilites and this does not make them infidels. Al- 
Ghazäli shows here that he has been very careful not to simply judge anyone as 
infidels. Indeed, in his Faycal at-tafrigah bayna al-Isl m wa I-zandagah (The 
Decisive Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Heresy) he discusses how 
some people will consider someone to be an infidel simply because he deviates 
32 Abu- Himid al-Ghazäli, el-Mungidb, p. 77; Ir. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Fait A pp. 
36-37. 
33 Abu- Himid al-Ghaznli, aI-Mimgidh, pp. 77-78; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Fail & 
p. 37. 
34 Abi Hamid al-Ghazäli, sl-Muogidh p. 77; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Fait4 pp. 
37-38. 
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from their system 35 
Fifthly, politics: according to al-Ghazali, discussion of politics is based 
on considerations of worldly and governmental advantage, which philosophers 
understand from the Divine scriptures that have been transmitted to the 
prophets and from the sayings of the ancient prophets. 36 
Sixthly, ethics, which consist of discussions defining the characteristics 
and moral constitution of the soul and enumerating the various types of soul 
and the methods of moderating and controlling them. According to al-Ghazäli, 
the philosophers took their theories of ethics from the süff s and then mixed 
them with their own discourse. This incorporation of conceptions from the 
prophets and the ýüfi s by the philosophers resulted in two evil tendencies; one 
on their part and the other on the part of their opponents. 37 
Regarding the opponents, when a person of weak acumen reads 
philosophy he might believe that what he reads is the product of the 
philosopher's character and hence has to be rejected. It is customary that 
weaker intellects take the men as criterion of the truth and not the truth as 
criterion of the men. Al-Ghazäli holds that men generally depend on their 
intellects to distinguish truth. from falsehood. So it is important to keep 
misleading books away from the public. Al-Ghazäli cites the example of his 
own work, which had sometimes been considered to have come from the work 
of the philosophers but was in fact the result of his own reflections. But 
35 Abü Hamid al-GhaznIi, a! -Mrmgidh pp. 79-80; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFait& 
pp. 38-39. 
36 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, al-Mungidh, pp. 80-81; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 
39. 
" Abu- ! iänrid al-Ghazi , al-Mwigidb, p. 81; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Fait A p. 
39. 
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whatever in philosophy does not contradict the Qur'an and Sunnah may be 
accepted. 
39 
As for their followers, those works of the philosophers that are mixed 
with the maxims of the prophets and the teachings of the mfrs may make the 
reader approve the false together with the true. In order to avoid this it is 
necessary that persons of weak intellect refrain from reading such books. Even 
though there may appear to be closeness between error and truth that does not 
make the false true 39 
In his discussions of these sciences, al-Ghazäli gives a few examples 
from daily affairs in order to help the reader understand the arguments more 
easily: the money-changer and the counterfeiter, 40 the surgeon's cupping glass 
with honey, 41 the weak swimmer and the snake charmer with the hoy. 42 This 
shows that al-Ghazäli, in contending with philosophy, uses the method of 
philosophical logic rather than arguments from revelation. 
The science of philosophy could not satisfy al-Ghazäli because, 
according to him, philosophy cannot assure the truth and cannot produce the 
certainty he was looking for. Al-Ghazäli's view of philosophy is that it cannot 
prove religious truth from its theoretical point of view. In his famous book 
regarding philosophy Tabifut al-falizsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) 
38 Abu- Himid a1-Ghaznli, al-MrmgidA pp. 81-84; tr. W. Montgomery, TheFaitly pp. 39- 
43. 
39 Abu Hamid al-Ghaznli, al-Mungidh, pp. 84-85; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith 
pp. 43-45. 
40 Abu Hämid al-Ghazäli, el-MrmgidA p. 82; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 4 1. 
41 Abi IIämid al-Ghazili, al-Mtmgidb, p. 83; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFaitb, p. 42. 
42 Abu Hämid al-GhazälT, al-Mrºngidly p. 84; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 44. 
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he stressed this position, pointing out that the philosophers were unable to 
prove the creation of the world by God43 or to manifest the spiritual matter of 
the human soul. 44 This is dangerous for it leads people to reject the details of 
religions and creeds. Al-Ghazali denies the necessary connection between 
cause and effect, which are not free from God's will. An example of a natural 
cause is that fire will burn cotton. But actually it is God who creates burning, 
so it is possible for it to occur without this cause. When this happens it is 
actually because of the taqdir(determining action) of God. 
As we have shown throughout the discussion, al-Ghazali succeeded in 
clarifying and judging the disputes between the religion of Islam and 
philosophy. His firm arguments have been acknowledged until today by 
many. 45 
Thus, by accepting the principles of philosophical argument and 
incorporating rational discourse into religious discussion, al-Ghazäli 
contributed to the approval of the intellect's role in Islam. He showed how the 
intellect has a part to play in Islamic teaching as well as defining the limits of 
its role. The acknowledgement of these limits leads to al-Ghazäli's affirmation 
that only through the ýnf way can faith actually be attained. This will be 
considered in more detail later in the chapter. 
After completing his study of the science of philosophy, al-Ghazilf 
engaged in examining the doctrines of the Isms"ilis. He writes that while he 
43 For details see Abu- Hiimid al-Ghazäli, Tabifut al-falssifa, pp. 110-115; tr. by Sabib 
Ahmad Kamali, Al-GbazWG Tabifvt, pp. 89-95. 
44 For details see Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, Tabifut al-falisifa, pp. 206-227; Ir. by Sabih 
Ahmad Kamali, AI-GbaziG's Tabifut, pp. 197-220. 
45 Janü I SaLÖa and Kami1 `Iyid, in the Introduction to al-Mungidh p. 8. 
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was studying the teachings of this group, he was asked by the Caliph to write 
a work on them. He accepted this task for at that time he himself was 
interested in them. Then he started to collect and put in order all the 
information available about the group so that he should fully understand them 
before producing his critiques and refutations. Al-Ghazäli was criticised by 
the orthodox for organising the doctrines of the Ismä`ilis in an orderly manner. 
They accused him of helping the Isms ilis by doing their work for them, 
systematising their doctrines and making it easier for them to spread their 
ideas. °6 
A1-Ghazäli replied that this observation might apply to doctrines that 
are not well known, since such work might alert the public to their existence. 
But in this case, the party of the Ismä`ilis was well known for its heresy and its 
doctrines must be refuted. Refutation should follow the statement of the 
doctrine. Al-Ghazäli said that he did not elaborate what they had not, and that 
from his own experience he knew that people used to laugh at the works which 
refute them for the authors did not fully understand their doctrines. Al-Ghazäli 
wanted to avoid this happening to him; his aim was to demonstrate all the 
weaknesses of the group after repeating their doctrines. 7 
Al-Ghazali said that in al-Mungidh he only intended to show the 
weakness of the Ismä' lis rather than their falsity, for he had already done so in 
his other books such as Fade'ih al-bätiniyyah wa fadi'il al-mustazhiriyyah 
(The Infamies of the Ismä ilis and the Excellencies of The Mustazhirftes) or al- 
Musta? hir% written in 487-8/1094. It was dedicated to the new caliph, al- 
46 For details, see Abu- Himid a1-Ghazitli, Tahifut al-falisifs pp. 206-227; tr. by Sabih 
Ahmad Karnali, Al-Ghazifl's Tahifut, pp. 197-220. 
47 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, a1-Mrmgidl, pp. 87-88; Ir. by W. Montgomery Watt, TäeFeith, 
pp. 
46-47. 
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Mustazhir. This book contains most of his views on the danger of the 
Ismä`ilis. Other works that concern the Ismä`ilis are Hu., jatul Hagq (The 
Demonstration of Truth), Mufassal al-khilaf(Fundamental Difference), and al- 
Qistas al-mustagim (The Just Balance). Al-Ghazil devised an effective way of 
arguing with this group, especially their doctrine of 'authoritative instruction' 
and'the infallible imam (leader)' 48 He gives examples of how to respond to the 
challenges of the Isms ilis by drawing upon various styles of argumentation in 
his discussion on the Ismä`ilis in the Munqidh. 
Al-Ghazäli concluded that the teachings of the Isma'ilis were 
extremely unsatisfactory and that they themselves did not have answers for 
most of the problems in their teaching. They were actually in real ignorance of 
their own teachings. 
Al-Ghazäl believed the Ismä`ilis to be dangerous both politically and 
dogmatically to orthodox Islam. The essence of his criticism lies in the 
unreasonable and heretical innovations that came from their tagrd (blind 
submission) to the ta`rm (authoritarian teaching) of their Imims. A]-Ghazali 
considered their unconditional approval of the Imäm s words to be in conflict 
with the intellect. 9 
Finally, al-Ghazäli turned to Sufism. He realised that the s5rt way must 
include both intellectual belief and practical activity. He admitted that 
intellectual belief was easier for him than practical activity. He started to 
study Sufism by reading the books of their scholars such as Abn Tälib al- 
48 Abu- Humid at-Ghazä , sl-Mrmgidh, pp. 92-94; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, 
pp. 54-56. 
49 Massimo Campanini, "Al-Ghazzi ", p. 261, in History ofislaadc Philosophy, (Part 1) 
edited by Nasr, Seyyid Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman. 
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Makkir, as well as the works of al-Härith al-Muhäsibi , the anecdotes about al- 
Junayd, al-Shibli and Abu Yazi d al-Bisjämi and other works from well-known 
ý5ff leaders, and through oral instructionSO 
If one follows his writings strictly, it seems as if al-Ghazali had had no 
previous contact with Sufism. Again, here al-Ghazali probably meant that he 
examined Sufism in earnest and with new purpose as he studied the other three 
groups. Thus, the charge that al-Ghazali did not give a true account of his 
intellectual evolution in al-Muagidh can be fairly rejected. 
After he had mastered their teachings from an intellectual standpoint, 
al-Ghazälf realised that the distinction of the süfis was that their teaching 
cannot be fully understood except by immediate experience (dhawq - literally, 
tasting), by ecstasy and by moral change. The süfi s are men of real experience. 
What remained for him was to experience this himself by entering into the s Tuf 
way of life. Al-Ghazali writes: "I apprehended clearly that the s ifi s are men 
who had real experience, not men of words, and that I had already progressed 
as far as possible by way of intellectual apprehension. What remained for me 
was not to be attained by oral instruction and study, but only by immediate 
experience and by walking in the süfi way. '" 
He said after he became a süfi he had gained firm belief in three 
principles, namely, faith in God, in prophethood or revelation and in the Last 
Day. He said that he gained these not through argumentation but by reason of 
various causes, coincidences and experiences that he could not describe in 
50 Abu- Hämid al-Ghaz, ili, al-Muagidb, pp. 95-96; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
FaitA pp. 56-57. 
si Abi Hämid al-Ghazäli, al-Muagidl{ p. 97; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TbeFailLy p. 
58. 
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detail. 52 These three principles are the key to al-Ghazli's theory of soul as 
well as his theory of knowledge as will be discussed in later chapters. 
It became clear to him that the key to the joy of the hereafter can only 
be attained through a God-fearing life, the essence of which is the withdrawal 
of the heart from all worldly things. Al-Ghazäli started to examine his own 
life. He realised that his deeds were contributing nothing to the achievement of 
eternal life. He examined his motives for teaching and realised that it was not 
purely dedicated to God. There was a struggle within him between the 
attractions of worldly desires and the impulses of eternal life. He became so 
distressed that it affected his health. He experienced what has been described 
as a nervous breakdown. He could neither speak not digest food. His doctors 
gave up, saying that the problem was a matter of the heart. Al-Ghaziili: sought 
refuge in God and His help. God made it easy for him to turn away from his 
worldly position, and al-Ghazäli finally decided to retire and leave Baghdad. 
He told people that he was going to Mecca but actually he travelled to Syria in 
order to devote himself to the snfr life. His retirement caused confusion among 
53 other scholars both inside and outside Baghdad. 
Some modem scholars who have studied al-Ghazhli have made their 
own speculations about his abandonment of his professorship. For instance, F. 
Jabre suggests that al-Ghazäli was afraid of thelsma'ilis. 54 Niz. im al-Mulk had 
been assassinated by them in 485/1092.55 AI-Ghazal- had attacked them in his 
52 Abu- Hsmid a1-Ghazäli, sl-Muagidb, pp. 96-97; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, T6eFailh, 
pp. 57-58. 
53 Abu- Vimid al-Ghazni, al-Mungidb, pp. 98-100; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Farb, pp. 58-61. 
54 Farid Jabre, "La Biographie et 1'oyuvre de Ghazali reconsiderees ä la lumicre des 
Tabagit de Sobki", (Melanges de 17nstit ut Dominicaire dl t odes Orientales de Cairo; i 
[1954], 73-102) esp. pp. 91-94, as cited by W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim, p. 140. 
55 Ibn Khallikän, Kltab wafayit aba`yan, vol. 1, p. 213. 
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writings and so was in danger. Watt in his Muslim Intellectual argues that this 
suggestion is not tenable since the Ismä'ilis did not practise assassination until 
after 489/1095. Furthermore he argues that their target would be the caliph 
rather than the scholar. 56 McCarthy in the introduction to his Freedom and 
Fulfillment finds Jabre's assertion somewhat exaggerated. 57 
Al-Ghazal%'s own account in al-Mungidh, that he abandoned the 
professorship for fear of hellfire, is clearly acceptable. This can be seen from 
two points mentioned in al-Mungidh itself. AI-Ghazali took a long time before 
he finally decided to forsake his ties with worldly affairs. If he were really 
afraid of the danger from the Isma'ilis, he would not have taken so long to 
make this decision. It was a full six months after Rajab 488 A. H. /July 1095 
A. D. that al-Ghazali finally decided (inDhu'l-Qa`da 488 A. H. /November 1095 
A. D. )58 It is unthinkable that someone afraid for his personal safety would wait 
so long in order to save his life. Another point that must be considered is al- 
Ghazali's sincerity. When he decided to return to teaching, he mentioned that 
he believed that Allah had eased his decision. He followed his faith in this 
though aware of the danger awaiting him in Nishäptir. He mentioned in al- 
Munqidh that he had wondered whether he would be able to resume spreading 
knowledge or would face the danger of death if he returned to Nishapnr. 39 He 
also mentioned that he had the same belief that it was God Who facilitated his 
departure from Baghdad in 488/109560 
36 W. Montgomery Watt, Muslims pp. 140-141. 
57 Mc Carthy, Freedom; p. xxiii. 
58 Abu- Himid al-Ghazil , al-Muugidh, p. 99, p. 115; Ir. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 60, p. 82- 
59 Abu- Himid al-Ghazili, al-Mwigidb, p. 116; It. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFeiI4 p. 
82. See also, Mustafa Mahmoud Abi-Sway, 'Al-Ghazili's "Spiritual Crisis" 
Reconsidered', Al- Sbajarab, vol. 1, no. i-ii, pp. 88-90. 
60 Abu- Himid al-Ghazili, &I-Muagidl4 p. 115; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFait4 p. 82. 
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As al-Ghazäli himself said, the reason for his departure was his 
realisation that what he was doing at that time was not profitable to the 
spiritual life. He found himself working not solely in the service of God but 
also for such worldly benefits as wealth and fame. 61 Watt again writes in 
Muslim Intellectual that this reason can be supported if one carefully studies 
most of the points contained in al-Ghazali's 1äyä . 62 Examining al-Ghazäl 's 
works after his conversion to Sufism one can consider that it was genuine and 
personal. 
Al-Ghazäli finally found the answer he was looking for in the way of 
the stems. The ultimate happiness is the vision of God and this can only be 
attained by becoming a practising süf. Al-Ghazäli believed that certainty 
would result from the highest kind of knowledge: that which can be attained 
only through mystical experience and dhawq (taste). The spiritual way is the 
source of true knowledge 63 
Further to the previous discussion, al-Ghazäli s awareness that this life 
is a preparation to the life to come made him very much concerned with the 
improvement of character. The improvement of one's character must start from 
his soul; hence the importance of the purification of the soul, and in order to 
purify the soul, one needs to know its powers and properties. This again makes 
the attempt to understand al-Ghazäli's life important to the present study. 
61 See previous pp. 20-21. 
62 Mc Carthy, Frmdon4 p. xxiii. 
0 Abii Hamid al-Ghazili, &I-Muagid , p. 
55; Ir. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFail6, p. 
17. 
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Even though al-Ghazäli depended most on the works of Abu- Talib al- 
Makkii'54 in his ýýff study and for his later works, his "originality can be seen in 
his selection, arrangement, and synthesis of the material he extracted from al- 
Maklci. Al-Ghazäli achieves a degree of clarity in his presentation of the basic 
features of mysticism by introducing a rational, theoretical framework to 
explain certain otherwise inexplicable aspects of mysticism. He had learned the 
language of the philosophers and theologians before he acquired a personal 
experience of the süfi life and was ready to perfect the work begun by al-Makkf 
and ýüfi s like him. '05 
In his works on Sufism al-GhazälF had to write from his own 
experience, which needed to be genuine, for real knowledge is given only to 
those who are prepared to receive it. Nobody can deny that al-GhazilF was 
among such people. Reading his works on Sufism one is assured of this, for 
only one who has experienced something deeply can explain his experience so 
well 66 For example, al-GhazhlF is able to affirm the reality of true knowledge 
(al-71m al-hagigi) or knowledge from on high (al- `ilm al-lad=7) as described 
by the s5fis67 He mentions the possibility of attaining transcendental 
knowledge during sleep. And thus he was able to describe the knowledge of the 
Silfl S68 
64 Abi Tilib Muhammad ibn `Ali (d. 996A. D. ). His book on Sufism is called Qtt a! -quhrb 6 
mu`smalat ahma{tbnb w&-wasfaI-tat7q al-mwidii maq m al-tawbria revised by Said 
Nasib Makarim, Bayrut: Dar Sadir, 1995. 
65 Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, Gbazirr s Theory of Virtue, p. 106. 
66 In his Mzan a1-'&w4 a1-Ghazi writes, "when my desire to follow the way of the süfs 
was strengthened, I sought help from süf scholars... ". This step was taken before he 
began to study the snfi method of acquiring real knowledge. It shows that al-Ghazäli 
writes according to his own experience. Abi Hämid al-Ghazrili, Mizen al-`amai pp. 
222-223. 
67 Abn Hämid al-Ghazäli, al-Risä/a al-ladrmiyya, p. 57, Eng. trans. p. 189. 
68 Abii Hämid a1-Ghazäli, al-Rissla al-ladtmiyyaý p. 67, p. 70, Eng. trans. pp. 359-360, p. 
366. 
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In al-Mimgidh al-Ghazali includes a chapter discussing the true nature 
of prophecy and why man is in need of it. This chapter reflects his experience 
of following the ýüfi way because he discusses there the knowledge that was 
only attainable when he devoted his life to süff training. In this chapter he also 
speaks of the creation of men and of their nature. Al-Ghazäli writes that there 
is a stage beyond the intellect, at which one can see the unseen and know the 
future by the will of God. This is the proof of the nature of prophecy. The truth 
of prophecy is the answer to the question which he had asked himself in the 
days of his intellectual scepticism - what is Truth? 
69 The effects of certain 
bodily activities and the concentration of one's mind may result in remarkable 
things, such as experience beyond the scope of the act of reasoning. Clear 
examples can be given from the experience of al-Ghazali himself. He admits 
that Sufism brought him the certainty that he was looking for. Al-Ghazäli also 
confirms that the süffs are people of both words and practice, and this 
combination of both outward and inward states leads to his certainty regarding 
prophethood. This makes the attempt to discuss al-Ghazäl 's concept of the 
acts of devotion in a later chapter important to the present study. 
Al-Ghaznli gives the example ofdreams which he said are similar to the 
stage of prophethood. When one dreams, one can see the unseen and 
understand what is in the future either explicitly or symbolically. But someone 
who has never experienced such things himself and relies only on his waking 
consciousness will say this is impossible. Al-Ghazäli writes: "Just as intellect 
is one of the stages of human development in which there is an 'eye' that sees 
the various types of intelligible objects which are beyond the ken of the senses, 
so prophecy also is the description of a stage in which there is an eye endowed 
69 Reynold A. Nicholson, The Idea ofPersonality in Surism, p. 44. 
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with light such that in that light the unseen and other supra-intellectual 
objects become visible. "70 
He discusses three questions related to the doubt of prophecy: doubt of 
its possibility in general, doubt of its actual occurrence and doubt of its 
attainment by a specific individual. According to al-Ghazal[ the proof of the 
possibility of prophecy is its existence and the proof of its existence is the 
existence of branches of knowledge such as medicine and astronomy, as these 
two sciences cannot be attained by reason alone. This is known to those 
engaged in these fields. For example, in astronomy there is an event that 
occurs only once in a thousand years. One who researches this matter knows 
that it cannot be learned by personal observation but can only be obtained by 
divine assistance and inspiration. This is an example of those things that 
cannot be apprehended by reason; hence, it shows the meaning of prophetic 
revelation. 71 The apprehending of this kind of extra-intellectual object is only 
one of the vast properties of prophecy. The others can only be attained by 
dhawq (immediate experience) from the practice of the mystic way. Analogous 
to this is the dream state. 72 
To satisfy doubt as to whether someone is a prophet or not, certainty 
can be gained by knowledge of his circumstances, either through personal 
observation or by report. In the same way, if we know how a doctor should 
speak and behave, we can recognise someone as a doctor by hearing what he 
has said even though we have not met him personally. Similarly, if we know 
70 Abu- Himid al-Ghazäli, al-Muvgidlk p. 106; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFailb p. 
69. 
71 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Muagidh, pp. 106-107; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, p. 69-70. 
n Abi Hamid a1-Ghazäli, al-Muugidb, pp. 107; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 
70. 
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what it is to be a prophet and have studied the Qur'an and the tradition, we 
will be convinced that Muhammad (p. b. u. h) is the Prophet. In order to 
convince ourselves we need look no further than what he said about the 
influence of devotional practices on the purification of the heart, how truly he 
said that when anyone helps the evil-doer, God will give the latter power over 
the former, and many other examplcs. 73 Al-Ghazälf concluded that certainty 
about the nature of prophecy can be gained only from the way of Sufism. 
Al-Ghazhli then proceeds to the need for prophecy. He explains this in 
the chapter regarding the reasons he resumed teaching. The prophetic 
revelation is important to help us to understand what is beyond our intellectual 
understanding. For example the secret behind the act of formal worship 
sometimes can only be apprehended by the light of prophecy. 74 
Al-Ghazäli found that there are four major reasons for weak faith: the 
reason connected to those who engage in philosophy, the reason connected 
with those who engage in the mystic way, the reason connected with those 
who profess the doctrine of ta`Iim and the reason based on the practice of those 
who are popularly described as having knowledge. The first group might say 
that they have studied philosophy and yet admit the existence of prophecy and 
its benefit, but the act of worship is to keep order among the common people. 
Since they, however, are not among the ignorant people, they do not need to be 
restricted by these duties. The second from the 'Latitudinarians' (ah! a! - 
`iba7ia), 75 might say that since they have knowledge of Sufism, they are above 
73 Abn Hamid al-Gbaznli, &I-Mamgid4 pp. 107-108; Ir. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Fail4 pp. 71-72. 
'4 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazi , al-Mrmgidh, (MR) p. 72; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 75. 
75 See "Ibijiiyya", Encyclopaedia oflslan; (second edition), vol. 3, p. 663. 
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the need for formal worship. These are people who have drifted from the süfi 
way. The third might say, the disputes are many and none is preferable to 
another. Even in the speculation of the intellect there is no certainty, let alone 
the unproved assertions of ta`Jim. The fourth might ask, why are there so many 
learned people who do not observe their duties if such matters are really 
compulsory? 76 
Al-Ghazali then mentions his other works in which he guides these 
people. For the people connected with the party of Ta`! im he said his book a! - 
gistas a! -mustagim (The Just Balance) can provide the answer. For those 
whose doubt is related to the ah! a! - `ibsdah, the book Kimiya-i sa `. idah (The 
Chemistry of Happiness) should help them. For the followers of the 
philosophers, who deny prophecy, he recommends the discussions in a! - 
Mungidh itself. He then elaborates these points by giving more examples. 
Finally, in dealing with the causes of doubt related to the `slim or learned 
man, he presents arguments based on logic. He says these people have 
knowledge, but still their desires sometimes overcome them, similar to the 
believers in medicine who sometimes do not follow the doctor's advice even 
though they know the doctor is right. Secondly, these men, If they neglect a 
few duties, at least can be brought to safety by their knowledge. But if the 
ordinary man who, lacking knowledge, then neglects his duties, he will perish 
through his own evil conduct with no intercessor. Thirdly, the genuine `slim 
does not intentionally commit sin, rather It occurrs by a slip. This is the 
criterion of genuine knowledge that tells us of the poison of sin and increases 
our fear and hope of God. The lesser sin that a faithful man commits with no 
intention does not argue any weakness of faith, because when the true believer 
76 Abu- Hämid al-Ghaziff, a/-Mungid4 pp. 112-113; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Fait4 pp. 76-78. 
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sins he repents. 77 
During his retirement al-Ghazal considered deeply all these doubts that 
occur among people and even within himself. For a time he believed that to 
continue his retirement was permissible. He writes, 
That is a fixed and determined character of this 
time; what benefit to you, then, are solitude and 
retirement, since the sickness has become 
general, the doctors have fallen ill, and mankind 
has reached the verge of destruction? I said to 
myself, however: When will you busy yourself in 
resolving these difficulties and attacking these 
obscurities, seeing it is an age of slackness, an era 
of futility? Even if you were to labour at 
summoning men from their worthless ways to the 
truth, the people of this age would be united in 
showing hostility to you. How will you stand up 
to them? How will you live among them, seeing 
that such a project is only to be executed with 
the aid of time and through a pious sovereign 
who is all-powerful? 7 
This statement makes it clear that al-Ghazäli felt that it was 
permissible for his retirement to continue. But then God changed his mind and 
n Abn Hämid al-Gbazäli, al-Muogrdh, pp. 121-122; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Failh, pp. 90-92. 
78 Abu- llämid al-Ghazi , al-Mrmgidh, p. 
114; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faitb, p. 
80. 
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he came to realise that it was his responsibility to go back to tackle the 
problem. "It is not right that your motive for clinging to retirement should be 
laziness and love of ease, the quest for spiritual power and preservation from 
worldly contamination. It was not because of the difficulty of restoring men to 
health that you gave yourself this permission. "79 
Al-Ghazäli then asked others among the 'people of the science of heart' 
and contemplation (possibly the Snfi s) regarding the matter; they advised him 
to abandon his retirement, and convinced him that this inner prompting was 
from God Himself who had chosen him to be the renewer of religion for the 
new century. Finally, after years of retirement, al-Ghazal returned toNishäpür 
in 499/1106. This time he would go back with a new aim: to call men to the 
knowledge by which the happiness of the hereafter would be attained. He 
himself was convinced that this feeling and guidance came from God. He asked 
God to give him guidance for his task. SO 
Al-Ghazälr realised that he had to curtail his contemplative life because 
Islam needed someone like him who was qualified to revive religion, society 
and politics in the Islamic world. He put his energies into defending the 
`agidah of Islam. He felt that it was his responsibility to correct the errors of 
his fellows. 
Al-Mungidh min sl-dsia1 focuses particularly on the faults of the 
philosophers and the party of Ta'rm. Al-Ghazäli gives many examples of how 
to argue with them using their own methods and logic. He ends the book with 
79Abn Hamid a1-Ghazäf, a1-Mungidh, p. 114; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Failb, 
pp. 80-81. 
80 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Mrmgidh, pp. 115-116; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Fait hi pp. 82-83. See above p. 23. 
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a prayer to the Almighty si 
(B) A Critique of al-Mungidh 
In al-Mungidh, al-Ghazäli describes to the reader the development of 
his critical thinking. He explains to us his doubt, his thinking and his certainty. 
He pictures to us the nature of his faith in the search for truth and certainty. It 
is the story of his spiritual crisis and what he suffered during the battle 
between the desire, intellect and instinct. Al-Ghazali described all of these 
from his own experience, which was perhaps the greatest thing about al- 
Ghazäli and can still be a source of inspiration to others. He wrote in a clear 
style which reflected his sincerity and truthfulness. This makes al-Mungidh 
unique among al-Ghazali's works. 
Al-Ghazal divides his autobiography into two distinct parts. In the 
first he explains the reasons he doubted the doctrine. This first part is relevant 
to anyone in our time or in the future. The second part is a sort of philosophy 
of Islamic orthodoxy, and suffers occasionally from the general attitudes of al- 
Ghazälf's time. The examples which al-GhazälT uses to illustrate his arguments 
may not always appeal to us nowadays. For instance, he states that the 
discovery of the properties of drugs ought to be attributed to the divine 
inspirations of prophets, 92 and it does not occur to him (al-Ghazal was after all 
not a medical man) that experiment and observation lead to the same result. 
Astronomy also is not a good example of knowledge beyond reason for the 
modem reader. However, the reader will find much food for thought in some of 
81 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, al-Mrmgid1 p. 122; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, TheFsit4 p. 
92 
82 Abi Hamid al-Ghazäli, el-Mtargidb, p. 107; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith p. 
70. 
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the points al-Ghazäli raises in al Mungidh; for example, the existence of the 
prophet who receives divine revelations. 
Al-Ghazäli's al-Munqidh can be regarded as the most influential Arabic 
autobiography before the autobiography of T. aha Ilusayn (1889-1973 A. D. ) al- 
Ayyam. The comparison between al-Mungidh and al-Ayynm here is to 
demonstrate the contemporary relevance of al-Ghazäli's autobiography. Both 
have gained the attention of East and West. Täha Husayn was a Muslim 
modernist from Egypt who was most influential. He produced a variety of 
works during his lifetime including some which are controversial. His works 
include novels and short stories as well as political articles and extended 
historical and critical studies. " His autobiography, which was started in 1926 
A. D., was quickly recognized as a masterpiece. It was the first modern Arabic 
literary work which gained acclamation at the international level. It has been 
translated into most of the major languages of the world. Al-Ayyern consists 
of three volumes, all of which have been translated into English. The first 
volume is called An Egyptian Chilhooc the second The Stream of Days and 
the third A Passage to France. BS 
AI-Ayyrim is not only the life story of Täha Husayn but "also is an 
example of social mobility in a Third World context. From a modest rural 
background, the young man grew up to conquer the West educationally, then 
returned to his homeland and reshaped its intellectual and cultural future. His 
is an Egyptian Horatio Alger story, and it has provided a role model for many 
83 M. Hämidullah, "Reviews on W. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of Al- 
Ghazeli", The Islamic Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 63-64. 
84Fedwa Malti-Douglas, Blindness and Autobiography, p. 8. 
as Tihn Hussein, The Days: His Autobiography in Three Parts, (Cairo: AVC Press, 1977): 
An Egyptian Childhoo4 trans. E. H. Paxton: pp. 1-93, The Stream ofDays; trans. Hilary 
Wayment: pp. 95-233, A Passage to France, trans. Kenneth Cragg: pp. 235-406. 
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an aspiring Egyptian. "ß6 Al-Ghazäli's a! -Mungidb on the other hand is not 
simply an autobiography, it also charts the spiritual route of the writer in. his 
search for truth. Al-Ghazäli left Baghdad for seclusion and came back with 
ideas of reform. Al-Ghazali has inspired many Muslims with his ideas and his 
works have gained an honoured place in both East and West. Both al-Ghazäli 
and Täha Husayn were major figures. So it is to be expected that their 
autobiographies should be important documents. 87 
Täha Husayn, who was blind from early childhood, was able to leave 
his mark on the entire nation of Egypt, especially through his sensitiveness and 
independence of spirit. These qualities can be seen in his autobiography. Täha 
Husayn himself was concerned to reshape the society of his time. For example, 
education was of primary importance for Täha Husayn. 85 What sustained him 
through his turbulent career was the belief which he firmly held in the duty and 
the power of the intellectual to reshape society by fearless assertion of the 
truth. As a result of his zeal to reform his society, the government deprived 
him of state employment and tried to restrain his lecturing and journalistic 
activities. Thus, during this hard period, from March 1932 until November 
1934, Täha left his native country and travelled to the United States. 99 
Both al-Ghazali and Ta^ha Ijusayn went through a difficult time 
attempting to reshape their societies. Both gained a high position in their place 
and period. Both tried to express their ideas and views in their writings. Both 
86 Fedwa Mahi-Douglas, BUndncss and Autobiography, p. 8. 
87 Ibid, p. 9. 
88 Ibid, Blindness and Autobiography, p. 7. 
89 Pierre Cachia, in the Introduction of Tihä Hussein, An Egyptian Childhood, (Al-Ayyam, 
voL 1); tr. by E. H. Paxton, pp. iii-iv. The Arabic version: Tihi Hussein, al-Ayyini, voL 
1, Egypt: Matba Sah al-Ma erif, 1939. 
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also travelled outside their native place during their time of difficulty. Al- 
Ghazali's life can be divided into two different periods: as a renowned scholar 
who at the peak of fame and then as a devout ýiifi avoiding all worldly aims. 
Täha Ijusayn also spanned two civilizations in his personal as well as his 
intellectual life. He married a Frenchwoman who remained a Catholic. The 
couple, with their two children, spent much time abroad. Husayn also gained a 
Western education: he studied in Montpellier in 1915 A. D. and in Paris from 
1915 A. D. to 1919 A. D. He spent much of his life studying and teaching in 
environments that varied from his native village to the French capital 90 But 
both he and al-Ghazal had courage enough to pursue their efforts with zest 
and vigour despite the difficulties that they faced both internally and 
externally. Thus, although Taaha Husayn cannot be compared with al-Ghazäli 
in many ways, their autobiographical works show some similarities. 
Al-Ghazäli tried to reconcile Orthodox Islam and Sufism and to show 
the inner aspects of the shari'a. Similarly Tiiha Husayn attempted to 
modernize Islamic teachings and he did so by enriching the Arabic literary 
tradition. Täha Husayn not only caused controversies with the government but 
also among Muslim communities by promulgating the idea of modernisation 
which sometimes contradicted Islamic teaching. For example, he created 
controversy when he argued sturdily against the veiling of women despite his 
good ideas on the position of women in the society and on extending the 
benefit of education to them9' Al-Ghazäli wrote his al-Munqidh to answer the 
questions of his fellow Muslims using the form of an autobiography; likewise 
Husayn wrote his al-Ayyim to tell us about his life and the difficulties that he 
faced from the beginning of his days as a poor and blind human being. In the 
9° Fedora Maui-Douglas, Blindness and Awobiography, pp. 7-8. 
91 Pierre Cachia, in the Introduction to Tähe Hussein, An Egyptian Childhood (Al--Ayysm, 
vol. 1), tr. by E. H. Paxton, p. ii. 
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end Husayn became one of the most honoured men in Egypt after all the 
controversies he had created by his advocacy of modernisation. "His 
autobiography might also have been specifically designed to enrich the Arab 
literary tradition, for the genre was virtually unknown in it". 92 
2.4 Al-Ghazali s spiritual crisis: 
The following discussion will show how al-Ghazäli's spiritual crisis 
became a turning point in his intellectual life. His doubt came from God and 
was not of his own choosing: "It was instinctive with me, a part of my God- 
given nature, a matter of temperament and not of my choice or contriving. "93 
The first step was his doubt of tagrd because for him there is no certainty in 
such knowledge, since no clear way is given to differentiate between truth and 
falsehood. 
Consequently as I drew near the age of 
adolescence the bonds of mere authority (tagrd) 
ceased to hold me and inherited beliefs lost their 
grip upon me, for I saw that Christian youths 
always grew up to be Christians, Jewish youths 
to be Jews and Muslim youths to be Muslims. I 
heard, too, the Tradition related from the Prophet 
of God according to which he said: 'Everyone 
who is born is born with a sound nature; it is his 
92 Pierre Cachia, in the Introduction to Tihi Hussein, An Egyptian Cbildboo4 (AI-AyyemS 
vol. 1), tr. by E. H. Paxton, p. iv. 
93 Abi Iiämid al-Ghazäli, al-Mrmgidb, p. 58; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 
19. 
68 
parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a 
Magian'. My inmost being was moved to discover 
what this original nature really was.... 4 
So, al-Ghazäli was looking for knowledge that contains the reality of 
things. But what is the reality of knowledge? Is it possible to attain to this 
certainty through tagild? The need now arose to look for the reality of true 
knowledge. In respect of what knowledge is, al-Ghazäli found this matter 
discussed among the philosophers. So, al-Ghazäli asked: what is true or certain 
knowledge? He described it as follows: "Sure and certain knowledge is that 
knowledge in which the object is disclosed in such a fashion that no doubt 
remains along with it, that no possibility of error or illusion accompanies it, 
and that the mind cannot even entertain such a supposition. Certain knowledge 
must also be infallible...  9s 
He was in a crisis of epistemology. Like Plato, he doubted the 
reliability of the senses . 
96 It was a situation which drove him to a mental 
breakdown, before God finally helped him to make the decision to retire. 
Al-Ghazali abandoned his professorship for solitude not because he was 
lost, but because he had some assurance that he could be delivered from his 
st Abü Haznid al-Ghazäli, a1-Mrmgidb, p. 58; tr. by W. Montgomery Wall, TbeFaitly p. 
19. 
Abü Hamid al-Ghazili, al-Mtmgidb, p. 59; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Fai1& p. 
20. See also above, p. 18. 
96 Plato's arguments in the end of Republic V, and both in Books VI and VII are often 
thought to show that Plato subscribes to the Two Worlds Theory (TW). According to 
this theory, there is no knowledge of sensibles, but only of Forms (non-sensible 
properties, properties not definable in observational or perceptual terms) and no belief 
about Forms but only about sensibles. See, Gail Fine, "Knowledge and belief in 
Republic V-VlY", Stephen Everson (editor), Epistemology, p. 85. 
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state of melancholy through the süft way97 About his spiritual experiences 
during his period of solitude, al-Ghazäli tells us that there were revealed to him 
things 'innumerable and unfathomable'. These experiences evidently perfected 
his acknowledgement of the authority of the Prophet and the complete 
submission to the truth revealed in the Qur'an. 98 
2.5. The four seekers after truth: 
As promised earlier, we will now discuss this topic in more detail. Al- 
Ghazäli regarded the seekers after truth as comprising four groups. There are 
many possible reasons for this, which may include the historical background of 
his own time, his education or his own personal attitudes. 
Generally speaking, the reasons why al-Ghaz@r chose these four groups 
and sought the answer to his problem among them stem from his contact with 
them during his education. These four groups represented the major 
intellectual and spiritual approaches prevalent in al-Ghazäli s day. Some of 
their doctrines had not retained their originality; however, their influence 
remained pervasive. Therefore it was necessary to study them again in order to 
give a clear picture of their independent teachings. McCarthy writes in the 
introduction to Freedom and Fulfillment, "As a natural consequence of these 
different cultural factors, often mutually opposed, this age was characterised 
by a kind of intemperateness in thought and an unruliness in imagination 
which led to an extraordinary confusion and a curious concern with religions 
and sects and movements, with each tongue and pen going its own ideological 
97 See above p. 52. 
9" Abil Himid al-Ghazili, al-Mrmgidly (MR) p. 62, p. 65; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Fait , p. 
63, p. 66. 
See also, M. Saeed Sheikh, At-Ghazii1 : "Metaphysics", in the A History ofMuslm 
Philosophy, p. 586. 
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Wajr. "99 
During al-GhazälPs lifetime these four were engaged in a relentless 
psychological and intellectual war. Firstly, the scholastic theologians tried to 
reconcile Indo-Greek philosophy with traditional Islam based on the Qur'an 
and sunnab. Secondly, the free-thinkers tried to reconcile Islam with 
philosophy. Thirdly, the Isma'ilis believed that the ultimate truth was known 
only to the infallible leader and, lastly, the snfi s paid attention mostly to their 
own souls. 100 
2.5.1. Al-Ghazäli and the science of kaläm: During al-Ghazäli's lifetime, the 
mutakallimrm were famous as the people of reason, thought and intellectual 
speculation. This group was considered by at-Ghazair as the people chosen by 
God in order to defend the orthodox creed, which they did through systems of 
speculation. Al-Ghazäli himself, besides 8qh, learned most of the Ash'arite 
kalrim from his teacher in Nrshäpür, al-Juwayni, but was unable to free himself 
from scepticism and doubt regarding the tagrd way of faith. This is possibly 
why he turned back to the study of the science of kaum with new purpose 
during his spiritual crisis. 
For al-Ghazäli, the science of kaliin has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Concerning the major advantage of kaum, he explains that it 
can discover truths and know them. At the same time the science of kaum can 
also protect the true faith from the doubts created by heresies. Regarding the 
disadvantages, he explains that it can bring confusion and change a firm belief 
into doubt by citing false evidence. This will cause true believers to disagree 
9' McCarthy, Freedom, p. xii. 
10° M. Hhinidullah, "Reviews on W. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of At- 
Ghazali", The Islamic Qratrterly, VoL 1, No. 1, p. 63. 
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among themselves and could also help heretics strengthen their beliefs by 
referring to their fanatical interpretation of religion which they developed 
through discussion. 10' 
At-Ghazali also attacked those theologians who accused the ordinary 
people of being unbelievers only because they did not follow precisely the 
theologian's steps, or because of their general ignorance of the shad'a. He 
regards this accusation as extravagant and excessive. According to al-Ghazäli, 
the true faith is the light from God which is given to the hearts of His servants. 
This can happen in many ways; for instance, by observing a pious man, 
accompanying him and studying under him. For al-Ghazali, anyone who thinks 
that the accomplishment of faith depends on the science of kaum and its 
proofs is a heretic. 102 
Al-Gha7ali: also taught that there are different types of people. Some 
can benefit from the science of kaum while some cannot accept it, indeed it 
may harm them. Al-Ghazäli believed that the basis of true belief is the Qur'än 
and haäith as well as purity of heart. 103 He says that anyone who worships God 
with real piety, constantly remembering God and renouncing worldly pleasure, 
may be honoured by the light of knowledge. This kind of knowledge will only 
be achieved after one has overcome the difficulty of believing and has been 
illuminated by God's light in his heart. 104 As God Himself says in the Qur'an, 
"Whomsoever Allah wills to guide, He opens his mind to the acceptance of 
'°1 Abi Himid al-Ghazili, Glib gawi`Id &I-`ageioo Ibyi, vol. 1, p. 127. See also, 
Kitib al-Slm, Ibye , voL 1, pp. 55-56, Eng. trans. pp. 104-105. 
1°2 Abu Hämid al-Ghazäli, Fay, sal al-ta6ýigah baina 1-Islem we -1"zandagaA p. 93. 
103 See above p. 69. 
104 Abu Hemid al-Ghazäli, . Nasal al-tafrigah baina 1--Islam wa -1-zandagah, pp. 94-95. 
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Islam"105 And God also says, "How enviable is the case of one whose mind 
Allah has prepared for the acceptance of Islam, so that he possesses a light 
from his Lord. "106 
Al-Ghazäli contends that if one intends to erase doubt and confusion, to 
discover the truth and to know the secret of faith, the best way is through the 
striving of the soul, restraining his desire, maintaining his full attention on God 
and keeping his mind from any sinful or useless discussion. It is the mercy of 
God that grants means of support to those people of good honour according to 
the degree of their belief, acceptance and cleanness of head. 107 This statement 
shows that al-Ghazäli was following the snff way to achieve the truth. He 
encourages people to strive towards the purification of their souls in order to 
gain complete happiness, and it is the purified soul that is able to receive true 
knowledge. 
As an Ash'arite theologian, 108 al-Ghazäli accepted the generalAsh`arite 
105 The Qur'an, 6: 125. 
106 The Qur'an, 39: 23. 
107 Abü Hamid al-Ghazal, Kit bgawi`id al-`age'id', lhyi, voL 1, p. 130. 
tos Ash'an to theology, though ultimately guided by the revelation, is formally conceptual, 
logical, and critical. It proves the truth of the basic articles of Muslim religious belief 
without formal appeal to any premise or thesis that is taken from religion as such. The 
Ash'arite theologians hold that rational speculation that is some minimal level of 
rational reflection on the basic truths of the revelation is required as a foundation of a 
valid religious assent. Ash 'ante theology is the school of theology for both Shafi' Pies 
and Milikites. But almost all the Hanbalites dissaproved of any form of rational 
theology as such. According to Frank in his book Al-GhaziJ and the Ash'arite School 
there are two general problems of al-Ghaziili's relation to the traditional theology. 
One is the few, diverse statements and conflicting statements that al-Ghaziilf makes 
when he discusses kalam as the traditional speculative theology of the schools. The 
other is that of the relationship between the theology of al-Ghazali and that of the 
Ash'arite school. Frank then concludes that there is a basic and integrated theoretical 
system that underlies al-Ghazali's logical and theological writings, but that al- 
Ghazali's basic theological system is fundamentally incompatible with the traditional 
teaching of the Ash 'ante school. This due to his perception of kaum as inadequate 
either to the attainment of genuine intellectual understanding or to the attainment of 
higher religious insight. Finally, Frank contends that al-Ghazil never composed a 
complete and systematic summary of his theology in formally conceptual terms. See R 
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view that man should never be encouraged to ask questions and discuss his 
faith as long as he is at peace with it in his heart. 109 Al-Ghazali viewed the 
science of kalam as useful to some extent. Dividing people into the the masses 
and elite (Awwim wa Khawäss), he held that the common people should be 
kept from studying kalam. Al-Ghazäli believed that science does not deal with 
the great issues of belief, which for him is part of the esoteric `ilm al- 
mukäshafa For him the faith of the mutakallimtºn was based on tag17d with the 
slight addition of defensive proofs. Faith that is founded on the science of 
kaum is weak, easily collapses and is incapable of reaching unwavering 
certainty. He warns of the dangers inherent in the science of kalrrm in his book 
Faisal al-tafWga. 110 Therefore al-Ghazäli taught that the study of this science 
was forbidden except in two cases. "The hesitating person, who might find in 
the science of kalr-un a solution of his doubts in his belief, after he could not be 
persuaded either by preaching or by traditional sayings (here the polemics 
might help), the wise and well-informed man, whose faith was unwavering 
(kiunil al- `aq1, risikh al-gadam fi-I-&n) and who sought, by means of kalsm, to 
save such a sceptic from his doubts, or to defend faith from dangerous 
innovations. ""' Generally, al-Ghazäli views the science of kah-un as a 
discipline that may cause more harm than benefit to someone who is not 
qualified to go deeply into it. It is better to keep away from water if one cannot 
swim. 
Al-Ghazäli introduced logic from the science of philosophy into the 
M. Frank, AI-Gbazir and the Ash'atite Scbooo pp. 7-8, p. 3, pp. 86-87, pp. 100-101. 
109 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in AI-Gbazzib, p. 384. 
10 Abu Hämid al-Ghazili, Faysal aJ-ta& qa beine 1-Islam we -I-zaadaga& pp. 93-94, see 
also, 
Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in A1-Ghazali, pp. 382-383. 
Abi Hamid a1-Ghazi , 
Faysal al-taiga baina 1-Islam wa -1-zandagab, p. 94, see also, 
Hava Lazarus Yafeh, Studies in AI-GhazeG, p. 383. 
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science of kalam. His efforts in kau m made this science clear and brought it 
within the reach of many Muslims. 112 Al-Ghazali was dissatisfied with the 
mutakalllmtm because in his view they attached too much importance to 
interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith accepted in earlier periods, which 
were not compatible with the advance of knowledge in Muslim society. He 
believed that new interpretations could and should be given to the words of 
God and His Prophet. ' 13 
As we have seen, al-Ghazäli writes in al-Mungidh that he had produced 
some works on the science of kalanm. 114 But these books either remain unknown 
or are so few that some biographers claim that he did not write on the science 
of kaum at all. In addition most of his biographers claim that al-Ghazäli did 
not excel in this science. But actually al-Ghazäli can be considered as one 
whose influence on the science of kalmm was as far reaching as that of Ibn 
Khaldim (733-808 A. H. /1332-1406 A. D. ). ' 15 
2.5.2. Al-Ghazälf and philosophy: Regarding philosophy, al-Ghazäl also 
studied logic under al-Juwaynf. During al-Ghazäli's lifetime, philosophy was 
mixed with religious matters. Studies in philosophy increased with the 
growing availability of translations of Greek philosophical works into Arabic. 
Philosophers are the people of logic. The expansion of philosophical studies 
made it necessary for scholars to prove religious matters through logic. A 
112 M. S. Stern, "Notes on the Theology of A1-Ghazzali's Concept of Repentance", Islamic 
Quarterly, vol. 1, No. 1, p. 82. 
"l M. Uimidullah, "Reviews on W. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of Al- 
Ghazali", The Islamic Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 63. 
114 Abü Himid al-Ghazid , a/-Mungidb, p. 66; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 
27. See also above p. 38. 
us `Abd al-Rahmen Ibn Khaldvn, a1-lbar we-triwen el-mublade' wa'l-kbebar, Part 6, Fesl 
10, pp. 821-838. 
75 
renowned scholar, al-Ghazäli was sufficiently interested to study and master 
the science himself. In addition, since the philosophers used logic rather than 
any revealed knowledge to reach their conclusions, al-Ghazal tried to discover 
the answer to his doubt in this science. He then found that their knowledge 
actually originated from the teachings of the old prophets and some was 
influenced by the teachings of the si'ffs, for example their theory of ethics 116 
The era of al-Ghazäli was the era of the battle between the religion of 
Islam and philosophy in which al-Ghazal himself played an important rolei'7 
So, he might have studied philosophy in depth in order to cleanse religion of 
the mixture of various cultural influences, one of them being Greek philosophy. 
Some of the heresies that occurred in al-Ghazali's day stemmed from 
thinkers such as Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato and Aristotle. People were 
deceived by the exaggerations made by their followers regarding their 
extraordinary intellectual powers: " 
that the principles they have discovered are 
unquestionable: that the mathematical, logical, 
physical and metaphysical sciences developed by 
them are the most profound: that their excellent 
intelligence justifies their bold attempts to 
discover the hidden Things by deductive 
methods; and that with all the subtlety of their 
intelligence and the originality of their 
116 This shows that all knowledge actually originated from revealed knowledge. 
117 McCarthy, Frcedon4 p. xi. 
Its Abu- Humid al-Ghazäli, TahWut, p. 38; tr. by Sabib Ahmad Kamali, AI-Ghazäü's 
Tahifut, p. 2. 
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accomplishments they repudiated the authority 
of religious laws: denied the validity of the 
positive contents of historical religions, and 
believed that all such things are only 
sanctimonious lies and trivialities. 19 
People tend to follow the philosophers in order to feel that they are 
higher than the common people. "They flattered themselves with the idea that 
it would do them honour not to accept even truth uncritically. But they had 
actually begun to accept falsehood uncritically. " 20 
Philosophers, according to al-Ghazäll, are those who produce various 
speculations. They are the people of heresy. These heresies originated from an 
uncritical acceptance of other philosophers' views. Al-Ghazali's book Magssid 
al-faläsifa demonstrates a broad and deep knowledge of philosophy. However, 
the arguments presented in this work show that al-Ghazäli did not write only 
for the sake of knowledge; he rather sought to calm his own doubt and resolve 
his spiritual crisis. Following this, his Tahäfut al-faläsifa shows his further 
doubt of true knowledge and his search for proof by intellectual reasoning and 
logic. Both of these books were written before his retirement. 
Al-Ghazäli wrote the Tahäfut al-falisifa in 488 A. H. /1095 A. D. while 
he was teaching at the Nizämiyyah Madrasah in Baghdad. He wrote the book 
to refute the philosophers by exposing the incoherence of their beliefs and the 
inconsistencies of their metaphysical theories. "It will bring to light the 
119 Abu- Hemid al-Ghaznli, Ta7rafut, p. 38; Ir. by Sabib Ahmad Kamali, AI-Ghazar's 
Tahel'ut, p. 2. 
120 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, Te6äföt, p. 38; tr. by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, A]-Gbaziri's 
Tahäfut, p. 2. 
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flimsiest and the obscurest elements of their thought which will provide some 
amusement for, and serve as a warning to, the intelligent men. "lzt Here al- 
Ghazäli meant those beliefs and opinions, by virtue of which they thought they 
could be distinguished from the common people. 
In Tahsfut al-falasifa al-Ghazal employed his policy of not refuting 
any doctrine before mastering it himself. He therefore stated the ancient 
philosophers' doctrines first before refuting them. He declared his aim: "This 
will serve the purpose of making it clear to the hide-bound atheist of our day 
that every piece of knowledge, whether ancient or modem, is really a 
corroboration of the faith in God and in the Last Day. The conflict between 
faith and knowledge is related only to the details superadded to these two 
fundamental principles, the two regular themes in the teachings of all 
prophets. "'22 His purpose was to criticise the error of those who believed that 
blindly accepting all the philosophers' teachings was an indication of 
intelligence: it would be better to hinder that acceptance. However, he argued 
that the philosophers were actually misunderstood. He attempted to 
demonstrate that the ancient philosophers in reality never denied the validity 
of the religious law. In fact, they did believe in God and did have faith in His 
messenger, but they had gone astray. And al-Ghazäli proposed to show how 
this happened in his Tahif 123 ut. 
Al-Ghazälf devoted two of his books Magssid al-faläsifa and Tahäfut 
al-falisifa, to summarising and criticising the views of the philosophers more 
121 Abi Hamid al-Ghazäli, Tabel'ut, pp. 38-39; tr. by Sabib Ahmad Kamali, Al-GbazäG's 
TabePut, p. 3. 
In Abu- Himid al-Ghazäli, Tahäfut, p. 39; tr. by Sabih Ahmad KamaG, AI-G6azäG's 
Tahefut, p. 3. 
113 Abll Hnmid al-Ghazäli, Tehefut, p. 39; tr. by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, AI-Gbazeri's 
Tahäl'ut, pp. 3-4. 
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thoroughly than in his other books such as al Mungidh, Faysal al-tafriga, a1- 
fgtisäd ff 1-i`tigäd and the Ihye. His doubt actually is related to philosophical 
questions such as the question of the reality of true or certain knowledge. 
These problems deserved examination from a new philosophical point of view, 
one that had not been tried by previous philosophers. 
AI-Ghazali said his scepticism occurred before he started studying the 
science of kalim, the Ismä`ilis' teachings, philosophy and Sufism. Yet some 
scholars have said it seems certain that the bout of scepticism, as he describes 
it, must have been preceded by some study of philosophy. 124 In addition, 
because he considered the seekers after truth to be four, one might suspect that 
he had studied these groups and others, previously. 
Al-Ghazhli made a clear distinction between mathematical logic and 
religious logic. Mathematics has nothing in common with religion. 125 Al- 
Ghazal 's view of philosophy is that as long as it stays within its own areas, it 
can be accepted. He made the science of philosophy easier to understand for 
the ordinary man. McCarthy remarks concerning the ancient philosophers: 
Before his time they had been surrounded, more 
or less, with mystery. The language used was 
strange; its vocabulary and technical terms had to 
be specially learned. No mere reader of the 
Arabic of the street or the mosque or the school 
could understand at once a philosophical tractate. 
Greek ideas and expressions, passing through a 
124 W. Montgomery Watt, Mz bm, p. 51. 
123 See previous p. 44. 
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Syriac version into Arabic, had strained to the 
uttermost the resources of even that most flexible 
tongue. A long training had been thought 
necessary before the elaborate and formal method 
of argumentation could be followed. All this al- 
Ghazäli changed, or at least tried to change. His 
Tähäfut is not addressed to scholars only; he 
seeks with it a wider circle of readers, and 
contends that the views, the arguments, and the 
fallacies of the philosophers should be perfectly 
intelligible to the general public. 126 
Al-Ghazäli's contributions in philosophy have brought to the science a clarity 
essential for its availability to the greater number of Muslims. '27 
Watt remarks that al-Ghazäli "was the leader in Islam's supreme 
encounter with Greek philosophy- that encounter from which Islamic theology 
emerged victorious and enriched, and in which Arabic Neoplatonism received a 
blow from which it did not recover. " 128 He was a master of Aristotelian logic 
and wrote well on it. He was also preoccupied with ancient physics and 
metaphysics especially the views of al-Färäbi and Ibn Sim. Al-Ghazäli 
benefited from his study of philosophy. He used logic in his arguments. He 
used the information he got from his study of philosophy to upgrade Sufism. 
Watt observes: "The achievement of al-Ghazäli was to master their technique 
126 McCarthy, Freedom, pp. Iii-Iiii. 
127 M. S. Stem, "Notes on the Theology of Al-Ghazz t 's Concept of Repentance, Islamic 
Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 82. 
128 W. Montgomery Watt, Introduction to The Faith, p. 13. 
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of thinking - mainly Aristotelian logic - and then, making use of that, to 
refashion the basis of Islamic theology, incorporate as much of the 
Neoplatonists' teaching as was compatible with Islam, and to expose the 
logical weakness of the rest of their philosophy. "129 
Al-Ghazäli would not admit that, in the case of a conflict between the 
sayings of God and Muhammad on the one hand, and the theories of Greek and 
Indian philosophers on the other, preference should be given to the latter. Blind 
belief (tagrd) in theories did not appeal to al-Ghazali who opposed immoral 
and irreligious tendencies in philosophical speculation. 130 Al-Ghazäli generally 
opposed faith based on tagrd 131 He even stressed that this kind of faith can 
prevent one from accepting religious truth and may make it difficult for him to 
accept even a vision of the truth. However, he was prepared to welcome this 
kind of faith in the case of ordinary people. 132 
2.5.3. Al-Ghazäli and the Ismä'ilis: The reasons al-Ghazili studied the 
Ismä'ilis, are connected to the political situation in which he lived. The 
political conditions of his time were rife with agitation and turmoil. Men were 
divided into Shi `ites and Sunnis, Ash'arites, Mu'tazilites and scholastic 
philosophers. The Abbasid Caliphate was declining. 133 The caliph lost his 
power. The Saljnq Sultan dominated the army and politics. The danger of the 
Isma'ilis was increasing. It reached its peak when they assassinated Nizäm al- 
129 W. Montgomery Watt, Introduction to The Faith, p. 11. 
130 M. Hämidullah, "Reviews on W. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of Al- 
Ghazali", The Islamic Quarterly, voL 1, No.. 1, p. 63. 
131 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazä , al-Mungidb, p. 58; Ir. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 19. 
132 Abi Iiämid al-Ghazili, al-Mrmgidk pp. 67-68; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, p. 28. 
133 See Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and The Age oftbeCaliphate; pp. 158-199. 
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Mulk in 485/1092.134 Behind them were the Fatimids, "a dynasty which 
established itself first in Tunisia in 909, and then in 969 transferred the seat of 
its power to Egypt. The Fatimid rulers claimed to be the rightful caliphs of the 
whole Islamic world, and sent emissaries into the Abbasid domains to preach 
revolution . 
035 Maybe their propaganda caused al-Ghazäli's concern, but 
certainly he was aware of the danger of the Isms' lis' teachings when he 
undertook to study them carefully in order to refute them. 136 In theMungidh he 
states that it was about the time he started to study about ta`rm that the 
Caliph asked him to write a book showing what their religious system really 
was. 137 
Hamidullah, reviewing Watt's translation of al-Mungidh, comments, 
regarding the Isma'ilis, "Al-Ghaziff's reply was simple: If chauvinism and 
blind faith in the infallibility of a human being are to be admitted, why should 
the object of this faith not be Muhammad, who is admitted to be the 
Messenger of God, rather than the head of the sect, particularly as 
Muhammad's teachings, unlike those of the Bitiniyyaf; are open and 
accessible to all men. " 138 
2.5.4. Sufism: As for Sufism, the discussion is best divided into two parts. 
Before we consider Sufism with reference to al-Ghazali, a general picture of its 
development follows. 
134 David Morgan, Medieval Persia, p. 32. 
135 W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim, p. 12, see also David Morgan, Medieval Persia, p. 43. 
136 McCarthy, Freedom, pp. ix-x. 
13' Abu- 1.1amid a1-Ghazäli, al-Munqidb, pp. 86-87; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, p. 45. 
us Abü liämid al-Ghazäli, al-Muagidh, p. 88; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Fait , pp. 47-48. See also, M. Hemidullah, "Reviews on W. Montgomery Wait: The Faith and 
Practice of Al-Ghazali", The Islamic Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 63. 
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2.5.4.1. The Meanings of Sufism: 
Sufism is the name given to the Islamic mysticism that can be defined 
as "the mystical movement of an uncompromising monotheism. "' 39 
A number of arguments and discussions within Sufism have occurred 
since the systematisation of this branch of knowledge. The reason for this may 
be the importance of Sufism, whose expansion has resulted in reconsiderations 
of various aspects of the way, the most obvious and noteworthy of which have 
involved the derivation of the word s07itself. 
Etymologically, various derivations have been suggested for the word 
s Some orientalists agree that the word derives from the Greek sophia 
meaning wisdom (hiknah). For example, in 1893 Adalbert Merx said that the 
word criif must come from the Greek sophos, meaning wise. He answered the 
objection that a Greek 's' stands for the letter sin ( 
_,,, 
) in Arabic rather than 
the letter sad ( ý, 
) as in c0i' , responding with many examples in which a 
Greek's' does correspond to an Arabic cad In addition, Sufism was influenced 
by the neo-Platonist tradition within Greek philosophy. 140 
But some Muslims rejected this definition. Their scholars argued that 
Sufism is an expansion of the esoteric form of the religion of Islam and has no 
connection with either Greek or Aryan influences. Again, they said that in the 
first and second centuries of the Islamic era Muslim intellectuals were far too 
much occupied in furthering their own system of ethics, and had neither the 
inclination nor any incentive to neglect what was their own in order to learn a 
139 A. J. Arberry, Sufism, p. l 1 
140 Mein, E. 0. A., Idee und Grundlinien einer allgemeinen Geschichte der Myslih 
(Heidelberg: J. Homing, 1893), cited in Julian Baldick, MysticelIslam, p. 31. 
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foreign culture. They stressed that poetry, which had become a passion within 
the Arab countries before Islam, was almost cast off in favour of Muslim 
theological activities. 141 
In addition they said that the attributes of snft s are mentioned in the 
Qur'an itself, which refers to such people as Mugarrabtin (men who are near to 
God), $' blrtin (men who are patient), Abrir(virtuous men), and Zuhhäd (pious 
men). Therefore this derivation was definitely rejected by the sufs themselves. 
Muslims argued that Sufism developed from the esoteric side of Islam that 
rejected its connection with any Greek influences. Another argument was that 
the study of Neoplatonic philosophy by Muslims only started in the third 
century of the age of Islam. This study was started by the caliph al-Ma`mun 
and continued until his successor, the caliph al-Mansur. This resulted in the 
translation of various books of Greek philosophy into the Arabic language. 142 
Some said that the süffs were named after their purity and sincerity 
toward God. Nevertheless this opinion seems to be based on an assumption, for 
if the term suiiwere from , saIi-' 
(purity) then the correct form derived from it 
would be ca/iwiyab and not safyah. '43 
There are others who said that the word was derived from the first rank 
(. yaE, meaning that ýütis are people who are in the first rank before God. This 
is because of their desire to cleanse their hearts of everything save God. 144 
141 lkbal All Shah, Islamic Safism pp. 16-17. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ab u- Bakt al-Katibidhi, Klub al-la `rrufli-madhab ahl al-tasawwuf, pp. 24-25; tr. by 
A. J. Arberry, The Doctrine of The Sufis, p. 9 
'44 Abü Bakr al-Kaläbädhl, Kitäb al-ta `arr4p. 21; tr. by A. J. Arberty, The Doctrine of The 
S1ifils, p. 5. 
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Some even said it derived from the first row (cafawwaI in performing 
prayer because there were people during the life of the Prophet Muhammad 
(p. b. u. h. ) who used to come to the mosque early, before the call to prayer 
(adhan), to be in the first row after the imam. 
It is said that on the Day of Resurrection a group 
of people will be assembled, their faces like 
shining stars. The angels will ask them: 'How did 
you conduct yourselves in life? ' To this they will 
reply: On hearing the Call to Prayer, we used to 
set about our ablutions, letting nothing else 
distract us. ' Another group will then be 
assembled, their faces like radiant moons. In 
answer to the same question, they will say: 'We 
used to make our ablutions ahead of time. ' The 
next group to be assembled will have faces like 
sun. They will say: 'We used to hear the Call to 
Prayer inside the Mosque. 't45 
It is related that early believers used to 
commiserate with themselves for three days if 
they missed the first 'AUshu Akbar+. ' and for a 
whole week if they missed the congregational 
prayer altogether. '46 
The most common suggestion is that süfr came from the word süf, 
145 Abi Hamid al-Ghazili, Kilib asrär al-soläb, 4yä; vol. 1, p. 198, English trans. by 
Muhtar Holland, Inner Dimensions oflslamic Worships p. 25. 
146 Ibid. 
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meaning wool. This denotes the woollen robe that men who devoted 
themselves to the mystic life would wear. '`' It was the practice of the pious to 
wear wool as a sign of their asceticism (zuhd). Wool that was cheap, long- 
lasting and rough was suitable for those who live without wealth. The habit of 
wearing wool seems to go back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad 
(p. b. u. h. ) and his companions. 149 
Some relate the süfi to the people of the bench (ah! al-suf kb) at the 
time of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ). Historically they were poor people 
who travelled to Medina to become Muslim. The Prophet Muhammad 
(p. b. u. h. ) gave them a place at the end part of the mosque in which to live. 
Later on, they became the people who devoted themselves totally to Islam. It 
was their practice to wear wool for ascetic reasons. It is said that some of them 
resumed travelling after becoming Muslim. '49 
Briefly, all these opinions (save the first definitions) tried to 
demonstrate the süfi s' inner disposition as well as their external qualities. They 
also suggest that there is a relationship between the meaning of the word sü 
and the characteristics of the snfi s or link the meaning with their practices. For 
example, wearing wool, living in asceticism (zuhd) and indigence are their 
external values; purity and desire for God are their internal virtues. None of 
these derivations are absolutely convincing from the linguistic point of view, 
though the derivation from the word if is the most likely. 
147 H. AR Gibb and J. H. Kramer, '°Tasawwuf', Shorter Encyclopaedia OfJslam, p. 579. 
148 Abu Bakr al-Kalnbädhi, Klub al-ta'arruC pp. 22-23; tr. by AJ. Arberry, The Doctrine 
of the Suüs, pp. 6-7. 
149 Abu- Bakr al-Kalibädhi, Klub al-ta'arruC pp. 21-22; tr. by AJ. Arberry, The Doctrine 
of'T he Suffs, pp. 5-6. See also, Ibn al-Jawzi, Talbis lb/s, p. 167. 
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However, the derivation from the 'people of the bench' (ahl al-suffah) 
seems to suggest a more suitable source from the historical point of view. 
These people devoted themselves totally to God despite living in poverty, for 
they took it as a test from Him. The Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) himself 
lived modestly and they followed his example. Among the companions of the 
Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) who were from the ah! al-sufi`ah were Salman al- 
Farisi (d. 35/655) and `Ammar b. Yasir (d. 37/ 657). 10 In addition, this 
derivation (ahl at-; sufah) contains all the necessary meanings such as inner 
purity and outward cleanliness, both which are ah! a/-suffafs virtues, as 
opposed to defilement and corruption. Wearing söf (wool) which was the 
practice of ah! al-suffab, together with their withdrawal from worldly affairs, 
living in poverty and asceticism (zuhd) by denying the material pleasures, 
travelling and turning their hearts towards God, coming early to the 
congregational prayer (for they lived at the end corner of the mosque): thus are 
combined all the elements from the possible derivations mentioned above. This 
term perhaps came to be used after the time of the Prophet Muhammad 
(p. b. u. h. ) to indicate people who devote themselves wholly to God or live 
according to the ways of ah! a! -suffah. 
Abu Hashim `Uthmän b. Shank from Kufa (d. 160/776) is supposed to 
have been the first individual to have been called a Sufi. Then this practice 
became common: the term referred to those who practised modesty. 151 
However, Abi Nair al-Sarräj (d. 378/988) in his Klub al-lumi'wrote that the 
word süfi had already been mentioned during the time of Hasan al-Ba$ff (d. 
110/728). 152 Whereas ýifis themselves use the term srifto refer only to those 
150 Al-Ilusayd, Jam6arab aAawliyi' wa aYam abl at-tasawwul; p. 35. See also, Abü 
Nu'aim al-Isfahäni, Hilyat al-awliyä ; vol. 1, pp. 139-143,185-208. 
131 A. J. Arberry, Sulisam, p. 35. 
152 Abu- Narr al-Sarräj, Klub al-Imwa `fi 1 tasawwul; p. 22. 
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who have reached the point of the; arigah. '53 
The truth is, the . 5-Uff s themselves realised that there was no such word 
as swat the time of the Prophet Mubammmad (p. b. u. h. ). However, this is not 
important. What matters here is not whether the term existed during the 
period, it is rather the realisation and understanding of the spiritual and ascetic 
pietism that originated from the Revelation (al-Qur'an), and the Doctrine of 
Tawhid (unity of God) as the fundamental bases for the Science of Sufism 
('Jim al-tasawwutj that will be taken into consideration. 154 
Looking back to the origins of Sufism takes us back to the time of the 
Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ). 155 His simple life, full of piety and asceticism, 
stands as the example for Muslims. During his life as a prophet and even before 
he became the Prophet, he used to go to the Jabal an-Nut, where the cave of 
H/i 'is, for his spiritual retreats and seclusion in order to remove himself from 
the misled society of the ignorant Arabs of that time. 156 The ýüfi s BiIäl b. 
Rabah (d. 20/641) and Abu- Dharr al-Ghifän (d. 32/652-3) were among his early 
companions. Others came from ahl al-cuf ah and led a contemplative and 
saintly existence in the Prophet's (p. b. u. h. ) mosque. 157 
153 Victor Danner, "The Necessity for the Rise of The Sufi", Journal Studies in Comparative 
Religion, vol. 6, no. 2, Spring. Tarigah-a way, method, way to God, the Snit Way to God 
or Tadq walsyah (the way of the saint/ wa/). The term is also used for both the social 
organization and the special devotional exercises that are the basis of the order's ritual 
and structure-Definitions from "Sufism: Süff Orders" in The Oxford Encyclopaedia of The 
Modern Islamic World- voL4, pp. 109-117. 
154 G. W. Davis, Art, "Sufism; From Its Origin to AI-Ghazäfi", The Muslim World voL 38, 
p. 241. 
iss Massignon, Essei sur les Origiues du Lexique terhuique de la Mystique musulmant 
Paris, 1922 as cited in H. A. R. Gibb, Mobamamedanisni p. 128. 
156 Häshim Ma ivf A1-Husayni, Sirat al-muslarg pp. 102-103. 
157 Al-Husayni, Jambarab a1-awliyä' wa a'lem abl at-lasawwut; vol. 1, pp. 35,39,46-47. 
See also, Abu Nu'aim al-Isfahäni, Hilyat al-awliyä ; vol. 1, pp. 147-151,156-170. 
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Ascetic practices developed rapidly during the period of the followers 
(täbi`ün). Among the most influential figures was Hasan al-Basri (d. 
110/728). 155 After the 2nd. /8th. Century onward, however, men became 
inclined toward a worldly life due to the expansion of Muslim civilisation. 
Many groups, such as the Kharijites, Murji'ites, Shiites, Sunnis, and 
Mu'tazilites emerged. Each of them claimed to represent an authentic Islam. 
Furthermore the need arose for the systematisation of sciences within the 
religion of Islam, such as figh, kalam, tafsir, and had1th, and this also happened 
to Sufism. The term 71m al-tasawwuf, denoting such a science, emerged and 
became widely used. 159 
Distinguished figures such as Däwzld at-Ta'r (d. 162/782), lbrhhim b. 
Adham160 (d. 165/782), Räbi `a al- `Adawiyai6' (d. 185/801), Fudayl b. `Iyad'62 
(d. 187/803) and Ma`rtif a1-Karkhi 63 (d. 199/815) were among those who were 
acclaimed within the gnfi traditions. Däwüd at-Ta`i was included in the early 
preserved silsilas (chain) given by al-Qushayri (d. 465 /1074) in his book ar- 
Risäla164 Ibrahim b. Adham was born in Khuräsan and was among the 
prominent gaffs in 2/8 century. He was famous for his generosity and 
138 A. J. Arberry, Muslim Saints and Mystics, pp. 19-25. This book is the translation of 
Episodes from the Tadhrdzit al-awhyi' by Fari: d alb n `Attar. See also, Abi Nu aim al- 
Isfahäni, J ilyat al-awliyi vol. 2, pp. 131-132. 
1591bn Khaldiin, Mugaddimab, p. 469, Eng. trans. by Franz Rosenthal, vol. 3, pp. 80-81. 
160 Al-Husayni, Jambarah &I-awiiyi' wa a'Imn ahl at-tasawwul, vol. 1, pp. 122-124, pp. 
125-132. 
161 A. J. Arberry, Muslim Saints and Mystics, pp. 39-51. 
162 See Al-Husaynf, Jambarab aJ-awbyi' wa a'Iam abI at-tasawwuf vol. 1, pp. 132-134. 
t63 Ibid, pp. 142-144. 
164 J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, p. 261 
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asceticism as well as for his remarkable achievement of self-denial. 165 
Ra^bi`a al-'Adawiya al-Kaysiyya was a famous female soff of Baca 
where she spent the whole of her life. She was born into a poor family in 
95/714 or 99/717-18 and later she was kidnapped and sold as a slave. She 
became an ascetic and spent the rest of her life as an extreme snfi . 
She 
practised a famous doctrine of pure love, or unconditional love for the sake of 
God alone, known as `ilm al-mahabba. Her most famous prayer was: "0 my 
Lord, if I worship Thee from fear of Hell, burn me therein, and if I worship 
Thee in hope of Paradise, exclude me thence, but if I worship Thee for Thine 
own sake, then withhold not from me Thine Eternal Beauty. "166 
Regarding her love for the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h) she said, "I 
love him, but love of the Creator has turned me aside from love of His 
creatures. " Besides her teaching of true love (mahabba) she was famous for her 
concept of the fellowship with God (uns) which is the pre-occupation of His 
lover. Räbi`a, like other süff s, aimed at union with God (was/). She was the 
first §üfi to introduce the doctrine of the unveiling vision of God (kashf)167 
Fudayl b. `Iyäd, who was a disciple of Sufyan al-Thawn, was born in 
Samarqand but grew up in Abiward. He went to Ku-fa to study had th. He said 
that the servant's fear of God results from his knowledge of God and 
satisfaction (ridä) with God, and is attained by those close to God. He was 
described as an ascetic who lived only for God. 169 
163 Abu- Nu hym at-Isfahäui, Hilyat al-awGyä ; vol 7, pp. 367-369,371-384. 
'56 Tnhä Abd a1-$äqf Surur, Räbi `ab al- `Adawiyab wa'1 beysl akü¢iyab 1'i 1-Isläm, p. 70. 
167 Ibid, pp. 74-78. 
168 Abu Nu laym al-Isfahäni, Hilyat a! -awliye voL 8, pp. 84-85,89. 
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Ma`rüf al-Karkhi 69 was one of the most famous early ýüfi s in Baghdad. 
He was honoured as a saint and his tomb in Baghdad became a popular shrine. 
His name has been included in many of the süfi orders' silsilas (chains of 
origin). Other early ýüi"i s include al-Härith b. Asad al-Muhäsibi (d. 243/857170 
who was a teacher of al-Junayd al-Baghdadi (d. 295/9 10), Dhü 'l-Nün al-Misr[ 
(d. 246/861) and Abü Yazid al-Bistami (d. 261/875)171 Al-Ijanth b. Asad al- 
MO asibi was born in Basa but spent most of his life in Baghdad where he 
died. He was famous for his idea of the examination of conscience. He was 
opposed by some sunnis and even among the süf'i s for they said this idea 
suggests that it is man who judges his own actions. But what al-Muhäsibi 
really meant is that all man's initiative comes from God. It is not men who 
judge their own actions, rather it is God who gives light to human hearts to 
make them realise their faults. As for the a1-tawwäbrm (people who repent), 
the realization of their faults is achieved by fear (khawij and hope (raji) 
towards God: both are gifts and favours from God Himself. ln 
Among at-Muhäsibi's works are Risilat mältiyyat al- `aql wa lma `nah 
(Concerning the Intelligence), Kitäb al-ri `äya li huquq Allah (Book of 
Observance of the Rights of God) and Kitrtb al-tawahhum we a1--ahwäl (Book 
of Supposition and the Terrors to Come). 173 He counted on reflection and 
reason in explaining the text of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ). But he rejected the extreme rationalism of the 
169 Ibid, pp. 360-368. 
170 See Margaret Smith, AI-Mubisibi: An Early Mystic ofBagbdao p. 5. 
171 A. J. Arberry, Sufisa; p. 46-54. 
172 Margaret Smith, Al-Mubisibl: AnEarly MysticofBagbda4 pp. 150-198. 
173 lbid, pp. 44-59. 
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Mu'tazilites on the createdness of the Qur'an: According to al-Mubasibi the 
divine word is uncreated but the letters of the Qur'an are created. '74 
Al-Junayd al-Baghdädi was a respected snff during his lifetime and is 
now one of the most celebrated siiff s; indeed some have regarded him as the 
greatest snf% His father was a glass-merchant. Al-Junayd was a disciple of Sari 
al-Sagäti who was also his uncle, and he was a close friend to al-Muhdsibi. He 
was the greatest exponent and the chief expounder of the 'sober' school of 
Sufism. Some of his surviving theories come from the letters he wrote to his 
contemporaries and some from his teachings. AI-Junayd was famous for his 
strictness, caution and sobriety, He defined tasawwuf as ethics (khu/y). 175 
Al-Junayd's doctrine is built on two pillars: the covenant and the 
'passing away', which are closely connected. The covenant is the promise from 
God that He makes those His friends who reply when He calls them. Since men 
originally come from God, they strive to be in Him again after their temporary 
disseveration from Him. This is referred to as 'passing away' (faný? ). 176 Al- 
Junayd died in Baghdad and the Junaydiyya school is among the influential 
schools of Sufism. 
Dhü 'I-Nun al-Misri was a contemporary of al-Muhdsibi 177 As his name 
indicates, he was born in Egypt. He was the first who tried to explain snff 
doctrines and systematised the mystic states (ahwiO and stations (magämät). 
He had many followers both during his lifetime and after his death. He held 
174 Ibid, pp. 253-256. 
175 Al-Subki, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 308. 
176 Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam, pp. 44 - 45. 
177 Abu- Nu'aym al-Isfahäni, Hilyat al-awliyi, vol. 9, pp. 331-395. See also, A. J. Arberry, 
SufIsm, p. 52. 
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that hardship can be one of the means of spiritual progress. Gnosis (rna`rifa) 
according to him is a saint's knowledge, which he characterised as knowledge 
of the attributes of the Unity. Dhu'1-Nun al-Misri was a great sufi but none of 
his works have come to light; his teaching is known from the works of other 
writers. 
Ab- Yazi d al-Bistimi was a friend of aI-Misri178 He was another famous 
süfi. His shatahät (ecstatic utterances) shocked other snfi s. Among them are 
"Subhani ! mä a `zamä sha `ni" (Glory be to me! How great is my majesty), "I 
am the well-preserved Tablet", "I am the throne and the footstool". Because of 
these utterances he created problems for Islamic mysticism and its acceptance 
by mainstream Islam. 
By the 5th. /11th. Century, Sufism had strengthened and spread 
throughout many Muslim countries. This period produced two distinguished 
su-ffs whose teachings and practices integrated orthodoxy and Sufism. They 
were Abu- al-Qasim al-Qushayrf (d. 465/1072) whose famous book, al- 
Risälah,! 79 is a synthesis of Sufism and orthodoxy, and Abdullah al-Ansärf (d. 
481/1088). Also during this period the historian Abu- Nu'aym al-Isfahänf (d. 
430/1038) wrote a work on , Uff biography and individual doctrine titled Hilyat 
al-A wliy0' . 
180 
There were other important mainstream süffs who integrated 
mainstream Islam and Sufism and tried to extricate the teachings of Sufism 
17s Abi Nu äym a1-Isfahäni, Nilyat al-awliye ; vol. 10, pp. 33-42. See also, A. J. Arberry, 
Sursn; p. 54. 
179 Al-Qushayr 
, 
'Abd al-Karim ibn Ilawzin, (986-1072 A. D), al-Risälab al-Qushayiiyab, 
edited by 'Abd al-Half m Mahmüd and Mahmiid Ibn al-Sharif, Cairo, 1966. 
180 Abu- Nu `aim al-Isfahäni, Ahmad ihn `Abd Allah al-Isfahäni, (948-1038 A. D)Hilyat al- 
awllyä' wa-t abaget al-asrye; Beirut, 1988, in 11 volumes. 
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from external influences such as those of Christianity. The ultimate concern 
was to recreate Sufism as it had been during the time of the Prophet 
Muhammmad (p. b. u. h. ) and his companions, which was the golden age of 
Sufism. '5' A1-Ghazali was one of the most important figures in this group. 
In the 6th. /12th. Century, Sufism became more institutionalised with 
the founding of the snfi orders ((arigab). The development of Khänagihs or 
Zswiyas (meeting places of sir, s for their devotional practices) later increased. 
The main areas where the süf1- turuq developed were Mesopotamia, Khuräsan 
and the Maghrib. Mesopotamia covered the areas of Baghdad, Syria and 
Egypt. 192 Although the Mesopotamian tradition does not represent all areas, it 
is held to be the only and best way to learn about Arabian Sufism. The various 
lines in this area seem to have coalesced into two major ones: Suhrawardi and 
the Rifa'F 193 Within this tradition, some masters were not included in the lines 
but nonetheless played important roles. However, no silsilas (chains) were 
named after them. Among these masters was Aýmad al-Ghazalf, the younger 
brother of the great Muhammad al-Ghazälf. 
2.5.4.2. Sufism in reference to al-Ghazal: 
Al-Ghazali s studies ofSufism are important because from them derive 
both his theory of knowledge and his theory of the soul. After his experiences 
as a ý5ff, al. Ghazälf came of necessity to a realization of the truth of prophetic 
revelation, as mentioned above, and that man was constituted of body and 
181 Abi Bakr Sirij ad-Din, Art, "The Origin of Sufism", The Islamic Quarterly, voL 38, p. 
241. 
182 J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sirr Orders in Islams p. 31. 
183 Ibid, p. 32. 
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soul. '" Al-Ghazäli affirms the possibility of esoteric knowledge as claimed by 
the ýüff s. One can accept this if he knows the power of the human soul and its 
qualities. l85 Thus, al-Ghazali's acceptance of the s iff way was important in 
determining and contributing to his theory of knowledge as well as his theory 
of the soul. Hence, it is worth considering the nature of al-Ghazäfi's Sufism. 
During al-GhazaIT's time Sufism was widely influential in his native 
country, and its practice sometimes involved excesses. 1S6 As we have seen, al- 
Ghazal considered sitffs as one of the four seekers after truth because Sufism 
was so common among the population. By studying it in detail he would be 
able to redefine it based on the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad's (p. b. u. h. ) 
traditions and free it from the alien influences. 
Al-Ghazäli actually tried to cleanse Sufism of its excesses. He always 
stressed the importance of genuine Sufism, which he claimed was the path to 
attain absolute truth. '87 His books which discuss Sufism are the Ihyi' `uliun al- 
din, Bidäyat al-hidiyah, l" al-Magcad al-asnä'8' and Kimiyä-i sa`ida 190 (in 
Persian). These books concern his ýnfi teachings, and thelhyi'can be seen as a 
184 Abi Hämid at-Ghazi , el-Mungidh, 
(MR) p. 71; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, p. 74. 
! 65 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazili, al-Risäla al-laduaiyya p. 57, Eng. trans. p. 189. 
186 McCarthy, Freedom, p. xi. 
187 See above, p. 55. 
1" In vol. 5 of Majmü'at rasi'i1 &I-bmam al-GbaziI, Beirut, 1988. Its part ial English 
translation by W. Montgomery Watt, in The Faith and Practice ofA1-Gbaziri, pp. 93- 
168. 
189 AI-Magsad al-esni 6 sharp ms ` ssma' Allih al- 4wni A English translation by 
McCarthy, Appendix IV, in Freedom and Fulfllment. Also by David B. Burrell and 
Nazih Daher, Al-Gbaziff The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God The Islamic Text 
Society Cambridge, 1995. 
190 Kimiyä al-sa'adab, Tehran, 1976, English translation from the Hindustani by Claud 
Field, The Alchemy offfappiaess, London, 1910. 
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complete guide for the devout Muslim to every aspect of Muslim life, and 
particularly to the path to the stiff- way of life. In addition, the Ihye' is suitable 
for all levels of readers. However, Rawdat al-talibin, 191 Mishkät al-anwii92, 
It zan al-a ma1,193 Mukäshafat al-Qulüb194, al-Rrsälo al-laduniyya'95 and 
Minhaj al- `äbiýn196 are more specifically concerned with al-Ghazali's theory of 
Sufism than is the Ihyri . 197 The character of his Sufism has been described by 
Saeed Sheikh: "His is surely a sober kind of mysticism carefully eschewing all 
kinds of pantheistic extravagances and severely criticising the antinomian 
tendencies of the intoxicated süfi s. "98 
191 Abu Hamid al-Ghazef, al-Rawdat al-tilibi4 Cairo, 1344 A. Ii. 
192 Mishkit alanwer, Cairo, A. H. 1322. Beirut, 1990 (edited by Badi' al-Lahham). It is 
also available in the fourth book of Majmu'at rasi'il al-ImRm al-Gbazalt, Beirut, 1994, 
and in an English translation by William H. T. Gairdner, The NicheForLigbts, 
London, 1924 or Lahore, 1952. W. H. T. Gairdner also wrote an article titled "Al- 
Ghazali's Mishkät al-Anwar and the Ghazeli problem", inDerlslacm vol. 4,1914, pp. 
196-197. Mishkit al-anwir seems to have been written during A1-Ghazäll's period of 
retirement and seclusion, in the years 488-499 A. H., but its authenticity has been 
doubted. (See `Abd al-Rahmen al-Badawi, Mu'allalät al-Gbazili, Cairo, 1961, p. 17. ) See 
W. Montgomery Watt's article "A Forgery in al-Ghazäli's Mishket" in Journal of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, (JRAS), London, 1949, pp. 5-22. 
193 Miizin al-"ama4 Cairo, 1342 A. H. Translated into French by Dr. Hikmat Hashim 
and submitted for his PhD. degree at the University of Paris in 1945 under the title Al- 
Gbaziii. Oitere de faction (Mtzin a! -`amab. See `Abd al-Rahmen al-Badewi, Mu'allafit 
al-Ghazni, p. 81. 
194 Mukisbafat al-Qulrib al-Mugarrab ill badhrat `slam al-gbuyüb h 'ilm al-lasawwu/, 
Cairo, 1978, edited by Abd al-Majid Halabi, Beirut, 1996. 
195 Al-Risila al-ladrmiyya was written during al-Ghazäli's period of retirement and 
seclusion, from 488-499 A. H. as the Mishkit al-anwir. (See 'Abd al-Rahmin al-Badaw'i, 
Mu'allaJiI al-Gbazil, p. 17). It is available in the tbird book of Majmri'al rasi'il al- 
Imim al-GbaziG, Beirut, 1994. English translation by Margaret Smith in Journal of 
the Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS), 1938, Part II, p. 191. 
i96 Minbij al-`ibiäin was written during his late years, around 503-505 A. H. (See 'Abd al- 
Rahman al-Badawi, Mu'allaJt el-Gbazifp. 17. ) There are translations in French and 
Turkish. (See Abd al-Rahmiin al-Badawi, Mu'allalst &I-Gbazi1, p. 237. ) 
197 Margaret Smith, p. 227. 
For example, in al-Risäla al-laduuiyya, al-Ghazili's discussion of the nature of 
knowledge, its different types, and the means by which it is acquired, includes the 
knowledge of the snfis. See pp. 257-260. 
19"M. Saeed Sheikh, "Al-Ghazäli: A Mysticism", in A History ofMuslim Philosophy, vol. 1, 
p. 617. 
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Certain important figures in al-Ghazäli's life such as his brother 
Ahmad, al-Juwayni and al-Farmädhi were important influences on his Sufism. 
His brother Ahmad al-Ghazäli (d. 520/1126) was also a noted gnfi. 
Ahmad al-Ghazäli had been more drawn to Sufism than his brother 
since their childhood, while they were under the entrusted guardianship of their 
father's Off friend after his death; since when he had devoted himself to süfi 
teachings. '" His ýýff teachers included Abü `Ali alFarmädhi (d. 477/1084) 
who was also the teacher of his brother Muhammad while he was at 
Nishäpür. 200 
Ahmad, in contrast to his brother who represented the 'sober' school of 
Sufism, was an important figure in the 'intoxicated' wing. 20' He was a director 
of souls with a number of disciples who later carried on his teachings. Some 
among his ýu-ft lineage became important representatives of the ýüf orders 
such as his disciple Abdul Qa-hir Abu- Najib as-Suhrawardi (d. 563/1168 AD. ), 
the founder of the Suhrawardiyya Al mad's theory of love made him famous as 
a master of love Sufism 202 Some have considered Ahmad al-Ghazal l's 
contribution to Sufism to be greater than that of his brother. According to 
Annemarie Schimmel: 
There is little doubt that Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, 
the great reviver of religious sciences, appealed 
199 A1-Subki, Tabagat, vol. 6, p. 60. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Julian Baldick, Myst; calIslam, p. 66. 
202 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions oulslag pp. 294-295. 
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to the average Muslim and is largely responsible 
for forming the moderately mystical outlook of 
Islamic society in the Middle Ages, but neither in 
depth of experience nor in beauty of language can 
he compete with his younger brother Ahmad. In 
fact, the 'Muslim Intellectual' Abü Hamid is 
reported to have acknowledged his brother's 
superiority in the path of love. 203 
Baldick writes that Ahmad's influence on Sufism can be considered 
greater even than that of his brother. 204 Besides being a distinguished scholar 
and s5fl, Ahmad al-Ghazair was known as a great and successful preacher who 
used to go into the villages and countryside to preach, especially during his 
visits to Baghdad. 205 He wrote a number of treatises on Sufism. Among them is 
the exquisite Sawanih al-ushshiqP6 (Aphorisms on Love). Schimmel 
comments: "... but even if he had written only the small treatise called Sawiwih, 
"Aphorisms on Love", it would have been enough to establish him as one of 
the greatest mystics in the Muslim World. "207 
Alimad also wrote a summary of the Ihyä' called Lubib al--ihyä' 2°6 and 
203 Ibid. 
204 Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam, p. 67. 
205 Ibn Khallikiin, Klub wafayit aba `yin, vol. 1, p. 40. 
206 Ahmad Ghazzli, Sawinih, Aphorismen ubcrdie bebe, edited by Heilmut Ritter, 
Istanbul, 1942. In Persian. 
207 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions oflslam, p. 295 
208 Ibn Khallikin, Kitib wafeyst al--a`y n Vo1.1, p. 40. See also, Margaret Smith, Al- 
Ghazijr the Mystic, p. 55. According to the article on al-Ghazili by H. Ritter, it is 
imcertaint whether this book was written by al-Ghazili himself or by his brother 
Ahmad. (IL Ritter, "Al-GhaziI 
, Ahmad b. Muhammad", The Encyclopaedia oflslaa; 
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a book named Bawäriq al--imlä : 20`' He took over his brother's post at the 
Ni imiyya College when the latter abandoned it during his spiritual crisis in 
A. H. 488 / A. D. 1095.210 
Another important figure in al-Ghazälf's life was Imam aI-Ilarämayn al- 
Juwaynf. He was known as Imärn al-Ilarämayn for he taught at both Mecca 
and Medina, the two Holy Cities. Al-Juwaynf's fields were both frgh (more 
particularly i1cüia1--fqh) and `ilm al-kalrim (Ash'arite School). A1-Juwaynf was 
better known for his teaching of `ilm el-kaum, which greatly influenced al- 
Ghazhlf. He was the greatest Ash'arite theologian of al-Ghazälf's period. Al- 
Juwaynf was also appointed as a teacher at the vizierNizäm-al-Mulk's college 
at Nfshäpnr where he taught Ash'arite theology. 211 
Even though al-Juwaynf's influence on al-Ghazalf was largely on his 
theology, al-Juwaynf himself was also sympathetic to Sufism. 212 Al-Ghazalf's 
studies under al-Juwaynf were not confined to theology but covered Islamic 
Jurisprudence (figb), dialectic, philosophy, logic and Sufism. 213 
Al-Ghazali also studied under al-Farmädhi while he was at Nishapiir. 
Vol. 2, London, 1965, p. 66. ) 
This work has been known by different names such as Mukätasaral-ihyi'or 
Mukblasarihyi' 'ulwn al-din. For further details on this matter see Abd al-Rahmin al- 
Badawi, Muallalät al-Gbazili; pp. 273-274. 
109 Bawäriq &I-Iml ' 1i7-radd `als man ynhaiTimu 7-samä, ed. by J. Robson in Tracts on 
Listening (Or. TransL Fund, NS v), London, 1938. 
210 AI-Sublä, Tabagät, voL 6, p. 61, see also, J. Spencer Trimingbam, The 900rdersIn 
IsIaa p. 33. 
211 Al-Suhki, Tebagit, vol. 5, p. 171. 
212 A1-Subki, Tebaqit, vol 5, p. 180. For example he is said often to have talked about 
Sufism in his lectures. 
213 A1-Sublä, Tabagät, voL 6, p. 196. 
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Al-Farmadhi (d. 477/1084) taught fiqh and probably influenced al-Ghazalf's 
Sufism. 214 Besides being a scholar jurist, al-Farmädhi was also a devoted 
süf1215 He was a pupil of the famous süfi al-Qushayri (d. 465/1074), and was 
himself a famous leader of the Offs in Tns andNishapiir. People from beyond 
Nishäpür came to profit from his teaching. He enjoyed the patronage of Ni? -am 
al-Mulk in his teaching of Sufism. 216 
2.5.4.3. A1-GbazAi s contribution to Sufism: 
In order to grasp the impact al-Ghazal had on Sufism, it is worth 
noting that süff practices before and during his time were more on an 
individual than an organisational basis. According to Watt, the süff movement 
flourished in the very situation where the scholar jurists were inclined to 
worldliness and materialism. He writes: "The süfs were those members of the 
intellectual class who had a genuine spiritual concern which had not been 
choked and killed by worldliness. The forces of worldliness were so strong in 
political and judicial circles that it was impossible for such men to express 
their spiritual aspirations in public activity. "217 
Such conditions made it impracticable for anyone to practise Sufism 
publicly. Sufis therefore concentrated on nurturing their inner life, being 
strongly opposed to the corruption of Islamic legal thought that they 
associated with the worldly and materialistic political attitudes of their 
214 AI-Subiä, Tabaqil, voL 6, p. 204, see also, J. Spencer Trimingham, The SO Orders In 
Islas p. 52. 
2 'S A1-Sublä, Tabagit, voL 5, pp. 305-306. 
216 Al-Sublä, Tabagät, voL 5, p. 305. 
217 W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim, p. 132 
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time. 218 
As Watt points out elsewhere, al-Ghazal 's contribution to Sufism was 
that he brought about a greater fusion between the movement and Sunnism, 
making clear the relationship between the two and proving that Sufism is part 
of Islam. This is not to say that all süffs before al-Ghazäli were heretical; 
rather, many of them were ulami' (scholars) such as al-Qushayri , who was a 
`slim among the Shäfi`ite jurists as well as being a leading üf219 and 
probably the most outstanding snff of the century before al-Ghazälf220 
Uamidullah observes: "Al-Ghazäli was as expressly opposed to formal and 
external Sufism: the hide of a tiger on a cow does not turn the cow into a tiger, 
and merely living in a convent and paying lip-service to the importance of the 
soul have no attraction for the seeker after truth. "221 
Examining the range of al-Ghazal 's works, one can see that he was 
concerned to elucidate the inner aspects of the canonical duties which are the 
obligation of every Muslim, bringing out the snfi meaning of each of them. He 
insisted that these duties are not merely external actions; they are linked to 
man's inmost being. According to al-Ghazäli, the beginning of a truly süff life 
was the faithful observance of all these duties. Only in this way could one 
proceed to the higher süfi "states" that were the special region of Sufism. Here 
al-Ghazäli had a special advantage, for he was able to write from personal 
experience. This supports the contention that the "states" do not entail hearsay 
2181bid, p. 133. 
219 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, pp. 91-92. See also, Julian 
Baldick, Mystical Isla , pp. 
120-121. 
220 W. Montgomery Watt, MUS, &4 p. 130. 
221 M. Hämidullah, "Reviews on W. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of Al- 
Ghazäli", The Islamic Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 63. 
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but are founded on the faithful observance of the shan'`a. 222 Al-Ghazäl made 
it clear that the snff way of life was not an alternative to the shad'a; rather, it 
is what makes the shari'a perfect. These distinctive ideas are especially 
prominent in the 4yä' `ulum aI-dJr1.223 For instance, in his discussion on ritual 
obligations such as 5a1ä1, $awm and haj al-Ghazäli combined both the inner 
requirements and the outer actions. These ideas were to have a great effect on 
the shff movement in many ways, by bringing closer together $u-ff teachings 
and the shari `a and clarifying their relationship. 
Watt writes that al-Ghazilf made those who hesitate to embrace the 
ýüff way of life and those who pay attention only to the observances of the 
shari'a realise that the teachings of Sufism actually presuppose these 
observances. This may be the reason for the growth of the si movement and 
its integrity within the Islamic society of later days. After the era of al- 
Ghazali, Sufism became more institutionalised. If before this period Sufism 
might be considered as mostly individual practices of piety and spiritual 
training, after al-Ghazäli's time the development of various (arigah (orders) 
increased. The Qidiriyya founded by Abd al-Qadir al-Jilanf (d. 561/1166) is 
usually said to have been the first farigah. 22a 
Each of these jarigahs usually has its own form of dhikr (a form of 
litany or religious exercise) which is intended for the remembrance of God and 
can stimulate the inner emotions. Watt contends that dhlkr can give what 
cannot be found in the austere Qur'änic worship. If he means by this that the 
Qur'anic worship is merely plain and simple, the question may arise: to whom 
222 W. Montgomery Watt, Masbm, p. 130. 
223 Ibid, pp. 176-177. 
224 Ibid, p. 177. 
102 
falls the responsibility of discovering the inner meaning of Qur'anic worship? 
This is in fact the essence of all süfi teachings. The dhikr has its basis in the 
Qur'änic teaching itself. Watt also contends that dhikr is more sensuous than 
formal prayer. 225 According to al-Ghazali dhikrpolishes the heart, making the 
heart like a mirror reflecting the divine attributes. 226 In order to gain the 
sweetness of being near to God, man should be more concentrated in his 
remembrance of Him. It is possible that dhikr can produce greater feeling and 
concentration because it is usually carried out in the jami`a (group), which 
consists of people united by the same desire. It is possible also that one feels 
this kind of sweetness from prayer more acutely if he really concentrates 
(khushü) in congregational prayer. 
Watt raises another question: How strong was the influence of al- 
Ghazälf, since dhikrin practice has sometimes become an alternative to formal 
prayer rather than its complement as al-Ghazälf directed. In addition the 
tarigah was not totally new; a similar situation can be found in previous times 
(even before 800 A. D. ) and al-Ghazali himself had established a semi-monastic 
institution at Tüs. However the orders subsequently became more 
institutionalised. 227 
The most important point is that al-Ghazali contributed to the 
development of these orders, being one of the chief proponents of the spiritual 
movement out of which the orders grew. That dhikr is not always considered 
225 Ibid. 
226 Regarding the tradition of Hasan al-Bash (d. 110/728), alGhazäli in his Ihyi' gave 
particular attention to remembrance of death and the day of judgement. Michael A. 
Sells, "Dhikr", in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World Vol. 1, p. 373. 
See also, Abi Hiimid al-Ghazäli, "Kitibdhikral-mawt wa-mi ba`dahd', Ihyi' vol. 6, 
pp. 74-202, English translation by T. J. Winter, AI-Gbaziff The Remomberance of 
Death And The Afterlife Cambridge, 1989. 
227 W. Montgomery Watt, M(1SIim, p. 178. 
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as complementary to the formal prayer by some tarigah or individuals might 
simply be a result of changing attitudes. 
By his teachings and personal example al-Ghazä certainly influenced 
the intellectual class of his own and following generations to be less worldly. 
His criticism, especially of the scholar jurists, and his gaining of the truth 
through süff teachings and practices supported Sufism itself. 
Al-Ghazali succeeded in giving Sufism a place in mainstream Islam by 
reconciling the two. He crossed over the boundary of the ascetic quietism of 
the early snffs 28 Al-Ghazal dedicated his efforts to organise and arrange the 
teachings of Sufism by making them clear, understandable, and accessible to 
the ordinary people. He helped many to accept Sufism as a necessary 229 
element of Islam. Smith comments, "Al-Ghazali's place in the history of 
Sufism is that of a great theologian and an original thinker who, desired to 
reconcile orthodox Islam with the mystical ideas of Sufism, which were widely 
prevalent in his day. "23° 
In his The Faith and Practice ofAl-Ghaz Watt writes that al-Ghazäf 
had "brought orthodoxy and mysticism into closer contact; the orthodox 
theologians still went their own way, and so did the mystics, but the 
theologians became more ready to accept the mystics as respectable, while the 
mystics were more careful to remain within the bounds of orthodoxy". 231 
228 Margaret Smith, Al-Ghazäf the Mystic, p. 227. 
229 Particularly in the sense of its contribution as a way to confirm one's faith and its 
ethical teaching. 
230 Margaret Smith, AI-Ghazali the Mystic, p. 230. 
231 W. Montgomery Watt, introduction to TheFait4 p. 13. 
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Finally, al-Ghazäli, by removing the tension between the Islamic 
Sciences and Sufism, made society aware that religion does not only function 
as a guide to their political decisions, it covers all aspects of human life 
including the spiritual aspect of social relations. 232 
2.5.4.4. The three sciences' contribution to the development of al-Ghazäli s 
Sufism: 
The kaum (speech) of the snff tends to be unreliable because too often 
they gave accounts of their spiritual state without considering the state of 
others. In addition their explicit statements are imprecise. Al-Ghazali used 
rational knowledge to give a better and more objective account of spiritual 
experience. Sufism for him was an indisputable way of achieving true 
happiness but must always be rooted in and controlled by trained reason. 33 
Sheriff comments: "... he uses Mysticism to explain and modify the philosophic 
and religious-legal paths to happiness and at the same time clarifies the 
Mystical approach through the use of Islamic teachings and the philosophic 
"234 
Al-Ghazali continually emphasizes that the first condition for those 
who would take the road to God is observing religious laws and practices. He 
uses rational and theoretical means to give a clear description of spiritual 
experience. Al-Ghazal also harmonised Sufism with Islamic teaching and 
philosophy. His rational approach to Sufism in general was commented upon 
by his contemporaries as well as by many subsequent Muslim thinkers such as 
232 W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim, p. 179. 
233 Muhammed Ahmed Sheriff Gbaz s Theory of Virhay p. 106. 
234 Ibid, p. 107. 
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Abu Bakr Ibn al-`Arabi (560-638 A. H. / 1165-1240 AM 
. 
). 235 In his 
description of spiritual experience al-Ghazäl inclined toward philosophy, but 
he opposed philosophy on those points that contradicted religious teachings, 
for example, that God knows the general but not the particular. 236 More 
important, however, in al-Ghazälf's inclination to philosophical Sufism is how 
he understood and used views that he borrowed from the science of philosophy. 
The path to God, according to süf teachings, is like an ascending 
'parabola'. It starts with "science" which, according to al-Ghazäli, is the 
knowledge of God and His Attributes and of religious duties. A set of further 
preparatory stages follows. Firstly, avoiding unlawful and blameworthy 
behaviour such as avarice, love of worldly goods, and other vices that can turn 
the murid (novice) from the right path. In order to struggle against such faults, 
commendable conduct such as repentance, asceticism and fear of God may be 
practised. Through repentance, one can be closer to God. Asceticism is the 
soul's rejection of materiality. This rejection has an a# (essence) which 
originates from science (süfi knowledge) and the light (illumination) which 
shines in the heart. Fear of God is "pain in the heart and its burning because of 
the expectation of future adversities". Fear causes the opening of the soul's 
inner doors to a quiet hope. Lastly, there is rift bi'I-gadi'which means that the 
Sufi must accept with ri( (silent satisfaction) God's qa(I '(decree) 237 
235 Muhyiddin Ibn `Arabi, al-Futhfrit al-makkiyyali Cairo, 1972. Muhyiddi n AbüBakr 
Muhammad ibn `Ali ibn al-`Arabi, was born on 27Ramadban, 560 A. H. in the city of 
Murcia in Andalusia. A. E. Affifi in his book The Mystical Philosophy ofMubyid Dia - 
lbou al-`Arab mentions that Ibn al-`Arabi borrowed ideas from numerous other 
sills and gave them all his usual pantheistic colouring. For example in his Futirhit al- 
makkiyyah. He refers to many among them including al-Ghaziif. (SeeA. E. Ali, The 
Mystical Philosophy ofMubyid Diu - lboul `Arabi, Cambridge University Press, London, 
1939, p. 190. ) See also, William C. Chittick, Albany, New York, 1989. 
236 For details on this matter see Abi Himid al-Ghazii , Tabifol, pp. 156-160 and pp. 164- 172; tr. by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, AI-Ghat ll's Tabifut, pp. 143-147 and pp. 153-162. 
237 Massimo Campanini, "AI-Ghazzäli ", in Hislory oflslamic Philosophy, (Part 1) p. 265. 
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After achieving a sound character, the mun d can truly begin walking 
the path to God. Firstly, the novice's niyyah (intention) should be entirely 
fixed on God. This niyyah in particular should be observed during two main 
moments: the dhikrand tawakkul. Dhikr, that is, the continuous remembrance 
of God's name, leads to the se's immersion and fans' (annihilation) in God. 
According to al-Ghazal-i, fare' is only a short passing away and does not 
constitute any kind of huhil (incarnation) of God in the snf. . By taking this 
view, al-Ghazali rejected what he saw as immoderate claims of some siiff, s such 
as al-Halläj or al-Bistämi regarding hulv1 on the contrary, he stressed the 
importance of mahabbah (love). 23g In Kita7i al-Arbain al-Ghazäli wrote: "a 
true learned man loves only God Most High; and if he loves somebody who is 
not God, he loves him for God, the Almighty and Sublime. "239 
The highest degree of love is tawakkul(full confidence in God). For al- 
Ghazäli, the 5dff path never meant the neglecting of religious duties and 
fulfilment of the Prophet's (p. b. u. h. ) sunnah. He always emphasised the inner 
aspect of religious laws, and obedience to their external expressions that will 
lead to the realisation of these internal values. According to Campanini, 
... 
Sufism is not for Al-Ghazä simply an individual 
path to reach perfection but a whole conception of life 
including ethics and morality, behaviour and belief, 
cosmology and metaphysics. In rational construction by 
which the learned person can taste the beatitude of 
ecstasy without relinquishing the satisfaction of 
2391bid, p. 266. 
239Abü Hamid al-Ghazili, Klu b al-arba in ff aril &W w, p. 193. See also Massimo 
Campanini, "A1-Ghazzili ", in History oflslamic Philosophy, (Part 1) p. 266. 
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theoretical inquiry. 240 
Al-Ghazali never separated reason and Sufism. He used his knowledge 
of philosophy to explain certain cosmological points as understood in Sufism, 
according to which the universe has two aspects: mulk (natural world) and 
malakrit (heavenly world). The mulk is a shadow of the true world, which is the 
world subdued to God's compulsory will. Intellect according to al-Ghazäli is 
the noblest human attribute; it is the tool for receiving divine illumination and 
for achieving mukishafa, i. e. the opening the heart to the ecstatic knowledge 
of God. 241 Since al-Ghazälf's adoption of the tfi life was a continuation of his 
early childhood influences, his süff teachings were influenced by his study of 
both the philosophy and the science of kaum. 
Although true knowledge is the knowledge of God and His acts, al- 
Ghazalf believed that esoteric knowledge could be dangerous to ordinary 
people. Regarding the science of kalim, he held that a deep study of that 
science would not help one to obtain eternal salvation. His Ijäm al-`awwrim 
`an `ilm al-ku/im242 (Restraint of the Common People from the Science of 
Kalam) discusses and concludes the matter if one accepts that this work is by 
al-Ghazälf. 
Al-Ghazäli, when dealing with the certainties that his soul attained 
from the ýnfi way, always considered other people. He himself, as a jurist, 
never rejected any Islamic duties. He took the "middle way" between the 
240 Massino Campanini, "Al-Ghazzäli ", in History oflslamic Philosophy, (Part 1) p. 266. 
241 raid, p. 269. 
242 Abu Himid a1-Ghazal , 
ll äm al-`awwem `an `ilm a . kalen; ed. M. al-Baghdadi, Cairo, 
1406%1985. 
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extremities. He advocated Islamic behaviour and obedience to those traditions 
consistent with the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ). 243 Al- 
Ghazali rejected both those who blindly submitted to the principle of authority 
and those who excessively trusted reason, whom he viewed as departing from 
obeying the laws of religion. He believed that both reason and authority 
determine social relations. 2 The broadness of al-Ghazäli's thought, covering 
three main aspects of the Islamic conception of rationality, shows that he is the 
ideal of the Muslim intellectual; an intellectual who was also a süfT, who 
nonetheless did not erase the meaning of judicial acts or the historical value of 
Islam. 245 Saeed Sheikh comments, 
He indeed did his best to vitalise the Law and the 
doctrine of Islam through this emphasis on the living 
religious experiences, and this is evident from the very 
title of his magnum opus, Ihyi' `alum al-din 
(Revivification of the Sciences of Religion). But the 
mystical teaching of al-Ghazäli found in the Ihyi; 
meant for all to read, must be studied in conjunction 
with what is given in his other works dealing more 
socially with the sdoctrine ... 
246 
Al-Ghazäli also put much emphasis on the ethical perspective of 
Sufism in his works. Sufism emphasises the importance of personal 
purification, training the character and will. The inner states are the most 
243 Massimo Campanini, "Al-Ghazznli ", in Histor yoflslamic Pfiilosopby, (Part 1) p. 270. 
244 Ibid, pp. 270-271. 
245 Ibid, pp. 271-272. 
246 M Saeed Sheikh, "A1-Ghazili: A Mysticism", inAHistory ol'MrtsGmPbilosopby, voL 1, 
p. 618. 
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important. The emphasis is on practice rather than abstract theory. Self- 
knowledge and self-purification are both necessary prerequisites for the perfect 
knowledge of God. Al-Ghazali can be considered one of the most influential 
Muslim writers on ethics. 247 His books containing soff teachings stress the 
ethical dimension. Among them are Ibye' `uhim a/457, Bidäyat al-hidäyah 
(The Beginning of Guidance), al-Adab fn al-Adab al-st fiyah, Ayyuha ''- 
walad and Minhäj al-`ibidrn. The Bidiyat al-hidäyah contains not only ritual 
matters such as prayer and other religious services but also detailed instruction 
on how one should pass one's days, how to behave when going to a water- 
closet and so on. This book is the best reference for someone who wants to 
study how the prophet conducted his life in detail. This matter will be further 
discussed in a later chapter. 
Al-Ghazäli reintroduced 'fear' (al-kbaw/) into divine service. 248 He 
discusses al-kbawf in book thirty-three of his 4yä. Khawfprimarily means 
the fear that is "the beginning of wisdom". 249 The goal of worldly life is the 
attainment of salvation. This depends on the individual believer's grasp of 
religious truth. For the `awwäm (uninitiated masses) salvation is the 
enjoyment of the pleasures of paradise. For them khawt meaning fear of losing 
the joy of paradise and fear of the torment of hellfire is a major aspect of their 
religious life. Al-Ghazal, however, held that this is not the true nature of 
salvation, but can be used as the motivation to normative behaviour. The 
reality of salvation lies in closeness to God and meeting God. Khawf to the 
true `arlf(Gnostic), is only a prior stage that is overtaken by that of love. His 
247 Sheila McDonough, Muslim Ethics and Modernity A Comparative Stuady of The Ethical 
Thought ofSayyid Ahmed Khan end Mauläaa Maud G, pp. 19-21. 
248 M. S. Stern, "Notes on the Theology of Al-Ghazzäli's Concept of Repentance", Islamic 
Quarterly, vol. 1, No. 1, p. 82. 
249 Mc Carthy, Fioodom; p. xL 
no 
fear is of being separated from the Beloved (God) . 
250 This world is a test and 
one should use this life as preparation for the hereafter. But al-Ghazal never 
forget his obligations to his society. 
Hava Lazarus-Yafeh contends in her book Studies in AI-Gharrer ".... 
even as a mystic al-GhazzälPs outstanding characteristic was his social 
activity. He belonged to those mystics whose ecstatic experiences inspire them 
with a social-educational ideal and with a feeling of vocation and mission to 
confirm and to reinterpret their own tradition rather than try to revolt against 
it. "251 
Conclusion: 
For the rest of his life al-GhazälF lived more openly. He gave attention 
to body as well as to soul, believed in God and the hereafter, had a complete 
faith in the truth of the Qur'an as the word of God and hadlth of the Prophet. 
He allowed himself to experience systematic doubt and opened his mind to 
anything that was reasonable. 252 As al-Ghazäli himself put it in al-Mungidh 
'Be an expert money-changer and have no fear of the counterfeiter, then alone 
will you able to distinguish true gold from the mass of spurious coins in the 
bag of the counterfeiter, 253 examine it yourself, accept what is said if it is true, 
no matter whether the speaker concerned is, in general, truthful or not' 254 
According to Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, "Al-Ghazzälf certainly was a real mystic, 
250 Abi Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kittb al-kbewfwe 1-raji', Ihyd, vol. 5, p. 9. 
251 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies is Al-GbaziG, p. 389. 
252 Ibid. 
253Abii Humid al-Ghazil , el-Mwigidb, p. 82; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 41. 
254 Abi Hamid al-Ghazili, al-Muugidb, p. 82; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 40. 
III 
and his authentic writings attest to this, not only in books such as Mishkel a! - 
anwär, but, paradoxically, especially so in his Ihys"ulum a1-äm. '255 
Al-Ghazälf realistically tried to give everyone their own right. He was 
not given solely to intellectual reasoning in dealing with religious belief like 
the theologians, nor did he resemble the philosophers in denying the religious 
commandments and restricting the faith on the basis of intellectual 
speculations alone; he refused to be blindly committed to one's teaching as the 
Ismä'iis were, or depend on the a! -kashf and a/-bitini entirely without 
considering the importance of the intellectual sciences and religious duties. Al- 
Ghazalf then can be considered as successful in reconciling the approaches of 
both the mind and the heart. 
Having no confidence in knowledge based on tagr4 al-Ghazali began 
to study the different seekers of truth. His dissatisfaction with the nature of 
the ways of knowledge provided by the theology, philosophy and Isms ilis 
brought him at the end to the study of Sufism. Al-Ghazäli's attitudes towards 
the four seekers are related to his theory of knowledge. He approves the ýüfi s' 
means of acquiring knowledge. This approval is based on his own experiences. 
In order to affirm this, al-Ghazali stresses the importance of investigation into 
the nature of the soul and its properties. This is because the rational soul is that 
by which man is enabled to know. 
After studying Sufism deeply, al-Ghazäli realized that he was not on 
the right path. His actions were not leading him to the attainment of eternal 
salvation. By accepting the süii way, he realized the importance of the 
purification of the soul. In order to prepare the soul to receive knowledge, it 
255 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Sl males is AI-Ghazzaß p. 3. 
112 
must be cleansed of everything that is other than God. Al-Ghazäli knew the 
süffs as men of both intellectual belief and practical activity. The iff way 
made al-Ghazäli aware of the inner meaning of the shari `a. This is the major 
content of his Ihyä' `ulrnn al-din. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. Ihyä' `uhim al-&n (The Revival of the Religious Sciences) 
This chapter concerns the Ihyä' `ultýun al-din, a work which covers 
almost every aspect of life. The chapter will show that al-Ghazäli's major 
concern is the inner aspect of the shari `a. As we have seen in the two previous 
chapters al-Ghazal decided on his theme after treading the snfi path both 
intellectually and practically. Al-Ghazäli's emphasis on the innermost aspect of 
man reveals his conviction that man's soul is what determines his behaviour. 
3.1. The lbyi' 
The Ihyä' Vain al-Xin was written during al-Ghazäli's retirement, 
possibly during the years 489-495 A. H. ' / 1095-1101 A. D. This work therefore 
belongs to his snf period. 2 Watt remarks: 
He would require time to settle down after the 
crisis of 488/1095 before he could contemplate 
such a work. It doubtless took several years to 
compose, though it has to be remembered that 
Arabic can be written almost as fast as shorthand 
and that al-Ghazäli appears to have been a fast 
worker. 3 
I M. Bouges, Esssi de cbronologie des oeuvres de al-Gbazil (Algazel), edited and revised by 
M. Allard, Beirut, 1959, pp. 41-44, as cited in K Nakamura, Introduction of AI-Gbaziff 
Invocation And Supplication, tr. of Klub al-adbkir wa'l-da'awat ofI¢yi' WIM2 al-dm, p. 
xvii. 
2 W. Montgomery Watt, Mus1ia4 p. 151. 
3 Ibid. 
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Normally several years would be needed to compose such a large work, 
but al-Ghazäli was a great scholar and was intellectually well prepared. 
Regarding the science of fiqh, for instance, he had been a scholar jurist himself. 
Also he wrote the Ihyl'during his retirement, away from all distractions, so he 
could concentrate wholly on his book. As for the ýüff teachings contained in 
the Ihyä ; these were based on his own experiences. In addition, he had devoted 
his life to the stiff way, and was therefore well acquainted with snfi writings, 
and could learn from his friends and their practices. 
The Ihys' `u/drn al-din is al-Ghazäli's major work; many scholars of al- 
Ghazälf hold that it is his greatest. For example, the writer 'Afif al-Din Yäfl'l 
(d. 768/1367) considered the Ihyd' to be the most precious of books and 
praised its literary style. He said that no one after al-Ghazali had left anything 
to equal it. Yäfi`i wrote a Qaaida in acclamation of al-Ghazali and his works 
The jurist Täj al-Din al-Subki (d. 771/1370) wrote that thelhyri' is one of the 
books which all Muslims ought to study and recommend to others, so that its 
guidance would benefit as many as possible. He said that almost no-one could 
fail to find in it some word of advice and help. 5 The traditionist Zayn al-Din b. 
at-Husayn al-`Irigi (d. 806/1404) regarded the Ihyd' as one of the greatest 
books of Islam, both for its analysis of what was lawful and unlawful for the 
true Muslim, and for its reconciliation of orthodox religion with the mystical 
doctrine of the 5 s6 Al-`Iraqi himself edited and made a collection of the 
traditions contained in the Ihyä , his Takhrl has been appended to the modern 
text of the Ihyä'. 7 Ihn Khaldün in his The Mugaddimah. An Introduction to 
Margaret Smith, AI-Gba the Mystiq p. 214. 
S Al-Subki, Tabagit, voL 6, p. 203, see also Margaret Smith, A! -Ghazi ii the Mystic, p. 215, 
Margaret Smith, Al-Ghaziff the Mystic, p. 216. 
7 Cairo edition, A. H. 1272 (reprint 1340). 
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Historywrites: 
Al-Ghazzali combined the two matters in the 
Kit lb al-Ilhyi. In it, he dealt systematically with 
the laws governing asceticism and the imitation 
of models. Then, he explained the behavior and 
customs of the people (Süfi s) and commented on 
their technical vocabulary. 
Thus, the science of Sufism became a 
systematically treated discipline in Islam. Before 
that, mysticism had merely consisted of divine 
worship, and its laws had existed in the breasts of 
men. The same had been the case with all other 
disciplines, such as Qur'än interpretation, the 
science of tradition, jurisprudence, the principles 
of jurisprudence, and other disciplines. (They 
were only later on) treated systematically. 8 
Abel Hasan `Ali Nadwi in his book Saviours of Islamic Spirit wrote 
that the 1yä' occupies a distinguished place among the few literary works 
which have had a lasting effect in moulding the moral and spiritual life of the 
Islamic world. 9 
Western scholars such as Margaret Smith concur that the Ihye' is the 
greatest of all a1-Ghazäli's books and his masterpiece10 Smith contends that 
Ibu Khaldiin, Mugaddimab, p. 469; tr. from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, The 
Mugaddimab: An Introduction to History, vol. 3, pp. 80-81. 
9 Abnl Hasan `All Nadwi, Saviours ofIslamic Spirit, p. 128. 
10 Margaret Smith, Al-Ghazif the Mystic, p. 28, p. 37. 
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the Ihyä' is also the most comprehensive and characteristic of al-Ghazali's 
writings. " Hava Lazarus-Yafeh in her Studies In Al-Ghazä/r refers to the Ihyi' 
as an exhaustive religious compendium. 12 T. J. Winter in his introduction to Al- 
Ghazäll" The Remembrance ofDeath and the Afterlife writes that the Ihyä' has 
also been considered as al-Ghazäli's magisterial exposition of the Islamic faith, 
and is acclaimed as the definitive summa theologica of Islam. 13 Winter 
comments, 
.... 
his Revival of the Religious Sciences, the 
crowning intellectual achievement of classical 
Islam, which, informed by his powerful 
conviction that the two were mutually 
indispensable to the balanced religious life, 
wedded inextricably the traditional exoteric 
sciences to Sufism. The scale of his 
accomplishment was summed up in a sentence 
which is quoted by almost all of the Imams 
biographers: 'were all the books of Islam to be 
lost save the Revival alone, it would supply for 
them in full'. '4 
Some even go so far as to consider the Ihyä'to be a second Qur'an. 's 
11 Ibid, p. 67. 
12 ßava, Studies in AI-Ghszz. ýI; p. 363. 
13 T. J. Winter, introduction to AI-Ghazal: The Remembrance of Death aad theAflerfif4 
(Kilab dhikr a/-mewl wa-ma ba'dahu) BookX of The Revival of The Religious Sciences 
(Ihye"Wim al-Div), tr. by T. J. Winter, p. ix. 
14 lbid, p. xvii. 
IS Margaret Smith, Al-Ghezäli the Mystic, p. 236. 
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This, however, clearly conflicts with the Muslim belief that the Qur'an is the 
kalam (speech) of God and therefore beyond any comparison with merely 
human works. The availability of many summaries of and commentaries on the 
Ihyä'also shows that it has gained the avid attention of many scholars since al- 
Ghazal f, and that it is still widely read. 
The Ihyä' comprises forty books in four major volumes. Each volume 
contains ten books which are divided into chapters (abwib) and subdivided 
into expositions (sing. bayan). This exact division makes the book clear and 
easy to use. Smith comments that in general, "Al-Ghazali's literary style is 
clear, attractive, readable and, in some ways, curiously modern. i16 In his 
writings, he showed that he had mastered his subjects and possessed the power 
of penetrating the human mind and soul. He wrote for both learned and 
ordinary readers. For example, those of his works which were composed from 
the substance of his lectures suit the learned, while his short works were 
written in a simpler style to suit less intellectual readers. 17 
The vast resources of his learning covered many sciences, both worldly 
and religious, and enabled him to present and illustrate many branches of 
knowledge. Also, al-Ghazäli's arguments are always closely reasoned, 
especially in the Ihys, the most comprehensive and characteristic of his 
writings. '8 
Generally, in the Ihyä' in discussing each topic, al-Ghazäli cites the 
Qur'anic verses, the traditions of the prophets, accounts of the early Muslims 
16 Ibid, p. 67. 
17 Ibid. 
`B Ibid. 
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(the salaf, or 'predecessors'), and anecdotes about the Jewish patriarchs. Al- 
Ghazali's use of stories about the early Muslims and the Jewish patriarchs 
shows that this kind of anecdote was of interest to his contemporaries. 
His division of the Ihyä' into four major parts consisting of smaller 
divisions and subdivisions seems to show the influence of figh, as this was 
always the structure of a fiqh book. AI-Ghazali possibly wanted to make his 
thought more easy to grasp by employing such a structure, which sets out the 
contents clearly because the Ihyä' covers many topics and categories. Hava in 
her StudiesinAb-Ghazziri attempts to show that al-Ghazäli regularly uses fi'qh 
terminology, even when he discusses different subjects. 19 The reason al- 
Ghazäli structured the Ihyä' in this way might be that at that time works on 
fiqh were widely circulated among the people; in addition, of course al-Ghazäl% 
himself was a scholar jurist. 
The influence of figh on al-Ghazair's writing can also be discerned in 
his other works. Al-Ghazäli deals with certain theological problems as if they 
were problems of law, such as the discussion of heretics and heresy, mainly in 
his Faisal al-tafriga. The influence of other sciences such as philosophy can 
also be seen in the clear examples he gave when discussing matters related to 
both fiqh and philosophy: he deploys closely reasoned arguments which show 
his mastery of logic. 
Al-Ghazäli was also influenced by works such as Abü Talib al-Makkf's 
Qöt al-quhib. He himself says in his al-Mungidh that this book was one of his 
süff sources. Indeed many have observed that al-Ghazali transferred much of 
this book's content to his lbyi. Smith comments in her A1-Ghaz97 The 
19 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies id Al-Ghanali, pp. 377-378. 
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Mystic, "Al-Ghazal made considerable use of the Qrit al-Qulüb of Abu Talib 
al-Makki, especially of his teaching on knowledge, both `ilm and ma`rifa and 
the learned (a1-`ulami' ). "20 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh writes in her Studies in A1- 
Ghazzilithat he was certainly influenced to a considerable extent by the sufi 
literature which he had studied, especially Qrit al-quhib. 21 Other sources 
include the works of Härith al-Muhäsibi and the fragments of the teachings of 
Abu Yazid al-Bistämi, Junayd and Shibli; Abü Yazid al-Bistämi in particular, 
who had been a great master of love of God, was a major influence on al- 
Ghazäli's teachings on stifTlove. 22 
The similarities between the JJyd' and previous books needs to be 
reconsidered. A great scholar such as al-Ghazäli, who possessed a vast store of 
knowledge, would have been well-versed in texts on `ilm, ma `rifa and love, 
since such works must have been in wide circulation among the ulami. For 
example, Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, in her Studies In AI-Ghazzir holds that al- 
Ghazält copied from Abu Tälib al-Makki several ahsdith regarding the 
importance of prayer into his book on prayer in the Ihyi; 23 but this could be a 
case of parallelism since they were discussing the same subject. She also 
writes that there is one hadlth which is mentioned by Abu- Talib al-MakkF but 
not by al-Ghazäli, and mentions the case of another hadith which al-Ghazäli 
explains but al-Makki does not. In addition, she observes that al-Ghazäli brings 
all these sayings together in one of the opening chapters of his book on prayer 
whereas al-Makkf widely distributes them throughout his book. 24 So this 
20 See, Margaret Smith, Ai-Ghazill the Mystic, p. 128. 
21 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-Ghazzah; p. 364. 
22 Ibid, p. 232. 
23 lbid, p. 40. 
24 Ibid. 
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appears to be an example of al-Ghazäl 's originality in re-working his sources 
for his purpose. 
The originality of al-Ghazäli, then, consists in his presenting his 
sources in his own way together with critical explanations and relevant 
discussions. He analyses his sources and develops them in a new and 
systematic way. In addition, in certain books of the Ihys, al-Ghazali's 
originality is obvious, such as in the final chapter which contains joyful 
reminders of God's mercy. This chapter must rank among the finest examples 
of Arabic devotional writing. 25 It was al-Ghazal who for the first time 
thoroughly discussed the doctrine of the Vision of God, although it had been 
considered by earlier süfi s such as Räbi`ah al-'Adawiyyah Dhü'I-Nün al-Misri 
and Abu- Yazi d al-Bistami26 
As regards the ahädlth of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) contained 
in the Ihyi, they have often been criticised as weak or even fake by certain of 
al-Ghazili's biographers and opponents. One such critic is Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 
597/1200), who contended that al-Ghazali wrote the Iliye' for his fellow süfs 
and filled it with false traditions, although he conceded that al-Ghazäli was 
unaware of their falsity; he accussed him of relying on revelation, departing 
from Canon Law, and producing a kind of esotericism. Ibn al-Jawzi collected 
what he considered to be the errors of the Ihyä' in a book which he called ]'lit" 
al--ih' bi al-ighlät al-ihyä . He also expressed his opinions on al-Ghazäli's 
27 teachings in his TalbisIbrs However, he acknowledged the effectiveness of 
25 T. J. Winter, the introduction of Al-Gbazub The Remembrance ofDealh and The Afterbfe, 
(glib dhilr al--mawl wa-ms ba'dahu) BookXL of The Revival ofRebgious Sciences 
(Ihye' 'h im al-Din) tr. by T. J. Winter, p. xx. 
26 Margaret Smith, A/-Gbazir the Mystic, p. 233. 
27 Ibn Jawzº, Talbislblrs, p. 171. See also, Margaret Smith, A1-Ghazif the Mystic, p. 200. 
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the Ihyä' and the contribution of the book to Islamic thought. He recognized 
that al-Ghazäli was not a muhaddith (tradit ionist). His summary of the Ihyä' is 
titled the Minhij al-gasisin (Path of the Truth-seekers), in which he deleted 
those portions of the Ihyä' which were objectionable from his point of view. 
However, this work lacks the inspiration and effectiveness so characteristic of 
the Ihyä. Al-Ghazali's use of this kind of haärth to inspire hope or fear is 
legitimate according to most authorities zs 
Only in his later days did al-Ghazäli pay much attention to the study of 
traditions. He concentrated on the two most authentic collections of the 
ahäditb, i. e. the Sahlh of Bukhar! and the $ahlh of Muslim. 
3.2. What kind of book is the lbyi'? 
The Ihyä , written during al-Ghazäli's retirement, was the result of long 
reflection and meditation. During these ten years he devoted himself to the süff 
life, that is, purification of the self in order to gain direct knowledge of God. 
As his decision to retire was due to his awareness of death and fear of the day 
of judgement, many of his later works bear witness to this awareness, as well 
as to his sincerity and spiritual accomplishment. In the Ihyä'the afterlife is 
mentioned on almost every page and forms the most characteristic theme of 
the book 30 A1-Ghazäl classes the study of matters relating to the next life as a 
fard `ayn, a duty incumbent upon every Muslim. 31 From the very beginning of 
28 The `Mama' are agreed on the legitimacy of using weak badilbs in the realm of virtuous 
works (fadö'il al- `aural). 
29 Abel Hasan `Ali Nadwi, Saviours oflslamic Spirit, p. 169. 
30 T. J. Winter, introduction to AI-GbazifL. The Remembrance ofDeatb and the ARerffo 
(, Glib dhikr &I-ma v4 we-ms ba `dahe) Book XL of The Revival ofRehgious Sciences 
(Ihye' `Ulºm al-Din)tr. by T. J. Winter, pp. xvii-xviii. 
'1 Abü Hamid al-Ghazili, Klub aI-'ilms Ikys ; voL 1, pp. 23-25. Eng. trans. pp. 
35-36. 
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the Ihyä , al-Ghazäli stresses the necessity of the awareness of the afterlife. In 
Book 1, he cautions us to remember "that life is waning and that what is to 
come is close at hand: that death is imminent but that the journey is still long, 
that the provisions are scanty, the dangers great, and the road blocked. 02 
Al-Ghazäli's purpose in writing the 4yä' was to raise the spiritual 
consciousness of the people of his time, which he considered weak. The Ihyä', 
is a reminder of the danger of worldliness, from which even the `ulamä-' were 
not exempt. He stresses this point on almost every page. His criticisms of the 
scholar jurists are also frequent. Al-Ghazair devoted the third part of his Ihyä' 
to discussing the negative qualities which lead men to muhllkät (eternal 
perdition), including jealousy, hatred, conceit, vanity, hypocrisy and ambition. 
The names of the books in the third part coincide largely with the negative 
qualities of the ` ulamä. 
One of al-Ghazal 's remarkable achievements was his evaluation of the 
religious and moral state of his society from an Islamic viewpoint which 
awakened the desire for re-Islamisation in the community. 33 The Ihye' also 
shows al-Ghazal 's keen observation of social life. He devotes one section to 
describing the innovations and deviations, customs and rites which cover all 
aspects of human life. He shows that some of these customs violate the 
shad `a. 34 Al-Ghazi made a critical evaluation of the religious sciences and 
the moral state of the Islamic society of his time, and then proposed measures 
to reform them. The Ihyä' was written to counteract the decadence of the 
32 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazälf, Kitib a! - `ilk lbyd, voL 1, p. 7. Eng. trans. p. 2. 
33 Abu-l Hasan `Alf Nadwf, Saviou s oflslamic Spirit, p. 128. 
34 This second section of the Ibyi' `u! al-Ar consists of ten books covering almost 
every aspect of human life. 
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mentors of faith. As al-Ghazäli writes in the preface: 
I found everyone hankering after the material 
gains. People had become forgetful of the eternal 
salvation, while the doctors of religion, who were 
guides to the right path, were not to be found any 
longer. There remained only those who had lost 
their soul (s. i. c. ) to worldly temptations. These 
people had led everyone to suppose that 
knowledge consists simply in the debates and 
arguments by which they sat in judgement to 
settle the disputes of others. The knowledge that 
was required to illuminate the path leading to the 
world-to-come had thus completely disappeared. 
I could not endure this state of affairs and had 
ultimately to sound the alarm. 5 
The Ihyä' then is al-Ghazäli's attempt to universalise the central 
transformative experience of his career. It reflects his conviction that the 
conventional learning of his time treated only the more superficial aspects of 
man's condition and had entirely failed to shake him from his preoccupation 
with mundane concerns. Al-Ghazäli finally had discovered the remedy for 
himself: knowledge revealed by internalising the formalities of religion 
through 'tasting' (dhawq): personal religious experience. And the message 
reiterated by many of the forty `books' of the Ihys' is the possibility of such 
knowledge. 36 
35 Shibli Na `omani, A1-GbazaII Azamgarh, 1956, pp. 48-49, cited in Abel Masan `Ali Nadwi, 
Saviours oflslawic Spirit, pp. 129-130. See Abu- Humid al-Ghazäli, Ibyä , vol. 1, pp. 7-8. 
36 T. J. Winter, introduction to AI-Ghat the Remembrance ofDeath and theAflerlile, 
(Kilih dhikr abmawt wa-mi ba `dabn) BookXL of The Revival of The Religious Sciences 
(Ihyä' `Ukun al-Din)tr. by T. J. Winter, p. xviii. 
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The Ihyi' `uhim al-fin is not strictly speaking a ýnfi work although it is 
coloured throughout by Sufism. Nor is it merely devoted to one particular 
science, whether it be Sufism, filth, kalam or philosophy. Rather it contains 
teachings from all these sciences. For example al-Ghazäl% discusses many 
matters pertaining to filth in the first part of the Ihyi; usually under such 
headings as a/- `Ami/ al-zihira Masi'il, Buhtith al-frghiyya and so on. 
However a close scrutiny of this material shows that, in these parts of the 
Ihyi, al-Ghazal does not follow the jurists strictly in every detail. This is 
clear from his discussion of the `aural al-bätina (inward actions to accompany 
the outward performance of religious law) and also from his description of the 
details of law connected with this outward performance. For example, he 
demands complete concentration during the whole period of prayer and not 
only at its beginning, unlike the scholar jurists, who said that humans were 
spiritually weak and therefore the majority could only concentrate at the 
beginning of the prayer. 37 Al-Ghazäli's knowledge of the sciences ofkalsm and 
philosophy can be seen from the rigour of his arguments and his astute choice 
of examples. As for the teachings of Sufism, the Ihyi' contains al-Ghazäli's 
mystical teachings set forth in an ordered sequence of thought, original, 
profound and mature, which is based upon reasoning'as sound as it is subtle' 38 
Winter comments on the structure of the Ihyi' as follows: 
Key terms such as `iim (knowledge), hikma 
(wisdom), and filth (jurisprudence), are examined 
and defined, and dhawq put forward as the only 
way to certitude (yagln). It is fortified with this 
n Hava Lazaruz-Yafeh, Studies is AI-Ghazzif, pp. 379-380. 
311 Margaret Smith, AI-Ghazil the Mystic, p. 68. 
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certitude that the range of traditional Islamic 
sciences is to be approached, and an exposition of 
these, beginning with the kalam, proceeds 
through the four 'quarters' of the book: on 
Worship, Usages, Mortal Vices and Saving 
Virtues, to an elegiac climax, where the voice of 
the Afterlife, which has run throughout the work 
as a cant usfrrmus, finally sounds alone. 39 
Hava Lazarus-Yafeh in her Studies in A/-Ghazzar contends that the 
Ihys'affirms that Al-Ghazalf was a mysticý0 Al-Ghazali sometimes expresses 
or hints at esoteric ideas in his Ihys , yet without the use of any technical 
terms. Thus, according to Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, the Ihys' contains a popular 
exposition of al-Ghazalf's süff teachings41 She writes, 
This book should not be considered as an almost 
orthodox, though '@5flavourcd, religious 
compendium, but rather as the expression of AI- 
Ghazzali's mystical re-evaluation and 
interpretation of traditional Islam, consciously 
devoted to its preservation and intensification 
and therefore of enormous historical and social 
importance to Islam. 42 
39T. J. Winter, introduction to AFGhaz " the Remembrance of Death and the AltcrIfe, 
(Kitib dbikr al-mawt we-mi ba'dabu) Hook XL of The Revival of The Religious Sciences 
(Ibyi"&Mn al-Din)tr. by T. J. Winter, p. xviii. 
40 Hava Lazaruz-Yafeh, Sturges in AI-Ghazzifl, p. 3. 
41 Ibid, p. 252. 
42 Ibid, p. 3. 
126 
Although the Iliyi' contains al-Ghazali's mystical teachings, it is 
written for all readers and must be considered in connection with the teachings 
given in his later books which deal specifically with süff doctrine such as 
Rawdat a1-tilibin, al-Ma `ärif al- `agliya, Mishkit al-an wir, Mlzin al- `amal, 
Mukashafat al-quhib and al-Risila al-laduniya. 43 In the Ihyi' al-Ghazali seems 
to follow the way of the prophets in alluding to the themes in the 'Ilm al- 
mukishafa (Science of Revelation) through inference, allegory and 
generalisation. Even though he indicates in the general preface that he will deal 
only with the `Jim al-mu`imala (Science of Behaviour and Relationship) he 
nonetheless inserts oblique references to the esoteric. These hints can be 
understood by thoughtful readers who may thus be directed to the right path, 
for example in Kitib al-tawhid we 1-tawakkul where al-Ghazäli discusses the 
esoteric theme of predestination and free choice. 
The question is, why should al-Ghazalt use this method in a book 
addressed to the general reader? The answer could be that al-Ghazäli wanted to 
raise the more attentive of his readers towards the light of true knowledge. He 
tried to incite their interest in hidden truths in a gradual way by disclosing the 
esoteric themes little by little in his discussion of related topics. Hava Lazarus- 
Yafeh observes, 
The Ihys' is therefore, to be considered Al- 
Ghazzalf's "map" of gradual education, in which 
he opens the eyes of the worthy readers in many 
ways (ranging from vague hints to entire books), 
and imparts to them some of the Divine secrets. 44 
43 Margaret Smith, AI-Ghazirl the Mystic, p. 227. 
44 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-Ghazr f, p. 373. 
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Despite his major purpose: to show the importance of the unity of the 
external sciences (`uhim al-mu'dmala) and internal sciences (`ultirn al- 
mukäshafa), al-Ghazäli unceasingly promulgated the belief that these two 
types of knowledge stand in a hierarchical relationship. 45 AI-Ghazäli held that 
a! -`awwBm (ordinary people) might not understand certain metaphysical 
truths, which could, however, be understood by al-khawlºss (the elect); but 
these truths can only be attained through 'tasting' and themselves transform the 
significance of words. In this he followed the Prophet's (p. b. u. h. ) tradition, 
"Speak unto people in accordance with their understanding. "46 Also, he warned 
that 'to disclose the secret of Lordship is unbelief. Al-Ghazäli discussed this 
matter further in his Kitäb al-imlä'flishkälat al--ihye. 47 
The Ihyä' calls us "to live a life in accordance with the shari `a, with 
heart fully alive and present, so that it remains whole and healthy, pure and 
free from evil, worthy of going to its Lord, without any shame or disgrace upon 
it. It helps us interiorise the externals. "48 
There are many verses in the Qur'an which clearly indicate that the 
'inward' and the 'outward' are inter-related. Prayer and humility go together: 
'Successful are the believers who in their Prayers are humble. ' (a/-Mu'mintm, 
45 T. J. Winter, introduction to Al-Ghazäli: the Remembrance olDhath and the ARerlift; 
(Kiteh dhikr al-ma wt wa-me ha'dahu) Book XL of The Revival of The Religious Sciences 
(Ihya' 'Uh a al-Din) tr. by T. J. Winter, pp. xx-xxi. 
46 Abu- Hamid al-Gba7ali, Klub a1-i/m, 16yp , vol. 1, p. 76. Eng. trans. p. 150. This 
6adilh also occurs in al-Chazali' s Kimiyä-i sa'idab, p. 88. 
47 Reference has been made to the Kiläh al-intle' which is in the sixth volume of the 
edition of the ILye , pp. 229-231. 
48 Khurram Murad, foreword in AI-Ghazili. Jnncrl)imcnsions of Islamic Warship, tr. by 
Muhtar Holland, p. 9. 
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23: 1). Fasting has been enjoined 'that you may become God-fearing. ' (a! - 
Baqarah, 2: 183). One who 'spends his wealth to purify himself - not as 
payment for favours received, only longing to seek the face of his Lord the 
Most High' (al-Lay!, 92: 18-20) will receive the pleasure of his Lord. 
Whosoever performs Pilgrimage and'honours God's sacred symbols, that is of 
the godliness in his heart. ' (al--Hajj, 22: 32). Sacrificing animals is an act of 
worship, but 'the flesh of them shall not reach God, neither their blood, but 
godliness from you shall reach him. ' (al-Hajj, 22: 3). 
Following the footsteps of the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ) is equally important, 
for in the Qur'an God says: 'If you love God, follow me and God will love you 
and forgive you your sins. ' (al-`Imrän, 3: 31). So, it is clear that both the'inner' 
and 'outer' are inseparable in terms of their necessity and importance. Both are 
dependent upon each other. Hearts can be moved by words and actions; words 
and actions must be transformed as light shines in hearts which have been 
overtaken by the love of God. 9 
Al-Ghazälº insisted that the science of fiqh is not only concerned with 
external matters; rather it must fulfil its purpose concerning internal matters. 
Al-Ghazali can thus be considered as fag7i al-na&(jurist of the soul). 
Al-Ghazzali also found a way of introducing at 
least part of the traditional 'Figh ' into the 
sciences dealing with the world beyond, by 
enlarging the concept of'Figh' and by using the 
expression 'Fiqh al-Nair ', 'Fiqh al-Din '. He 
claimed that originally the science of law dealt 
49 Ibid, p. 13. 
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both with matters of this world and the world to 
come, but that the first doctors of law, in the 
Prophet's time, tried to deal mainly with the latter 
and to help people purify themselves by uprooting 
vices from their hearts and implanting therein 
virtues, in order to prepare themselves for the 
world to come rather than settle their petty 
disputes in this world. Yet in his day, and for 
several generations before that, it would seem 
that the doctors of law preferred to deal with 
exactly at part of the 'Fiqh' which is concerned 
with this world only ('Figh al--Dunya '). In this 
way they tried to comply with the rulers' wishes 
and add to their honour by means of barren 
disputations. These doctors of law seem to Al- 
Ghazzali ignorant of the real, wider meaning of 
'Fiqh', believing that they follow in the steps of 
the 'Sahiba ' and deal with really important 
religious issues. 50 
After realising and acknowledging that the snff path was the only way 
to gain true knowledge, al-Ghazäli felt compelled to spread his message of 
reform and uprightness. The means he chose was the Ihye ; into which he 
poured his great learning and unshakeable faith. Nadwi comments, "In 
reflecting the tremendous sincerity and heroic sacrifice, heart-felt certitude and 
ardent zeal of the author to revivify the true faith the Ihyä' presents a striking 
example. i51 
50 Hava Lazarus-Yafeb, Sludicsia AI-Gbarzali, pp. 380-381. 
51 Abül Hasan `Ali Nadwf, SavioursoflsJamicSpirit, p. 129. 
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The Ihyfi' can be regarded as "the first detailed sociological study in 
Islam which brought out courageously and poignantly the social and moral ills 
of the society and suggested measures for its reform and transformation into a 
healthy community. 02 
In his visionary zeal to reform the Muslim society of his time, al- 
Ghazali pointed out that the most important reason for the decline of the 
Muslims' faith was the weaknesses of the `Mama : The `ulami, who were 
supposed to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong, were no longer qualified for 
their role. The `ulamä' were responsible for the comprehensive religious and 
moral degeneration of the Muslims, and this neglect of their duties was 
severely criticised by al-Ghazal in his Ihyä. The ulama were infected by the 
love of wealth, power and honour. For example, they were not courageous 
enough to uphold the truth if to do so might anger the ruler. 
The Ihyi' also represents the ethical philosophy of al-Ghazali. His 
studies in ethical philosophy discern 'the mysteries of head and heart' and 
exhibit a subtle insight into the eternal values of life S3 So the Ihys' actually 
covers almost all the important aspects of Muslim life. In this al-Ghazält 
differed from his contemporaries who were expert in their own branch only. 
"Jurists were stretching their legal quibblings too far, to include all sorts of 
futile juristic issues; dialecticians deemed it worthwhile to engage in specious 
reasoning and irrelevant polemics; traditionists busied themselves with 
unnecessary researches into the terms and phrases used in the Traditions and 
their derivatives; while mystics considered it an act of devotion to commit the 
52 Ibid, pp. 130-131. 
S31bid, p. 151. 
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writings of their masters to memory. "', ' 
Thus, the Ihyä' is pre-eminently a reforming work addressed to Muslim 
society, a work which is sufficient for both the education and discipline of 
seekers after truth. The Ihyä'can also be regarded as a guidebook for educators 
and preachers. It serves as an encyclopaedia of the Islamic sciences. It can be 
used as a manual for the Islamic way of life. Al-Ghazäli succeeded in creating a 
compendium of Islamic beliefs and practices containing measures required for 
the purification of the soul, the disciplining of moral conduct and the 
cultivation of a mystical awareness of the truth. The effect of the Ihyä' on its 
readers can be great, not to say overpowering, perhaps because it was written 
by al-Ghazali at a time when he was himself filled and deeply impressed with a 
ss feeling of higher awakening. Nadwi describes his own reaction: 
The inner experience of unseen realities giving an 
insight into the higher realms, through which Al- 
Ghazal had himself passed, and which is 
reflected in the 1hy8, sometimes makes its 
readers disenchanted with the world. It creates a 
longing for solitude and penitence, contemplation 
and devotion and produces an awe and reverence 
of God peculiar to the mystic way of life which is 
often harmful for the health. The writer of these 
pages has himself experienced these feelings 
while going through the Ihys' for the compilation 
54 Ibid, p. 146. 
55 Shibli Na bmani, AI-Gbaziry, Azamgarh, 1956, p. 48, cited in Abül Hasan 'Ali Nadwf, 
. Saviours oflslamic Spiril, p. 150. 
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of this book. m 
The Ihyi'thus reflects the sincerity and courage of al-Ghazäli as well 
as his earnestness and selfless devotion to the truth which made him abandon 
his enviable position in Baghdad. This is the main reason for the effectiveness 
and enormous popularity of al-Ghazali's works. His message of reform can be 
inferred from the Ihyä'as well as his other works. Its distinctive feature is that 
this reformation must start from the examination of one's own soul, and the 
intense concern for the reformation of one's own soul is essential to the reform 
of society. 
During the fifth century after Hijrah, some great intellectual leaders in 
different fields were brought forth by Islam, including `Abd al-Qähir al-Jurjäni 
(d. 471/1079) in jurisprudence and literature, Abü Ishäq Shirazi (d. 476/1083) 
in religious sciences, Abü Zakarya Tabri zi (d. 502/1109) in grammar and 
lexicography, and al-Ghazäli himself in religious sciences. Thus, during this 
period of intellectual awakening, nobody could hope to achieve success unless 
he was well-versed in all the common sciences. So it was vital for one who 
wanted to fill the hearts of people with faith and knowledge, cure them of their 
scepticism, provide solace to the spiritually distressed and ignite them with a 
burning desire for moral and spiritual uplift to possess prodigious knowledge 
and literary distinction as well as brilliance of mind and moral and spiritual 
excellence 57 All of these qualities are to be found in al-Ghazäli, to which he 
added a burning eagerness for the renovation of the faith which spurred him to 
call his fellow Muslims to uphold the tenets of the shari `asg and the sunnabS9. 
56 Abül Hasan `Ali Nadwi, Saviours oflslamic Spirit, p. 150. 
57 lbid, pp. 175-176. 
58 The law, including both the teachings of the Qur'in and of the Traditions (both the 
actions and sayings of the Prophet). See AbW Hasan `Ali Nadwi, Saviows ofIslamic 
Spirit, p. 403. 
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AI-Munqidh and the Ihyä' are connected in their purpose. In fact all of 
al-GhazälPs works are related to each other, and a truly critical understanding 
of al-Ghazalf's mind requires the study of his entire output. AI-Mungidh, like 
the Ihyä ; is not a book on any particular subject. Rather it discusses the basic 
ideas of the science of kaläm, philosophy, the Ismä'f lis and Sufism. On the 
other hand, the Ihyä' presents the results of al-Ghazälf's studies of these four, 
which he also specifically examined separately in his other works. In terms of 
structure al-Munqidh is an autobiographical work while the Ihyä' is similar to 
a work of figh. Al Mungidh recounts a spiritual journey whereas the Ihyä' has 
many topics and sub-topics. 
So, we can say that the lhyi' answers the questions that al-Ghazali 
raised in his al-Munqidh. Al-Ghazäli put these answers in a manner easily 
understood by most people, but he also included many passages that hint at 
`ilm al-mukishafa for the more discriminating reader, i. e. 'the elect'. The Ihyi' 
can also be regarded as an exposition of his ideas for reform which he 
developed during his period of retirement. In al-Mungidh he tells us that he 
resumed teaching in the year 499/1106, being convinced that this was his 
responsibility. The Ihyi' formally sets out his teachings, in particular those he 
imparted after his return from retirement. Most importantly it contains the 
programme for reform which was inspired by God during his seclusion. 
59 As opposed to the Qur'an which is a direct revelation from God, the Prophet also 
received what is regarded as wahigbairal-mutalla'inor an unread revelation which enabled 
him to give authoritative declarations on religious questions. The Arabic words used for 
these traditions are Heditb and Summab (a saying and a custom). The Prophet gave very 
special instructions respecting the faithful transmission of his sayings. Gradually, 
however, spurious traditions also gained currency and an elaborate canon of subjective 
and historical criticism was evolved for the reception or rejection of the Traditions. 
See Abül Hasen 'Ali Nadwi, Saviours oIlslamic Spirit, vol. l, p. 403. 
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3.3 Al-Ghazäli the Ofi : 
Was al-Ghazafi a true süfi, and if so, what kind of $nft ? Hava Lazarus- 
Yafeh contends: 
I feel that there should be no doubt of the fact 
that Al-Ghazali really experienced authentic 
mystic ecstasies and cherished deep mystical 
views about God, man, cosmos, gnosis etc., most 
of which he explained quite explicitly in 
authentic books of his such as the "Ihyä' ", 
"Djawähir", "A/-Magsad' and "Mishkij. He 
tried to infuse these views into traditional Islam, 
lending its basic principles deep inner meanings 
complementing its outward forms rather than 
contradicting them. Therefore he had no need for 
a secret doctrine, for a belief in double truths. He 
only revealed most of these deeper truths to those 
capable of understanding (Ahlihf) while he 
withheld them from the masses. 
Yet even as a mystic Al-Ghazzali's outstanding 
characteristic was his social activity. He 
belonged to those mystics whose ecstatic 
experiences inspire them with a social- 
educational ideal and with a feeling of vocation 
and mission to confirm and to reinterpret their 
own tradition rather than try to revolt against 
it. 0 
60 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies is A/-Gbazzig, p. 389. 
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According to al-Ghazäli both the 11'ama! al-? ihir" (outward action) and 
" `ama! a! -bitin" (inward action) should come together to ensure the perfection 
of the soul. Al-Ghazal always talks about "`ilm wa-`amal ", but of course puts 
the " `ilm " or "ma `rifa " on a higher level than " `amal " 6' Al-Ghazalf stressed 
that it is wrong to seek the way of the hereafter in the snff spirit, without 
sincere and heartfelt observance of the religious commandments. 
According to al-Ghazali, the uniqueness of man and the divine element 
in him consist in his ability to know and understand the truth about objects, 
the world and God. Every creature has been created for the sake of its own 
particular unique attribute in the full development of which it finds its mission 
and perfection. Hence, man's perfection and everlasting joy in the presence of 
his God lies in his attainment of true, eternal knowledge. If man does not seek 
after the knowledge for which he was created, he degrades himself to the level 
of the beasts. But if he pursues it with all his might, he can raise himself to the 
ranks of the angels. 2 Only this true knowledge can bring the true love of God, 
which is the source of the love of one's fellow-men and of all the other human 
virtues, and thereby gives him a slight foretaste in this world of the joy 
everlasting which is in store for him in the next world. 63 
However, while searching for his perfection, man usually goes astray. 
For most human beings, the element of the Divine which is created in 
themselves constitutes as great a danger as do their bestial, lustful and satanic 
61 Abu- Hemid al-Ghezäli, voL 5, Kiteb al-mababba wa'1-shariq we 'I -insu wa'1-rrdbä ; 
IbYa , pp. 
208-211. 
62 Abu-Hämid al-Ghaznli, Ki18b 'ajeib al-galb Ibyä ; voL 3, p. 112. 
63 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, Kit lb al-mababbab wa'1-sbariq wa'1-iasu wa'I -ridbä ; Ibyä ; vol. 
5, see also Abi Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb al-arba'ie r mttl al421; pp. 198-199. 
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impulses. As a result they try to find satisfaction in worldly power, wealth, 
scholarship and all the other paths to the soul's destruction instead of seeking 
perfection in true knowledge. So, in the Ihyä, al-Ghazäli tried to guide man 
back on to the right path to true knowledge. 
The proper understanding of the religious commandments is important 
here in order to obtain true guidance. The function of the religious 
commandments needs to be understood correctly. This understanding is part of 
the'knowledge of action' (`ilm al-mu`immala) which has to come together with 
the'knowledge of revelation' ( `i/m al-mukishafa) to constitute the'knowledge 
of the world to come' (`ilm al-ikhira). 65 
The `ilm al-mukäshafe is concerned with the true knowledge of God, 
His attributes and works, and seeks to comprehend the structure of the 
universe, prophetic revelation, the nature of the angels and of the devil, and the 
true content of such religious conceptions as Paradise, Hell and the like. The 
aim of the `ilm al-mu`Amala is the understanding of the ahwi/ al-galb (states of 
the heart). This understanding concerns both praiseworthy states such as long- 
suffering, gratitude, fear and hope as well as those states which are damned, 
such as malevolence, enmity, arrogance, anger and so forth. This science aims 
at erasing from the heart all that is sinful and strengthening all that is virtuous, 
by instructing man to recognize the symptoms, causes and consequences of 
both the good and bad attributes of the heart. This stage must be taken as a 
first step before the seeker prepares for the `ilm al-mukishafa which is 
subsequently granted by God's help to all who are worthy of it. 
64 On the various elements in man, see Abü Hiimid al-Ghaziili, Kileb dbamaroal-dunya 
4yä', vol. 3. Also Abi Himid al-GhazilL Kitsb alp-arba Jn Ii usitl al-&&A pp. 108-109. 
65 Abi I-tämid al-Ghazili, Glib `ajeib al-ga1b, Ibye ; vol. 3, p. 131. 
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The `i1m al-äkhira can be attained by man both by revelation and 
reasoning. 66 The heart that obtains the `ilm al-ekhira by revelation obtains it 
from the world of absolute reality but the heart that obtains it by reasoning 
alone obtains it only indirectly, through the somewhat distorting medium of 
the senses and organs that belong to the world of appearances. 67 There is 
however no great difference between these two methods. For instance, scholars 
who strive for this knowledge through their senses and minds, receive it 
through opening their hearts to the phenomenal world; whereas the ascetics 
seek the divine truth by constantly polishing the mirror of the heart (tasgii al- 
mir'st), hoping to be granted an inner illumination through the opening which 
leads to the ideal world. 
Divine revelation is not granted to the prophets alone; it is also granted 
to the awliyä, the saints and to anyone whom God chooses and trusts. This 
may happen in their waking hours or in sleep. Therefore, it may be granted to 
anyone who struggles to prepare his heart for the Divine mercy by purifying 
himself, mastering his desires and cleansing his soul, detaching himself from 
all worldly matters and persistently yearning to gain true knowledge Fx 
In this struggle to overcome his basic impulses and in his efforts to 
purify his heart to do God's will, man finds help, guidance and support in the 
commandments of the faith. The main function of these commandments is to 
help him to master his passions, "For God, in his supreme wisdom, has made 
the salvation of mortals dependent on their deeds as opposed to their natural 
66 The process where the heart perceives the true nature of objects as they are in the world 
of absolute reality can be compared to the way a mirror reflects the objects around it. 
There are many things that can interfere between the mirror and its surroundings or 
between the heart and the truth. 
67 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazal ,Kub 
`ajiib al-gelb, Ays , voL 3, p. 132. 
6s Ibid. 
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impulses and has entrusted their control to religious law". 9 The tazkiyat al- 
nafs (cleansing of the soul) will bring man near to God and thus know Him and 
love Him. The function of the commandments is two-fold: to annihilate evil 
from the heart and to implant good in it. Al-Ghazali writes on this matter as 
follows: 
Know that the purpose of the (ritual) 
commandments is to strengthen the feeling of joy 
in the recollection of Almighty and Worshiped 
God, that man may return to the world of eternity 
and that the heart of man may be indifferent to 
the world of temptation; but only he will have 
bliss in the next world, who comes at his death to 
his God through love, and only he can love God 
who knows Him and frequently mentions His 
name, since knowledge and love can only be 
attained by constant meditation and recollection. 
Nor can the recollection of God be kept lastingly 
in the heart except by deeds that recall Him, and 
these are the commandments. 0 
Implanting the heart with good and cleansing it of evil is not the final 
goal; rather it is only the necessary condition for the knowledge and love of 
God. The function of the commandments is not merely one of moral 
preparation but to bring man closer to the supreme knowledge of God by 
69 Such as in there are the actions which are unthinkable and cannot be understood 
by reason what are their purposes. Thus, they are done as a total `ubüdiyah (servitude) 
towards God. Ab u- Hämid al-Ghaznli, Ki/sb asrir abhajj, Tyi , vol. 1, p. 353. 
70 Ab U- Humid at-Ghazal f, Kiteb al-arba`in 6 usnl al-äm, p. 76. 
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meditation and thought. This will lead to the knowledge and recognition of 
truth. However obedience to the commandments will not automatically bring 
man closer to true knowledge: man, in order to make proper progress, must 
know the 'states of his heart', its attributes, both good and evil, and the 
influence of his actions upon them, before he can carry out the commandments 
in the right way to bring him nearer to his goal. 71 For in order to fight against 
evil, one must be able to identify it and its fruits. Thus everyone should obtain 
the `ihm al-mu`imala, the knowledge of the Qur'än and the sunnah and a 
detailed familiarity with the religious law and observation of all its subsidiary 
sciences, in so far as they are required by the individual for the proper 
observance of the commandments. 
Then man should know how to perform the commandments properly in 
order to gain the desired effect. Every commandment must be carried out 
sincerely, with single-minded devotion and purity of thought. Al-Ghazälf 
discusses these concepts in the seventh book in the fourth section of the 
Ihyä'. 7Z Single-minded devotion is what differentiates and gives meaning to 
the commandments. Otherwise observance is mere meaningless movements of 
the body rather than divinely ordained actions. 
Following the fulfilment of these commandments with total devotion 
to God, man should feel khawf wa-rajä' (fear and hope): fear that his deeds 
may have been rejected by God and hope that, by the mercy of heaven, they 
may have been found acceptable to God. 73 Al-Ghazäl stressed the combination 
71 Abi Hamid al-Ghazäli, Klub ', jib llSys ; voL 3, pp. 122-124. 
72 See Ab -U Himid al. -Ghazäli, Kitäb W-aiat wa'1-ikbli; s wa'! -sidq, Ibyi ; voL 5, 
pp. 264-304. 
" See Abll Hämid al-Ghazäli, Kitebal-kbewfwa'1-raje', Ibyä; voL 4, pp. 411-427, 
vol. 5, pp. 3-45. 
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of `i! m wa- `amal (knowledge and action)74 to ensure the proper performance of 
any deed in the 'way of the world to come'. This opinion also held by other 
Muslim thinkers, rejects the view that intellectual cognition alone is enough to 
assure the perfection of the soul and its everlasting bliss. 75 Not that action 
alone is enough. Both knowledge and action must go together and have an 
influence upon each other. `Ilm leads to the right `amal which in turn will 
bring man closer to ma `rifa and love of God, which will improve his deeds. In a 
similar way, fulfilment of the commandments and virtuous deeds lead to 
proper meditation and right thoughts. Meditation then renews the ahwal al- 
galb beneficial to right action while love facilitates the performance of right 
action. 76 
Right action is not limited to the proper observance of the written 
commandments; rather it embraces every good deed, including for example 
man's obligations to other human beings. Knowledge on the other hand should 
be present at the beginning and at the end. The beginning is the `i! m al--`ama! 
(knowledge of action) which is followed by the `ama! (action). The purpose of 
the action is to purify and cleanse the heart so that the truth may be revealed 
to it. This truth is the 'knowledge of the revelation'. " But although al-Ghazäli 
stresses the importance of understanding the deeper purpose of the 
commandments, he held the view that those commandments which are 
performed by man without the benefit of such understanding are the ones that 
really express our subjugation to God . 
78 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, in her Studies in 
74 This parallels his discussion on the `aural al-zehiriab (external action) such as in the 
discussion on zakat. See Klub al-zakat, I¢yi, vol. 1, pp. 276-305. 
75 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in AI-Ghazzif, p. 420. 
76 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Kit lb al-tafakkar, Ibyi, vol. 6, p. 47. 
77 Abu Hamid al-Ghazäli, Klub al-mababbab we'] -shawq wa'l-insu wa'I-ridhs , 
Ibyi ; vol. 5, p. 208. 
79 Abu Hamid al-Ghaza-li, Kitib asraral-ba6', Ibyi, vol. 1, p. 353. See also, Abu Hamid 
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AI-Gbazzer comments that here, al-Ghazhli's attitude is somewhat 
ambivalent. 9 But actually al-Ghazälf's views are not contradictory. Man 
should try to understand the reason for every commandment, for God asks man 
to think. But there are commandments for which human beings cannot 
understand the reason, and in such cases man is still obliged to perform them, 
for God has compelled their observance. Everything which is from God exists 
for good reason. So, whoever performs this kind of commandment surely does 
it solely for the sake of God and because of his firm belief in everything 
coming from God. Here al-Ghazäli's opinion differs from that of the 
philosophers, some of whom believed that the commandments are no more 
than an intermediate stage for those who are not wise enough to understand or 
who have not yet attained to true knowledge. 80 For example the Ikhwan al- 
$afi'(Brethren of Purity)81 "claimed to be content with their own leader which 
was the human reason (a! - `agi) 'which God most glorious has made leader over 
the best of His creation', and they observed that they would rigorously avoid 
the company of anyone who was not content with 'the dictates of reason 
(share `! t al- `agq'. r82 These philosophers believed that reason should have a 
Caliphal supremacy over man's soul. 
Thus, according to al-Ghazali, the purpose of the commandments is to 
enable man to master his basic impulses, to purify his heart of vice and to 
strengthen it with virtue; and in this way to bring him near to eternal 
al-GhaZaff, Klub al-arba `in I usril al-SA pp. 25-26. 
79 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Stwi es in AI-Ghat p. 433. 
80 Ibid, p. 422. 
8I The Ikhwin aI-Sati'were a group of medieval Arab philosophers. Their writings are 
presented in the form of rasi'il(epistles). For details on this group of philosophers, see 
LPL Netlon, Muslim Neoplatonists: Au Introduction to the Thought of the Brethren of 
Purity (Ikhwan al-Sam). 
82 Ibid, p. 103. 
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knowledge, which is their ultimate purpose. But their secondary purposes 
cover many different aspects. For example the fulfilment of the 
commandments is like a medicine to diseases of the heart that may lead man to 
muhlikät (eternal perdition); it also shows man's gratitude to God for His 
mercy to us, for strengthening our hearts to reject the temptations of this world 
and to desire the true joys of the next. These are also among the virtues needed 
on the quest for true knowledge. Therefore, all the meanings given by al- 
Ghazäli to the commandments are for the purpose of strengthening their 
influence over man's soul. 
In the Ihyä' al-Ghazäli stresses the importance of the commandments 
for the individual and how they can help man to master his passions, guide him 
to virtue and enrich his personal religious experiences. Many ethical questions 
are dealt with in this massive and comprehensive manual from both a practical 
and religious point of view. For example, prayer is considered formally as well 
as from the point of view of its deeper religious significance as mentioned 
above. Al-GhazTdPs concept of the ethical combines knowledge ('11m) and 
action (`aural) and the disposition of man. These points will be considered 
further in the chapter on al-Ghazali's theory of soul. 
Al-Ghazälf's attitude toward this world as the sown field for the Mrld 
to come is what differentiates him from the extreme snff s. For al-Ghazilf, this 
world is not in itself the source of evil. It is man's attitude to this world that 
decides whether it is to be the source of eternal joy or a cause of disgrace. So, 
even money is not an evil in itself if it is used to sustain man's body, for 
example with food, for the body is the 'vehicle' which upholds him into the 
next world. And with money also man can give charitably or go on hajj 
(pilgrimage). This attitude is quite different from that generally accepted 
among the s5fffs of his time, for example as expressed by Abu- Talib al-Makkii 
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in his Qiit a! -quhib. 
83 Man has to be mindful of the next world, the resurrection 
of the dead and the day of judgement, and never forget that this world has no 
solid foundations and that death will end worldly pleasure. But, at the same 
time, this world is the place for man to prepare for the world to come. The 
better he prepares in this world the greater will be his joy in the next. So, one 
who attempts to escape totally from this world is no better than one who is 
enslaved to its vanities. For someone who considers this world as a place of 
preparation for the next, his seeking to live longer is a result of his eagerness to 
prepare more fully for the next world rather than a clinging to the vanities of 
this world, because he knows that death will end his chances to improve his 
soul. 84 
Since this world is the preparation for the next world, man needs his 
body and his organs to achieve the true purpose of this life. His organs are the 
vehicle of his heart, his knowledge is the provisions he carries with him on his 
journey to meet his God, while his good deeds are the channel by which he is 
enabled to 'taste' and store up as much as he needs of these provisions. So it is 
the duty of man to take care of his physical body as well as his inner self. 65 
Thus, the world, wealth and the body are not good or bad in 
themselves, rather it depends on how man uses them in his life. Al-Ghazali 
regards uncompromising self-subjugation to total poverty, monasticism and 
the like as leading away from God, for he who hates something is no less 
occupied with it than he who loves it. Therefore, the highest degree of self - 
g' Abu- Tfllib al-Makki, Qüt el-quhib, vol. 2, pp. 215-218. 
sa Abu- ]ja-mid al-Ghaznli, Klub al-srba 'in fi usirl al-din, p. 110. Also Abü Hnmid al- 
Ghazäli, Kit lb a]-mababba wa'1-insu wa'I -sbewg wa'1--ridbe ; Ibys ; 
voL 5, pp. 205-206. 
ss Ab u- Hämid a1-Ghaznli, Klub 'ajäib el-gall; ", Ibyä ; vol. 3, pp. 112-113. 
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denial is attained when a man's soul is neither inclined to this world nor 
withdraws from it in disgust, but regards its presence or absence with 
composure 96 
This doctrine shows the moderateness of al-Ghazali's Sufism. In al- 
Muugidh, al-Ghazäli might be referring to the kind of extreme snff teaching 
described above when he writes that the faith of people around him had been 
shaken by the influence of the ignorance of the süffsg7 besides that of the 
philosophers, the scholar jurists and the dialecticians. 88 
As well as the religious scholars, al-Ghazali criticised the pious and the 
ýuf s. He pointed out their misconceptions, self-deceptions and their show of 
assumed piety. He disclosed how some of their devotional practices were really 
unimportant and that the motive of these devotional acts was not sincere 
dedication to God, but rather to satisfy oneself or impress others, or to seek 
respect and honour. 
Thus al-Ghazalt can be considered as one who succeeded in making 
Sufism compatible with sunni Islam. The reconciliation of Sufism and the 
shari`a actually reached its height with al-Ghazalt; who reconstituted orthodox 
Islam, making Sufism an integral part of it, and at the same time reforming 
Sufism itself. The Ihyä' outlines an orthodox system for the attainment of 
unity with God. 
sb Abii Nämid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb al-arbain I'i ash a1-44 p. 157. 
87 Abi Hkmid al-Ghazäli, a1-MLngidb, p. 112; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faitb, p. 77. 
Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, al-Mrmgidk pp. 116-122; tr. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Faith, pp. 76-80. 
89 Abii Fiämid al-Ghaznli, Kiteb dham a! jab wa'I--rive Ibyä ; voL 4, pp. 91-95. 
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This chapter and the two which precede it have dealt with al-Ghazäli's 
background. His theory of soul is much related to his own spiritual 
development, because his affirmation of the possibility of esoteric knowledge 
is based on his süff experiences. This knowledge can only be attained by souls 
fit to receive it, by purifying the soul from what is other than God and through 
the internalisation of the shan'`a. This is why spiritual discipline is also 
important in regard to such knowledge. Since al-Ghazäli contends that it is by 
the soul that man knows, it is essential to know the origin of the soul, its 
nature, its capacities, and its states, and this knowledge of the power of the 
soul and its qualities is important in order to show the possibilities of the 
different methods of attaining knowledge. For the sake of comparison, the next 
chapter discusses Greek and Islamic theories of soul. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Theories of Soul (Nafs) 
4.1. Greek Theories of Soul 
Soul can be said to distinguish inanimate from living natural 
substances. The early Greek philosophers were concerned to investigate the 
reality of the soul. In order to analyse their conceptions of soul, three major 
figures have been chosen: Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus. Discussions on the soul 
can be found in their writings on psychology and metaphysics. 
4.1.1. Plato 
According to Plato, life begins when the soul enters the body. He 
defines the soul as that which is alive: ' the Greek word for soul (psyche) was 
generally used for the principle of life? Plato also claims that our souls pre- 
existed our birth or existed before they became actualized or incarnate in our 
bodies. 3 Plato's theory of recollection, as put forward in his dialogue Meno, 
also rests on the belief in pre-existence. 4 He asserts that the human soul 
belongs to a permanent spiritual or mental world, which is the soul's true 
home, while the body, which is the inferior part of man, belongs to the world 
1 Plato, Pbaedo, 86a-b, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 296-299. See also, C. J. Rowe, Plato Pbaedo, Cambridge, 1993, p. 8, p. 205. 
2 Plato, Epinomis, 983b, ed. and trans. by W. R M. Lamb, The Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 456-457. 
3 Plato, Pbaedq 76e-77a, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 266-269. 
Plato, Menq 86a, ed. and trans. by W. R M. Lamb, The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 320- 
321, see also Plato, Timaeus, 34c-35a, ed. and trans. by R G. Bury, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 64-65. 
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of flux. 5 And the body should stand in relation to the soul as a slave stands in 
relation to his master. 6 Thus, soul is the ruling element in the living being. 
Plato also regards the soul as divine. 8 His theory of the soul's divinity 
was to some extent influenced by the concept of god in Greek religion. 
Generally, the function of souls is to have care of the universe; the more 
perfect soul having the more extensive area of operation. 10 The most perfect 
soul takes care of the entire universe and directs it along the best path" This 
concept is related to Plato's view of the role of intelligence. In Republic II, 
Plato argues 
... that the gods are good, 
12 [footnote mine] for 
they possess moderation, rationality, and order 
and in no way their opposites. Being good, fully 
capable, and attendant to details, 13 [footnote 
There is a dispute whether the soul belongs to the world of form or of flux. This matter is 
related to Plato's Two Worlds Theory. See Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in 
Republic v-vii", Epistemology, (Edited by Stephen Everson), pp. 85-115. 
6 Geddes MacGregor, Introduction to Religious Philosophy, p. 201. 
' Plato, Pbsedo, 80a, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 278-279. 
Plato, Phaedo, 80a, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 278-279. 
9 Michael L. Morgan, " Plato and Greek Religion", in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 
p. 241. 
io Plato, Phaedrus, 246b-c, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 470-473, Plato, Philebus; 27-30, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, 
The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 254-269, see also, J. C. B. Gosling, Plato, p. 70. 
" Plato, Laws, Book 10,897c7-9, ed. and trans. by R. G. Bury, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 342-343. See also, Michael L. Morgan, " Plato and Greek Religion", in The 
Cambridge Companion to Plato, p. 241. 
12 Plato, Republic Book 2,379b-c, ed. and trans. by Paul Shorey, The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 1, pp. 182-185. 
13 Plato, Laws, Book 10,900c-903b, ed. and trans. by R G. Bury, The Loeb Classical 
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mine] then, the gods must be thought to care for 
each individual through 'the control of ruling 
powers that have perfected the minutest 
constituents of the universe'. Individuals act 
according to psychological laws and their actions 
contribute to the cosmic order and suit the laws 
of destiny. Eventually appropriate reward and 
punishment come to all. '4 
Plato then justifies the dualist doctrine that the body and soul are two 
different things. The soul is immaterial, imperceptible and immortal. So, 
similarly to the Forms, it is imperceptible and indestructible. On the other 
hand the body is material, perceptible and mortal. '5 Plato fully investigates the 
separation of body and soul in Phacdo, which probably belongs to his middle 
period. 16 In the Epinomis (which is Plato's last work or one written by another 
shortly after his death), the dichotomy of soul and body is again strongly 
reaffirmed. '7 
His discussions on pain and pleasure also imply the separateness of soul 
and body. '8 For example, in his dialogue Philelm Plato mentions that there is 
Library, pp. 352-363. 
la Michael L. Morgan, " Plato and Greek Religion ", in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 
p. 241. 
15 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 99. 
16 Plato, Phacdo,, 64c-67b, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 222-233. 
17 Plato, Epinomi. 980d-e, ed. and trans. by W. R. M. Lamb, The Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 448-451. See also, T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology, p. 155. 
18J. C. B. Gosling, Plato, p. 35. 
In earlier work of Plato, pleasure seems to be entirely confined to the body. See Plato, 
Phaedo, 64d-69c, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 224-241, see also, Dorothea Frede, "Disintegration and restoration: Pleasure and 
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a division between the pleasures of the soul and those of the body. It is not just 
the body that suffers pleasure and pain; the soul also perceives disturbances 
(pains) and restorations (pleasure). 19 This leads to the definition of the 
pleasures of the body as perceptions: "They are to be distinguished from the 
pleasures that the soul can experience all by itself. These are specified, at least 
at first, as the pleasures that the soul has originally experienced with the body 
and can then re-experience all by itself through memory. 00 Desire also is not a 
matter of the body, rather it is a pain of the soul that brings it in touch with the 
appropriate 'filling'. In the cases of both hunger and thirst, the soul does not 
merely notice the demands of the body, but desires at the same time the 
respective "filling" and thus employs memory. These kinds of pains and 
pleasures are important for the preservation of every animal. ' 
In another dialogue, Timaeus, Plato discusses the four dimensions of 
the soul; "From the Soul the four dimensions are projected upon Matter, in the 
form of combinations of basic triangles, to form the four Empodoclean 
elements, Fire, Air, Water and Earth. "22 This doctrine is related to the 
discussion of mathematical and geometrical matters. But the word 'soul' here 
refers to the cosmic entity or the World Soul. 23 Aristotle, in his De Anima, 
pain in Plato's Philebus", in the The Cambridge Companion to Plalo, (edited by Richard 
Kraut), p. 435. 
19 Plato, Pbilebu 
, 
33c-d, 35b-c, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb 
Classical Library, pp. 276-279,284-285. 
20 Dorothea Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and Pain in Plato's 
Philebus", in the The Cambridge Companion to Palo, (edited by Richard Kraut), p. 441. 
21 Plato, Philebu 35c-d, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 284-287. See also, Dorothea Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration: 
Pleasure and Pain in Plato's Philebus', in the The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 
(edited by Richard Kraut), p. 441. 
22 Plato, Timaeu, 32c, ed. and trans. by R G. Bury, The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 60- 
61. See also, John Dillon, The MiddlePlatonists, p. 5. 
23 Plato, Timaers 35a, ed. and trans. by R G. Bury, The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 64- 
65. 
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supposed that Plato described the Soul as the 'place' (topos) of the Ideas, 
receiving the Ideas into itself and transforming them into mathematicals, then 
projecting them upon matter to form the physical world. Inside this cosmic 
entity or World Soul is the human soul, which is a microcosm. 24 
Plainly the Soul is designed as the supreme 
mediating entity, receiving influences from the 
intelligible realm and passing them on, in 
modified form - that is to say, 'extended' and 
'diversified' to bring about the creation of the 
sensible realm. This is the process described, 
with many mythological flourishes (of which the 
Demiurge is the chief one), in Timaeus25 
In the Republic, Plato asserts that the soul is tripartite: rational, 
spirited and appetitive. 26 There are many arguments on this point but for the 
24 Aristotle, De Anima, 1.2,404bf1 ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, On The Soul The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 22-23. See also, John Dillon, The Middle Plaloaists, p. 6. 
25 John Dillon, The MiddlePlstonisls, p. 6. See also, Plato, Timeeu% 36e-37c, ed. and trans. 
by R G. Bury, The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 72-75. 
26 This tripartite division of the soul corresponds to the three levels of soul in Islamic 
teaching to some extent. The appetitive part, or desire of the soul, does not perceive 
things as good or bad, rather its only concern is what satisfies it. This part of soul sees 
things without further considerations. Secondly, is the spirited part of soul: here is where 
difficulties occur. It seems to have two different tendencies. One is the tendency to 
agression and violence and the other involves reasons and reason-giving. And if it is not 
properly trained, the spirited part might become harsh. On the other hand, if it is 
properly trained, it can be the source of courage. It is the helper to reason unless it is 
corrupted by evil nurture. (Republic, Book 4,441a). Thus, spirit shares features of both 
desire and reason. Lastly, the rational part of soul is the reasoning part; its two major 
functions are searching for the truth, and increasing one's knowledge. It is the part of 
our soul that wants to extend our knowledge of truth; at the same time it finds pleasure 
in doing this. It seeks truth in both the practical and intellectual spheres. It also 
appears as the part by which we work out whether we have been wrongly made to 
suffer or are suffering justly. It is what urges us to both intelligent practical choice and 
the discovery of theorems. Reason, then, is the source of practical judgment about what 
is best for the person as a whole. See Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic 
pp. 125-140. And in Pbaedo, specially 66c-67b, it is said that the purification of the soul 
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present it is enough to consider that the division of the soul into three parts is 
at least intended to establish a distinction between three sorts of desire, the 
three sorts essential to the human person, at least during his embodied life. 
Any person, therefore, manifests three different sorts of desire that at times 
conflict with each other. Here, some personal legislation is needed to ensure 
that each plays its proper role. 27 This shows Plato's recognition of conflict 
within the soul. 
Discussing his doctrine of the soul in the Republic IV, Plato attacks the 
notion that all desire is for good. 28 According to Plato the "desire for good only 
can be found in the rational part of the soul. Desires of the appetitive part of 
the soul, on the other hand, are brutely irrational, or as we might say, blind. , 29 
For example, "If my desire to eat the pastry is an irrational desire, then even if 
you convince me that it would be better for me not to eat it, the desire does 
not go away and I may in fact act on that desire. Furthermore, my behavior can 
be changed without any change in my belief - simply by acting on or 
of ordinary desires and fears was a condition of its acquisition of wisdom, which here 
means a clear-minded appreciation of what is truly valuable. But this is only available 
to the philosopher. See C. J. Rowe, (editor) Plato Pbaedo, Cambridge, 1993, p. 151. 
Hence, Plato recognises that the purification of the soul is necessary in order to receive 
wisdom (or guidance in Islamic teaching). But the tripartition of soul is a later 
development of Plato's doctrine. In his earlier work, Pbaedo, Plato asserts that soul is 
indivisible. See R. Hackforth, PlatosPbaedq translated with an introduction and 
commentary, Cambridge: University Press, 1972, p. 11. 
27 Plato, Republic, Book 4,441e-442b, ed. and trans. by Paul Shorey, The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 1, pp. 406-409. See also, J. C. B. Gosling, Plato p. 14. 
28 In earlier works of Plato, he asserts that all desire is for good. For example see, Plato, 
Avtagoras, 351b-358a, ed. and trans. by W. R. M. Lamb, The Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 220-245, see also, Dorothea Frede, "Disintegration and restoration: Pleasure and 
pain in Plato's Philebus", in the The Cambridge Companion to Plato, (edited by Richard 
Kraut), p. 433. Hence, the recognition that conflict exists within the soul as well as the 
doctrine that the desire for good, can be found only in the rational part of the soul is 
not developed until the Republic. 
29 Plato, Republic Book 4,439a-e, ed. and trans. by Paul Shorey, The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 1, pp. 394-399, see also, Terry Penner, "Socrates And The Early 
Dialogues", in The Cambridge Compaction to Plato, p. 129. 
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awakening my irrational desires. "30 Plato claims that it is possible to act 
contrary to what one thinks is best. 31 Here Plato differs from Socrates, who 
denied the existence of such a phenomenon 32 
In Meno, for the first time, Plato discusses matters beyond the realm of 
moral philosophy. Here he considers the immortality of the soul. This 
discussion is connected with the idea that knowledge is recollection. 33 He 
proposes a radical theory of knowledge: that all learning is actually a process 
of recollection 34 He holds that "the human soul is born with the ability to 
recollect what it once learned in a previous existence. 105 Thus a teacher who 
teaches his pupil is not teaching something new; his function is rather to 
prompt the pupil to remember what is already in his mind. The pupil's task on 
the other hand is to respond to his teacher's efforts to stimulate his memory. 
So differences may occur within a group of students, for each will differ in 
their ability to remember. Some people may be able to remember more quickly 
than others. "In Meno, Plato brings the example of the slave who can make a 
significant progress toward an understanding of geometry, if he is asked the 
right sorts of questions. "36 Plato also taught that all learning is really a process 
30 Terry Penner, Socrates And The Early Dialogues, p. 129. 
31 Plato, Republic, Book 4,439c-d, ed. and trans. by Paul Shorey, The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 1, pp. 396-399. 
32 Terry Penner, Socrates And The Early Dialogues, p. 129. 
33 Plato, Phaedo, 72e-73a, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 252-253, see also, Plato, Republic, Book 7,518c-d, ed. and trans. by Paul 
Shorey, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 2, pp. 134-137. 
34 Plato, Mono, 80e-86c, ed. and trans. by W. lL M. Lamb, The Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 300-323. 
35 Richard Kraut, "Introduction to The Study of Plato", in The Cambridge Companion 
To P/a1q edited by Richard Kraut, p. 6. 
36 Richard Kraut, Introduction to TheStudyofPlato, p. 6. 
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of recollection in another dialogue, Phaedo. 37 
In a further dialogue, the Phaedrus, Plato argues that the whole soul is 
immortal because only the immortal remains forever in motion. Soul is self- 
moving, the source and the beginning of the motion of all other things. 38 "For 
every body which derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has 
its motion within itself has a soul, since that is the nature of the soul; but if 
this is true - that that which moves itself is nothing else than the soul - then 
the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal. "39 The arguments on 
the immortality of the soul also can be found in Republic. 40 
Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul also affected the 
philosopher's life, as discussed in Phaedo. 
In coming to know the Forms and in cultivating 
the virtues, we prepare ourselves for the state we 
will finally reach when we are free of the body. 
Some people do brave or temperate or just 
actions only when they see some further material 
advantage coming from them; these people have 
a mere 'facade' of virtue. The philosopher, 
37 Plato, Pbaedo, 72e-77a, cd. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 252-269. 
38 Plato, PhaedruS 245c-d, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 468-471. 
39 Plato, Phsedruss 245e-246a, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 470-471. See also, Geddes MacGregor, Introduction to Religious Philosophy, 
p. 215. 
40 Plato, Republic, Book 10,608c-612a, ed. and trans. by Paul Shorey, The Loeb Classical 
Library, 1963, vol. 2, pp. 468-483. See also, Richard Kraut, Introduction to The Study 
of Plxto, pp. 9-10. 
. 
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however, is unreservedly committed to the 
virtues, because he does not care about any 
worldly loss they may involve 4' 
Plato's theory of the immortality of the soul was to some extent 
influenced by the practice of Greek religion. As Morgan points out, there was 
"evidence of increased interest in various forms of ecstatic rituals and 
personally oriented salvation rites and corybantic rites among them. The 
central feature of these practices was an aspiration to purification and catharsis 
from earthly ills, to transcend the physical world, to achieve an ecstatic kinship 
with the divine, to become in some sense divine. These rites often involved the 
use of wine and erotic stimulation to bring the celebrant to a state of raving or 
frenzy. Their goal was to gain release from distress and the pressures of 
physical life and to achieve a postcarnate blessedness. "42 Morgan goes on to 
discuss Plato's attitude to these practices. 
At certain points he accepts but also criticizes 
the polis tradition of festivals, sacrifices, oracles 
and so forth. At other times, however, Plato 
adopts the alternative mode of piety, the mode 
that includes mystery cults and ecstatic rites of 
initiation, purification and salvation. In adopting 
this latter mode, moreover, Plato modifies it 
significantly. The model is ecstatic insofar as it 
involves a kind of transformation whereby the 
4l Terence Irwin, p. 99. See also Plato, Pbaedo, 64c-68b, 68c-69d, 72e-76e, ed. and trans. by 
Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 222-237,237-241,252-267. 
42 Michael L. Morgan, "Plato and Greek Religion", in The Cambridge Companion to Palo, 
p. 230. 
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soul of the human initiate steps out of its 
physical environment and becomes purified of 
worldly distress; it thereby gains a kind of divine 
blessedness and becomes as divine as it can be. 
The soul, in a sense, crosses the divide that 
separates the human from the divine; already 
divine to a degree, it seeks to perfect its divinity. 
In the Orphic-Bacchic rites, this transformation 
is achieved through a process of emotional 
excitement, induced by music, dance and other 
means. Plato accepts the ecstatic model, that 
human beings can, by bringing their souls to a 
certain state, achieve divine or nearly divine 
status. But he replaces the emotional character of 
the ritual process with cognitive content. For 
Plato, that is, a life aimed at salvation takes the 
form of a life of rational inquiry, a philosophical 
life. 
Platonic learning, then, is an ecstatic ritual 
process because it is precisely organized, 
religiously motivated by the desire to become 
divine, and facilitated by the assumption that 
human soul, which is immortal, can become 
divine or nearly divine. The result of this 
Platonic appropriation of the ecstatic model, 
then, is a conception of philosophy as a lifelong 
quest for salvation. 43 
43 Ibid, pp. 231-232. 
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Thus, from all that has been discussed here, we can infer that according 
to Plato the soul is immortal, and has in the prior life possessed knowledge, so 
what is called learning is really the recollection of that which is already known. 
Soul is different from body: bodies, which are composed of matter, are 
changing and perishable44 while the soul exists within the realm of Forms 45 
Like the Forms themselves, souls are eternal, invisible archetypes . 
46 Hence, the 
soul belongs to an order beyond the 'ordinary world'. The soul is the master 
while the body is a slave, and so the soul rules over the body. 47 Further, in his 
dialogue Republic, Plato also argues that the soul is divided into three 
components 48 Two points are important here: that the soul is immortal and 
that learning is recollection. Based on Plato's theories of recollection and of 
the tripartition of the soul, it is possible to infer that it is by virtue of the soul 
that man has knowledge and reason. Also, this brings us to the understanding 
that Plato takes the soul to be a real individual, the locus of the individual's 
essential properties and what make him what he is. 
Drawing on the above discussion, we may attempt a schema of the soul 
according to Plato; 
Plato 
1. Soul belongs to the spiritual world 
44 Plato, Pbaedo, 80b-c, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 278-281. 
45 Plato, Pbaedo, 79d-80a, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 276-279. 
46 Plato, Pbaedo, 79b-c, 80b-c, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical 
Library, pp. 274-277,278-281. 
47 Plato, Phaedo, 80a, ed. and trans. by Harold North Fowler, The Loeb Classical Library, 
pp. 278-279. 
48 Plato, Republic Book 4,441b, ed. and trans. by Paul Shorey, The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 1, pp. 404-005. 
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2. Soul rules over the body 
3. Soul is divine, immaterial, imperceptible, 
immortal 
4.13ody is material, perceptible, mortal 
5. Body belongs to the world of flux 
6. Dichotomy of soul and body 
7. Learning is recollection 
4.1.2. Aristotle 
The other important Greek philosopher whose ideas on the soul are 
under discussion here is Aristotle. In his work De Anima, and in the collection 
of shorter works known collectively as the Parva Naturalia, 49 Aristotle 
discusses the nature of the psyche and its capacities. Aristotelian "psychology" 
is different from contemporary psychology in terms of the subject matter: 
where the latter focuses on conscious and intentional states, Aristotle is more 
concerned to give an account of all those activities which are characteristic of 
living things. SO In other words, Aristotelian psychology provides an 
explanation of all the capacities which are possessed by living things. 
However, no single definition of soul can be given from Aristotle's discussion. 
In addition, Everson contends that Aristotle's views on soul "are usually a 
matter of high, or at least intense, controversy. 01 
49 The discussion on soul by Aristotle also can be found in his work de Motu Animaffinu 
Aristotle, Aristotelis De animalium motione, " et De aaimalirni incessu Ps AristotelisDc 
spiritulibellus, edited by Vernerus Guilelmus Jaeger, Lipsiae: in aedibus B. G. 
Teubneri, 1913. 
50 Stephen Everson, "Psychology", in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. by 
Jonathan Barnes, p. 168. 
51 Stephen Everson, "Psychology", in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. by 
Jonathan Barnes, p. 170. 
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Aristotle insists on the widest possible definition of soul as virtually 
the principle of all life. 52 In addition, for Aristotle there are different levels of 
life: intellect, 53 sensation, nutrition55, motion are all forms of being alive. 57 
In DeAnimall, he states "But of natural bodies some have life and some have 
not; by life we mean the capacity for self-sustenance, growth, and decay. "58 
Psyche is, as we have seen, a general term for all those powers which plants 
and animals possess, but the lifeless elements do not. Therefore it covers a 
wider range than'life'. 59 Also, in attempting a theory of the psyche, Aristotle is 
implicitly committed to providing a theory of the mind, which in fact arises 
from his arguments on the nature of the human soul 60 Hence, Aristotle is not 
confined to the discussion of the human mind or soul only, rather he is 
concerned with all forms of psyche, meaning all that distinguishes living 
creatures, including man, from inanimate objects. Aristotle's 'types of soul' can 
be recognized as a classification of the kinds of living organism - plants, 
animals and man. The functions of feeding, growing and reproducing, which 
are the sole functions of plants, can also be found in animals and man. But man 
is distinguished by the faculty of reason. 61 All organisms have souls but there 
52 Aristotle, DeAnimq 11. IV, 415b13, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 86-87. 
53 Ibid, 11. III, 414b20, pp. 82-83. 
54 Ibid, 11. II, 413b13,414b17, pp. 74-75,82-83. 
55 Ibid, 11.1V, 416a 19, pp. 90-91. 
56 Ibid, 11. III. 414b18,11. IV, 415b14, pp. 82-83,86-87. 
57 Ibid, 11. III. 414a30, pp. 80-81. 
S8 Aristotle, De Anima 11. I, 412a13, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 66-67. See also D. J. Allan, The Philosophy ofAfislolle, p. 
45. 
59 D. J. Allan, The Philosophy ofAristotle, p. 45. 
60 Stephen Everson, "Psychology", in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle ed. by 
Jonathan Barnes, p. 169. 
61 Aristotle, De Anima 11. III, 414b20, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
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are different kinds of soul, just as all bodies have shape but there are different 
kinds of shapes. 
According to Aristotle, "Every natural body, then, which possesses life 
must be substance, and substance of the compound type 62 ... 
We describe one 
class of existing things as substance; and this we subdivide into three: (1) 
matter, which in itself is not an individual thing; (2) shape or form, in virtue of 
which individuality is directly attributed, and (3) the compound of the two. " 
63 
Natural bodies, including living bodies, are from the third class of substances 
for they have both form and matter. So that to specify the form of a living 
substance is to cite its psyche for the psyche is the form of a natural living 
body. Living bodies are a subclass of natural bodies and, in Aristotle's view, 
Greek already had a term to distinguish the forms possessed by the members of 
that subclass - and that term was psyche. Aristotle ridicules those who 
attempt to characterize the psyche without taking into consideration the body 
of which it is the form. Their failure to discuss the relation between the psyche 
and the body manifests a misunderstanding of the nature of the psyche. 
According to Aristotle, each body has its own particular form and shape. By 
placing the psyche as the form of the living body, Aristotle claims to provide 
proper explanations of the relation between a living body's capacities and its 
material constitution. For example, for something to be an axe, it must have 
the capacity to cut things. If it is to have this capacity, its head must be made 
of a hard material. Similarly, if the body is to have organs which are able to 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 82-83. 
62 Ibid, 11. I, 412a15-16, pp. 66-67. 
63 Aristotle, De Anims, 11.1,412a6-9, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 66-67. See also, Stephen Everson, "Psychology", in The 
Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, p. 171. 
ba Stephen Everson, "Psychology", in The Cambridge Companion to Aristode, ed. by 
Jonathan Barnes, p. 171. 
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fulfil their constitutive functions, these also need to have particular material 
constitutions. In the case of the sense organs, their distinctive capacity is that 
of receiving "the perceptible forms without the matter. t65 
For Aristotle, "the individual organism is a single, unified and 
independent substance whose matter is its body and whose form, moving cause 
and end are its soul. Soul and body are separable only as the matter of a 
physical object is separable from its shape. "66 This concept of soul also 
reflected Aristotle's terminology of form and matter and the notions of 
function and purpose. His doctrine can be clearly understood from his example 
of the axe and the eye. "The sharpness of the axe is not something separable 
from the iron or bronze; it is the form and function of the metal. Similarly if 
the eye were a complete living creature, its sight would be its soul. The soul is 
regarded as the properties and capacities of the organism, and the body as the 
material constituent, the instruments or organs by means of which the soul 
fulfils its functions of growing, breeding, seeing, feeling and thinking. " 67 Given 
Aristotle's general account of the psyche as the form of living things, "the 
body" and "the psyche" here do not denote two different substances: rather 
there is only one substance which can be affected that is the living body. " 
Aristotle also defines the soul as "the first actuality of a natural body 
that is potentially alive. "69 There is a difference between the first and the 
65 Ibid, pp. 179-180. 
66 A. E. Wardman and Creed, J. L. (translators), The Philosophy Of Aristotle, p. 231. 
67 A. E. Wardman and Creed, J. L. (translators), The Philosophy OfAristotle, pp. 231-232. 
See also, Aristotle, De Anima, 11.1,412b10-413a3, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., 
The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8,1975, pp. 68-73. 
68 Stephen Everson, "Psychology", in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. by 
Jonathan Barnes p. 189. 
69 A. E. Wardman, and Creed, J. L. (translators), The Philosophy OfArislotl4 p. 232. See 
also, Aristotle, De Anima, 11.1,412b29-413a, De Anima, 11.11.414a26, ed. and trans. 
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second grade of actuality. For example, a man may be said to know Greek, but 
it is only he who is actually reading or writing or speaking Greek who is 
knowing it in the fullest sense. Similarly, a natural body is considered as alive 
if it reaches the first grade of actualization and it is fully living when it uses 
one or more of the other capacities70 such as the activities of feeling, seeing, 
growing or thinking that distinguish animals, plants and men from their 
inanimate environment. Just as an axe is sharp but it may not be engaged in 
cutting, so the eyes may have the power of sight, but are only fully actualizing 
that capacity when seeing something. 71 So it is with soul that this second 
actualization take place. 
Soul is then, the form or actuality of a living 
thing. 
Soul is the first actuality of a living body, while 
its exercise of function is its second or fuller 
actuality. 
Now a living body is just a body endowed with 
organs, i. e. containing a diversity of parts 
cunningly adapted to different activities. Soul is 
thus 'the first actuality of a natural body 
furnished with organs. 72 
Aristotle suggests another definition of soul after his first general 
conclusion. At first he writes, "If then one is to find a definition which will 
by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, voL 8, pp. 70-71,80-81. "The body is 
that which exists potentially. " Loeb, p. 71. 
70 i. e. when it My realizes the capacities or properties of the soul. 
71 E. Wardman, and Creed, J. L. (translators), The PhilosophyOPAristotle, p. 232. 
72 Sir David Ross, Aristotle, p. 134. 
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apply to every soul, it will be 'the first actuality of a natural body possessed of 
organs. "73 Then later he wrote, "that the soul is the origin of the characteristics 
we have mentioned, and is defined by them, that is by the faculties of 
nutrition, sensation, thought and movement. "74 In this later conceptions of 
soul, Aristotle seems to give a more precise definition. But Aristotle himself 
advises us not to spend too much time over these generalities but rather to 
concentrate on the different functions of the soul. 75 
The intimate connection of the body and the soul is like the 
relationship between matter and form. If the eye were an animal, the eyesight 
would be its soul. 76 Sight, then, is the form or capacity of the eye. So to speak 
of the soul is to speak of a capacity or propensity to function in a certain way 
which depends on a certain bodily structure, or it is to speak of the actual 
exercise of such a capacity or propensity, which is the second kind of 
actuality. 77 
Since the soul is a capacity or a set of potentialities, Aristotle argues 
that it is a mistake to think that the soul moves in a physical sense, for it is 
illogical to conceive a capacity or tendency as moving or being moved. 7g 
73 Aristotle, De Anima, 11.1.412b4-6, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 68-69. See also, Jonathan Barnes, Aristolle5 p. 66. 
74 Aristotle, De Anima, 11. II, 413b11-13, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 76-77. See also, Jonathan Barnes, Adstolle p. 66. 
75 Aristotle, De Anima, 11.1.412b6-8,11.1.413a3-5, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., 
The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 68-69,72-73. See also, Jonathan Barnes, 
Aristotle, p. 66-67. 
76 Aristotle, De Anima, 11. I. 412b20, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 70-71. 
77 R. S. Peters and C. A. Mace, "Psychology", in the The Encyclopedia ofPbilosopby, vol. 7, 
p. 2. See also, J. L. Achill, Aristotle The Philosopher, p. 59. 
78 R S. Peters and C. A. Mace, Psychology, in the The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, vol. 7, 
p. 3. See also Aristotle, De Anima, 1. N. 408b37-409x, ed. and trans. by W. S. Heft, M. 
A., The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 48-49. But Aristotle also held that soul may 
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According to Aristotle, soul is a cause of movement79 but is not self-moving. 80 
Aristotle argues that soul is a substance because it is the form of a 
natural body and that the body is the matter informed by the soul. But he does 
not agree with Plato on the independence of soul from body. K He uses three 
examples to give a clear picture of this view: the iron and the cutting in an axe; 
the flesh and the seeing in an eye; and body and soul. Like the cutting and the 
seeing, the soul is inseparable from the matter. The form is something beyond 
the matter, just as the word 'cat' is something beyond its constituent letters 
(since the letters have to be arranged in the right order before they constitute 
this word rather than the word 'act' or the non-word 'tca'). But we should not 
regard the form as some further immaterial element or constituent that must be 
added to the material constituents: 
So one need no more ask whether body and soul 
are one than whether the wax and the impression 
it receives are one, or in general whether the 
matter of each thing is the same as that of which 
it is the matter; B2 
be moved or even move itself incidentally. See again Aristotle, De Anima, I. IV. 408a30- 
31,408b31-408b33, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 46-47,48-49. 
"Aristotle, De Anima, 1.1V. 408b6, ad. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 46-47. 
80 Sir David Ross, Aristotle p. 133. 
But Aristotelian soul can be independent from any particular matter. See below, note 
95. "The matter which is now linked with a soul to form a living thing existed before 
the union began and will exist after it ceases. It is only from form, not from this form, 
that this matter is inseparable. And again this form can exist apart from this matter. " 
See Sir David Ross, Aristotle, p. 132. 
az Aristotle, De Anima 11.1.412b6-8, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 68-68. See also, Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, pp. 130- 
131. 
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Again if the soul is the form or actuality of the living body, reference to 
the soul should state the formal and final cause of a creature's behaviour. 83 
This is because soul is the cause of movementS4 and the instrument whereby 
man acts: learns or thinks or pities. Though movement does not take place in 
the soul, it sometimes penetrates to the soul and sometimes starts from the 
soul: 85 "Perception starts from particular objects and reaches the soul; 
recollection starts from the soul and extends to the movements or resting 
points in the sense organs. 46 For instance, a dog leaps up to get a plate of meat 
because it sees it and wants it. Here the final cause or the goal is to get the 
plate of meat. This goal explains the action. The reason for the action is that 
the dog saw the plate and wanted it. When we mention the states of a 
creature's soul - perception, belief, thought, desire, pleasure or pain - we 
explain its behaviour in formal, functional terms. Aristotle therefore takes the 
states of the soul to be the formal, functional states of a living creature. 87 
Nutrition, perception, appetition, change in place and thought are the 
powers or faculties that are possessed by the soul, but some things possess all 
these powers and some do not. For instance, plants only possess the power of 
nutrition (nutritive faculty). 88 The nutritive soul is the minimal soul for this 
83 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 131. 
Sa Aristotle, De Anima, 1. IV. 408b6, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 46-47. 
Ss Ibid, 1. IV. 408b12-408b15, pp. 46-47. 
56Ibid, l. IV. 408bl6-408b19, pp. 47-48. 
87 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 131. 
88 Aristotle, De Anima, 11. III. 414a29-414b6, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The 
Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 80-81. See also, Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle, pp. 65-66. 
Aristotle, De Anima, 11.111.414a29-414b6, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The 
Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 80-81. See also, Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle, pp. 65-66. 
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exists in all living or besouled beings - in plants and animal alike. Next comes 
the sensitive soul which exists in all animals. Within the sensitive soul the 
same scheme reappears, for touch is a minimal form of sensation presupposed 
by all the others. 89 But the various powers or faculties of the soul constitute a 
hierarchical system 90 For example, if a creature has the power of perception 
then it has the power of appetite, which consists of desire, inclination and 
wish. Everything which has perception also experiences pleasure and pain, the 
pleasant and the painful; and everything which experiences those also possess 
desire (for desire is appetite for the pleasant). 91 Some creatures possess in 
addition to these the power of locomotion, and others also possess the power 
of thought and intelligence 92 Thought, according to Aristotle, requires 
imagination and hence perception, so that any thinking creature must be 
capable of perceiving. The higher faculties never exist apart from the first 
principle of animation, that of nutrition and reproduction, 93 but reason is the 
faculty peculiar to man. 94 
Aristotle contends firstly, to have a soul is to be a natural organic body 
capable of functioning. Secondly, soul is the explanation of those functions. 
Hence, Aristotle regards souls as sets of powers, capacities or faculties. 
89 Aristotle, DoAuima, 11.11.4144,11. IH. 415a3-6,11. XII1.435a13, ed. and trans. by 
W. S. Hatt, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 78-79,82-85,198-199. See also, 
Sir David Ross, Aristotle, pp. 129-130. 
90 See also, T. H. Irwin, Aristotlesphilosophyofming Stephen Everson, Psychology, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Adstotl4 ed. by Jonathan Barnes, p. 79. 
91 Aristotle, De Anima, 11.111.414b3-414b8, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The 
Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 80-81. 
92 Ibid, 11. M. 410-1020,415a5-415a8, pp. 82- 83,84-85. 
93 Aristotle, DeAnima, 11. III. 415a9-415a13,111. III. 427b14-427b16, ed. and trans. by W. 
S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 84-85,156-157. See also, Jonathan 
Barnes, Aristotle, pp. 65-66. 
94 Aristotle, De Anima, 11. III. 414b18-414b20, ed. and trans. by W. S. Bet t, M. A., The 
Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 82-83. 
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Possessing a soul is like possessing a skill. "A skilled man's skill is not some 
part of him, responsible for his skilled acts; similarly, a living creature's 
animator or life-force is not some part of it, responsible for its living 
activities. "95 
Aristotle holds that one should not ask whether the soul and the body 
are one, just as one should not ask whether the wax and the shape are one. Also 
one should not ask how soul and body can act upon each other. Souls cannot 
exist apart from bodies as skills cannot exist apart from the skilled person, for 
souls are the fulfilment of bodies. Unlike Plato, Aristotle thought it impossible 
that the soul could survive the death of the body which it animates; it must be 
'enmattered' in some appropriate stuff. For Aristotle, soul and body are not 
two substances, but inseparable elements in a single substance. But 
'inseparable' here needs further reflection. Soul and body, like form and matter 
in general, are in a sense separable. Although matter is linked with soul to form 
a living thing, it is only from form, not from this particular form that this 
matter is inseparable: this form can still exist apart from this matter because, 
according to Aristotle, one form is embodied in all the members of a species 
and it can exist independently of any one member though not of all. Therefore, 
for its existence, this form requires this kind of matter (it cannot exist 
embodied in another kind of body) but not this particular matter only. Soul 
cannot exist without a body but it requires a body with a certain kind of 
chemical constitution and a certain shape. 97 Thus, contrary to Plato, the theory 
of the transmigration of human soul into the animal bodies is not possible in 
Aristotle's view of soul for such a theory is like suggesting that carpentry can 
ss Jonathan Barnes, Arislotl4 p. 66. 
' Ibid, p. 67. 
97 Sir David Ross, Aristotle, p. 132. See Aristotle, DeAaims, 1.111.407b24-407b25, ed. 
and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, vol 8, pp. 42-43. 
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find its way into flutes. 98 
This general theory of the relation of soul and body means that for 
Aristotle, the soul is not a pure spiritual being10° to which its body is as much 
part of the outside world as other physical things - though Aristotle makes an 
exception in favour of the active reason. 101 Rather soul and body form a union 
which, while it lasts, is complete; they are merely aspects distinguishable by 
the philosophic eye. 102 
On the popular view, which is accepted by Plato, that life begins when 
the soul enters the body, Aristotle contends that corporeal things cannot exist 
without a body. Hence, life cannot come from outside. '"The 'principles' or 
powers of the soul are corporeal principles - to be animated is to be a body 
with certain capacities. Hence to suppose that those capacities could exist 
outside any body103 [footnote mine] is as absurd as to imagine that walking 
could take place apart from any legs. "104 
Aristotle's discussion on those life-functions; nutrition, reproduction, 
perception, desire and movement is consistently biological except when he 
9s Aristotle, De Anima, 1. M. 407b25, ed. and trans. by W. S. Het t, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 42-43. See also, Sir David Ross, Arislolle, p. 132. 
99 But the soul as the form is constituted by the essential properties. 
100 See also, J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle The Philosopher, p. 56. 
101 Aristotle, De GenerationeAnimaliwn, 11.1IL 736b27-28, ed. and trans. by A. L. Peck, 
Generation ofAnimals, The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 170-171, see also, Aristotle, De 
Anima, HI. IV. 430a22, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 8, pp. 170-171. 
102 Sir David Ross, Aristotle, p. 132. 
103 of the same kind of chemical constitution and a certain shape. 
104 Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle, p. 68. 
. 
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comes to the discussion of thought. For Aristotle holds "that Reason alone 
enters in, as an additional factor, from outside, and that it alone is divine, 
because physical activity has nothing whatever to do with the activity of 
Reason. "105 It seems, then, that thought can exist without the body. Aristotle 
divides thought into two: active intellect and passive intellect. Active intellect 
(the highest element in the human soul) is separable and impassive and 
unmixed, being essential actuality and when separated it is just what it is, and 
it alone is immortal and eternal. 106 It comes in from outside and exists after the 
body's death. ' 07 The active intellect is the highest 'form' which is essentially an 
activity. It remains pure both while united with and separated from matter. It 
is the only reason that is immortal: the passive reason is perishable. 108 
According to Barnes in his book entitled Aristotle, the special status given to 
thought by Aristotle depends upon the view that thinking does not involve any 
corporeal activity. But we may asked, how can Aristotle hold that view? 109 His 
general account of the soul makes it plain that thinking is something done by 
natural organic bodies, and his particular analysis of the nature of thought 
makes thinking dependent upon imagination and hence upon perception. So, 
even if thinking is not itself a corporeal activity, it requires other corporeal 
105 Aristotle, De GenemtioneAnimalirr4 11. III. 736b27-29, ed. and trans. by A. L. Peck, 
Generation OfAnimals; The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 170-171. See also, Jonathan 
Barnes, Aristotle, p. 68. See also, Aristotle, Do Anima; 413a4-6, ed. and trans. by W. 
S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 72-72. 
106 Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle, p. 68. See also, Aristotle, DeAnima; III. V. 430a17-430a18, 
430a22-23, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 
170-171. 
107 Aristotle, De Anima, UL N. 430a22, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A, The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 170-171. See also, Sir David Ross, Aristotle, p. 132. 
108 Aristotle, De Anima; III. IV. 430a20-24, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8,, pp. 170-171. 
109 Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle, p. 68. 
The connection of reason with the other faculties is one of the obscurest parts of 
Aristotle's psychology. If soul is inseparable from body, how is any part of it can fail to 
be such? See also, Sir David Ross, Aristotle, p. 135. 
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activities in order to take place. According to Barnes: 
Aristotle's treatment of thought is both obscure 
in itself and hard to reconcile with the rest of his 
psychology. But neither that fact, nor the various 
errors and inexactitudes in his physiology, should 
dim the light of his work on psychology: it rests 
on a subtle insight into the nature of souls or 
animators, and it is persistently scientific in its 
approach to psychological questions. ' 10 
The good things that we enjoy, like wealth and health, says Aristotle, 
have no value if our soul is not good. "' According to Aristotle, the soul 
constitutes our essence and the rational part of the soul is superior to the 
irrational part. 112 The best thing we can do is to bring out the best in the best 
part of us, which is to be as rational as possible, and to come to know the most 
important things! 13 The body is naturally and properly under the direction of 
the soul. Without the rational direction provided by the soul, the body is 
unable to cope with the environment. ' 14 
110 Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle, p. 68. 
111 Aristotle, Nicbomachean Ethics, 1.5.1095b15-1096a11, ed. and trans. by H. Rakham, 
M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 19, pp. 12-17. 
112 Aristotle, Nicbomacbean Ethics, 1.13.1102b27, ed. and trans. by H. Rakham, M. A, 
The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 19, pp. 66-67. Sec also, Aristotle, De Anima, III. IX. 
433a5-10, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, 
pp. 186- 187. 
113 D. S. Hutchinson, "Ethics", The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. by Jonathan 
Barnes, p. 196. See also, Aristotle, Nicbomacbean Ethics, 1.7.1098a20-25, ed. and trans. 
by H. Rakharn, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 19, pp. 30-33. 
114 Aristotle, Politics, ed. and trans. by H. Rakham, M. A., The Loeb Classical Library, 
1. I. 1252ä26-1252a27,1252a31,1. L1252b12, I. IL1253b32-33, pp. 4-5, pp. 6-7, pp. 16-17. 
See also, C. C. W. Taylor, "Politics", The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle; ed. by 
Jonathan Barnes, p. 254. 
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So, according to Aristotle's definition of soul and his explanation of 
both soul and body, the soul is potential in itself (in its capacities). Soul is also 
inseparable from body. It is the actuality of the body with the exception of 
active reason, which according to Aristotle is not the actuality of any body. 
Elsewhere, Aristotle also points out that the soul is not only the actuality or 
formal cause of the body but it is also the body's final cause and the efficient 
cause of all the changes it originates, whether of place, of quality or of size. ' 15 
Another important matter is the conception of thinking. According to 
Aristotle, thinking is a faculty of soul by which it reasons and forms 
judgements. And this part of soul is not mixed with the body. 116 So, how does 
the mind work? According to Aristotle, knowledge is what is knowable and 
sensation is what is sensible. Both knowledge and sensation are divided to 
correspond to different realities. The faculties of knowledge and sensation 
within the soul are only potentially knowable and sensible objects. What is 
already present in the soul is the form of an object, and not the object itself. 
There are two powers within man's mind; a receptive (potential) faculty upon 
which the essence is impressed like a seal, and the active (ever-actual) power 
which will bring out the essence within the sensible particular, as the sunlight 
brings colours into being. The potential can be changed only by something that 
is already actual. Hence, unless this second power is assumed, there would 
never be an act of knowing. 117 Therefore, the receptive mind, though not 
'as Aristotle, DeAnrma, IL IV. 415b12-28, ed. and trans. by W. S. Heft, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol- 8, pp. 86-89. See also, Sir David Ross, Aristotle, p. 135. 
116 Aristotle, De Anima; III. N. 429a22-25, ed. and trans. by W. S. Heft, M. A., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 164-165. 
117 Aristotle, De Anima, II 1. N. 429b23-430a9, ed. and trans. by W. S. Ilett, M. A., The 
Loeb Classical Library, vol 8, pp. 168-169. See also, D. J. Allan, The Philosophy of 
Aristotle, p. 55. 
171 
material, is liable to be affected and so must become worn, but the active mind 
is not subject to change. It is eternal and able to exist separately. But why then 
does the active mind not remember knowledge if it has existed prior to the 
present life? Because it is upon the receptive mind that all knowledge is 
impressed. In other words, it is the light and not the coloured object that pre- 
exists. Thus, there is no innate knowledge. 118 
Drawing on the above discussion, we may attempt a schema of the soul 
according to Aristotle: 
Aristotle 
1. Soul is not purely spiritual 
2. Body needs rational direction of soul 
3. Onlthought is divine 
4. Onlactive intellect is immortal, impassive and unmixed. 
5. Body is not purely physical and not totally part of outside 
world 
6. No clear dichotomy of soul and body 
7. There is no innate knowledge 
4.1.3. Plotinus 
Another important philosopher whose ideas on soul will be taken into 
consideration here is Plotinus. According to R. T. Wallis in his book 
Neoplatonism, most of the factual information about Plotinus' life comes from 
Porphyry's119 biography, which is included in all modern editions and 
118 Aristotle, DeAaima III. N. 429a10-430a, ed. and trans. by W. S. Hett, M. A., The 
Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, pp. 162-169. See also, D. J. Allan, The Philosophy of 
Aristotle pp. 55-56. 
119 Porphyry was a student of Plotinus. His biography is titled "On The Life Of Plotinus 
And The Order Of His Books", Ennead The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1, pp. 1-85. 
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translations of the Enneads 120 According to the only statement about Plotinus 
in the ancient sources which is not found in Porphyry, he was born at 
Lycopolis (modern Asyut) in Upper Egypt. Based on Prophyry's account, 
Plotinus's birth can be estimated to have occurred in A. D. 204 or 205 and his 
death in A. D. 270. He was brought up as a Christian but later abandoned 
Christianity. 121 Beside contributing to philosophy, Plotinus also stressed the 
mystical experience. He contends that only in the light of such experiences can 
difficulties be resolved. This is also related to his use of imagery, especially of 
the so-called 'dynamic images', in which processes drawn from the material 
world are used to illustrate the activity of the spiritual order. 122 
The philosophy of Plotinus is the product of the Platonic and 
Aristotelian revivals. According to Irwin in his Classical Thought, the 
influence of Plato is obvious in Plotinus' philosophy. And as Plotinus' 
biographer Porphyry writes (as quoted in Classical Thought): 'Stoic and 
peripatetic doctrines are mixed inconspicuously in his writing. ' Plotinus 
normally began his lectures by commenting on some passage from a Platonist 
writer or commentator on Aristotle. But according to Porphyry, Plotinus had 
distinctive ideas of his own and he did not follow those books strictly. '23 
Before examining Plotinus' discussion on soul, let us consider how 
Plotinus' concepts of form and matter are related to his explanations of body 
120 Eaaeads(Greek canes, nine) is a treatise containing the results of Plotinus' 
reflections. Porphyry divided them into six groups of nine (hence their collective 
title) They are more like meditations than a systematic treatise, but together they 
present Plotinus' view of the conclusions that ought to be drawn from Plato. See 
Terence Irwin, Classical Tbotgbt, p. 185. 
121 R T. Wallis, Ne+oplatonisa; p. 37-38. 
122 R. T. Wallis, Neooplaloaismp. 41. See Plotinus, Enaeads V1.4.7., ed. and trans. by A. H. 
Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. VT, pp. 292-297. 
123 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 185. 
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and soul. 
Plotinus begins with the common conception of 
matter as 'some sort of subject and receptacle of 
form'. '24 [footnote mine] Following Aristotle, he 
argues that unqualified change requires matter as 
its subject; since the most basic stuffs, the four 
elements (earth, air, fire and water), can change, 
these changes also require a material subject; 
which must be without positive qualities of its 
own altogether. Matter must therefore be 
completely indeterminate, and we can think of it 
only indeterminately. Indeed, this is why matter 
is necessary for bodies, since a mere combination 
of perceptible properties would not result in a 
body. We must assume matter as the basis for all 
the changes in bodies, even though it cannot 
itself be acted on. ' 25 
So, according to Plotinus, form is reality and matter is unreality. Following 
Aristotle, Plotinus identifies form with soul; and so he infers that by proving 
the reality of form and the unreality of matter, he has equally proved the 
reality of soul and the unreality of body. According to Plotinus, the only reality 
is mind-dependent, essentially an object of awareness for some Soul. 126 
124 Plotinns, Enneads IL4.1.1-2, ed. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 2, pp. 106-107. 
'25 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 187. See Plotinus, Eaneads, 1I. 4.6.114-20, 
1L4.8,11.4/10-12, ed. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 2, 
pp. 118-119,122-125, -126-137. 
126 Terence Irwin, Classical Though!, p. 189. See Plotinus, Enneads, I1.6.14-15,1L7.3., ed. 
and trans. by A. II. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 2, pp. 182-183,204-205. 
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For Plotinus, there is only one Soul, which is manifest in all human 
beings. This results from his theory of the unreality of bodies, which states 
that bodies are not individuated by distinct material properties. According to 
him, belief in many souls depends on matter, for we distinguish different souls 
by the different bodies they belong to. He argues that even though we might 
believe that there is just one soul in two alleged bodies (say, yours and mine) 
we can still explain the apparent differences in our experiences by ascribing 
them to different states of one soul. According to Plotinus, the appearance of 
many souls is not a mere illusion, rather it reflects some genuine plurality in 
the Soul itself. It is wrong to consider the individual souls parts of the Soul; 
but each of them expresses partially what is fully expressed by the Soul as a 
whole. 127 
Plotinus rejects the idea that the soul is the highest level of reality. 
This is because according to him, the Soul's mode of being is temporal; we 
cannot conceive conscious life except as a temporal sequence. 128 From this 
hypothesis, Plotinus arrives at the view that we conceive ourselves no longer 
as Soul but as Intellect. 1'9 
According to Plotinus, the embodied person, or what he calls a 
127 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, pp. 189-190. See Plolinus, Enneads, IV. 3.6.15-17, 
IV. 8.3-4, IV. 9.2., ed. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 
IV, pp. 50-51,404-411,430-433. 
128 Plotinus, Enneads, IV. 3.9.36-42, ed. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. IV, pp. 64-65. See also, Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 190. See also, 
Henry J. Blumenthal, "On Soul and Intellect", Lloyd P. Gerson, (editor), The 
Cambridge Companion to Plotinusy p. 210. 
129 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 190, for further discussion see Henry J. 
Blumenthal, "On Soul and Intellect", Lloyd P. Gerson, (editor) The Cambridge 
Companion to Plotinus, pp. 82-104, Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, pp. 190-195. 
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'compound' or'animal', is a combination of body and soul. The living body has 
a further soul or 'shadow of soul' which is the cause of ordinary physical life. 
Plotinus agrees that soul is substance but, unlike Aristotle, he rejects the 
conception of the soul as the realization of the body, i. e. as the substantial, but 
inseparable, form of the living body. Rather for him the soul is separable and 
he argues that it cannot be in a body, in any ordinary sense of'in' because it is 
immaterial and therefore cannot be in any place. 130 
Because Plotinus regards the soul as immaterial, he contends that only 
the body is affected and the soul simply notices what happen to the body 
without itself being affected by the changes in the body or the external world. 
The soul is not strictly affected by the body but is concerned for the body as 
for a close dependent. 131 
Plotinus holds that vice is the result of the soul's attachment to the 
body. 132 The vicious soul attaches itself to the body by its own free choice and 
by being too concerned with the body's desire. This mean the body provides 
the opportunity for evil rather than being its cause. To cure this attachment of 
the soul to the body, training in the virtues is needed and the higher virtues 
constitute the purification of the soul which frees it from concern with the 
body. 133 After purification comes contemplation. 13' Plotinus values 
130 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 196. See Plotinus, Enneads, IV. 4.18.8, IV. 7.8(4). 14, 
IV. 7.8 (5), od. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. IV, pp. 
182-183,372-373,374- 379. See also, Stephen R. L. Clark, "Plotinus: Body and Soul", 
Lloyd P. Gerson, (editor) The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, pp. 275-291. 
131 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 197. See Plotinus, Enneads, I. 1.7.7-24, IL3.9.11-32, 
III. 6.1.1-24, M. 6.3.1-25, m. 6.4.1- 37, IV. 4.18.1121, ed. and trans. by A. H. 
Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1, pp. 108-111, vol. 2, pp. 72-75, vol. 3, 
pp. 210-213,220-223,224-227, vol. 4, pp. 182-183. 
132 Plotinus, Eimeads, L7.3.20-3, ed. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 1, pp. 272-273. 
133 Plotinis, Eaaeeds, 1.1.9.1-16,1.1.10.11-14,1IL6.2.22-33, III. 6.2.54-68, ed. and trans. by 
A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1, pp. 112-113,114-117, vol. 3, pp. 
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contemplation far more highly than action: "Contemplative reason is proper to 
the reasoning soul that is really ourselves; it is the whole of our good and the 
misfortunes and pains suffered by the body are not really ours. " Plotinus argues 
that if a virtuous person is tortured, the torture does not really happen to the 
person, it happens to the animal from which the rational soul detaches 
itself. 13s 
Regarding action, Plotinus seems to have inconsistent views: we are 
responsible for our actions with the exception that our physical movements are 
to a considerable degree, externally determined. Also sometimes Plotinus 
suggests that we act freely but only when we act on correct reasoning. 
Sometimes he insists that our actions are our own responsibility: thus the 
wicked should not be excused even if they are not responsible for being 
wicked. 136 Here one might argue that if we accept the view that our bodies are 
essentially unconnected with 'us', we should not be blamed for what they 
do. 137 
Plotinus' view of the Supreme Being is that the soul's goal, which is 
assimilation to God, is through virtue. 139 Without virtue, 'God' is a mere 
name. 139 Such'virtue' primarily denotes the discipline that purifies the soul for 
216-217,218-221. 
134 Contemplation is related to the theory of emanation as will be consider below. 
135 Terence Irwin, Classical Thongh4 p. 197. Plotinus, Enaeads, 1.4.7-10, ed. and trans. by 
A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1, pp. 188-201. 
136 Plotinus, Eimcadsy Ill. 1.7,111.1.10.4-15, I1I. 2.10,111.2.17.13-17, ed. and trans. by A. H. 
Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 3, pp. 28-31,34-35,76-79,100-101. 
137 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 198. 
138 R T. Wallis, Neoplatonist p. 85. Plotinus, Enaeads, vol 1.2.1.5-7, ed. and trans. by A. 
H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol 1, pp. 126-127. 
19 Plotinus, Euueads, vol. I1.9.15.39-40, ed. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 2, pp. 284-285. 
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contemplation. 
The One or the Good, in Plotinus' philosophy, is the first principle. Any 
discussion of the One is only appropriate in terms of what it is not, not what it 
is. 140 The term "One" by no means defines the One as a single distinct object; 
it rather removes all plurality. 141 Union with the One is the goal of philosophic 
or spiritual life. 142 The soul derives from Intellect and the Intellect's source is 
the One. 143 Thus, Soul falls from the One and may rise to it again. 144 
Contemplation is the source and goal of all action and production of every 
level. The contemplative life of minds started from the lowest level of 
contemplative life, that of Nature (which is also the last phase of Soul and the 
inherent principle of growth), through Soul, to share in the Intellect's 
contemplation of the One or Good. 145 The intellect needs, desires and always 
seeks to attain the Good but the Good needs nothing. 146 Thus, the One or Good 
is the source of all beings. It is the goal of all aspirations, human and non- 
human. 
Drawing on the above discussion, we may attempt a schema of the soul 
according to Plotinus; 
140Ibid, VI 9.2. voL VII, pp. 306-311. 
141 John Bussanich, "Plotinus's Metaphysics of the One", Lloyd P. Gerson (editor), The 
Cambridge Companion to Plotinuss p. 42. See Plotinus, Enneads, 11.9.1.1-8, VI. 7.38.4-9, 
VL9.5.29-34, ed. and trans. by A. IL Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. H, 
pp. 224-225, vol- VII, pp. 204-205,320-321. 
142 Plotinus, Enneads, V1.9.11.25-51, ed. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb 
Classical Library, voL VII, pp. 342-354. 
143 lbid, VI. 9.5. vol. VII, pp. 318-323. 
144 Ibid, V1.9.11. vol. VH, pp. 340-345. 
145 raid, IH. 8.5, IH. 8.6. vol. III, pp. 372-381. 
146 Hrid, M. 8.1 1. voL III, pp. 396-441. 
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Plotinus 
1. There is one Soul, which is derived from the Intellect, whose source is the One 
2. Inconsistent view of human action 
3. Soul is real, immaterial, temporal and only the intellect is immortal 
4. Soul is not affected by bodily changes 
5. Body is unreal 
6. Soul is scparable and cannot be in any particular place. 
7. Recollection is the intellect's discovery of its own nature 
Conclusion: 
From an examination of the above arguments it is clear that the nature 
of the soul has been an issue of great importance in Greek philosophy. The 
problem of body and soul / mind is one of the two central problems in 
metaphysics; any discussion of it leads us to inquire into the nature of reality. 
There follows a short comparison of the three philosophers discussed in this 
section. 
Neoplatonic notions of the immortality147 and destiny of the soul, and 
its ascent to the intelligible world through love, 148 are based on Plato. '49 Man 
is not a simple thing but a composite of soul and body. The body will perish 
but the soul, which is the real self, will survive. 150 By its virtue, the soul was 
good in itself, but to become good again it must free itself from composite 
147 Tbid, TV. 7.9-14, voL IV, pp. 378-391. 
148 Ibid, 111.5.4, IQ. 5.4.25-26, voL III, pp. 180-183,182-183. 
149 R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonist p. 19. 
'50 plotinus, Eoneads, IV. 7.1. 
, ed. and trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, voL IV, pp. 338-341. 
179 
(bodily) existence. 151 Thus, Plotinus seems to follow Plato in accepting the 
divinity of the soul. Regarding his theory of recollection, Plotinus interprets 
Plato's theory of recollection as the intellect's discovery of its own nature and 
structure, rather than the discovery of something outside the intellect itself. '52 
According to Aristotle there is no innate truth. 153 But Plato rejects the 
definition of knowledge as perception because he holds sense-impression to be 
below judgement. ' Plato also, unlike Aristotle, accepts that soul is pre- 
existent. However, both Plato and Aristotle agree that the soul is the source of 
life, a view generally consistent with Greek theories of soul. On the other 
hand, Plotinus declares that there is only one Soul, not many. This results from 
his rejection of the reality of matter. 155 Aristotle, when discussing soul, 
includes the animals and plants, but Plato156 and Plotinus concentrate on the 
human soul. Plato, when discussing the soul, talks more than Aristotle about 
the properties of eternal and imperceptible matters. Aristotle gives a clearer 
account of the relationship between body and soul in a simple manner, similar 
to his discussion on form and matter. On the other hand, both Plato and 
Plotinus discuss it in a more complex way. Aristotle also gives a clear 
definition of substance, unlike Plato and Plotinus. Plotinus rejects Aristotle's 
assumption that soul is the inseparable form of the living body. His dualist 
concept may be derived from Plato. Plotinus seems to have a harsh view of 
151 Stephen R. L. Clark, "Plotinus: Body and Soul", Lloyd P. Gerson (editor), The 
Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, p. 275. Plotinus, Enneads, 1.7.3.20-3, ed. and trans. 
by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1, pp. 272-273. 
152 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 191. 
153 D. J. Allan, The Philosophy ofAristotlg p. 56. 
154 Ibid, p. 52. 
155 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 189. 
156 Only in a few places, Plato did discuss the World soul, for instance in Timeu . 
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matter as the source of evil's7 compared to the other two philosophers. Finally, 
it may be said that all three philosophers agree that, though body and soul are 
united to form all living beings, it is the soul that makes man who he is 
because the final cause of man's behaviour is his soul, except according to 
Plotinus, though soul is concern about bodily changes, soul itself is not 
affected by it. iss 
137 Denis O'Brien, "Plotinus on Matter and Evil", Lloyd P. Gerson (editor), The Cambridge 
Companion to Plotinus p. 171, Plotinus, vol. 1, Ennead, I. 8.8.37-44,1.8.13.7-17 ed. and 
trans. by A. H. Armstrong, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1, pp. 302-303,308-311. 
'58 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 197. See above, p. 174. 
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4.2. MUSLIM PHILOSOPHERS' THEORIES OF NAFS (SOUL) 
Nafs, (plural Anfus or Nis) literally means soul, the spirit, self, the 
body, blood, flesh; a person, an individual, a substance, an essence. ' 
Throughout the discussion on the word nafs, all translations of the Qur'änic 
verses will be based on the English translation of the Qur'an by `Abdullah 
Yüsuf `Ali, The Meaning of The Holy Qur'än. 2 The term nafs is frequently 
employed by the Qur'an, with various meanings. It is often translated as 
"soul", and simply means "person" or "self". For example, in 4: 1, "0 mankind! 
reverence Your Guardian-Lord, Who created you from a single person". 
Although generally nafs refers to human beings, it does in a few places 
refer to Allah Himself, for example in surah 3: 28, "But Allah cautions you (to 
remember) Himself; for the final goal is to Allah". Sometimes it refers to a 
group of other makhlük (creatures) together with man, such as a group of man 
and jinn as in 6: 130, "we bear witness against ourselves". 
The meaning of nafs that has the most interest for scholars is when it 
refers to the human soul. For example in surah 3: 161, "Then shall every soul 
receive its due, whatever it earned and none shall be dealt with unjustly". And 
in surah 89: 27-30, ("to the righteous soul will be said: ) "0 (thou) soul, in 
(complete) rest and satisfaction, "Come back thou to thy Lord - well pleased 
(thyself), and well-pleasing unto Him, "Enter thou, then, Among my devotees!, 
"Yea, enter thou My heaven! ". 
Joseph Catafago, Au Arabic And English Literary Diclionary, (Third Edition), Beirut, 
1980, p. 436. 
2 `Abdullah Ynsuf `Ali, The Meaning of The HolyQur'i, A (New edition with revised 
translation and commentary) Brentwood, Md: Amana, 1991. 
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There is agreement among scholars that the Qur'an, contains 
descriptions of at least three types of this kind of nais: 3 These types are best 
understood as states, aspects or tendencies of the human personality, 4 and are 
ranked from the worst to the best: Nafs al-ammimh bi al-sn' (the nafs that 
urges evil), nafs al-lawwamah (the nafs that blames) and nafs al-mutma'innab 
(the nafs at peace). 
These three types of nafs are regarded as three states or stages of the 
development of the human soul: (1) Anunärah which is prone to evil and, if not 
checked and controlled, will lead to perdition. Allah refers to this nafs in the 
story of the wife of al- `Azi z (Zulaikhä) and the Prophet Yiisuf (s): "The 
(human) soul is certainly prone to evil" (12: 53). 5 This verse particularly 
concerns al-nafs al-ammarah, that is, human desires: both shahwat al-batni 
(desire of the stomach) and the shahwat al-fan (sexual desire). Both these 
desires cannot be separated from human beings as long as one lives in this 
world, except those that God loves, as God says in the same verse, "Unless my 
Lord do bestow His Mercy" (12: 53) This means that with God's will, there are 
certain people that Allah protects from these desires, for example in this verse 
the Prophet Ynsuf (s). People that God protects from these desires are among 
those whom He loves. They are the people whom He guides and to whom He 
gives guidance (hidiyat); they are freed from the temptation of desire. Human 
beings must try to control their desires, and in this verse, Zulaikhä admits that 
she is the one who cannot control her desires. But at the end of the verse, God 
says, "but surely My Lord is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. " (12: 53) Thus 
those who have gone beyond the limit and has followed their desires, but then 
3 Muhammad 'Aiº f al-'Aldo, The Meaning ofNafs, p. 1 
4 Fazlur Rahmar, Major Themes of The Qur'in p. 17. 
5 'Abd ullah Y of 'Ali, The Meaning of The Holy Qur'euý p. 1565. 
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realizes their mistake and repents, God will forgive them 6 As Allah also says: 
"0 ye who believe! Follow not Satan's footsteps: If any will follow the 
footsteps of Satan, he will (but) command what is shameful and wrong: And 
were it not for the grace and mercy of Allah on you, not one of you would ever 
have been pure: but Allah doth purify whom He pleases: and Allah is One Who 
hears and knows (all things)" (24: 21). According to Sayyid Quib, in this verse 
God teaches us how life should be lived in this world. God urges believers 
(mu'miniin) to live righteously, but such a way of life will never free one from 
the temptations of the devil (shai{an). The devil will never stop making human 
beings choose the wrong way that will bring them to the lower level and a life 
full of disgraceful wrongdoings. The more man tries to follow the right way, 
the more the devil will tempt him. The struggle between the effort to live in 
the right way and the temptations of the devil result in the battle within man's 
self. This situation means that only God is able to help man. Therefore, it is 
the responsibility of man to make the effort to put himself in the way of Allah, 
for Allah is the only One who will cleanse anyone He wishes from evil. Man 
must strengthen his relationship with God by fulfilling his responsibility to 
Allah in order to be among those whom Allah chooses to purify. It is man's 
responsibility in this world to struggle to live according to the way of Allah 
and not just let himself be the victim of his own desires. Man must struggle to 
purify himself and to strengthen his relationship with God but it is God Who 
ultimately purifies. And God will always listen to man's invocations (dui) 
and He knows all our doings. 7 
By its very nature this type of nafs directs its owner towards every 
wrong action. This naß inhabits the world of the senses and is dominated by 
6 Sayyid Qutb, Fi zlläl al-Qar'äu, voL 4, p. 2004. 
7 Ibid, p. 2504. 
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earthly desires (shabwat) and passions. In this nafs lies hidden evil that leads it 
on to do wrong. If Allah were to leave the servant alone with this nafs, he 
would be destroyed between its evil and the evil that it craves; but if Allah 
grants him success and help, then he will survive a No one can get rid of this 
evil without the help of Allah. 
(2) Lawwrimah, the nafs which feels conscious of evil, and resists it, 
asks for Allah's grace and pardon after repentance and tries to amend; it hopes 
to reach salvation. Allah says of this nafs, "And I do call to witness the self- 
reproaching spirit; (eschew evil). " (75: 2). This second stage may be compared 
to conscience, except that in English usage conscience is a faculty and not a 
stage in spiritual development .9 
So, this nafs is conscious of its own 
imperfections. '° 
In the first verse of stoat al-giynmah, Allah says "I do call to witness 
The Resurrection Day". (75: 1) What is the relationship between the 
Resurrection Day and nafs al-lawwrimah? Sayyid Qutb in his Tafsir fi zilel al- 
Qur'in has chosen the interpretation of Al-Ijasan al-Basri (d. 110/728) in 
giving the meaning of al-nafs al-lawwimah as mentioned in this verse. Al- 
I3asan al-Basri has said that the faithful man will always regret his defections, 
his speaking in that manner, his eating and drinking in such a way, his selfish 
desires. In contrast, one who is traitorous towards God will continue doing 
sinful things, and not until after a long time will he regret it. Thus, from the 
concepts of muhasabah (contemplating) ourselves and repentance of 
wrongdoings, the relationship between the Day of Resurrection and al--nafs al- 
s Muhammad 'AK ii a1=Akin, The Meaning ofNafs, p. 2. 
9 Abdullah Yüsuf Ali, The Meaning of The Holy Qu 'in, p. 1565. 
10 Muhammad 'Aid a1=Akiti, The Meaning ofNafs, p. 2. 
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lawwsmah in this verse is understood. In conclusion, this verse gives us to 
understand that a person who is aware of his wrongdoings, and thinks of his 
mistakes, is a person who is remembering Alläh. He will think first before 
acting because he is aware that if he avoids committing sin, he will be saved 
on the Day of Resurrection, of which he is always mindful. " 
(3) Mutma'innah is the highest stage of all: in it the soul achieves full 
rest and satisfaction. Alläh refers to this naf; "0 (thou) soul, in (complete) rest 
and satisfaction! ". (89: 27). 12 When a man reaches this stage, his soul will 
accept (ridha) whatever God decrees and submit completely to God's will. This 
stage of nafs has gone through the various experiences of life, both good and 
bad. But it accepts that everything is from God and there is ftikmah (wisdom) 
behind all occurrences. This is actually the nafs that has achieved real faith in 
God for it has been matured by the trials of life. 13 And in the following verse, 
God says, "Come back thou To thy Lord - Well pleased (thyself), And well- 
pleasing Unto Him! " (89: 28). So, this nafs is tranquil as it rests on its faith in 
A1läh. 14 Ibn. `Abbäs (r) 15 said regarding this nafs, "It is the tranquil and 
believing soul". While al-Qatadah (r) said about this nafs, "It is the soul of the 
believer, made calm by what Allih has promised. Its owner is at rest and 
content with his knowledge of Alla-h's Names and Attributes, and with what 
He has said about Himself and His Messenger (p. b. u. h. ), and with what He has 
11 Sayyid Quib, FJzilä! a1-Qzir'io, vol. 6, p. 3768. 
12 'Abdullah Y-Usuf 'Ali, The Meaning of The Holy Qur'an, p. 1565. 
13 Sayyid Quib, R#&I al-Qur'an, vol. 6, p. 3907. 
'4 Muhammad 'Art ff a1- AA*i., The Meaning ofNafs, p. 3. 
Is 'AbdAlläh b. al-'Abbas (frequently Ibn. Abbas without the article), Abu'l-'Abbas, called 
al-f ibr'the doctor' or al-Bahr'the sea', because of his doctrine, is considered one of the 
greatest scholars of the first generation of Muslims. He was the father of Qur'anic 
exegesis. He was born three years before the hijm in Mecca. He died at al-Taff in 68 
A. H. / 686-8 A. D. ). (See L. Veccia Vaglieri, "'Abd Allah b, Al-'Abbas", in the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam Second edition, vol. 1, pp. 40-41. ) 
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said about what awaits the soul after death: about the departure of the soul, the 
life in the Barzakh, 16 and the events of the Day of Qiyamah which will follow. 
So much so that a believer such as this can almost see them with his own eyes. 
So he submits to the will of Alläh and surrenders to Him contentedly, never 
dissatisfied or complaining, and with his faith never wavering. He does not 
rejoice at his gains, nor do his calamities make him despair - for he knows that 
these all were decreed long before they happened to him, even before he was 
i17 created.... 
The word nafs sometimes refers to the pagan gods. As in sumah 7: 197, 
"But those you call upon besides Him, are unable to help you, and indeed to 
help themselves. " In this verse, the word 'those' refers to the a! -asnam (idols) 
that were worshipped by the mushrik (idolater) Arabs. These gods are useless; 
they are actually created by man who then worships them. Even though they 
have been created with legs, hands, eyes and ears, all these are not functional, 
As God says in the preceding verse, "Have they feet to walk with? Or hands to 
lay hold with? Or eyes to see with? Or ears to hear with? Say: "Call your 'god- 
partners', Scheme (your worst) against me, And give me no respite! " (7: 195). 18 
Another word which is closely related to the word nafs is the word rrih. 
In the Qur'an, the word rub occurs in connection with a different matter. It has 
a connection with the life of Adam (r). When this is the connection, the word 
nafakha, which means "blew", is used with it. Here rein means that Alläh gives 
16 A Persian and Arabic word meaning "obstacle" "hindrance" "separation". Barzpkh, in 
eschatology, is used to describe the boundary of the world of human 
being, which consists of the heavens, the earth and the nether regions, and its separation 
from the world of pure spirits and God. (See B. Carra De Vaux, "Barzakh", in the 
Encyclopaedia oflslaw Second edition, vol. 1, pp. 1071-1072. 
17 Al-Tabiiff, /ami`al-bayan fi tafsiral-Qur'an, vol. 13, Bulaq 1323 A. H., as cited in 
Muhammad `Ail ff al-Akit i, The Meaning ofNafs, p. 3. 
18 Sayyid Qutb, Hzrlel al-Qur'eq voL 3, p. 1415. 
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life. For example, (32: 9), "But He fashioned him in due proportion, and 
breathed into him something of His spirit. i19 Mankind was originally created 
from clay, but since then, the reproduction of life has occurred through the 
sperm of man. Through the fertilization of the ovum by the sperm, an 
individual life comes into existence. Then this combination of both parties is 
kept in the woman's womb. After certain stages, God blew His ruh "and 
breathed into him something of His spirit. " This does not mean that the rui i of 
man is the rui t of Alläh. If this were the case, God would be as many as human 
beings. Rather the phrase means that the nib of mankind is in the possession of 
God. It is God's property and it is under the ultimate power of God. 20 As a 
simple example, if someone says, "the book is mine", it does not mean that the 
book is part of himself. 
The meaning of rffh as the'breath of life' also occurs in connection with 
' sä (r) (Jesus). For example, (66: 12), "And Mary the daughter of Imran21, who 
guarded her chastity; and We breathed into (her body)22 of our spirit; and she 
testified to the truth of the words of her Lord and of his revelations, and was 
one of the devout (servants). " Here also it means that Allah gives life to the 
19 Here is the distinctive attribute of man into whom M1 h's spirit is breathed. (See 
'Abdullah Ynsuf 'Ali, The Meaning of The Holy Qur'an, p. 1047. ) 
20 Sayyid Qutb, zilal aI-Qnr'inn vol. 5, p. 2810. 
21 l miin was traditionally the name of the father of Mary the mother of Jesus. She was 
herself of the purest of women, though the Jews accused her falsely of unchastity. (See 
`Abdullah Yilsuf `Ali, TheMeauiag ofTkcHoly Qr r äq p. 1495). 
22 This is comparable to the meaning in verse 21: 91. As a virgin she gave birth to Jesus: 
19: 16-29. In 32: 9, it is said of Adam's progeny, man, that Allähh "fashioned him in due 
proportion, and breathed into him something of his spirit". In 15: 29, "when I have 
fashioned him (in due proportion) and breathed into him of My spirit, fall ye down in 
obeisance unto him. " Here similar words are used with reference to Adam. The virgin 
birth should not therefore be supposed to imply that Allih was the father of Jesus in 
the sense in which Greek mythology makes Zeus the father of Apollo by Latona or of 
Minos by Europa. And yet that is the doctrine to which the Christian idea of "the only 
begotten Son of God" leads. (See `Abdullah Yiisuf `Ali, The Meaning of The Holy 
Qrar in, p. 1495). 
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Prophet 2sä (a. s. ) by giving one of theru7j under His possession. 23 
In the Qur'an, the word nih is also connected with the word amrin a 
few places. For example in 17: 85, "They ask thee (Muhammad) concerning the 
Spirit. " Rrih in this verse refers to the rrih which is inside the human self that 
conditions one's life. In this verse also, God mentions that human knowledge is 
limited to a certain degree that has been permitted by God only. "Say: The 
Spirit (cometh) by command of my Lord: of knowledge it is only a little that is 
communicated to you, (0 men! )". (17: 85) Here there is also a connection with 
knowledge. The reality of rvh is one of the secrets of Allah. Only God knows 
the reality of rrih. This verse also suggests that man should exercise his 
thinking within the boundary given by God. The secrets of creation arc much 
wider than the limited knowledge that God has given to man. God has given to 
human beings knowledge enough for him to be as a kharfah in this world. God 
has given to man what He wishes. Ruh exists but the reality of it is not known 
to man. How it comes and how it goes, where it was and where it will be 
remains the secret of Allah. What man knows about rtih is only the little 
information that can be found in the Qur'an 24 
The classical scholars of `i/m al-nafc (knowledge of soul) such as Imgm 
al-Ghazäli, Ibn Hazm and others including the modem psychologists who have 
studied soul (oafs) and nip, only know the condition of man's soul based on 
human actions. But they themselves never know the realities of soul itself and 
there is no such knowledge given to man. This is the secret of God Himself. 
Another verse, (16: 2) states, "He doth send down His angels with 
23 Sayyid Qutb, F17, #la! a! -Qrrr'äq voL 6, p. 3622. 
24 Ibid, vol. 4, p. 2249. 
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inspiration of His command, to such of His servants as He pleaseth, (saying): 
"warn (man) that there is no god but I: so do your duty unto Me. " The word 
rrihhere is connected with the angels, and refers to the wahy (revelation) from 
Allah. The revelation is called rih here for it gives the impression that the 
revelation is actually like a life to a human being. This is because it gives life 
to an individual and to the society, as revelation can protect mankind from 
destruction. The revelation is the greatest ni`mat (blessing / favour) that has 
been sent down to human beings. In other words, human life is meaningless 
without the revelation. And in this verse also, Allah says that the nil, (the 
revelation) is sent down by angels (mali'ikat) to human beings chosen by 
Allah Himself. They are the prophets who then preached this revelation. Thus, 
a/-wahy is like life for mankind. Also Allah says at the end of this verse that 
the basis of the wahy is the confession that there is no god except Allah and 
that man must obey and be pious towards Him. Thus all other teachings in 
revelation come from this basis called Tawhi4 which is the real life (r4) for 
human beings. Rrlh or revelation in this verse is guidance for human lives that 
has been brought by the chosen prophets and it will remain as it is as long as 
this world lasts. The revelation stands on the basis that there is no God but 
zs Allah 
In another verse we read, "By His command doth He send the spirit (of 
inspiration) to any of His servants He pleases, that it may warn (men) of the 
Day of mutual meeting. " (40: 15) Here the word rüfi is connected with the 
creatures. In this verse, rzih also means revelation. The revelation here is the 
revelation of the risile (epistle). Also the way the word rui r is used in this verse 
means that the revelation gives the realities of the wafiy itself. That is, the 
wahy is perceived to be the rrih or life to humankind. The other reality of 
25 Ibid, p. 2160. 
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revelation is that it is given only to the chosen in this world. And all these 
belong to Allah 26 Man is not considered to be truly alive if his soul has still 
not received the waby(revelation) of Allah that is brought by the prophets. As 
in (8: 24), God says, "0 ye who believe! Give your response to Allah and His 
messenger, when He calleth you to that which will give you life" 
Ruh means Allah's soothing mercy. For example, "No one despairs of 
Allah's soothing mercy, except those who have no faith. " (12: 87) The believers' 
(mv'mintin) hearts are connected with God and thus they do not despair of 
Allah's soothing mercy even though they may have been afflicted by grief, 
sorrow and intense distress. 27 
The word rüh is also mentioned with the word al-Qudus. As in 2: 87, 
2: 253,5: 110.29 In these three verses Allah says that He strengthened 1-sä (r) 
with His Holy Spirit. In these three verses, the Holy Spirit refers to the Angel 
Gabriel. "We gave Jesus, the son of Mary, clear (signs) and strengthened him 
with the Holy Spirit. " (2: 87) 
The Holy Spirit is not connected to I sä (r) alone but also to the 
believers. As God says, "Say, the Holy Spirit has brought the revelation from 
thy Lord in truth, in order to strengthen those who believe, and as a guide and 
glad tidings to Muslim. " (16: 102). Why does rul1 al-Qudus mean the Angel 
Gabriel? Rtih al-Qudus here means the Holy Spirit which is also one of the 
names that refer to the Angel Gabriel. This is because the Angel Gabriel is 
freed from all the defective characteristics that possess mankind. The Angel 
261bid, vol. 5, p. 3073. 
27 Ibid, vol. 4, p. 2026. 
28 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 89, p. 282, vol. 2, p. 997. 
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Gabriel was sent down by God to impart the revelation to the Prophet 
Muhammad (s. a. w. ). God sent the Angel Gabriel with the truth (al-hagq) that 
freed from falsehood. This revelation has strengthened believers' faith. The 
Angel Gabriel came down with guidance from Allah to humankind to guide 
them in their way towards Allah's mercy, bringing with him the good tidings 
for those faithful people who gave themselves to God and also the mercy of 
God to them in the hereafter z9 
As also in 58: 22, the Holy Spirit is connected with the righteous: 
"Thou wilt not find any people who believe in Allah and the last day, loving 
those who resist Allah and His Messenger, even though they were their fathers 
or their sons, or their brothers, or their kindred. For such He has written faith 
in their hearts, and strengthened them with a spirit30 from Himself' (58: 22). 
According to Sayyid Qutb in his 1 u10 a! -Qur'an, ru71 here is what 
strengthens believers and binds them together. 31 This view of 58: 22 is also 
given in Tafsirlbn Kathlr. 32 Rub here means the help God gives to believers in 
order to strengthen them against their enemies 33 
The word rtrh is also mentioned with the word al--amen. As in 26: 193, 
29 Ibid, vol. 4, p. 2194. 
30 In 2: 87 and 2: 253, where it is said that Allih strengthened the prophet Jesus with the 
Holy Spirit. Here we learn that all good and righteous men are strengthened by Alläh 
with the Holy Spirit. If anything, the phrase used here is stronger, "a spirit from 
Himself". Whenever anyone offers his heart in faith and purity to Allib, Allih accepts 
it, engraves that faith on the seekers's heart, and further fortifies him with the divine 
spirit, which we can no more define adequately than we can define in human language 
the nature and attributes of Allah. (See `Abdullah Yu-suf `Alf, The Meaning of The Holy 
Qur'zq p. 1439). 
31 Sayyid Qutb, F la/ &I-Qur'in, voL 6, p. 3515. 
32 Al-Imam Abi al-Fide' Ismä'il Ibn Kathir al-Quraishi aI-Dimasygi, Tafsirlbn Kathir, 
vol. 4, p. 330. 
33 Wahbah al-ZuhayG, al-Tafslral-mrmrrf al-'ag'rdah wa absbarn'ah wo al-maabaj, voL 
27-28, p. 59. 
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"With it came down the Spirit of Faith and Truth. "' Again ruh al Amin here is 
the Angel Gabriel 3S In this verse, the Angel Gabriel is called rüh al-Amin to 
mean the trusted ruib. The Prophet Muhammad (s. a. w. ) was also called al- 
Amin by his tribe the Quraish even before he became a prophet. Al-Amin then 
has become his title, meaning the trusted person. As the Prophet Muhammad 
(s. a. w. ) is trusted not to add to or reduce or compose himself the revelation 
that he received, so is the Angel Gabriel. 
In 42: 52, the connection is with the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) 
"And thus have We, by Our command, sent inspiration to thee (Muhammad): 
thou knewest not (before) what was revelation, and what was faith; but We 
have made the (Qur'an) a light, wherewith We guide such of Our servants as 
We will; and verily thou dost guide (men) to the straight way. " (42: 52). Here, 
rO is the revelation itself. Revelation, as in verse 16: 2, is denoted by the word 
rcih for it gives life to human beings. It makes their hearts and bodies alive. 
Before the revelation came, the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) had heard about 
the book (kits-b) and about faith (`agidah) in A! -Jazirah al-`Arabiyab. But, in 
this verse, rtii does not refer to this kind of kitäb or faith but means the 
embracement (ishtimi) of the human heart by the reality of revelation itself 
and the effects of revelation within human beings. 36 In other words, human life 
34 Ruh al-Amin; the epithet of Gabriel, who came with the inspired Messages to the Holy 
Prophet, is difficult to render in a single epithet in translation. In 26: 107, "1 am to you 
a messenger worthy of all trust. " Amin here is the adjective applied to a prophet. It 
means one to whom a trust had been given, with several shades of meaning implied: e. g., 
(1) worthy of trust, (2) bound to deliver his trust, as a prophet is bound to deliver his 
message, (3) bound to act entirely as directed by the trust, as a prophet is bound to give 
only the message of Alläh, and not add anything of his own, and (4) not seeking any 
interest of his own (See `Abdullah Ynsuf `All, The Meaning of The Holy Qur'dn, p. 921). 
A further signification as attached to the spirit of inspiration is that it is the very 
quintessence of faith and truth, unlike the lying spirits which deluded men with 
falsehood. On the whole, according to `Abdullah Yisuf `Ali, "the Spirit of Faith and 
Truth" will best represent the original here. (See `Abdullah Yitsuf `Ali, The Meaning of 
The Holy Qur'än, p. 930). 
35 Sayyid Quib, ýzi1a1 el-Qmr'sq vol. 5, p. 2617. 
36 Ibid, p. 3171. 
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is meaningless and similar to death without taw R, `ibsdat and faith. And 
again, the revelation, apart from giving truth and life to the human soul, is also 
the light (nnr) that illumines human hearts as God wishes. However, the 
Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) cannot himself give the hidsyat to human 
hearts; rather the hideyat is given by God alone to whom He wishes, 37 
From all the verses mentioned above, we may conclude that the word 
nib in the Qur'an does not have one particular meaning, but it definitely does 
not carry any of the meanings of the word nafs in the Qur'an. 
4.2.1. A1-Firäbi 
To discuss nafs further the views of two Muslim philosophers, al- 
F bf and Ibn Si nä, will be considered. Both of them are included among the 
great names of the Islamic philosophical tradition, which flourished from the 
Ninth to the Fourteenth Centuries. 38 Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Tarkhnn al- 
Firibi is better known in classical sources and among the Latins of the Middle 
Ages as Abu- Nasr (Latin: Abunaser). Al-Färab is unanimously considered to 
be the leading logician and expositor of Plato and Aristotle of his day. 39 He is 
the founder of Arab Neo-Platonism. 40 He was born at Wasidj, which was a 
small settlement in the district of Farab in Turkish Transoxiana. He received 
his education in Baghdad, studying both literary and mathematical subjects 
under a teacher named Yuhannä ibn Hailän. He worked in Baghdad and spent a 
long time there. Al-Fbi then moved to Halab (Aleppo). There he settled at 
37 Ibid, pp. 3171-3172. 
38 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. vii. 
39 Majid Fakhry, A History oflslarmic Pbilosopby, p. 125. 
40 1bid, p. 147. 
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the court named Saif al-Daula. Al-Faräbi died at Damascus in 339 A. H. / 950 
A. D. when he was eighty years old. 41 
Al-Färäbf paraphrased and commented upon many works composed by 
or attributed to Aristotle, especially in logic, for which he had a propensity. 
Among them are the eight logical treatises, viz. the Categories, the 
Hermeneutics, the First Analytics, the Second Analytics, the Topics, the 
Sophistics, the Rhetoric and the Poetics, to which he added the Isagoge of 
Porphyry as an introduction. Then follow the eight treatises which deal with 
physical subjects, viz. Auscultatio Physics De Coclo et Mundo, Dc 
Generation et Corruptions, the Meteorology, the Psychology, De Sensu et 
Sensato, the Book of Plants, and the Book of Animals. Then came the 
Metaphysics, the Ethics, the Politics and so on. His vast contributions in 
physics, metaphysics and politics entitle Al-Faräbf to a preeminent position 
among the Muslim philosophers. 42 
Al-F bi, as the founder of Arab Neo-Platonism, seeks to demonstrate 
that the ideas of Plato and Aristotle harmonize with one another, while 
attempting to adapt them to the Muslim faith. 43 Al-FaräbPs account of the 
relation of Plato to Aristotle can be found in his important treatise titled al- 
Jam `u bayna ra yay al-hahkimayn" (Reconciliation of the Two Sages). 45 
A marked feature of al-Firibi s analysis of Aristotle's philosophy is the 
41 Ibid, p. 126. 
42 lbid, pp. 128-130. 
43 Lean E. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. vii-viii. 
44 Al-Färäbi, al--Jam' bayna ra'yay al-hmaya, revised and edited by Albert N. 
Nader, Beirut, 1960. 
45 Majid Fakhry, A Hislory oflslamic Philosophy, p. 135. 
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close correlation between the ethics or theory of happiness on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the theory of knowledge and his extant commentaries on the 
Isagogc, the Categories, and the De Interpretation. The union of speculative 
and practical philosophy as being necessary for man's happiness in this life 
became a characteristic feature of subsequent Islamic thought. Nevertheless 
religious and eschatological questions were of major importance, for the 
afterlife was considered to be an extension of man's present life. 46 Regarding 
theology, he tried to harmonize Aristotle's opinions with those of Plato and 
both with the Islamic beliefs. 7 
Regarding physical and cosmological aspects, according to al-Faräbr, 
Aristotle observes that the purely physical processes which are common to 
man and the other animals do not account for man's nature, and that mind is 
the faculty which sets him apart. It is the final principle or telos and thus its 
relation to the other faculties of the soul is similar to that of the soul to 
nature 48 However the mind, denoting the perfection (or'ente/echeia') of man, 
is merely a power of the soul, which is subordinate to the operation of reason, 
as it grasps the intelligible forms of things. At this supreme level, reason has 
become actual and has attained the ultimate stage of perfection which rules all 
the preceding stages (the natural life of the organism as well as its other 
psychic functions). 49 Al-Färäbi's conception of philosophy in relation to the 
other sciences is comparable to the conception of the whole Islamic 
philosophical school of the nature and interrelation of the Greek and the 
46 Ibid, p. 1 29. 
47 Muhsin Mahdi, preface to Fal. safat Aristritä/is p. ix. 
48 A1-IFäräbi, Falsafat Arist til ilis, Beirut, 1961, p. 122 cited in Majid Fakhry, A Historyof 
Islamic Philosophy p. 130. 
49 AI-Färäbi, Falsalät An'st trtälis, l3cirut, 1961, p. 126 cited in Majid Fakhry, A History of' 
Islamic Philosophy p. 130. 
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Islamic syllabus of the sciences 5° 
Al-Faräbi surveys and classifies the whole range of the sciences known 
in his day under eight headings: the linguistic, the logical, the mathematical, 
the physical, the metaphysical, the political51, the juridical and the 
theological 52 According to al-Fära^bi, metaphysics can be subdivided into three 
major parts: one dealing with the existence of beings, i. e. ontology; one dealing 
with immaterial substances, their nature, number, and the degrees of their 
excellence, culminating eventually in the study of a perfect being which is the 
ultimate principle of all things and from which everything else derives its 
being, i. e. theology; and one dealing with the primary principles of 
demonstration underlying the special sciences. 53 
According to al-Färabi, metaphysics takes its name from the fact that 
its theme and questions rise above the questions of physics concerning motion 
and change. The objects of metaphysics may exist entirely beyond the physical 
realm, separated from matter both notionally and in actuality. Goodman 
comments, "The primary object of metaphysics is being and thus oneness 
(since unity or self - identity is the most general mark of being). But, 
correlatively, metaphysics must study non-being and otherness as well. Thus 
so Majid Fakhry, A History ofislamic Philosophy, p. 130. 
51 His important works on politics include Kit ab tabsil as-sa `ädah (Attainment of 
Happiness), Hyderabad, 1926; Fusül al-madam(Aphorisms of the Statesman), whose 
text has been edited and translated with an introduction and notes by D. M. Dunlop, 
Cambridge, 1961; Kit lb al-siyisä al-medaoiyya (The Goverment of the City), edited by 
Fauzi M. Najjar, Beirut, 1964; and Kit lb ire' abl al-madinab al-! arlilah (Opinions of 
The People of The Ideal City), always quoted briefly as al-Madlnab a! -radilab (The 
Ideal City). Its bibliographical details are in note p. 196. 
52 Al-Färäbi, Ihre' a . 'uIzizn, p. 2, see also Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 
131. 
53 Al-F ribi, lüsä' &l-`uhiaz, pp. 60-63, see also Majid Fakhry, A History oflslamic 
Philosophy, pp. 133-134. 
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there are three sciences ultimately: physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. 
Physics deals with bodies; mathematics, with the abstract characteristics of 
bodies; and metaphysics, with being as such, its character, its kinds, its nature, 
and its basis. "-4 
Al-Färäbi's substantive thought falls into two major divisions: 
metaphysics and politics. In al-Färäbf's thought there is a close association 
between the two. Al-Färäbf propounds an organic view of man in relation to 
God, the universe and his fellow men, as embodied in the Islamic system of 
belief. 55 Based on this view, both politics and ethics are perceived as an 
extension or development of metaphysics or its highest manifestation, 
theology, i. e. the science of God. This is the reason why al-Färäbi's major work 
on metaphysics titled Mabidi' ärä' ahl al-madinah al-läciila56 (Opinions of the 
Inhabitants of the Virtuous City) opens not with a discussion of justice and 
man's relation to the state but with a discussion of the First Being (the One of 
Plotinus), His attributes and the manner in which He has generated the whole 
multitude of objects existent in the world through the process of emanation. 57 
Under the heavenly bodies, of which the moon being the simplest body, 
has the lowest position in the hierarchy, lies the terrestrial region, in which the 
process of development is reversed: from the imperfect to the more perfect and 
from the simple to the more complex in accordance with a set cosmological 
54 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenas, p. 16. 
55 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, pp. 135-136. 
56 This work of al-Fiiräbi has been translated by Richard Walzer, Al-Firibi on a Perfect 
State, Oxford, 1985. This work also contains the Arabic texts of the original work. 
This book of al-Faräbi deals with both political and metaphysical matters. 
57 Richard Walzer, Al-Faribi On The Perfect State, pp. 57-105, see also, Majid Fakhry, A 
History ofislamic Philosophy, pp. 136-137. 
Note: For a clear picture of a1-Fiiribi's theory of emanation, see Figure 2 Emanation 
and al-Faribi, in Ian Richard Netton, Allib Transcendent, p. 116. 
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pattern. At the lowest level lies prime matter which is followed by the four 
elements; minerals, plants, animals and finally man, who stands at the summit 
of this rising spiral of created objects in the terrestrial region. 58 
The elements first combine to give rise to a 
variety of contrary bodies that are not very 
complex, and these combine in turn with one 
another, as well as with the elements, a second 
time, yielding a more complex class of bodies, 
possessing a variety of active and passive 
faculties. This process of combination, which is 
subject to the action of the heavenly bodies, goes 
on generating the higher and more complex 
entities in the sublunary world, until man 
emerges as a result of the final combination. 59 
Man is an epitome of the cosmos. When man arises, the hierarchical 
process of development is consummated. The first faculty of man to emerge is 
the vegetative, followed by the sensitive, the appetitive, the representative or 
imaginative and the rational. All the faculties of the soul are ruled by the 
rational, which also rules all the other faculties. 60 But at the physiological 
level, the heart is the ruler in each case. The heart is defined as the original 
source of animal heat 61 Following after the heart in the order of generation as 
ss Richard Walzer, Al-Fir b On The Perfect Steh p. 141, see also, Majid Fakhry, A 
History of Islamic Philosophy pp. 137-138. 
59 Richard Walzer, AbFiribi On TbePerfect Statt pp. 135-141, see also, Majid Fakhry, A 
History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 138. 
60 Richard Walzer, AI-Firibi On The Perfect State, pp. 165,169-171. 
61 Richard Walzer, Al-Firibi On The Perfect State, p. 171,175,177, see also, in Majid 
Fakhry, A History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 138. 
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well as of importance is the brain. The brain performs the crucial function of 
moderating the animal heat emanating from the heart, which imparts it to all 
the faculties of the soul, thus insuring that each faculty functions with the 
greatest effectiveness. 2 After the brain follows the liver, then the spleen, and 
finally the reproductive organs 63 
Al-Färabf's theory of knowledge enabled him to formulate the gradual 
rise of reason: from a faculty of cognition in man, to an agency governing the 
terrestrial region, and finally to the conception of reason as the ultimate 
principle of all being. TM He thus viewed reason from three distinct but closely 
interrelated standpoints: the epistemological, the cosmological and the 
metaphysical. But this cannot be the complete picture, for it can also be seen 
6s from the ethico-political point of view. 
According to al-Färäbi, "the real knowledge is what is true and certain 
at all times, not at some time rather than another, and (not) what exists at a 
particular time and may not exist afterwards. "66 Consequently reason is 
represented by al-Färäbi as the ultimate pathway to happiness, which consists 
in the aspiration to attain the level of active reason and to share in its 
immateriality. 67 To attain this level, three types of action are required: 
62 Richard Walzer, Al-F bi On The Perfect State, pp. 177-181, see also Majid FakhryA 
History ofIslamic Philosophy, pp. 138-139. 
63 Richard Walzer, AI-Firibi On The Perfect State, p. 187, see also Majid Fakhry, A 
History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 139. 
64 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 142. 
Note: For a detailed discussion on al-Firibi's theory of intellect and knowledge see Ian 
Richard Netton, AJ. Fitibi and His School London, 1992. 
65 Majid Fakhry, A HistoryofIslamic Philosophy, p. 142. 
66 D. M. Dunlop, Al-Firibi : FmiisJ-Madam, p. 43, Arabic texts, p. 126. 
67 Al-Firiabi, Risila fi7--`aq4 p. 31, al-Siyarat a1-madaaiyab, p. 32, p. 35, Richard Walzer, 
AI-Färibli On The Perfect State, pp. 197-198, p. 207, see also, Majid Fakhry, A History of 
Islamic Philosophy, p. 142. 
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voluntary, intellectual and bodily, corresponding to the three types of virtue: 
the moral, the intellectual and the artistic. " 
According to al-Färabi , the 
fate of the soul depends on the condition of 
the body with which it was associated during its earthly existence. Therefore 
its subsequent joy or misery also depends on this. But the portion of happiness 
will increase as successive generations of kindred souls rejoin the intelligible 
world 69 However, this blissful fate is reserved for the virtuous souls of the 
virtuous cities; the souls of the inhabitants of the non-virtuous cities will never 
be released from the bondage of the body if their earthly happiness consisted in 
indulging its sensual appetites. "Instead their Souls will appear in one material 
condition, then another, either endlessly, if they are fated to be reincarnated in 
human form, or until such time as they have degenerated by degrees to the 
bestial level, whereupon they would simply perish. "70 According to al-Färabi, 
the knowledge of true happiness is the prerequisite of eternal bliss, but 
ignorance leads to destruction. "Hence the fate of the other cities, the 
renegade and the erring, will depend on the measure of their apprehension of 
true happiness. Whoever has been the cause of their deliberate perdition or 
degeneracy will suffer everlastingly. Their inhabitants, however, having lived 
in blissful ignorance, will meet the fate of the ignorant or nonvirtuous city, 
which is total annihilation. 01 The virtues are the states of the soul by which a 
man performs good deeds and fair actions, and the vices, defects and base 
bs Richard Walzer, A . Fir bi On The Perfect Stale, p. 207, see also, Majid Fakhry, A 
History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 142. 
69 Richard Walzer, A! -Firibi On 7äePerfec[ State, p. 265, see also, Majid Fakhry, A 
History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 146. 
70 Richard Walzer, A -Firibi Ob The Perfect Slate, pp. 271-273, see also, Majid Fakhry, A 
History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 146. 
71 Richard Walzer, Al-Fsribi On The Perfect State, pp. 253-259, p. 275, see also, Majid 
Fakhry, A History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 146. 
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qualities are those by which man performs wicked deeds and ugly actions. 72 
Parallel to his close connection between his metaphysical theory and 
political theory, according to al-Färäbi, the statesman or king who treats souls 
needs to have knowledge of the soul as a whole and in detail, in a similar way 
that the doctor who treats bodies needs to know the body as a whole, the parts 
of the body and their relation to the whole, the diseases which can affect the 
body, methods of healing and so on. Thus the statesman should have 
knowledge of the soul as a whole, the parts of the soul, the defects and vices 
which are liable to affect it, the states of the soul which enable man to perform 
good actions, the means whereby vices may be removed from the souls of the 
people of the city, and virtues established and preserved, and so on. 73 
The first faculty of soul to arise when man comes to be is the nutritive 
faculty (quwwaghadhiya). Then comes the faculty of sense perception (quwwa 
Kassa). Together with this faculty of sense is the faculty of appetition (quwwa 
nuzu`iyya) to desire or dislike the object of perception. Then comes the faculty 
of representation (quwwa mutakhayyila) by which the sensibles in the soul are 
imprinted and retained. Here the faculty of appetition is connected to the 
objects of representation. Finally, the rational faculty (quwwa nätiga) arises 
and by it man can distinguish good and evil and know the intelligibles. Here 
also the faculty of appetition is joined to the objects of reasoning. 74 Thus, the 
faculty of appetition is linked to all the others with the exception of the 
nutritive faculty. The faculty of representation presupposes the existence of 
sense perception and cannot have arisen before it. 75 
72 D. M. Dunlop, Al-Firibi: Fusül al-Madaal, p. 27, Arabic text, p. 103. 
73 D. M. Dunlop, Al-Firbi: Fusril a! -Madan% p. 28, Arabic text, p. 105. 
74 Richard Walzer, Al-Firibi on A Perfect State, p. 165. 
75 Richard Walzer, the commentary in Al-Fersbi on A Perfect State, p. 384. 
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The nutritive faculty consists of one ruling faculty and of the faculties 
which arc its auxiliaries and subordinates. The ruling faculty is the heart. The 
auxiliaries and subordinates are distributed among the other organs, each of 
the subordinate auxiliary faculties being in one organ of the body. 76 The same 
applies to the faculty of the senses. This faculty also has both ruler and 
auxiliaries. The ruler is again the heart. The auxiliaries are the five senses 
which are distributed in the eyes, the ears and the sense organs, each of them 
apprehending their special kind of sensibles. Everything apprehended by the 
senses is brought to the ruling faculty. " Thus, the five auxiliaries are assigned 
to the different sense organs to carry their service to the heart. The appctitivc 
faculty has both a ruling faculty and subordinates. In this faculty arises the will 
towards or away from what has been apprehended by sense-perception or by 
representation or by the rational faculty. The will or the appetite is brought 
about by the ruling faculty which is the heart and the bodily acts arc brought 
about by the subordinate faculties such as the nerves or the muscles, which 
reach out to the limbs (such as hands or feet) by which the acts are carried 
out. 78 The faculty of representation, however, has no auxiliaries, although this 
faculty also resides in the heart. 79 The 'imitation' of various kinds of sense 
perception by the faculty of representation occurs in dreams and all sorts of 
divination as well as in true visionary prophetic experience. 80 The rational 
faculty has no auxiliaries or subordinates, but it rules all the other faculties. 
Knowledge of a thing may therefore be brought about by the rational faculty, 
76 Richard Walzer, AI-Fernbi on A Perfect Stag p. 167. 
77 Ibid, pp. 167-169. 
78 Ibid, pp. 169-171. 
79 Ibid, p. 169. 
80 Richard Walzer, the commentary in AI-Fernbi On The Perfect Stag p. 383. 
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by the faculty of representation or by sense-perception. 81 
The division of the human soul in al-Firibi's opinion constitutes an 
ascending series, not one of co-ordinate ranks. In other words, there is an 
hierarchic order within the human sou1.82 
The different faculties of the human soul are basically one and 
indivisible: it does not consist of different souls and has no parts. However, the 
faculty of reason alone is immortal and survives death; 83 Thus, it has a special 
status of its own, which has been discussed above. 
The heart, then, is the centre for almost all activities. It is the ruling 
organ and is not ruled by any other organ. Below the heart in supremacy is the 
brain, which is also a ruling organ governing all the organs and limbs but being 
itself under the rule of the heart. 94 
As we have seen, al-Färäbi states that the main faculties of the soul are 
five; the nutritive, the sensory, the imaginative, the appetitive and the rational. 
He divides the virtues into the intellectual (rational) and the ethical. The 
rational virtues arc the virtues of the rational faculty such as wisdom, intellect, 
cleverness and excellence of understanding, while the ethical virtues are those 
of the appetitivc faculty such as temperance, bravery, generosity and justice. 85 
Rl Richard Walzer, Al-Faribi On The Perfect State, pp. 171-175. 
82 Richard Walzer, the commentary in Al-Farmbi on 7äe Perfect Stag p. 386. 
83 Ibid, p. 382- 
84 Richard Walzer, Al-Faräbi on The Perfect State, p. 175. 
85 D. M. Dunlop, AI-Fsribi: Fusril al-Madan pp. 29-3 1, Arabic text, pp. 106-108. 
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According to al-Färäbi, it is only the intellectual part of the soul which 
is immortal, 86 and in his view there are various modes of the individual soul's 
survival. One of these is the endless progression of the soul through the cycle 
of death and rebirth. 87 The possibility of the survival or the resurrection of the 
human body is not even mentioned. 88 This view is in total contradiction to the 
Islamic faith. 
All existence, according to al-Färabi, must be based on matter and 
form. Matter is a substratum for the subsistence of form while form cannot 
exist and be maintained without matter. Matter exists for the sake of form: if 
there is no form, matter on its own cannot exist. But form does not exist to 
bring about the existence of matter, rather to make the substance which is to 
become body into an actual substance. Thus the union between form and 
matter bring about perfect existence. A species with matter but without form 
exists potentially rather than actually. For example, the wood (matter) of the 
bed but without the form of the bed is a bed potentially. When the form of the 
bed is present in its matter, it becomes a bed in actuality. 89 
Among sublunary bodies, there is no necessary and permanent 
existence. The forms of these sublunary bodies are contrary to each other and 
each of them may exist and may also not exist; the matter of each of them may 
receive the form of this particular element and its contrary. The form of a thing 
may exist in that matter and may also not exist in it; the matter may even exist 
86 Richard Walzer, Al-Firibi On The Perfect State, pp. 197-211. 
87 Richard Walzer, Al-Faribi on The Perfect State; pp. 271-277, see also, Majid Fakhry, A 
History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 147. 
88 Richard Walzer, the commentary in Al-Fir bi on The Perfect State, p. 457. 
89 Richard Walzer, AFFaribion The Perfect State, pp. 109-111. 
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without that form. 90 The forms of the four elements which have been 
mentioned above: the mineral, the plant, the animal and man, are contrary to 
each other. The matter of each of them can receive the form of that element 
and its contrary. The matter of each clement is shared by all of them and all 
the other bodies below the heavenly bodies, since all the sublunary bodies arise 
out of the elements. The matter of these four elements is unalloyed for they are 
primary91 The primary matters (a! -mawädd al-all) arc common to all 
sublunary bodies. These primary matters potentially exist before they arc 
joined to a form. No existence in the sublunary world is an actuality from the 
very beginning. 92 So, the prime matter is constantly striving to obtain the form 
into which it substantifies itself. Then it rises up gradually until its form 
becomes present in it, through which it obtains its actual existence. 3 The 
highest form is reason, which is the highest faculty in man. Al-Färäbi contends 
that reason is to be in command of all the other faculties94 In addition, the 
active reason or intellect acts as a bridge between the heavenly or celestial 
world and the sublunary world. 95 Therefore, besides being the immortal faculty 
in the human soul, this important role of the intellect also gives it a special 
position in al-Färabf's cosmology. 
From the preceding discussion, it is obvious that al-Färäbi relates his 
theory of soul to his political ideas, connecting the political to the 
metaphysical. In his discussion of the fate of the soul after death, he connects 
90 Ibid, p. I1 1. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Richard Walzer, the commentary in Al-Firäbi on The Perfect State, p. 372. 
93 Richard Walzer, Al-Farihi on The Perfect Slalq p. 113. 
94 Richard Walzer, the commentary in Al-Faräbi on The Perfect Stag p. 390. 
95 Ian Richard Netlon, Allib Transccndcol, p. 117. 
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moral and intellectual qualities. This approach is similar to Plato's discussion 
of justice in his Republic. 96 His approach to the psychology of the soul can be 
considered Aristotelian in that he identifies the different faculties of the soul: 
the nutritive, sensitive, imaginative and rational. Also, his theory of emanation 
clearly plays an important role in his concept of soul. The significance of this 
theory to the Islamic faith is the acknowledgement of the existence of God the 
First Cause. 
Bearing in mind the above discussion, we may attempt to schematise al- 
Faräbi's theory of soul: 
Al-Farabi 
1. Soul originates from the First Cause 
2. Rational faculty is the ruling faculty 
3. Soul is form 
4. Onlintellect is immortal 
5. Body is matter 
6. The union of form and matter brings about perfect existence 
7. Knowledge is brought by the rational faculty, the representative faculty or 
the sensory faculty 
4.2.2. Ihn Sinä 
The second important figure under discussion is Ibn Si nä, whose name 
and ideas are also well known in the West. 97 His full name is Abu `Alf al- 
Husain Ibn Sf nä, known to the Latin authors of the Thirteenth Century as 
96 Sec Plato, Republic, Book 1. 
97 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna p. vii. 
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Avicenna. In the history of Arab Neo-Platonism, Ihn Sinä owed a debt to al- 
Farabi r since he gained his first understanding of the goal and point of 
metaphysics from al-Faräbi's works? 9 Ibn Sinä was born in the village of 
Kharmaithan near to Bukhara in the year 370 A. H. / 980 A. D. Then his family 
moved to Bukhara itself. By the early age of ten Ibn Sinä had completed 
memorising the Qur'an. He first heard about the discussion of the soul from 
the Ismi'7 yya. As well as studying jurisprudence, he studied philosophy under 
Abu 'Abd Allah al-Natili; he began to read the Isagoge at this time. As his 
father used to study the Rasä'illkhwan a/-$' (The Treatises of the Brethcren 
of Purity), he himself became familiar with it. 100 Ibn Sinä also studied 
medicine in Bukhara, and at the age of seventeen he had the good fortune to 
cure the prince Null ibn Mansur. After this incident he obtained the privilege 
of using the prince's library. He then became his own teacher in scientific 
research and practice. 101 Ibn Sina died in Hamadan in the year 428 A. H. /1037 
A. D. at the age of fifty-eight. 102 Ibn Sinä wrote a large philosophical 
encyclopaedia called Klub al-shiia . His Klub al-najäl is an abridgement of 
Kit lb al-shil. '03 
Ibn Sin, following the Aristotelian definition of soul, defines it as the 
98 Majid Fakhry, A History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 147. 
99 Lenn E. Goodman, Aviceaoa, p. ix. 
100 William E. Gohiman, The Life OfIbn Sind pp. 17-21. 
101 Ibn Sina's famous book on medicine is titled al-Qanrm Ii '1-tibb (A System of 
Medicine), Romae, 1593, to which is added a compendium of Aristotelian philosophy, 
entitled al-Najit, abridged by him from his larger work entitled Klub al-sbifi There 
is a translation of this book; Al--Qanrm fiY-tibb(The General Principles of Avicenna's 
Canon of Medicine) translated with an introduction by Mashar II. Shah, Karachi, 
1966. 
102 Majid Fakhry, A History oflslamic Philosophy, p. 150. 
103 Fa7lur Rahman, the introduction to Avicennas Psychology, (An English translation 
of Kitib &I-Najit, Book 11, Chapter VI), p. 1 
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entelechy of a natural body possessing organs. According to him, the soul is 
not a mixture or a harmony of the elements but something over and above 
them. 104 Ibn Sf na categorised souls into three: the vegetable soul, the animal 
soul and the human soul. "The human soul is distinguished from both the 
vegetable soul and the animal soul. The human soul is an immaterial substance 
and is independent of the body... The human soul is the first entelechy of a 
natural body possessing organs in so far as it acts by rational choice and 
rational deduction, and in so far as it perceives the universal. "105 According to 
Ibn Si nä, Aristotle's notion of the soul as not a separate substance incapable of 
existing independently of the body, and as the 'entelechy' of a natural 
organised body, should not be understood in the sense that there first exists an 
organised body into which the soul enters. Rather the soul itself is an 
immanent principle which organises the body, gives it its specific 
characteristics, and makes it what it is. 106 
Ibn Sinä understands ensoulment in functional terms. He partitions 
bodies into a material and a formal aspect. There is inseparability of form from 
matter. All motion needs soul as a prime mover. Ibn Sinä affirms that 
something similar to a will must presuppose any action or motion. 107 The soul 
in any creature is what makes possible the activities of life - the growth and 
reproduction of plants, the sensitivity and motility of animals, the 
consciousness and rationality of human beings. The soul therefore is the form, 
but plants cannot be said to have souls in the same sense that animals do. 108 
104 Fallur Rahman, the Introduction to Aviceana's Psychology, p. 2. 
toy Fallur Rahman, "Avicenna's Psychology, p. 25. 
106 Fallur Rahman, the Introduction to Avicenna's Psychology, pp. 3-4. 
107 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. 149-150. 
ios lbid, pp. 152-152. 
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Ibn Si na compares the soul with a source of movement. This can be found at 
the beginning of his discussion on the nature of the soul in his Dc Anima. 109 
The soul is a formal principle that initiates the motion of bodies. "Bodies, on 
Ibn Si na's scheme, act in specifiable manners on account of the forms that 
organize them and give them a definite character. And the forms do come from 
above. Thoughts too come from on high, insofar as they arc thoughts. And 
even the shapes perceived by the eye, insofar as they are shapes, come from the 
Active Intellect, not through its action on the eye directly, but through its 
imparting of the forms to the objects which the eye beholds. " "O 
In his psychological treatise Kitäb a1--shims, Ibn Si nä proves that the 
soul is not something material but is of the order of form. Having stated that 
soul is form, Ibn Si nä goes on to say that the soul is an entelechy because it is 
the soul which perfects the several species of living beings; that is, the soul 
makes a particular living being a member of a particular species. But some 
things may make others perfect without themselves being inherent as forms; 
they may be substances separate from the things they perfect. Some souls 
therefore, are not forms subsisting in matter, rather they are separable from it. 
This is the reason why Ibn Si nä felt it better to define the soul as entelechy 
(perfection) of the body rather than as form. " It makes a living thing what it 
is; it makes living things capable of action as what they are. ' 2 The human soul 
by itself is a substance. Some entelechies are mere forms while others arc 
substances. "The soul that simply animates an organic body is its form. Here 
soul is to body as seaworthiness is to ship. But the rational soul, the human 
109 Fadlur Rahman, Avicenna,; De Anima, pp. 4-16. 
This point also cited in Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 153. 
110 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 152. 
1 11 Fazlur Rahman, the Introduction to Avicenna's Psychology, p. 9. 
112 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 154. 
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mind or consciousness, does more and is more. It is a substance and in 
principle separable from the body. "' 13 
According to Ibn Si nä, then, the human soul is independent of bodily 
existence, and is therefore a substance; 114 it is incorporeal because it is not 
matter. 115 Ibn Sinn also argues that the human soul is immortal. Firstly, "The 
soul is not related to the body as an effect to its cause in any sense of the term. 
The existence of the body merely provides an occasion for that of the soul . 
"116 
And the soul is not the form of the body, for it is not essentially attached to 
the body and it is not necessary for the soul to die with the body. The soul also 
is eternal since it is an independent immaterial substance. Secondly, the soul is 
immortal for it is simple: if it is accepted that the soul is uncompositc, it 
follows that the soul will be immortal since only composite things are liable to 
corruption. 117 Thus the core of Ibn Si na's argument for the immortality of the 
soul is based on the independence of the soul from the body. Since soul is 
independent of body, it cannot die with the death of the body. ' 18 
Since the soul is not wholly dependent on the body and is not a mere 
113 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. 155. 
114 Here Ibn Sinn gives the example of intellectual apprehension. Self-knowledge would 
be impossible if rational consciousness were dependent on an organ (just as sense 
perception and imagination cannot see the organs they employ), that the understanding, 
unlike the senses, is not worn down by constant use, damaged by focusing on powerful 
objects, or eroded by age. On the contrary, wisdom improves with maturity, even as the 
senses have begun to wane. And, if it is argued that forgetfulness also takes hold with age 
or illness, the philosopher answers that it is only increased care for the needs of the body 
that distracts the souls of the elderly or ill from intellectual functions. Fazlur Rahnian, 
Avicenna'sPsychology, pp. 51-54 cited in L. E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 161. 
115 Fa7lur Rahman, the Introduction to Aviccnnas Psychology, p. 10. 
16 Ibid, p. 12. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology, pp. 58-63. 
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form in a substrate, human actions are not to be conceived solely in terms of 
the behaviour of the body. The soul is not a mere function of the body: its 
actions are not always to be perceived as dependent variables. They are also 
independent: souls can affect bodies and it is not always a case of bodies 
affecting souls. Ideas, beliefs and volitions can have consequences and be self- 
governing. This means that human thought, action and experience cannot be 
adequately explained in mechanistic terms. Thus, to say that the soul is a 
substance is to claim that human beings arc subjects, that we can act and are 
not simply acted upon. Freedom and autonomy are actually the issue here. ' 19 
Regarding the relationship between consciousness and the body, 120 Goodman 
writes that the relationship is not simply that of effect to cause. "Bodies act 
insofar as they have specific forms but souls act as well. Their states arc not 
strictly determined by those of the bodies they belong to, even if it proves to 
be the case that for every mental state there is a corresponding physical state 
in the body or the brain. Consciousness itself may be a determinant of the 
states of the body - as, for example, when we discover or develop an idea or 
come to a decision, and consciousness itself determines the conformation of 
the brain and the resultant operations, say, in committing the relevant words, 
images, or symbols to memory, or effectuating an overt action. " 121 
According to Ibn Si ITd the soul is a unity. So it is a unitary substance. 
As a result the spiritual faculties do not function independently but rather 
come under one principle, which is the soul as a whole. Every act of every 
faculty is operated by the whole soul. "The soul is thus the substratum of all 
experience. It is also self-conscious. Whenever an event occurs in the human 
119 Lenn L. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 161. 
120 Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna: s Psychology, pp. 54-56. 
121 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. 161-162. 
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mind, this centralizing principle pronounces 'I perceived, I became angry. "22 
Thus, soul is identified as the self-conscious unifying principle of 
experience. '23 
One of Ibn Sfna's theories of the soul is that the soul retains its 
individuality after separation from the body. This doctrine has led to 
contradiction. 124 The simultaneous occurrence of soul and body is not merely 
possible, it is necessary. To prove this Ibn Si nä argues that "It is impossible for 
the soul to exist before the body. For then there will have to be either a 
plurality of souls or one soul. A plurality of souls is impossible. For in their 
prior existence these souls are immaterial and since matter is the individuating 
principle, these souls cannot be many. But the supposition of the existence of 
one soul is equally impossible. For then the soul of an individual like Zayd 
would be identical with the soul of an individual like `Amr. This is absurd. If, 
then, in the supposed prior existence there can be neither a plurality of souls 
nor one soul, the prior existence of soul to body is impossible. The soul cannot 
exist before the body but must exist with the body. "125 This view is in 
contradiction to his statement that the soul can exist independently as 
mentioned previously. Ibn Sf na also argued against transmigration. 126 If 
transmigration is possible, then in every individual, there must be two souls: 
the created soul and the transmigrated soul. This is impossible since we 
122 Fazlur Rahman, the Introduction to Aviccnna'sPsycbology, p. 12. 
123 Fazlur Rahman, the commentary on Avicenna''s Psychology, p. 111. 
124 Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", 
in McdiacvalStudics, vol. XXII, p. 232. 
125 Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna's De Anima, p. 228, cited in Michael E. Marmura, 
"Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", in Mcdiaeva/Sludics, vol. 
XXII, p. 234. 
Note: Avicenna's De Anima is the psychological part of his Kithb a/-Shiis. 
126 Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna Psychology, pp. 63-64. 
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experience ourselves to be one person rather than two. 127 
A discussion of a related problem can be found in the article by 
Marmura entitled Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls. 
Ibn Si nä accepts that the soul is a substance separable from matter; that the 
soul separates from the body after death; and that the number of bodies is 
potentially infinite. This actually creates the problem of the infinity of souls. 
The problem can only be solved if the proof that the soul exists before the 
body is rejected. Ibn Si na simply disproves the proof and contends that the 
problem of infinite souls is irrelevant and that the infinity of souls is 
impossible. Marmura concludes that Ibn Si nä actually accepts that 
transmigration is necessary. This means that Ibn Si nä must reject the 
impossibility of the actual infinite in the case of souls. Somehow, therefore, 
the infinity of souls is possible. But he does not tell us how this might be, 
either in his Risala or directly in any of his other writings on the Soul. 128 
But, according to Marmura, the solution can be found elsewhere. 
It is a fundamental doctrine of Ibn Si nä that the 
soul is immaterial and thus has no position in 
space. If no position in space, then no order in 
position. Moreover, he also maintains that souls 
in relation to each other have no natural order 
similar to that which exists between necessary 
essential causes. In the Najät, in the section 
dealing with the problem of the infinite, 
127 Fazlur Rahman, the commentary on Avicenns's Psychology, p. (09. 
128 Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", in 
MediaevalStudies, vol. XXII, p. 235. 
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Avicenna argues that entities that have no order 
in position or nature can form an actual infinite. 
For then one part of the infinite cannot in 
principle be applied to the whole with the 
contradictory ensuing. That which has no order is 
outside the category of part and application. 
Certain kinds of angels and devils, Avicenna then 
tells us, are such entities with no order, and their 
infinite coexistence is possiblc. 29 
Two important critics of Ibn Si nä's doctrine of soul are al-Ghazal and 
Ibn Rushd (520-595 A. H. /1126-1198 A. D. ) known to the West as Averrocs. Al- 
Ghazäli in his book Tahäfut al-falisifa, argues that the philosophers cannot say 
that his theory that the world was created in time by an eternal will is false 
when their own doctrine of an eternal world leads to self-evident 
contradictions. He stated that one of these contradictions is the conclusion 
that an infinite number of souls coexist. 130 Ibn Rushd himself in his book 
Tahäfut al-tahäfut, 13' while criticising al-Ghazäli's error in method, 
nonetheless agrees with him on the impossibility of an infinite number of 
coexisting souls. 132 Ihn Rushd adds that this contradiction results from the 
129 Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna's Pychology, pp. 46-50, as cited in Michael E. Marmura, 
"Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", in Mediaeval Studio vol. 
XXII, p. 235. 
13° Al-Ghazali, Tabifut al-falicifa, pp. 228-232, tr. by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Al-Gbaieli's 
Tahafut, pp. 221-225, cited in Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the 
Infinite Number of Souls", in Mediaeval Studies, vol. XXII, p. 235. 
131 Muhammad Ibn Ahmad (Ibn Rushd), Tahafai al-tahlfut, edited by Dr. Sulaimän 
Dunya, Dar al-Ma`arif, Egypt, 1964, translated by Simon Van Den Bergh, Aver oes' 
Tabäfut al-tabifut (The Incoherence of The Incoherence), London, 1954. 
132 Averroes, Tahifut al-tabifut, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, 1930, pp. 26-28, cited in Michael 
E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", in 
Mediaeval St udics, vol. XXII, p. 235. 
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false theory of individual immortality, a theory which, he believed, came from 
Ibn Si nä himself. 133 
Al-Ghazälf also pointed out that this problem leads to another 
consequence which is that these philosophers do not demonstrate the existence 
of God. Marmura comments as follows. "Their proof, al-Ghazälf argues, rests 
on the impossibility of the actual infinity of essential causes. But they cannot 
deny the possibility of the actual infinity of essential causes when they allow 
the possibility of the actual infinite in the case of souls. Avicenna's solution to 
the problem of the infinite number of souls, the argument from order, al- 
Ghazälf maintains, is no solution. Night follows day in sequence. If we assign 
to each night the birth of at least one soul we will end up with an ordered 
sequence of souls, the impossibility of which is self evident. 034 Ibn Rushd 
confirms that this problem arises from Ibn Sf nä's theory of individual 
immortality, which he did not take from the ancients but originated himself. 
This theory leads to the contradictory consequence of affirming the existence 
of an actual infinite. One who holds the doctrine of the individual immortality 
of the soul is then committed to the doctrine of transmigration. 135 Ibn Rushd 
133 Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", 
in Mediacval Studies, vol. XXII, pp. 235-236. 
134 This argument is related to his rejection of the potential infinite. The philosophers 
argued that the infinite succession of night and day is possible because the past 
instances no longer exist and there is no actual infinite. The question of existence or 
non-existence, al-Ghazä6 argued, is irrelevant. A number of imagined horses that have 
no real existence must still conform to the logic of number. Al-Ghazäli, Tabifut a/- 
falssifa, p. 112, tr. by Sabih Ahmad Karnali, Al-Ghazäli's Tahafut Al-Falisife, pp. 91- 
92, cited in Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number 
of Souls", in Mediaeval Studies, vol. XXII, p. 236. Here al-Ghazali argues that even if 
we grant the possibility of an infinite number of past days and nights we cannot do so 
with the souls because these still exist. The argument from order is no help because 
positional and natural order are not the only kinds of order. There is also the order of 
temporal succession. Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite 
Number of Souls", in Mediaeval Studies, vol. XXII, p. 236. 
135 Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", 
in MediacvalStudies, vol. XXII, p. 236. 
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holds that this doctrine of individual immortality is contradictory on two 
related issues: the individuation and the infinity of souls. Ibn Rushd draws the 
conclusion that the theory of individual immortality is an exoteric theory and 
also suggests that in putting it forward Ibn Si na was merely seeking to satisfy 
the public. 136 
According to Ibn Si nä, the human rational soul can be divided into two 
faculties: the practical and the theoretical. Both he calls intelligence (intellect). 
The practical faculty is the principle of the movement of the human body. It is 
related to the animal faculties of appetcnce, imagination and estimation. It 
also has a certain dual character in itself. 137 
Thus the practical intellect is the source of human behaviour. Its 
relation to the animal appetitive faculty is as the source of certain human 
emotions, for instance shame. Its relation to the animal imagination and 
estimation is that it makes use of them in its deliberations concerning 
particular actions and human arts. The practical intellect's dual character is 
that, with the help of the theoretical intelligence, it becomes the source of 
moral premisses (such as that lies and tyranny arc evil) and the general 
principles on which morality is based. The practical intelligence or intellect 
must govern and control the irrational tendencies and facilitates the reception 
of contemplative knowledge from above by the theoretical intelligence. 13S On 
the other hand, the "function of the theoretical faculty is to receive the 
impressions of the universal forms abstracted from matter. If these forms are 
already abstract in themselves, it simply receives them; if not, it makes them 
136 
Ibld, p. 239. 
137 Faziur Rabman, AviccnnaS7 I'sychology, p. 32. 
138 Fazlur Rahman, the commentary on Avicenna's Psychology, pp. 83-84. 
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immaterial by abstraction, so that no trace whatever of material attachments 
remains in them. 039 
The theoretical intellect, then, is concerned with the pure cognition of 
truth. It is the faculty in which forms come to be imprinted. If the forms are in 
matter, it abstracts them and if the forms are already abstract, it simply 
receives them. The theoretical intellect has two kinds of recipient, 140 the 
potential and the actual. Ibn Sf nä gives the example of learning, in particular 
writing, in explaining the stages through which the theoretical intellect passes 
from potentiality into the actual possession of forms. 141 The first stage is that 
of absolute potentiality. It exists in an infant. This is when a knowledge, not 
only of the art of writing but even of its basics is lacking. The second stage is 
when the child already knows about the basics of writing: he can use pen and 
inkpot and has learnt simple letters. The third stage is when the child reaches 
the perfection of this potentiality, such as the capacity of a perfect scribe to 
write. The transition of potential intellect into actual intellect can be compared 
to the three stages above. Ibn Sfn is doctrine of the individuality of the soul 
opposes the doctrine of the collective soul, and his theory of the immortality of 
the soul opposes the theory of the physical resurrection of the human being. 
This is because Ibn Sf nä believes that resurrection is the linking (muwdsrla) of 
the soul with those spiritual substances. It is the human soul that receives its 
reward since it survives after the perishing of the body and is unaffected by the 
passage of time. '42 
139 Faziur Rahman, Avicenna s Psychology, p. 33. 
140 Fazlur Rahman, the commentary on Avicenns's Psychology, p. 87. 
141 Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna'sPsychology, pp. 33-34. 
142 Aviccona on Prayer(Rissla fi mahiyyali 7-saläl), Arberry's translation in Avicemma on 
Theology, (London, 1951), p. 54, cited in Leon E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 168. 
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Ibn Sinä agrees with al-Färäbi that through contact with the Active 
Intellect man knows as God does. Thus, the human being may know God and 
all things. In knowledge or in ecstasy, according to Ibn Sinä, the individual is 
still present as a subject, to receive the higher understanding that gnosis makes 
possible. Ibn Sinä identifies what is spiritual or intellectual with what is 
immortal in man. 143 According to Ibn Sinä, the work of the human rational 
soul is the noblest of tasks. Thus, its trust is to contemplate reflectively the 
marvels of God's art. The rational soul always faces the higher world, for it 
does not love the lower. This is why the most distinctive activity of the human 
soul is knowing and consciousness! According to Ibn Sinä, the heart is the 
primary and dominant part in animals. It is also the first part to be formed in 
animals and human beings. 145 Here Ibn Sinä and al-Färäbi agree that the heart 
and not the head is dominant in man. 
The key to understanding Ibn Si nä's notion of soul is best expressed by 
Lenn E. Goodman: "The key to Avicenna's synthesis was his conceptualization 
of this world and everything in it as contingent in itself, but necessary with 
reference to its causes, leading back ultimately to the First Cause, the 
Necessary Being, whose timeless existence eternally authors the finite and 
determinate reality that we know. "146 
Thawing on the above discussion, we may schematise Ibn Si na's theory of soul 
as follows: 
143 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenos, pp. 165-167. 
144 Avicenna on Prayer (Risila f mibiyyali '1- salsl), Arberry's translation in Avicenna on 
Theology, (London, 1951), p. 53, cited in Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 167. 
145 Fa21ur Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology, p. 66. 
146 Lean E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. ix. 
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Ibn Si nä 
1. Soul comes from above 
2. The intellect is the source of human actions 
3. Soul is eternal, incorporeal, immaterial substance. 
4. Soul is immortal 
5. Body is material 
6. Soul is independent of body 
7. Knowing is the most distinctive activity 
Conclusion: 
Al-Färäbf has a distinctive way of explaining the human soul. He 
relates his discussion of the soul to political ideas. Al-Färäbf discusses only the 
human soul with its various faculties. On the other hand, Ibn SF nä defines soul 
as the first perfection of a natural body possessed by organs. He discusses three 
types of soul separately. They are the vegetable soul, animal soul and human 
soul. Further, he divides the human rational soul into the theoretical and 
practical. Both al-Färäbf and Ibn Sind view the active intellect as an 
incorporeal being and it is the highest in the human soul, governing all other 
parts. It is the source of human behaviour. Al-Färäbf views the human soul as 
form and its perfect existence is completed by matter. For Ibn Sfnä, on the 
other hand, the human soul is an independent form, that is, a substance. In al- 
FäräbPs opinion, survival after death concerns only the intellectual part of the 
soul. The immortality of the soul results from the intellectual development of 
man, therefore the souls of the ignorant perish. Ibn Sfnä, on the other hand, 
denies physical resurrection and contends that only the soul survives. 
Furthermore, since the human soul is an incorporeal substance, it is by nature 
immortal. The two philosophers arc similar in that the fate of the soul in the 
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hereafter is determined by its intellectual attainment in the present life. Hence, 
significance is also given to the moral life in this temporal world. To 
summarise, one can do no better than to quote A. S. Tritton, "It is easier to 
admit the existence of soul than to define it for it has neither genus nor 
propdw7r, any definition is imperfect and any description inadequate. "147 
147 A. S. Tritton, "Man, Nafs, Rnh, 'Aql", in The Bulletin of The School of Oriental and 
African Studies, vol. 34,1971, p. 491. 
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4.3 AL-GHAZALI 'S THEORY OFNAFS 
Al-Ghazäli writes concerning the human soul (nafss) in various ways to 
suit the different levels of understanding of his readers. The Ihyä, Mishkäl al- 
anwär, al-Risila al-laduniyya, Kimiyä-i sa`ädahl and al-Mungidh min a1-4aläl 
arc to some extent addressed to a distinct readership and discuss the soul 
accordingly. For example, some of his books contain explanations of `ilm al- 
mukäshafa and are intended for a select few whereas others deal with `ilm al- 
mu`rimala and are meant for laymen. The following discussion on al-Ghazäli's 
theory of nafs will be based on al-Ghazäli's own writings; specific reference 
will be made to the above mentioned works. The purpose here is to try to 
reconcile the apparent contradictions, incoherences or inconsistencies in al- 
Ghazäli's thought. In order to achieve this aim, the discussion will be based on 
those of al-Ghazali's popular books that contain his theories regarding the 
human soul. 
4.3.1. The Four Terms: 
Al-Ghazäli's explanation of the human soul starts by first defining four 
terms: al-galb, al-rtih, al-nafs and al-`aql. In the Ihyä , al-Ghazäli discusses the 
meanings of these terms in The Book of The Mysteries of The Heart. 2 
Regarding the heart (galb), al-Ghazälf considers its attributes and 
characteristics as well as its qualities and offers instruction on how to purify it 
and direct it towards God. Al-Ghazälf's examination of the heart and those 
matters related to it leads to his epistemology and sources of knowledge. 
'The points taken from this book will be based on its English translation by Claud Field, 
The Alchemy ofHappinc London, 1980, with reference to the Persian edit ion volume 
1. 
2 Abü Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kilib `aje'ib al-galb, lhyi ; voL 3, pp. 112-115. 
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Al-GhazälT states that the human heart (galb) has a dual nature. The 
nature which is known to physicians concerns the physical attributes of the 
heart, but it also has a subtle (latlfa), spiritual (rtihäni) and lordly (rabbini) 
nature. This inner nature is what concerns al-GhazälT: it is the essence of the 
human being (hagiqat al-insin) which actually grasps (mudrik), knows (`Rim) 
and intuits (`ärif). It is this essence that is commanded by God and that will be 
judged. It moves the body for it is closely related to the physical heart. But, 
according to al-Ghazälf, many people find this relation difficult to understand, 
and in the Ihyä' he gives two reasons why he does not intend to discuss the 
matter further: firstly because this second spiritual nature of the heart is linked 
to `ilm al-mukishafa, which is not the concern of the book. The second 
reason is that it is impossible to comprehend the reality of the inner nature 
because it is related to the secret of al-rtih which was never discussed by the 
Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ). What concerns al-Ghazälf, therefore is not the 
essence (hagiqat) of the second nature of the heart, but rather its attri butes and 
conditions as they relate to `i/m a1-mu`ämala. 3 Indeed this inner heart is 
something that cannot be an object of reflection and perception, and the way in 
which it is connected to the physical heart is known only to a few people 
whom God chooses to enlighten. 
But sometimes the word yalb may mean the physical heart. According 
to al-Ghazäli this is because of the special relationship between both aspects of 
the heart's dual nature: the spiritual heart is connected to the human body by 
way of the physical heart, which acts as its vehicle and from which it rules the 
body. 4 Al-Ghazal also connects the inner heart to the cognitive faculty of the 
3 Ibid, p. 113. 
4 Ibid, p. 115. 
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human being. It is the place of `ilm (knowledge). 5 This is parallel to his 
definition of this inner heart as the essence of the person. In order to receive 
the maximum `ilrrm possible, one's spiritual heart should be ready, clean and 
pure, channelled to receive the right `i/m, and free from tagrid Finally, one 
should know what is the correct direction for his inner heart in order to attain 
his spiritual goal. Al-Ghazäli explains these points by providing the analogy of 
a mirror and its object. ' 
Al-Ghazal[ then discusses his perception of the inner heart as being that 
part which is subtle, lordly and spiritual. He considers the other three terms 
that are sometimes used to denote the second nature of the yalb. The first, a! - 
ro, has two meanings: al-rrih is a subtle energy which stems from the physical 
heart and travels through the human body by the way of the nerves. It is like 
the light of a lamp shining and enlightening the inside of a house. This is what 
concerns physicians. The second meaning of al-rtih is a subtle faculty that can 
perceive and understand. This meaning is related to the second nature of the 
heart: it cannot be grasped by most human beings and is among the matters 
that the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h) asks us to leave to God. 7 God says in the 
Qur'an, "Say thou (Muhammad), The spirit is from the command of my Lord" g 
But it seems that al-Ghazal[ is not concerned to make a clear distinction 
between the two meanings. 
The second term is of--naf, which is our concern here. Al-Ghazali gives 
two meanings of this word that are related to his exposition of the heart. The 
5 Ibid, p. 125. 
6 Ibid, pp. 125-127. 
7 Ibid, pp. 113-114. 
8 Al-Qur'an, 17: 85. 
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nafs is the place of anger and desire in the human being. This is the meaning 
which is used by most of the su-f s, who hold that all the evil in human beings 
comes from the nafs, and that therefore man must fight the nafs and subdue it. 
This view is based on the Prophet's (p. b. u. h. ) saying, "Thy nafs which is 
between thy two sides is the worst enemy. " The second meaning of nafs is 
related to the inner heart. It is the essence of man by which he knows not only 
God but all things. This nafshas different attributes depending on its condition 
or state. There are three states of al-nafs which have been previously 
discussed: `' al-nafs al-mutma'innah, al-nafs al-lawwamah and a/-nafk a/- 
ainrndrah bissti'. A/-nafs al-mutma'innah is the nafs which is submissive to the 
command of God. It is free from the worldly passions, and is effectively "the 
soul at rest. "10 Secondly, when the soul does not achieve a completely calm 
state and is still struggling with its desires, it is called al-nafs al-lawwämah, 
that is, "the self-reproaching soul", " for it rebukes its owner for his neglect in 
the worship of his God. Finally, if the soul ceases to protest and surrenders 
itself totally to the call of evil passions, it is called al-nafs al-ammarah bi-sti' 
i. e. "the soul that enjoins evil". 12 This nafs can therefore be seen as that 
referred to above by the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ): it is the agent of man's destruction 
and is altogether blameworthy. Being evil and defective, this nafs does not 
visualise its return to its God for it has kept itself far from Him. On the other 
hand, the nafs which is the human essence (the second usage) is praiseworthy. 
It is that in man which knows God and all knowable things. 13 
9 See above pp. 181-185. 
10 A1-Qur'an, 89: 27. 
11 Al-Qur'an, 75: 2. 
12 A1-Qur'an, 12: 53. 
13 Abu- IIamid al-Ghazali, Klub `aje'ib a! -galb, Ibyi, vol. 3, p. 114. 
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The final term is al-`aql. Al-Ghat li discusses al-`aql in the Kildb al- 
`i1m14 of his Ihyd : Al-`aql is the place from where knowledge develops. This is 
what makes it noble. 15 Al-`aql differentiates man from animal: it is like a light 
which is inside the human heart, enabling and preparing it to receive `i m. 16 
There are two meanings of `aql which arc related to al-Ghazäli's discussion of 
the human inner heart. The first is knowledge of the reality of things. Thus al- 
`aql illustrates the situation of `ilm which is in the heart; in other words it 
means knowledge of the true nature of things whose seat is in the heart. The 
second is the `aql which grasps and knows `ilm, and in this case 'aqlmeans the 
second nature of the human heart or the inner heart as described above. 
Regarding the saying of the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ), "The first thing that God 
created was intelligence (al-`agl)917, al-Ghazali says that every man possesses 
`ilm, meaning that inside him exists an 'origin' standing on its own, `ilm being 
one of this origin's attributes, and this attribute is not characterised (al-sifat 
ghair al-mausutj. Thus, `aql means either the quality of the intelligence of one 
who has knowledge or the perceptive mind itself in which that quality 
resides. 18 
Al-Ghazal ultimately comes to the conclusion that these four terms 
share one common meaning beside the four specific meanings that each one of 
them carries: the physical qa/b, the rtih which is related to the body and its 
nerves (a]-Ghazälf calls it rtih al jismini), the desire nafs and the `u/UM (p1. of 
14 Abu- I- amid al-Ghazaff, Klub al-71m, Ibys , vol. 1, pp. 111-114, Eng. trans. by 
Nabih Amin Faris, The Book ofKnow1edgc, p. 225-231. 
'S Abü Iiämid al-Ghazali, Ki1ib al-Arg 4yä', vol. 1, p. 108, Eng. trans. p. 221. 
16 Abn Hamid al-Ghazili, Kit ib al-71m4 Ihyi, vol. 1, p. 1l1, Eng. trans. p. 226. 
17 Haditb al-Tibräni in al-Aw. sad Abü Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitib al-MM Ibyi, vol. 1, p. 109, 
Eng. trans. p. 222. See also, Abn 1.1ämid al-Ghazali, Faysal al-tafriga 
baina Islam wa 4- 
zandaga4 p. 82. 
18 Abn Hamid at-Ghazali, J itil' `ajs'ib al-galt Ibyä , vol. 3, pp. 114-115. 
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`rlm). There are four words but five meanings. The fifth meaning that unites 
them is that subtle power which intuitively grasps and comprehends the 
knowledge of human bcings. 19 This is what the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) refers to when he says: "Whosoever knows his self 
knows his Lord". 
Al-Ghazali mentions that in the Qur'an and sunnah the word galb 
usually refers to the fifth concept, namely something subtle in man that knows 
and perceives. However, as we have seen, sometimes it refers to the physical 
heart because between the physical heart and the spiritual heart there is a 
special connection. Thus, its primary connection is with the physical heart, 
which is, as it were, the seat of the spiritual heart from which the latter rules 
the body. 20 
4.3.2. The Nature of the Soul: 
In his Kimiyi-i sa`i dah al-Ghazäli discusses the twofold composition 
of man, since knowing what we are composed of is the first step towards true 
self-knowledge. Man has a dual composition, the outward and the inward. By 
the outward aspect is meant the human body and by the inward is meant the 
human soul or heart (the second meaning of the four terms as stated above). 21 
Again, al-Ghazäli stresses the significance of the verse of the Qur'är? 2 which 
regards the human soul or spirit as under the command of God. The human 
soul is the indivisible essence of man which belongs to the world of decrees 
19 Ibid, p. 115. 
20 Ibid, p. 115. 
21 Al-Qur'an, 15: 26-29; 23: 13. 
22 Al-Qur'an, 17: 85. 
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and it is created and not everlasting. Although man cannot perceive the reality 
of the soul, al-Ghazali says that "an exact philosophical knowledge of the spirit 
is not a necessary preliminary to walking in the path of religion, but comes 
rather as the result of self-discipline and perseverance in that path, as it says 
in the Qur'an: "Those who strive in Our way, verily We will guide them to the 
right path. " On account of this al-Ghazäli always emphasises the importance of 
moral discipline whose aim is to purify the heart of passion and resentment, 
until it becomes a clear mirror able to reflect the light of God. 24 The true 
nature of the human spirit or soul does not belong to the visible world but to 
the invisible. The knowledge of its entity and its attributes is the key to the 
knowledge of God25 which is revealed only to a select few. 
The human being has a dual composition, that is, body and soul, and 
the soul completes the nature of the body. The body and soul are two different 
things: the body is associated with evil and base desire, is subject to 
corruption, composite, made up of parts and earthy; whereas the soul is 
substantial (/awhan), simple, enlightened, comprehending, acting and moving. 
The substance of the soul is made manifest by God's command. The body, 
however, has been laid down under God's rules and God arranged its affairs and 
appointed its limit. 26 
Al-Ghazalf also stresses the dual nature of the human soul. Man's soul 
has two natures: the animal and the spiritual. 
23 Claude Field, The Alchemy of Happiness, (Eng. translation of al-Ghazäli's Kimiyi-i 
sa `idah), pp. 19-20, Abü I Iämid al-Ghazäli, Kimiyä-i sa `idah, pp. 17-18. 
24 Claude Field, The Alchemy ofHappiness, p. 21, Abn Hamid a1-Ghazäli, Kimiye-i 
sa `ädah, p. 25. 
25 Claude Field, The Alchemy of Happiness, p. 19, Abu-1.1 amid al-Ghazali, Kimiyi-i 
sa'idah, pp. 15-16. 
26 Abu- 1:, 1ämid al-Ghazäli, al-Risäla al-laduuiyya, pp. 59-60, Eng. trans. pp. 191-192. 
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Man has two souls, an animal soul and a spiritual soul, 
which latter is of angelic nature. The scat of the animal 
soul is the heart, from which this soul issues like a 
subtle vapour and pervades all the members of the 
body, giving the power of sight to the eye, the power of 
hearing to the ear, and to every member the faculty of 
performing its own appropriate functions. It may be 
compared to a lamp carried about within a cottage, the 
light of which falls upon the walls wherever it goes. 
The heart is the wick of this lamp, and when the supply 
of oil is cut off for any reason, the lamp dies. Such is 
the death of the animal soul. With the spiritual, or 
human soul, the case is different. It is indivisible, and 
by it man knows God. It is, so to speak, the rider of the 
animal soul, and when that perishes it still remains, but 
is like a horseman who has been dismounted, or like a 
hunter who has lost his weapons. 27 
The spiritual soul is the rider, and thus controls all the functions that 
result from the animal soul. In order to do this, it must become the most 
powerful aspect of the human being. When a person dies, it is the animal soul 
that perishes, which is why the body can no longer function when death comes. 
The spiritual soul is still present but no longer has the means to rule the body. 
Given that a man's soul has two natures, how can we say that the 
angelic nature is man's real essence? According to al-Ghazälf, the essence of 
27 Claude Field, The Alchemy offlsppincx4 p. 53, Abü Hämid al-Ghazali, Kimiyi-i 
sa `idah, p. 83. 
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each creature is to be sought in that which is highest in it and peculiar to it; 
thus the highest of man's natures is the angelic and this is his real essence. And 
as regards the animal qualities in man, he differs from other animals, for God 
has given him reason. 28 Here is one of the reasons for man's unique position; he 
has a capacity for creative knowledge (besides his creation in the best possible 
form and his acceptance of the amana (trust) from God as the kharfa 
(vicegerent) of this world). This concept of man's real essence is also related to 
al-Ghazäli's perception concerning this world. According to al-Ghazali, this 
world is a stage which is passed through by pilgrims on their way to the next. 
The spirit of man has descended into this world of water and clay' to acquire 
some knowledge of the works of God 30 
Again, al-Ghazälf writes in Kimiyh-i sa `ädah: "The reason of (sic) the 
human spirit seeking to return to that upper world is that its origin was from 
thence, and that it is of angelic nature. It was sent down into this lower sphere 
against its will to acquire knowledge and experience". 1 
28 Claude Field, The Alchemy ofllappincss, p. 21, Abu- Ilämid a1-Gbazali, Kimiyi-i 
sa `adJah pp. 25-26. 
29 "The Qur'an talks about two levels of the creation of man. The first level is that of 
ghayb, the unseen which occurred in primordial time, which is known only through 
revealed knowledge. The level is the so-called natural biological process that man 
knows through experience as well as science. At the primordial stage, it is mentioned 
repeatedly that man is created cx nihilo from lower organic subtances referred to as 
tiq (clay), t uräh(dust and mud), min salsal min hams'immasnUa (and from dark 
altered clay) which God moulded with His own Hand and when it was fully formed, 
breathed His Spirit into it. This divine spirit, moulded in the 'best possible form' into 
the human organism has neutralized, and in fact, superseded the humbler materialistic 
composition of the human constitution and made man the most honoured of God's 
creatures. This is perhaps one of the reasons why God ordered the angels to prostrate 
to Adam, the first man. The second level of the creation of man is the scientifically 
known biological process: a sperm which lodged in a firm place and was turned into a 
lump which was later equipped with bones and flesh. " (Wan Mohd. Nor Wan Daud, 
The Concept ofKnowledge in Islam, pp. 15-16. 
30 Claude Field, The Alchemy ofHappiness, p. 43, Abu Hamid al-Ghazil , Kimiyi-i 
sa `idah, pp. 71-72. 
31 Claude Field, The Alchemy of Happiness; p. 55, Abü I. Iämid al-Ghazati, Kimiyi-i 
sa `slob, p. 87. 
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According to al-Ghazälf, the human soul is a simple substance, perfect 
and having life in itself32 and it is solely concerned with remembering, 
studying, reflecting, discriminating and considcrating. The soul is receptive of 
all kinds of knowledge including that which is abstract or immaterial. This 
soul is the ruler of the other two spirits: the animal spirit (al-rt h al-hayawäni 33 
and the natural spirit (al-reih al-(abN). The animal spirit is the force which 
seeks to satisfy its appetites: it may stir up lust and passion. The animal spirit 
produces life and sensibility as well as activity which originates from the heart 
and affects all the bodily members. Feeling and movement as well as lust and 
anger are among its composites; this force resides in the heart. The natural 
spirit on the other hand is the force which seeks sustenance and is concerned 
with eating and drinking. Digestion and secretion are among this force's 
attributes. This force resides in the liver. The powers of imagination, 
procreation, growth and all other natural powers are servants to the flesh, 
which in turn is the servant of the animal spirit, for the flesh receives its 
powers from the animal spirit and acts according to incitement of that spirit. 
Consequently, the natural and the animal spirits and all the bodily powers are 
the troops of the human soul. This soul is the controller of all the faculties, all 
are its servants and act in accordance with its command. 34 Thus, the condition 
of the human body, 35 whether good or corrupt is derived from it. 36 
32 Abü Hamid al-Ghazalf, sl-Risa/s al-/aduaiyya, p. 62, Eng. trans. p. 198. 
33 The siiff s call the animal spirit "soul" (i. e. the lower self =naf). This nets must be 
disciplined in the interest of ethics. 
34 Abü Ilamid al-Ghazalf, al-Rissla sl-laduviyya, p. 60, Eng. trans. p. 194. 
35 In the present Arabic edition it reads 'religion' not body. But, logically, the goodness or 
corruption of religion follows from the goodness or corruption of the individual Muslim. 
Thus, the word body here as it appears in the translation seems to make the context 
more clear. 
ae Abeý Hamid al-Ghazäli, al-Risäla al-ladrmiyya, p. 62, Eng. trans. p. 198, 
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Al-Ghazäli calls this soul the rational soul (al-na/ al-näligah), as do 
the philosophers. 37 The süfis call it the "spirit" and sometimes the "heart to . 
38 
This is what the Qur'an refers to as "the soul at rest" and the "spirit which is 
the ainrof God". 39 Thus, the "heart", the "spirit" and the "soul at rest" are all 
the names for the rational soul in al-Ghazalf's view. It is the living substance 
which lives, acts and comprehends. 40 All the four terms; nafs; rtib, galb and 
`aql in their second meaning arc the names for this simple substance which is 
the seat of the intellectual process. 
According to al-Ghazälf, different opinions on the soul reflect the 
limits of the thought of different philosophers. Al-Ghazal[ himself conceives 
three divisions: the body, the accidental impression and the simple substance. 
For al-Ghazälf, "the animal spirit is a subtle body", it is like a lamp which has 
been kindled and placed in the glassvesscl of the heart (here al-GhazäIi refers 
to the cone-shaped" object which is suspended in the breast). Life is the light 
of the lamp, the blood is its oil, feeling and movement are its flames, lust is its 
heat, passion is its smoke, the appetite that seeks sustenance and is situated in 
the liver is its servant, guard, and protector. This spirit is found in all beings, 
both animals and men, the spirit is a body and the impressions it receives are 
37 AI-Färähi and Ibn Ski . 
See Richard Walzer, Al--Fir bi On The Pcrkct Stete; pp. 169- 
170, Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology, p. 16,35. 
38 And to the süfi s the word soul, refer to the animal spirit i. e. the lower self. (See Ahü 
1l mid al-Ghat 1i, al-Rid /a al-laduniyya, p. 60, Eng. trans. p. 195. 
39 Al-Qur'an, 17: 85. 
40 Abü 11amid al-Ghazal[, al-Risila al-laduniyya, p. 60, Eng. trans. pp. 194-195. 
41 In &I-Mungidb min al-dalel,, al-Ghazal[ refers to this cone-shaped object as the flesh 
and blood which man shares with dead bodies and the brute beasts (the lower animals). 
See Abü IIamid a1-Ghazal[, aI-Mwigidb, p. 110 , 
Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Wall 
in The Faith, p. 74. And in his Kimiyi-i sa`ädab, he refers to this cone-shaped object as 
the piece of flesh situated in the left side of the human body. See Claude Field, The 
Alchemy ofllappinessy p. 19, Ab u- llamid al-Ghazal[, Kimiys-i sa`idab, pp. 15-16. 
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accidental. 42 
Al-Ghazäli holds that the animal spirit is different from the simple 
substance which he refers to as the actual human soul for it is a refined but 
mortal body in which reside the senses. 
The human soul is the subject of knowledge; the animal spirit cannot 
direct man to the knowledge of God, for it is a servant and a captive and dies 
with the death of body. There can be two reasons for death: either the oil 
(blood) is excessive and extinguishes the lamp by excess heat, or if the oil is 
lacking and the lamp is extinguished by excessive cold. The extinguishing of 
the lamp is the cause of bodily death 43 
Thus, the commands of God and the prophets are not meant for this 
spirit, as it is possessed by all beings. But man is obliged to follow the Shari `a 
for he possesses another spirit which cannot be found in any other being. This, 
according to al-Ghazdli, is what is meant by the "rational soul" and the "spirit 
at rest". Furthermore, this spirit is not a body nor accidental, is its coming to 
be because it comes into being at the command of God. As God Most High 
says, "Say, the spirit (proceedeth) at the command of my Lord", 45 and "0 
soul at rest, return unto thy Lord, satisfied with Him, giving satisfaction unto 
Him. 1146 
42 Abü Hamid al-Ghazali, a/-Risa/a a1-laduniyyy pp. 60-61,1: ng. trans. pp. 195-197. 
43 Abü Hamid a1-Ghazali, al-Risila al-laduniyya, p. 61, Eng. trans. p. 196. 
44 Abü Ilamid al-Ghazali, al-Risäla a/-laduniyy. % p. 61, Eng. trans. p. 196. 
45 A1-Qur'an, 17: 85. 
46 A1-Qur'an, 89: 27-28. 
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Thus the soul created by the command of God is not a body, nor is it 
subject to the accidental; it is rather a Divine force like the Universal Mind (al- 
`aql al-awwaO, the Tablet and the Pen47 which are simple substances, 
immaterial, incorporeal, intellectual and without sensitivity. Al-Gharhli's use 
of the terms 'spirit' and 'heart' are derived from these substances. So the spirit 
is not affected by corruption, nor does it die with the death of the body, rather 
it is separated from the body when the latter dies and will return into it on the 
Day of Judgement as stated in the shari `a. 48 God Most High says, "Return unto 
thy Lord. "49 When the spirit leaves the body, the body and its natural faculties 
cease to function. so 
The rational spirit then is an abiding (sribit), eternal (dh'irn) and 
incorruptible (ghair uisid substance, in contrast to the body, which is 
composed of matter and form and is subject to destruction. Moreover, al- 
Ghazali holds that God Most High has related the spirit to Himself, ("1 
breathed into him My Spirit")5' His command, ("Say, the Spirit (proccedeth) at 
the command of my Lord")52 and His glory ("And We breathed into him of Our 
Spirit"). 53 God Most High then is too glorious to attach unto Himself a 
physical, contingent body that is low, subject to change, destruction and 
corruption. 54 
47 God Most High has created the Pen to make the hearts of men able to be inscribed with 
knowledge. (See Abu- I; Iamid at-Ghazal[, Kiteb `ajs ib al-galfi, Ihye , vol. 3, p. 130. ) 
49 Abu- Hamid a]-Ghazal f, al-Risäla al-laduniyya, p. 61, Eng. trans., pp. 196-197. 
49 AI-Qur'an, 89: 28. 
50 Abu- iiamid al-Ghazili:, al-Risela al-laduniyya, p. 62, Eng. trans. p. 198. 
Si At-Qur'an, 15: 29; 30: 72. 
52 Al-Qur'an, 17: 85. 
53 Al-Qur'an, 66: 12. 
54 Abü Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Risila aI-laduniyya, pp. 61-62, Eng. trans. p. 197. 
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Al-Ghazal recognises that nafs is the word used in the Qur'an to 
broadly mean the human soul which survives the death of the body; its 
meaning is not limited to the sensual element of the soul which must be 
subdued and controlled, as most of the süfisbelieve. Al-Ghazalf's fundamental 
position on the human soul seems to be quite abstract. According to him rllh is 
not a body (jism) nor is it an accident (`aracl) but it is a substance (jawhar) 
existing in itself and not in the heart or brain nor anywhere in space; it is a 
substance (jawhai) because it knows itself and its creator and it perceives 
intelligible things (al-ma`qüfat, objects of the `aql) 5` 
If we compare al-Ghazäli's various explanations of the soul throughout 
his works, they appear contradictory, but he is essentially describing the same 
thing. If one examines his use of concepts carefully, it is clear that his notions 
of man are consistent but he uses a number of descriptions, such as in his 
division of the various human faculties. 
In another work entitled Mishkil al-anwar, al-Ghazali elaborates 
further on the arwib (plural of rsii). He adopts five classifications of arwii, 
making these cover all the physical faculties. Firstly there is al-rtlh a/-hs+as, 
"the rtih of the senses", this rtih receives sense impressions. According to al- 
Ghazali, this class of rtih is possessed by all animals, and is also found in the 
smallest infant. Secondly, al-rtih al-khayir "the image- or picture-forming 
rtih", registers and retains what the senses bring; this class of rtih is possessed 
by some animals. Thirdly, there is al-rih a/-`ayr, "the intelligent or reasoning 
rtih". This formulates ideas (main) from the impressions that come from the 
senses and from the image-forming faculty. This kind of nib is the special 
55 Duncan B. Macdonald, The Development of the Idea of Spirit in Islam", Part ii, The 
Moslem World, Vol. 22,1932, p. 154. 
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characteristic of man and is not possessed by the lower animals; it perceives 
necessary and universal knowledge. Fourthly, there is a/-rüi a/-fikr% "the 
logical rrih". This rib attains to truths by syllogism. And finally, there is a1-rtih 
al-qudsi al-nabawi, "the holy and prophetic rtih" which is the power of 
prophets and some saints. By way of this FO, the Unseen World (`ä/am a/- 
ghaib) is immediately revealed to them. All these al-Ghazäli calls lights 
(an war, plural of ntv). The first and second class of rtih mentioned above are 
possessed by both man and the lower animals, but in animals they serve only 
physical needs. However, man may rise to a higher plane through these two 
same classes of rri/i, and achieve higher aims. For example, through the senses 
man reaches general ideas that arc the beginnings of religious perception. 56 
These details further serve to illustrate al-Ghazali's view on human faculties in 
another way: his notion fits within the dualistic concept of man, the animal- 
angel, according to which the lowest degree is animal and the highest is nearly 
divine. 
Al-Ghazali believes the human soul is the subject of knowledge, it 
receives the images of objects and comprehends the realities of existence. 
However the human soul does not concern itself with the corporeal forms of 
things because the rational soul is able to understand the reality of objects 
without seeing them, for the soul itself possesses an organ of sight like the 
physical body. 57 The outward things are perceived by the physical sight while 
the inward realities are perceived by the eye of the intcllect. 58 
If the spirit proceeds from the command of God Most High, surely it is 
56 Abu- Hamid al-GhazäIi, Mishkäl a/-an war, pp. 23-25, Eng. trans. by W. H. T. Gairdncr, 
The Niche For Lighls, pp. 143-149. 
57 This is a position of the soff s as al-Ghazäli stated himself. 
58 Abu- llämid al-Ghazälf, al-Risila al-laduniyya, p. 62, English trans. p. 198. 
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like an alien within the body; it is only an immigrant and will always look 
towards its source (i. e. God Most High) and ultimately return to it. Unlike the 
flesh which is accidental and needs an abode, the spirit does not abide in any 
place; consequently the body is not the abode of the spirit or the home of the 
heart, rather it is the instrument of the spirit and the tool of the heart and the 
vehicle of the soul. Although the spirit concerns itself with the body, and is 
beneficial and generous to it, it is neither attached to the body nor detached 
from it. The spirit will obtain more benefit from its source (i. e. God Most 
High) than from its bodily form when it is strong and free from the fetters of 
human nature. 59 
According to al-Ghazalr, the first place where the manifestation of this 
spirit takes place is in the brain for the brain is its special place of 
manifestation: from the front part of the brain it takes its "guard", from the 
middle part of the brain it takes its "prime minister" and controller, from the 
back part of the brain it takes a treasury, a treasurer and a guardian, and from 
all parts of the brain it takes infantry and cavalry. 60 From the aforementioned 
animal spirit, it takes for itself a servant. From the natural spirit it takes a 
sergeant, from the body it takes a vehicle and from this world it takes a sphere 
of action. From this life, the spirit obtains goods and wealth, from activity it 
gains merchandise and from knowledge it increases knowledge. On the other 
hand, the next life is the place of return for this spirit and the Shari `a provides 
59 Abn Ilamid al-Ghazäli, a! -Risila a! -laduniyyA; p. 62, L'ng. irans. pp. 198-199. 
60 This is an interesting point made by al-Ghazäli. According to modern biology, the 
human brain is divided into four parts; mmntal, parietal, occipital and temporal. The 
brain together with the spinal cord constitutes the central nervous system (CNS), which 
integrates the physical and mental functions of man. The four major parts of the brain 
further divided into a number of smaller areas. These areas are responsible for a 
number of functions, e. g. intellectual, sensory, physical, emotional, and those concerned 
with arousal, activation, balance and breathing. Thus, one of the key feature of the 
brain is the localization of function. See Bryan Kolb, Ian Q. Wishaw, Jan Cioe, 
"Brain", Encyclopedia oflluman Biology, (Renato Dulbecco, editor- in- chief), vol. 2, 
pp. 169-178. 
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it with a road towards its destination. The nafs al-ammarah provides it with a 
guard and a leadcr6L while the nafs al-lawwämah serves as its exhortation. The 
senses are its spies and allies and from religion it takes a cover of armour while 
reason is its instructor, and sensibility serves as its pupil. Finally, behind all 
these is God Most High. 62 
Al-Ghazali's conclusion on the human soul or spirit perfectly 
recapitulates all the major points in his discussion. He writes that the soul as 
described above is not part of the body but is a distinct entity which helps the 
body to attain success by obeying its Lord. The spirit's only aim in this life is 
to acquire knowledge which is the beauty of the Hereafter as are wealth and 
children in this life. Just as the five senses acquire various forms of knowledge, 
for example sounds, and tastes, "the spirit at rest" seeks only knowledge and Is 
interested in nothing less - wanting the best for its body, for which it shows an 
unattached concern. It seeks beneficial knowledge until the day it parts with 
its corporeal counterpart. Understanding how intensely the spirit loves 
knowledge, and being aware of the various states of the spirit, al-Ghazäli 
contends that it is important to consider the different types of knowledge. 63 
This matter will be further discussed later in this chapter. 
Thus, al-Ghazalf agrees with Aristotle's principle of the incorporeal 
character of the human spirit. Also for al-Ghazalf the nuts is a spiritual 
substance (awharrühtini); it is neither confined in a body nor imprinted on it, 
nor is it joined to or ever separated from the body. Just like Allah and His 
61 It should be noted that this guard and leader is provided by the commanding soul 
(nafs alammärah) which is not the same as the soul which enjoins evil (nals al- 
ammsrah bi al-sºl). Ammarab simply means 'command' and is morally neutral. 
However the connection between the two is unclear. 
62 Abu Hämid al-Ghazäli, al-Risäla abladuniyya, pp. 62-63, Eng. trans. pp. 199-200. 
63 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, al-Risila abladuuiyya, p. 63, Eng. trans. p. 200. 
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angels it is neither outside nor within the world. The naß is actually that part 
of man which possesses knowledge and perceives. Its existence, therefore, is 
not an accident. In his Tahhfut al-falisifa, al-Ghazal[ claims that the 
philosophers' rational attempt to show that the human soul is a spiritual 
substance which exists in itself is not successful. He questions the 
philosophers' claim that by rational arguments they can know the soul's 
incontingency, but he does admit that their account of the animal and human 
faculties are observable facts. Al-Ghazäli attempts to prove that the rational 
arguments alone are inadequate; man does indeed need to depend on religion. 
In this regard, al-Ghazäli says that the discussion on the resurrection proves 
that intellect alone is imperfect: man needs religion together with his reason. '' 
Al-Ghazäli refutes the philosophers' assertions that the soul cannot be 
destroyed. The philosophers give reasons for the destruction of the soul (if they 
perish at all); they then argue that these reasons are invalid. The reasons are: 
the death of the body, the occurrence of something contrary to the soul which 
comes to replace it, and the power of a powerful agent. In support of the first 
reason, the philosophers argue that the soul cannot perish with the death of the 
body because the body is not the substratum of the soul. Rather, the body is 
only an instrument used by the soul with the intermediation of the faculties 
which subsist in the body. It is not necessary that the corruption of the 
instrument will be followed by the corruption of the one who uses it, unless the 
latter were subsisting in, or impressed upon it. Also, the philosophers argue 
that the death of the body will not be the cause of the perishing of the soul 
because the soul has two forms of action: one with the help of this instrument 
and the other without its help. The actions performed with the help of this 
instrument such as imagination, sensation, desire or anger, surely will corrupt 
64 See Abn Hämid al-Gha7Ali, Tabäfut, pp. 206-227, Eng. trans., pp. 197-220. 
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and be destroyed with the destruction of the body. However, other actions, 
which are performed by the soul without the help of this instrument, such as 
cognition of the intelligibles stripped of matter, will not die with the death of 
the body. As to the second reason, they argue that it is incorrect to say that the 
soul might perish because of the occurrence of its contrary for the substances 
do not have contraries. According to the philosophers only accidents and forms 
are perishable. 65 For instance, the form of water perishes because of the 
occurrence of its contrary namely the form of air. On the other hand, matter, 
which is the substratum of these forms, will never perish. It is the same case 
with the substance which has no substratum: it is definitely impossible for it to 
perish. No substratum means no contrary, for something contrary comes from 
successions over the same substratum. Finally, the philosophers argue that it is 
false to say that the power of a powerful agent might destroy the soul because 
non-existence is nothing. It is unthinkable that the power of any agent could 
cause the soul to end 66 
Al-Ghazali objects to these arguments. His purpose is to show that they 
are limited and weak and can be refuted. Al-Ghazäli's arguments support the 
possibility that human souls can be destroyed. He contends that for the soul to 
remain healthy, it needs to sustain a relationship with the body. It is therefore 
likely that the immortality of the soul depends on the existence of the body; 
consequently any harm caused to the body would result in harm being inflicted 
on the soul. But since this mutual link cannot be defined it is not a sufficient 
premise for the philosophers to use as a basis for their theories. It is also not so 
surprising that the power of God may destroy man's soul as al-Ghazali had 
previously demonstrated in his argument on the problem of 'the 
65 Among them, Ibn Sinn and al-Färäbi. See Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna c Psychofug}; p. 
59, Richard Walzer, AI-Färsbi On The Perfect State, pp. 111-113. 
66 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Tahiful, pp. 228-229, Eng. trans., pp. 221-222. 
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indestructibility of the world'67. Al-Ghazäli also feels that the ways that the 
soul can be destroyed listed by the philosophers are not the only ones possible. 
The philosophers' theories do not admit any possibilities other than those 
mentioned, but the soul might be destroyed by many others. There is no logical 
61 reason to limit the ways of destruction. 
Al-Ghazäli also rejects the philosophers view that the soul is eternal 
and that its relation to the body is accidental. Al-Ghazäli here agrees with Ibn 
Si nä, who also rejected Plato's view with regard to this matter. Al-Ghazäli 
argues that there is a connection between the soul and the body. This is the 
reason why the soul does not come into existence except when the body 
exists. 69 This suggestion seems to contradict his opinion, mentioned above, 
that the soul has life in itself. But what al-Ghazäli wants to demonstrate here 
is that the human soul's existence in this world is certainly accompanied by the 
existence of the human body. Nevertheless the soul is alive in itself even when 
it is without the body. The union of the soul with the body in this world can be 
categorised as an aspect of the nature of God's creation. The existence of the 
soul in this world is a blessing to the body for the body cannot exist by itself in 
this world. This suggestion may also be solely for the sake of argument in 
order to illustrate that the philosophers' view is worthy of rejection. 
Ai-Ghazdlis theory of the soul as the seat of knowledge inside the 
human being is related to his theory of prophecy. Al-Ghazilf rejected the 
philosophers' view that only reason can guide human beings. He contended 
that reason is not the only way to achieve knowledge of realities. Moreover, 
67 For a1-Ghazäli's argument on this topic sec, Abu- I. lämid al-Ghaxnli, T. 2hi ißt, pp. 
48-70, pp. 71-88, Eng. trans. pp. 13-53, pp. 54-62 
6& Abi- Hamid al-Ghazaii, Tahilut, pp. 231-232, Eng. trans., p. 225. 
69 Abü Ilämid al-Ghazäli, Tahafut, p. 229, Eng. trans. p. 224. 
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the ultimate realities, according to al-Ghazäli, cannot be understood or reached 
by reason, which is only one aspect of human nature. There is also the life of 
the soul; man came forth from God and is thus able to mantain contact with 
God. According to al-Ghazäli, the soul is a witness and proof of the fact of 
prophecy. He explains this by discussing three stages of certainty in his a/- 
Munqidh min a/-da/u. Al-Ghazäli here approves of the way of the siiff s, 
referring to their spiritual experiences or "states" (ahwä/). Al-Ghazäli wrote in 
his a/-Munqidh min al-da/al that he who has no experience of the 'states' 
cannot comprehend what true prophetic revelation is. What the aw/iys' 
(saints) experience in the form of 'miraculous graces' (ka«mat) when they 
reach these 'states' is identical to the ahwdl of prophets at the beginning of 
their prophetic missions. This is the 'state' the Prophet Muhammad (s. a. w. ) 
was in when he secluded himself in Mount Hira'. These 'states' can only be 
appreciated through experiencing them oneself or keeping the company of, and 
observing, those who do. If one associates with them (the süffs), one derives 
benefit and live experience from them. Even those who do not have contact 
with snffs can still be sure of the truth of these ecstatic experiences by reading 
al-Ghazäli's exposition in thelhyä , in the chapter called "The Wonders of the 
Heart". 70 "Certainty reached by demonstration is knowledge (`i/m); actual 
acquaintance with that 'state' is immediate experience (dhawq); the acceptance 
of it as probable from hearsay and trial (or observation) is faith (imwn). These 
are three degrees .,, 
71 Here al-Ghazdli echoes the Qur'an: 'God will raise those 
of you who have faith and those who have been given knowledge in degrees'72 
One may conclude from this quotation that what is gained through sütT 
70 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitäh shark `aji'ib al-gelb, Ihyi', vol. 3, pp. 112-169. 
71 Abu- 1.1amid a1-Ghazali, al-Mungidh, p. 103, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery 
Watt, The Faith, pp. 64-65. 
72 AI-Qur'an, 58: 12. 
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'states' lies in the fact and certainty of prophecy. This is because there is a 
spark of the Divine nature in man. In the Ihyä , then, al-Ghazäli declares his 
conviction that man can communicate with the unseen world. And in his a! - 
Mungidh min a! -daläl one can read his conclusion as to the nature of man and 
the character of man's intercourse with the unseen world. He writes that, 
during his ten years of withdrawal from the world, he experienced certainty 
once by spiritual experience, another time by demonstrated knowledge and at 
another time by acceptance with faith that man is created with a body and 
with a heart. Again, here al-Ghazäli writes that by the 'heart' he means man's 
spiritual essence which is the locus or seat of the knowledge of God. AI- 
Ghazalf perceived this 'heart' as a body which experiences health and 
sickness. 73 The disease of the heart is effectively its destruction in the world to 
come: ignorance of God and disobedience to Him are what make the heart ill. 
But, as with sickness of the body, there is also a remedy for the disease of the 
heart. The knowledge of God leading to obedience to Him is the most effective 
medicine. 74 In this connection, as we have seen, al-Ghazäli emphasises the 
importance of moral discipline in purifying the heart of man from "the rusts of 
passion and resentment" until it becomes like a clear mirror which reflects the 
light of God. 75 Al-Ghazäli adds that reason alone cannot be an effective 
medicine for the 'heart'; rather one should follow the prescription given by the 
Prophet (p. b. u. h. ), who was the only one to attain knowledge of the properties 
of these devotions (i. e. their definitions and quantity) by the light of prophecy 
and not by the way of intellectual apprehension. These acts of devotion that 
are the medicine of the disease of the heart are compounded of different 
73 Al-Qur'an, 26: 89. "only he who comes to God with a sound heart', and al-Qur'an, 2: 9. 
"in their heart is disease". 
74 Ahü Hämid al-Ghazali, al-Mimgidh, p. 110, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, p. 74. 
75 Abu- 11 mid al-Ghazäli, Kimiyi -i sa`mlah, p. 25, Eng. trans. by Claude Field, The 
Alchemy of Happiness, p. 2 1. 
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ingredients in different amounts (such as prostration (sujid), bowing (rukü` ), 
and the different numbers of raki`at in prayer); they belong to the domain of 
prophecy which can only be understood by its light. 76 
The limited task of the intellect or reason, al-Gha7ali contend;, is to 
teach us that the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ) is the physician of the heart's diseases and 
the intellect should bear witness to the truth of prophetic revelation. Its task is 
also to bear witness to its own inability to attain what only the eye of 
prophecy can reach. The reason then should commit itself to prophetic 
revelation just as anxious patients entrust themselves to their physicians. 77 The 
intellect is only Alläh's balance-scale on this earth. 7 
Adjusting his style to a level appropriate to the ability of his various 
readers, al-Ghazali discusses further man's relation with God in hisMishkäl al- 
anwer. For example, what al-Ghazäli writes concerning the highest degree of 
lights cannot be found in his other books such as al-Munqidh. He writes: "The 
highest class are themselves blotted out, annihilated. For self-contemplation 
there is no more found a place, because with the self they have no longer 
anything to do. Nothing remaineth any more save the One, the Real... " 79 
Thus al-GhazaIF's definition of the heart is different to its meaning in 
English. The Arabic word 'galb' refers to the seat and subject of knowledge. 
On the other hand, the English word 'heart' is more related to the emotions, 
'G Abu- Hamid al-Ghazi , a! -Muagidb, pp. 
110-111, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Fai[4 pp. 74-75. 
"Abü Hamid at-Ghazali, al-Mungidb, p. 111, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt The 
Faith, p. 76. 
78 Ab u- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Misbkit al-anwi, p. 12, Eng. trans. p. 107. 
79 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazili, Mishkät al-anwir, p. 32, Eng. trans. p. 173. 
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affections and sentiments, yet both definitions may be similar in as much as 
they refer to the inner matter. By way of the heart man can draw near to God; 
the job of the heart is to work for God and strive toward Him. Thus, the 
knowledge of the heart and its essential qualities is the root of religion and the 
foundation of the way of man towards God. This is probably the reason why 
al-Ghazäli devoted the second half of hislhyP `u/rim al-dz nr to the internal and 
hidden sphere of life; the heart and its workings, good and evil. It is because of 
the importance of the knowledge of the heart that al-Ghazal[ starts the second 
half of his Ihyä' `ulwn al-äin with an introduction dealing with the wondrous 
qualities and nature of the heart. Then he proceeds to discuss the general 
'discipline' through which the heart can be directed and purified. 
But it is essential to note here that al-Ghazal[ himself reminds the 
reader that the reality of this simple substance (the human soul) cannot be fully 
understood by ordinary people, who only can think in terms of matter and 
operate within the boundaries of the conception of position in space. This is 
why al-Ghazalis method of description concerning this matter is always to 
illustrate by means of analogies with physical objects, as we can see in the 
above discussion. 80 Al-Ghazäli tries to defend, logically, the possibility of this 
transcendental fact. But knowledge of the soul is always based upon 
revelation. The facts about this simple substance are abstract and can only be 
put into words or presented to human thought in the form of images. 
After having explained the meaning of the four terms: al-galb, al-rüh, 
al-nafs and al-`aql in the Kit lb shark `ajä'ib al-gaib of his Ihyä' `u/tim al-din, 
al-Ghazälf then proceeds with the discussion on the resources and working of 
the heart. According to him, the heart has armies. There are many of the c, 
80 See previous discussion, p. 241. 
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whose exact number only God knows, two of which are our immediate 
concern, although al-Ghazali further subdivides them, as we should sec. 
Firstly, the army that can be seen with the physical eyes and secondly, the 
army that can only be seen through spiritual eyes. The heart is lord of both the 
physical and spiritual armies, which are the servants of the heart. The first 
army is composed of the hands, the feet, the ears and all other organs of the 
body, internal and external. These organs were created to obey the heart just as 
the angels obey God, the difference being that these organs have no knowledge 
of their obedience. For example, the eyelid has no knowledge of itself when it 
opens or shuts. So, to the heart this army is like a vehicle on the journey to 
God for whom it was created. God says, "I created not mankind and Jinn save 
to worship me. " St The vehicle is the body and the requirement is knowledge; 
this knowledge cannot be attained save through sound action in the field of ad- 
dunya which is the first stage on the road to the ultimate stage of a/-ekhiral. 82 
Now, because the body is the vehicle by way of which man arrives in 
this world, it is man's duty to care for it. This duty can be fulfilled by giving 
the body what it needs and avoiding what may destroy it. Therefore, the heart 
needs two armies: to provide for the external needs of the body such as food, 
and to provide for the internal needs of the body such as appetite. The 
appetites are created in the 'heart' and the physical organs are the instruments 
of the appetites. 83 Further, al-Ghazäli classifies each army of the heart into 
three divisions: firstly, there is the will which incites man to obtain what is 
necessary and avoid what is harmful. Secondly, comes power which moves the 
limbs and is distributed evenly through all the limbs. Thirdly, knowledge and 
81 Al-Qur'an, 51: 56. 
82 Abu- fIämid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb sbarb 'ajä ib a/-qa/b, Ibye ; vol. 3, pp. 115-116. 
83 
Ibid, p. 116. 
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perception which perceives and recognises exists in the organs of sense. Each 
of these invisible forces has as its instruments its own external, visible army, 
which is the organs of flesh and bloods`' 
The third class above, knowledge, consists of five senses: hearing, 
sight, smell, taste and touch; they correspond to the five external organs of 
sense and five internal senses which end in the brain. So, if we close our eyes 
after seeing something, we can still see the image of that particular thing. This 
is called the power of visualising (khaydi; this image remains because it has 
been preserved by the power known as memory. If we then reflect on what we 
remember and make a new combination, we use the power of reflection. We 
can also recall what seems to have been lost from our memory; this is called 
the power of recollection. We also gather the ideas (ma`dn, ) of the senses into 
our imagination through the "general sense" (a! -hassu al-mushtarak baina al- 
mahsiisät). All these five powers reside in the brain. $5 
Moreover, al-Ghazäli explains that the armies of the passions and the 
appetites of the flesh may be completely submissive to the heart. When this 
happens, their submission helps the heart on its way to eternal happiness. But 
sometimes, they revolt against the heart and may thus destroy it. But the heart 
has other forces: knowledge (`iim), wisdom (hikma) and reflection (lafakkur). 
These three armies are the party of God that assist the heart in the fight 
against anger and fleshly appetite. However, if the heart does not seek help and 
gives up the struggle, therein lies the death of the heart and the termination of 
its journey towards eternal happiness. Man's intelligence in this state is 
subdued by the power of the armies of appetite and he is driven to satisfy his 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid, pp. 116-117. 
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destructive passions. Al-Ghazälf believes that this is the state of most peoptc! 6 
Al-Ghazälf then presents three analogies to describe the nature of the 
heart's armies. In one of these, he compares man's body with a city of which 
the intellect is the king. All the forces of the senses, both external and internal, 
are the king's soldiers and his allies. The organs are like the citizens of the city 
whom the king rules. The nafs al-ammi. rah, which enjoins evil, is like the 
enemy that constantly strives to destroy the people of the king. Thus, the body 
is like a besieged city and the soul is like its guardian posted therein to protect 
it against the forces of evil. If the king fights against his enemies, defeats them 
and compels them to do his bidding, he will be praised when he returns to 
God's presence: as God says, "Those who strive in the way of Allah with their 
wealth and lives, Allah hath conferred on those who strive with their wealth 
and lives a rank above the sedentary. "87 And as the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ) said, "We 
return from the lesser jihad (holy warfare) to the greater. "88 Thus, the jihad 
against evil is the truest jihiid. R9 
Al-GhazälPs comparison of man's body and intellect with the city and 
the king is quite similar to al-Faräbi's description of the nature of man in his 
al-Madinah a/-fadilah. 90 The main difference is that al-Farabi sees the 
86 1 nia, p. I17. 
87 Al-Qur'an, 4: 95. 
ss Abti l lamid al-Gharäli , 
Kiteb sbarh `aje'ib a1-yaib, Ihyä; vol. 3, p. 118. 
89 For more references about jibed see, Peters, Rudolph, Jibad in Medieval and Mtdlem 
Islam, Leiden, 1977. Khaddun, Majid, War and Peace in theLawoflslam, Baltimore, 
1955.1 
' 
lamidullah, Muhammad, Muslim Conduct ofState, 6th rev. cd. Lahore, 1973, 
Kelsay, John, and James T. Johnson, eds. Just War and Jihad. "Ilistorical and Thewmical 
Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, New York, 1991. 
Rudolph Peter, Jibad In Classical And Modern Islam Princeton, New Jersey: Markw; 
Wiener Publishers, 1996. 
90 Refer to the discussion on soul according to al-Farabi. 
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perfectibility of man's nature leading towards the making of the perfect state, 
whereas al-Ghazal[ does not make the political realm his main concern. Still, 
al-Ghazäli's allegory comparing man's body and soul with the city and the king 
show how the fate of the state and its citizens depends on the king. 
Knowledge and will arc what distinguish man from the animal and 
make his approach to God possible. Knowledge here is that concerning religion 
and the world to come. Will is the determination to do an act perceived as 
desirable or necessary: such an act by the intellect may result in the best 
consequences. But, in order to possess this knowledge and will, man has to 
prepare himself for the struggle from his early childhood. Man uniquely lies 
between the beasts and the angels. His true "differentia" is his knowledge of 
the essences of things. When he employs all his members and powers to attain 
this knowledge, he is similar to an angel and worthy of joining them, but when 
he follows his appetites he becomes like the beasts. In other words, his 
members and senses can be used either to bring him closer to God and his 
eternal salvation or conversely drive him to his destruction. 91 
4.3.3. The Soul and its Relation to Knowledge: 
According to al-Ghazali, all human souls are scats of knowledge, but 
acquire knowledge to different degrees due to the weakening influence of 
embodiment, for originally all human souls were capable of receiving all types 
of knowledge. But sometimes, because the soul has been affected by the 
diseases of this world, it is prevented from understanding the true meaning of 
things. Al-Ghazäli discusses the remedies for these illnesses and how to restore 
91 For further details on this matter, refer to Abu-Hamid al-Ghazali, Kitab sbarh `aji'ib 
al-gaib, Ibyi ; vol. 3, pp. 118-121. 
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the human soul to its original state. of purity. 92 In his Kitäb shark `aji'ib a! - 
qalb al-Ghazäli also discusses the various relations of the heart with 
knowledge. Although he likens the human heart to a mirror reflecting the 
forms of things, he gives five reasons why the human heart may not receive 
knowledge. Firstly, there is simple deficiency: for example, an infant cannot 
receive certain kind of knowledge for its heart has not yet reached the stage of 
maturity. Secondly, the heart may not grasp the true meaning of knowledge 
because it has been stained by sins. Thirdly, the heart may turn away from the 
direction of truth. Fourthly, the heart may be veiled by a deep-rooted faith 
acquired by blind imitation. Finally, the heart may be ignorant of the correct 
direction in which to turn in order to reflect truly. 93 
Regarding the implantation of knowledge within the human heart from 
its very beginning, al-Ghazäli seems to contradict his exposition in his a! - 
Mungidh min al-daläl. There he says that the human soul is created in 
emptiness and simplicity without any knowledge of the worlds of God. 94 But, 
al-Ghazali may perhaps be referring to the first type of the human heart, one 
that is not capable of receiving knowledge due to its immature state. If we 
refer to the context of his discussion in al-Mungidh min al-dalil we find that 
he mentions the emptiness and simplicity of the human heart in connection 
with the stages of a human being's development. 
Without the above five impediments, the human heart is capable of 
knowing or reflecting the true essence of things. This is because man's created 
nature (fi(rs) is fitted for that and it is what makes man's heart noble and 
92 Abu- Hamid ai-Ghazali, al-Risala al-ladrmiyya, pp. 71-73, Eng. trans., pp. 368-372. 
93 Abu- Hamid a1-Ghazäli, Kiläb shark `ajä'ib al-galb, Ihys, vol. 3, p. 125-126. 
94 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, al Mungidh, p. 103, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Faith, p. 67. 
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different from all other substances in this world. As God says in the Qur'an, 
"We offered the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, then 
they refused to uphold it and fear it; then man upheld it. "95 Also there is the 
saying of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ), "Every child is born according to 
God's plan (`alä-1-ftra); it is his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or 
a Magian". 915 
Since according to his view the human heart (soul) in its original state 
is firmly embedded with knowledge, al-Ghazal says that the task of acquiring 
knowledge (al-ta`allum) is actually the process of restoration of this original, 
innate knowledge which has been lost or forgotten because of the hindrances 
that afflict the human heart due to its preoccupation with this world. So it is 
by study that man can seek to perfect his heart again and eventually attain real 
97 happiness. 
By occupying the soul with study, the heart's infirmities can be 
removed. So we see that the soul which is sick needs to study and occupy itself 
with acquiring knowledge. 98 Also, in his al-Mungidh min al-dale/, al-Ghazali 
writes that the ignorance of the knowledge of God is destructive poison to the 
human heart and to disobey God by following one's evil desires results in 
diseases of the heart. Thus, knowledge of God and obedience to Him is the 
95 Al-Qur'an, 33: 72. 
96 AI-Ghazalf also brings the samebadith in his al-Mtmgidh, p. 58, Eng. trans., by W. 
Montgomery Watt in The Faith, p. 19. Also in his Kimiyä-i sa `idab, Claude Field, The 
Alchemy oflfappiness, p. 23, trans. of al-Ghazaf, Kimyi-i sa `idab, p. 31. And the first 
part of this haditb of the Prophet Muhammad (p. h. u. h. ) in al-Risila al-laduniyya pp. 
71-72, Eng. trans., p. 368. See al-Bukhäri Muhammad ibn Ismällf, Kitib al-talsir, 
baditb number 4775, al-lami' 81 sahib, vol. 3, p. 275. Abi al-llusayn Muslim Ibn al- 
Ilajjäj al-Qushayri al-Nfsäbiui, Kiteb al-gadr, baditb number 22, Sahib Muslim; vol. 4, 
p. 1624. 
91 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazal, al-Risila al-laduaiyya, p. 72, Eng. trans., pp. 370-371. 
9s Abu- 11amid al-Ghazal, al-Risäla al-ladrmiyya, p. 73, Eng. trans., pp. 371-372. 
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healing medicine for such diseases. Elsewhere, in his Kitäb shark `ajä'ib a/- 
qa/b, al-Ghazäli emphasises the same point: that fidelity to God and 
compliance with His commands can clean and polish the heart. 10° Also, in his 
Kimiyd-i sa`ddah, al-Ghazäli has set out the alchemy that can purify the heart 
of its negative qualities. This alchemy is designed to turn the heart towards 
God; it has four constituents: 
1) The knowledge of the self 
2) The knowledge of God 
3) The knowledge of this world as it really is 
4) The knowledge of the next world as it really is. 101 
In fact, al-Ghazäli stresses the same points in many places in his various 
books. 
The real knowledge of the self, in al-Ghazäli's view, consists of the 
answers to the following questions: what are you in yourself?, from where have 
you come? where are you going? for what purpose have you come to stay in 
this world? what does your real happiness and misery consist of? Some of your 
attributes are those of animals, some are of the devil and some are of the 
angels, so which of these attributes are accidental and which arc essential'? 
Unless man knows all the answers to these questions, he cannot find out where 
his real happiness lies. 102 
9' Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, aI-Mungidb, p. 110, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt 
The faith, p. 74. 
too Ab u- Hamid al-Ghazal , 
Kiläb sbarb `ajä'ib al-gelb, Ibye, vol. 3, p. 124 and p. 
128. 
1°1 Claude Field, The Alchemy of Happiness, p. 16, Abu 1j mid al-Ghazäli, Kimiyä-i 
sa `ädah, p. 11. 
102 For details on al-Ghazili's explanation on how the knowledge of one's own self will 
lead to the knowledge of God, see his Kimiyi-i sa`sdah, pp. 13-46. Eng. trans. by 
Claude Field, TheAlchemy ofHappmess, pp. 17-29. 
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Al-Ghazäli believes that the knowledge of the soul or self is the key to 
the knowledge of God. As the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ) said, "He who knows his self 
knows God" meaning that he who apprehends knowledge of his self will 
acquire knowledge of God. By contemplating one's own existence and 
attributes, man may achieve knowledge of the Divine Existence and His 
attributes. Yet, in reality many who contemplate themselves still do not 
acquire knowledge of God. Consequently, al-Ghazäli holds that there must be a 
specific way in which to acquire knowledge of God. There are two methods of 
arriving at the knowledge of God: the first is complex and abstract. In his 
Kimiyd-i sa`ädah al-Ghazäli leaves this method unexplained. He goes on to 
discuss the second method. Al-Ghazäli argues that when man considers his 
own state, he knows that there was a time when he was non-existent. Man 
knows that he was made out of an impure drop of water in which there was no 
intellect, no senses, no head, organs or limbs. Consequently, it is evident that 
whatever degree of perfection he may have arrived at he did not bring about 
himself. Man cannot even make a single hair of his own. If he thinks about the 
parts of the body and their different functions, he will realise that all these 
surely have been created by the All-Powerful and Omniscient Creator. Such 
questions and reflection, al-Ghazäli says, will lead one from the knowledge of 
one's own existence to that of the Divine Existence. Realizing and appreciating 
the bounties and mercy of God towards us will lead us to the love of none 
other but God. 103 
A1-Ghazal[ writes that as long as the senses of man remain with him, he 
is said to be "in this world"; when the senses depart and only his essential 
attributes remain, he is said to have gone to 'the next world. " There are two 
things that are necessary for man while he is still in this world. Firstly, the 
103 For details on the knowledge of God, see Abfi Hamid al-Ghazali s Kimiyä-i sa'ädah, 
pp. 47-75. Eng. trans. by Claude Field, The Alchemy ofIlappiness, pp. 30-42. 
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nurture of his soul and secondly, the care and nurture of his body. 104 
The proper nourishment of the soul is the 
knowledge and love of God, and to be absorbed 
in the love of anything but God is the ruin of the 
soul. The body, so to speak, is simply the riding- 
animal of the soul, and perishes while the soul 
endures. The soul should take care of the body, 
just as a pilgrim on his way to Mecca takes care 
of his camel; but if the pilgrim spends his whole 
time in feeding and adorning his camel, the 
caravan will leave him alone, and he will perish 
in the desert. 10S 
Hence, al-Ghazalis conception of self-actualization emphasises the love of 
Allah. Al-Ghazäli maintains that the key of the knowledge of God is the 
knowledge of one's own self. From his own creation man comes to know God's 
existence; through the wonders of his bodily frame, man comes to know God's 
power and wisdom and from the bountiful provisions that have been made for 
his various needs, and appreciation for these, man comes to know God's love. 
Al-Ghazal perceives this world as consisting of three divisions, 
namely, animal, vegetable and mineral. These three basic categories are needed 
by man, and it is from these three divisions that all practical human activities 
including occupations and businesses come about. As man's relations with the 
104 Claude Field, The Alchemy of Happiness, p. 43, Abu- I jimid al-Ghazali, Kimiye-i 
sa `edab, p. 72. 
105 Claude Field, TheAkbemyofHappiness, p. 44, Abü Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kimiyi-i 
sa `edah, p. 72. 
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three categories become more complicated he comes to need an organised 
system of life: a political system, government, and laws. Man can then strive 
to achieve happiness in this world, but he must remember that all these will 
not last. He must take this world to be a stage on a journey or a market-place 
passed on his way to the next world. The essential requirement for man's 
journey is surely the knowledge of God; he must be aware of the deceitful 
character of this world and should use all its good things in just proportion in 
order to help him attain happiness in the next world. '06 
For its future existence the human soul is independent of the body, for 
as we have seen, it consists of two natures: the animal nature and the angelic 
nature. When a person dies, the animal nature perishes but the angelic nature 
remains. It is the angelic nature of the human being that allows the human soul 
to return to the superior world, i. e. its place of origin. 107 
Discussing the spiritual heaven and hell, al-Ghazäli says that all 
believers in the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) 
are sufficiently informed regarding the joys of heaven and the pains of hell 
which follow this life, but that only the heart of the enlightened man knows 
the spiritual heaven and hell. 108 Al-Ghazalr further elaborates that the pains 
that the soul suffers after death all have their source in excessive love of this 
world. One kind of spiritual hell is forcible separation from worldly things: 
"Many carry about within them the germs of such a hell without being aware 
of it; hereafter they will feel like one who, after living in luxury, has been 
106 For more details see Claude Field, The Alchemy of happiness, pp. 43-51, Abu- LIimid 
al-Ghazali, Kimryä-i sa `. dah, pp. 71-85. 
107 Claude Field, The Alchemy ofllappincss, pp. 53-55, Abü liäaiid al-Ghazßli, Kimiyä-i 
sa `adah, p. 87. 
toB Claude Field, The Alchemy ofHappin ss, p. 52, Abü Nämid al-GliazälF, Kimiyä-i 
sa `sdab, pp. 81-82. 
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dethroned and made a laughing-stock. i109 Another kind of spiritual hell is that 
of shame. This happens "when a man wakes up to see the nature of the actions 
he committed in their naked realities. Thus he who slandered will sec himself 
in the guise of a cannibal eating his dead brother's flesh, and he who envied as 
one who cast stones against a wall, which stones, rebounding, put out the eyes 
of his own children. "110 And the third spiritual hell is that of disappointment 
because of the failure to reach the real goal of man's existence. "Man was 
intended to mirror forth the light of the knowledge of God, but if he arrives in 
the next world with his soul thickly coated with the rust of sensual indulgence 
he will entirely fail of the object for which he was made. ""' 
The spiritual heavens are the opposites of the three spiritual hells. 112 
Al-Ghazäli does, however, discuss in detail the life after death and matters 
regarding the afterlife, among them the reality of death, what happens to the 
soul before the Day of Judgement, and the resurrection of the body including 
all the different views regarding it in the Klub dhikr al-magi wa-mi ba'dahu 
(The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife) in his Ihyä `alum al-din. 113 
Certain souls remain healthy, without infirmity and corruption. And 
these souls which are perfect are the prophetic souls which arc receptive to 
revelation and (Divine) strengthening. These souls are able to manifest 
'09 Claude Field, The Alchemy ofilappincss, p. 60, Abü Fliimid al-Ghazali, Kimiyi-i 
sa`ndah, pp. 152-153. 
11° Claude Field, The AlchemyolHappiness, p. 60, Abü Hämid al-Ghazäli, Kimiyi-i 
sa`idah, pp. 153-156. 
Claude Field, The Alchemy ol'ffappiness, p. 61, Abü 11ämid al-Ghaznli, Kimiyä-i 
sa `edab, pp. 156-158. 
112 Al-Ghazal does not speak about them in any detail. 
113 Abu Hamid al-Ghazal , 
Ki1ab dhikr al-mawt wa-mä ba `dah1; Ibyä ; vol. 6, pp. 74- 
202, Eng. trans. by T. J. Winter, AI-Gbardli: The Rememberance of Death and The 
Aflerlifeý The Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 1989. 
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miracles and supernatural power in this world of generation and corruption, 
because their perfection has not been affected by the infirmities of this world. 
Thus, the prophets are the physicians of the soul. Their duty is to summon 
mankind to the perfection of their created nature; that is, to the true faith. ' 14 
Al-Ghazäli also writes about these types of souls in his Kimiys-i 
sa`idah. The souls of the prophets attain a special degree of power. They not 
only rule their own body but those of others as well. The effects that these 
souls can produce are known as miracles. These souls are different from the 
layman's soul in three ways: firstly, what others only see in dreams, they can 
see in their waking moments, secondly, while others' wills only affect their 
own bodies, these souls, by will-power, can move bodies extraneous to 
themselves and lastly, the knowledge which others acquire by laborious 
learning comes to them by intuition! 15 
As the human heart is the seat of knowledge and the true essence of 
man, it is not free from the temptations of evil. The fundamental conception of 
evil is the whisperings and promptings (waswes) of the Devil in the heart. The 
gates to the heart cannot be locked; however, they must always be watched. So 
man must not become heedless of God at any time for this can allow the Devil 
an opportunity to enter into his heart by means of'waswis'. Al-Ghazäli divides 
the subject of evil temptations into further topics and discusses them in detail 
in the Kitäb shark `ajä'ib al-galb in his Ihyä' `ultun al-d-. 116 
114 Abu Hi mid al-Ghazaff, &I-Rlsila s! -laduaiyyg p. 72, Eng. trans., p. 369. 
is Claude Field, The Alchemy ofHappiness, pp. 23-24, Abu Himid &I-Ghaziili , Kimiyi-i 
sa'idah, pp. 33-34. 
116 For details on the nature of this subject see Abu Hiimid al-Ghaz-aali, Kii b shard 'ajä'ib 
al-gaib, Ihyji, vol. 3, pp. 142- 169. 
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We may conclude that according to al-Ghazäli the basic powers of man 
have their origin in certain principles of his nature: the appetites and passions 
originate from his animal nature, and the intellect is derived from his divine 
nature. The power of the intellect is the major target of the Devil's temptations 
because of its divine nature. The Devil's temptations always try to incite the 
animal powers to rebel against the intellect. But the intellect with its divine 
nature tries to fight against this temptation and overcome it, seeking to control 
the animal powers and direct them towards the correct channel. If the intellect 
succeeds in weakening the Devil's temptations and makes the animal powers 
submissive towards it, the struggle between these forces ceases. The human 
soul can then pursue its goal. This is the state of na/k al-mulma'inna. 
On the other hand, if the Devil manages to seize control of the animal 
powers and overcome the intellect, then he will become the controller of all 
other forces inside the human being and the intellect will become his slave. If 
the Devil is victorious, all the forces of the body will be directed towards 
gratification and consequently destruction. This is the situation of the nafs a! - 
ammirah. However, if the intellect is still fighting and struggling with the 
Devil's influence, this is the condition of the al-nafs al-lawwrimah. Thus, it 
becomes clear why, in al-Ghazäli's view, all manner of vices and virtues 
originate in the heart. 
When discussing al-Ghazal 's view of the human soul as the seat of 
knowledge it is necessary to follow his argument using the methods of study 
that he recommends: he holds that human knowledge is acquired by two 
means: 
1) submission to human teaching 
2) submission to divine teaching. 117 
117 Abu- Iiämid a1-Ghazäli, al-Risäla a! -ladrmiyyas p. 67, Eng. trans., p. 360. 
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In short, the first means is deduction and study, also known as reflection and 
meditation - this is the method of most intelligent scholars as well as most 
people in general. ' 18 
The second means consists of two further types; namely, divine 
revelation (al--wahy) and inspiration (ilbam). Revelation is given to the perfect 
soul which has turned away from all defilement of human nature and 
attachment to this world. This soul has turned towards God and relies upon His 
grace and the outpouring of His Light. "Then God Most High, by His most 
excellent favour, welcomes that soul with full acceptance and looks upon it 
with (His) Divine regard, and He takes from it a tablet, and from the Universal 
Soul a Pen which inscribes upon it all His knowledge. Then, the Universal Soul 
becomes the teacher, and the sanctified soul the taught, and all knowledge is 
acquired by that soul and all images are impressed upon it without study and 
reflection. "119 As God says in the Qur'an to the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ), "And He 
made you to know what ye did not know. 020 Thus, the knowledge of the 
prophets is the most honourable and most certain of all the sciences of 
mankind, for it comes directly from God without mediation. 121 Secondly, 
"Inspiration is the awakening, by the Universal Soul, of the individual, human 
soul, in proportion to its purity and its receptivity, and the degree of 
preparedness. Now Inspiration follows upon Revelation, for Revelation is the 
clear manifestation of the Divine Command, and Inspiration is the hinting 
thereat". This kind of knowledge, i. e. that which is derived from inspiration, is 
"a Abi Hamid al-Ghazal, al-Riseila a -laduai)ya, pp. 67, Eng. trans., p. 360. 
119 Abi liämid al-Ghazali, al-Risila al-ladtmiyya, pp. 69, Eng. trans., p. 363. 
120 Al-Qur'an, 4: 113. 
121 Abn Uimid al-Ghazi , al-Risi/a al-laduaiyya pp. 69, Eng. trans., pp. 363. 
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called `ilm al-laduni (knowledge direct from God) for it comes from God 
without mediation. 122 
But there are differences between revelation and inspiration though 
both come from God Most High without mediation: according to al-Ghazälf, 
"It has been made clear that Universal Mind is nobler and more perfect and 
stronger and nearer to the Most High Creator than Universal Soul, and 
Universal Soul is nobler and more receptive and more honourable than the rest 
of the creation, and from the outpouring (ifa-ifah) of Universal Mind emanates 
revelation, and from the irradiation of Universal Soul comes inspiration. " 123 
Thus the saints are below the prophets, because inspiration is below revelation 
as the soul is below intelligence. And vision (ruya)124 is below inspiration. Al- 
Ghazälf maintains that all knowledge is attained and known in the substance of 
the Primal Universal Soul (jawhar a/--nafs a/-kul/iyah al-lila), through its 
relationship to the First Intelligence (al-`ayl a/-awwal / Universal Mind). 
Revelation is only received by the prophets whereas inspiration is received by 
both the prophets and the saints. '25 
Al-Ghazali explains the different types of knowledge in both al-Risila 
122 Abu- I-iämid al-Ghazäli, al-Risala al-laduniyya, p. 70, Eng. trans., p. 365. 
123 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazäli, al-Risäla a1-laduniyya, p. 70, Eng. trans., p. 365-366. 
124 Vision; here al-Ghazäli means the true vision (a1-ru'ya a! -sädigah). It occurs in sleep. 
AI-Ghazäli writes in his Kimiyi-i sa `idah, "His (man's) five senses are like five doors 
opening on the external world; but more wonderful than this, his heart has a window 
which opens on the unseen world of the spirit. In the state of sleep, when the avenues of 
the senses are closed, this window is open and man receives impressions from the 
unseen world (Divine World) and sometimes foreshadowings of the future. His heart is 
then like a mirror which reflects what is pictured in the Tablet of Fate" (Preserved 
Tablet). See Claude Field, The Alchemy ofHappiness p. 22, Abü Ilämid al-Ghaxäli, 
Kimiya-i se', dap, pp. 27-29. But in the Ihyi' `ulran al-dz. 7, al-Gharäli says that this 
vision can also occur during the waking state. See Abü Ilämid al-Ghazäli, Kilab sharp 
`ajäib al-gaib, Ihyä, vol. 3, p. 132 and 141. 
125 Abu- f mid al-Ghazäli, al-Risila al-laduniyya p. 70, Eng. trans., pp. 365-366. 
260 
al-Iaduniyya and Kitib shark `ajä'ib al-galb of the Ihyä' `ulttm al-&n. There 
are two types of knowledge: religious knowledge (ad-d niyyq, ash-shar`iyya) 
and intellectual knowledge (al-`ilm al-`agliyya). He then divides intellectual 
knowledge into ad-daruriyya (necessary) and al-mukt&saba (acquired). He 
further divides acquired knowledge into another two types: ad-dunyiwiyya 
(dealing with this world) and aI-ukhräwiyyah (dealing with the other world). 
Religious knowledge is also divided into two types: the first is 
concerned with fundamental principles (usriO; it is knowledge of the Unity of 
God which is concerned with the Essence of God Most High, His eternal 
attributes, His creative and essential attributes. These are set forth in the 
Divine Names. Also included in this first division are the states of the 
prophets, and the Imäms after the prophets and the companions, the states of 
life and death, and the states of Resurrection. Also included are the summons, 
the assembly, the judgement and the vision of God Most High. The Qur'an and 
the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) are the two main sources 
for this religious knowledge, and of course the basic requirement for 
understanding these sources is the Arabic language. 126 
The second division of religious knowledge is concerned with the 
knowledge derived from these fundamental principles. Knowledge is either 
theoretical or practical. Thus, the fundamental principles are theoretical and 
their consequences are practical. The latter includes three obligations: 
1. What is due to God: this consists of the essentials of religious devotion such 
as purification, prayer, almsgiving, etc. 
2. What is due to one's fellow-servant: this covers all kinds of customary usage 
such as all kinds of transactions and contractual obligations. To this the term 
126 Abn Hamid al-Ghazali, al Risida al-Iaduniyya, pp. 63-65, Eng. trans., pp. 353-357. 
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jurisprudence applies. 
3. The knowledge of moral qualities concerning the Self 127 
Intellectual knowledge is difficult and abstract; it enables us to 
distinguish between the true and false. 128 It can satisfy the `aql but it cannot 
be attained by simple listening or imitation. 129 This knowledge consists of two 
main divisions: 
1. Necessary knowledge, that is, knowledge which man himself does not know 
how and from where it comes; such knowledge is innate. For instance, man 
knows that one person cannot be in two places at the same time. Al-Ghazali 
believes such knowledge must come from God Most High. 130 
2. Acquired knowledge: this knowledge is further divided into two aspects: 
i. Worldly, such as the science of mathematics, astronomy etc. 
ii. Other-worldly, such as knowledge concerned with the Essence of God, his 
attributes, His commands, His decrees etc. 131 
As regards the way of gaining acquired knowledge, sometimes it is 
attained by way of study and reasoning or deduction, for instance, through 
instruction from another person. Al-Ghazäli calls this kind of knowledge 
inference (i `tibdr) and reflection (istibsrºr). This is the knowledge of the 
scholars and learned people, but sometimes acquired knowledge is gained 
without study or reasoning. This happens in two ways: if the individual knows 
its source (such as if he sees angels transmit the knowledge into himself), then 
127 Abü Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Risäla al-ladtmiyya, pp. 65-66, Eng. trans., pp. 357-358. 
128 Abü Hamid al-Ghazäli , al-Risäla al-ladrmiyya; p. 
66, Eng. trans., p. 358. 
129 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali , 
Kiteb sbarb `ajR'ib al-gaJb, lby$ ; vol. 3, p. 129. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid, p. 131. 
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it is called revelation (wafiy); if however it happens without the realization of 
the individual, then it is called inspiration (ilhäm). 132 
Given that the main factor in this matter is actually the human heart 
itself, the knowledge gained by man and how it is attained depends on the 
state or condition of the human heart as the scat of knowledge, i. e. the degree 
to which it is ready to receive the knowledge. Also, it depends on the manner 
of the lifting of the veil from the human heart whether by man's choice or 
133 otherwise. 
We see then, that al-Ghazalf's theory of naf is closely related to his 
theory of knowledge. The human soul has a dual nature: the animal and the 
angelic. Man can rise to the level of the angels with the help of knowledge, but 
if he is commanded by his appetites and passions, he will descend to the level 
of the animals. Therefore, man's distinguishing quality is knowledge; it is this 
that supports all his physical and mental activities and guides him in the right 
use of them. It is with the help of knowledge that man can progress towards 
the ultimate realisation. 
4.3.4. Al-Ghazalf's Vicw of al-Farabf and Ibn Sf nä: 
AI-Ghazali mentions in his al-Mungidh min al-daläl that his study of 
philosophy led him to reject and refute many of its doctrines. His encounter 
with philosophy can be seen in his Tahifut al-faläsifa, in which there are many 
similarities to be found between al-Ghazäli's arguments and those of the 
philosophers. His use of their terminology and syllogisms shows that al- 
132 ]bid, p. 132. 
133 Ibid, pp. 132-134. 
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Ghazali, quite apart from the great intellectual effort involved in learning 
philosophy by himself, as he recounts in al-Mungidh, 134 had undertaken an 
extensive and profound study of this field. 
Being well acquainted with the technical language of the philosophers, 
al-Ghazdli manages to use this language in order to express his own ideas 
clearly. For example, in a1-Risala a/-/aduniyya, al-Ghazali uses the term a! - `aq/ 
a1-awwa/, 135 meaning the Universal Mind; '36 this term was commonly used 
among the Neo-Platonic philosophers. 
Both al-Färäbi and Ibn Si nä are among the sources used by al-Ghazäli 
in his study of philosophy, for he mentions them as the transmitters of 
Aristotle's philosophy. But he perceives them as representatives of Islamic 
philosophy. ' 37 Al-Gharäli is not against philosophy as a whole, but takes issue 
with what contradicts the doctrines of Islam: he refutes its irreligious doctrines 
in his Tahdfut a/-/a/dsifa. Al-Färäbi and Ibn Si nä were the great masters of 
Greek philosophy among Muslims before al-Ghazäli. Al-Ghazäli bases his 
refutation of the system of the Greek Philosophers on the interpretations of 
both al-Färäbi and Ibn Si nä, whom he perceives as the most faithful translators 
of and the most original commentators on Aristotle's works. 138 
Al-Ghazali holds that both al-Faräbi and Ibn Si nä are unbelievers 
'3' Abu- }ismid al-Ghazäli, al-Alungidb, p. 69, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Wait 
Tbc Paid; p. 29. 
135 Abü I Iämid al-Ghazal , al-Risila al-laduniyya, p. 
61, Eng. trans., p. 196. 
116 Abü ilämid al-Ghazali, al-Risela a! -ladrmiyyx, pp. 70, Eng. trans. pp. pp. 365-366. 
See also above p. 259. 
137 Abü I1ämid al-Ghazäli, al-Afungidh, pp. 72-73, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery 
Watt, The Faith, p. 32. 
138 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazali, Tahifut, p. 40, Eng. trans. p. 5. 
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because they followed their master Aristotle regarding three crucial points. 139 
Even though al-Ghazäli bases his refutation of philosophy on al-Färäbi and Ibn 
Si nä, he seems to have a deep and wide knowledge of other Greek philosophers 
among the Nco-Platonists. This can be seen in his detailed discussion of 
philosophical matters. For example, he does not discuss philosophy in general 
terms, but through an examination of its various sciences which he divides into 
six categories: mathematics, logic, natural sciences, theology or metaphysics, 
politics and ethics. Al-Ghazäli believes that the errors of philosophers occur 
most often in theology or metaphysics. Al-Ghazäli perceives the philosophical 
views of al-Far, bi and Ibn Si nä as genuinely part of the philosophy of 
Aristotle. As we have seen in the previous chapter, these views, according to 
him, fall under three headings: firstly, what must be counted as unbelief, 
secondly, what must be counted as heresy and thirdly, what is by no means to 
be denied. 140 
Al-Ghaz8li takes pains to be strictly scientific in his enquiry and he 
does not declare anything to be heresy or unbelief without sufficient reason. 
Again, he does not refute philosophy as a whole. He accepts philosophy as 
scientific knowledge; he accepts the truths of mathematics, logic and physics 
for these sciences do not in any way contradict religion. Nevertheless, al- 
Ghazali warns the mathematicians and the logicians against the serious error of 
using the fruits of their researches for the examination and evaluation of 
metaphysical and religious matters. 141 Al-Ghazäli condemns the philosophers 
but his chief concern is to point out the errors of their teachings rather than to 
19 The eternity of the world, God knows only the universal, and the denial of bodily 
resurrection. Sec previom chapter p. 46. 
14° Abu- ilämid al-Ghazäli, a! -Mungidb, p. 73, ling. trans. by W. Montgemery Watt 
The Faith pp. 32 -33. 
141 Sec: Abü 11amid al-Ghazili, a! -Maayidb, pp. 74-77, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery 
Watt, The ! Faith, pp. 33-37. 
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judge them personally. 
In refuting the philosophers in his Taihifut al-falesifa, al-Ghazalf makes 
a careful examination of their views, particularly what had been transmitted by 
al-Faräbi and Ibn Sinn. Al-Ghazäli then treats their views summarily under 
twenty headings. These are as follows: 
1) The refutation of their doctrine that the universe is eternal. 
2) The refutation of their doctrine that the universe is everlasting. 
3) The exposure of their dishonest statement that God is the creator of the 
universe. 
4) To show the philosophers' inability to affirm the existence of the Creator of 
the world. 
5) Their inability to bring forward arguments against the impossibility of two 
gods. 
6) The refutation of their doctrine that God has no attributes. 
7) The refutation of their doctrine that it is impossible that something should 
share a genus with God, being separated from him by differentia; and that the 
intellectual division into genus and differentia is inapplicable to Him. 
8) The refutation of the doctrine that the God is a simple essence. 
9) Their inability to prove by rational arguments that God is not a body. 
10 The explanation of their beliefs in time and their inability to prove by 
rational arguments the existence of the Creator. 
11) Their inability to prove that God could know other than Himself and the 
refutation of their thesis that God knows the species and genera in a universal 
manner. 
12) Their inability to prove that God knows Himself. 
13) The refutation of their doctrine that God does not know particulars. 
14) The refutation to show their inability to prove that heaven is living, and 
obeys God through its rotatory motion. 
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15) The refutation of the motive power which they ascribe to Heaven. 
16) The refutation of their doctrine that the souls in the heavens know all the 
particulars which originate in the world. 
17) The refutation of the doctrine that the laws of nature are inviolate (will not 
depart from the natural course of events). 
18) Their inability to give a rational demonstration of their theory that the 
human soul is a spiritual substance which exists in itself, and is neither a body 
nor an accident. 
19) The refutation of their belief in the impossibility of the destruction of the 
human soul. 
20) The refutation of their denial of the resurrection of bodies and of the 
possibility of them experiencing physical pleasure and pain in Paradise or 
Hell. '42 
The twenty points listed above demonstrate that the philosophers' 
accounts of the soul and the body arc inevitably inter-related and, to a certain 
extent, must come from their incoherent and inconsistent metaphysical 
theories. Taken together, these twenty points render the philosophers' account 
of the soul and body unacceptable, inadequate and even opposed to Islamic 
beliefs. For example, the philosophers' inability to give a rational 
demonstration of their claim that the human soul is a spiritual substance which 
exists in itself, and that the soul is neither a body nor an accident, is related to 
their inability to show that God is neither inside the world nor outside it. This 
is because their sole dependence is on reason. Al-GhazälF in this case shows 
that the religious discussion of resurrection lends its support to this view. 143 
Another example is the philosophers' thesis that the human soul cannot be 
142 Abu- lIämid al-Ghazäli, Tahifut, pp. 46-47, Eng. Irans. p. 11-12. 
143 Abu- lIämid al-Ghazäli, Tahifut, p. 210, Eng. trans., p. 200. 
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destroyed, this is related to their belief of the everlasting nature of the world, 
time and motion. 
Of these twenty doctrines, three make the philosophers infidels and the 
remaining seventeen make them heretics. Al-Ghazäli's purpose is to challenge 
the philosophers and to illustrate that there is nothing constant in the 
philosophers' position. Al-Ghazäli's purpose is to establish the inadequacy of 
logical reason as used by the philosophers. According to al-Ghazäli, applying 
logical reason in the attempt to explain metaphysical matters will lead 
nowhere, or rather, it leads to many contradictions. 144 Al-Ghazäli wants to 
show that every piece of knowledge, ancient or modern, is actually the 
acknowledgement of faith in God and in the Last Day. He wants to show that 
the philosophers are incapable of denying the validity of God, His prophets and 
the religious law. '45 In doing so, al-Ghazäli uses the logical methods of the 
philosophers in order to refute their false doctrines. The Qur'an and sunnah are 
the primary sources of Islamic philosophy, and according to al-Ghazäli, 
religious faith is always above reason, but philosophers such as al-Färäbi view 
human reason as superior to religious faith, although Ibn Si nä seems to allow 
the latter a higher position. 
Al-Farabi's theory of prophecy, 146 for instance, shows how he takes 
reason to be above religious faith: even though prophecy shows perfection in 
man, it is still secondary to man's rational faculty. In al-Färäbf's view, 
prophecy is not outlined as a state of possession by supernatural powers. He 
14' Abu- llamid al-Ghazali, Tahi! ut, pp. 38-40, Eng. trans., pp. 3 -4. 
145 Abu- l1amid al-Ghazali, Tahäful, p. 39, Eng. trans., p. 3. 
146 Al-Farabi discw sas how prophets can receive revelation in the chapter entitled 
Representation and Divination. See Richard Walzer, Al-Färäbi on The Perfect State; pp. 
211-228. 
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further writes that divine inspiration together with the highest form of 
prophecy may be granted to the perfect man who has reached the highest 
philosophical level. However, he holds that it is necessary that the prophetic 
illumination or revelation be preceded by ordinary philosophical thinking. In 
other words, the prophet's intellect must go through the stages of development 
through which an ordinary thinking mind passes; only then can revelation 
comc. 1t7 
Al-FäräbF writes that it is only the intellectual part of the human soul 
that is immortal ; 148 this clearly contradicts Islamic doctrine. 149 Firstly, because 
al-FäräbF regards the annihilation of the human soul to be an impossibility. 
Secondly, this will lead to the belief that only the intellectual part of the soul 
will be resurrected. On the other hand, Ibn Sinä also believed firmly in the 
immortality of the human soul because, according to him, the human soul is 
immaterial, therefore corruption cannot affect it. According to Ibn SFnä, the 
immateriality of human soul is proved by its capability of understanding the 
intelligibles which are immaterial. This notion is refuted by al-GhazälF in his 
discussion of his ninetieth proposition in his Tahäfut al-falasifa. l5Ö Both al- 
FäräbF and Ibn Sinä deny the resurrection of the human body on the Day of 
Judgement. This is one of the three reasons why al-GhazälT considers them to 
be unbelievers. Al-GhazalF discusses this matter in his twentieth proposition in 
his Tab fut a/-falasifa. 15' 
147 Fazlur Rahmar, Prophecy in is/am, p. 30. 
14' Richard Walzer, Al-Firibi On The Perfect Stott; p. 263. 
149 This means the denial of the physical pains and pleasures experienced in hell and 
paradise. See Abü Hamid al-Ghazäli, Tahifut, p. 241, Eng. trans. p. 235. See also, Abu 
Hämid al-Ghazilf, Klub dhikra/- maul wa-ma ba`dabq Ibyi, vol. 6, pp. 178-185, 
pp. 185-192, Eng. trans. pp. 219-231 232-244. 
150 Abu- 11ämid al-Ghaiili, Tabäful, pp. 228-234, Eng. trans., pp. 221-228. 
151 Abu- Uamid al-Gha7iff, Tabifut, pp. 235-253, Eng. trans., pp. 229-248. 
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Despite al-Gharäli's refutation of the philosophers, there are sometimes 
parallels between his arguments and theirs, probably because al-Ghazäl1 
adopted the philosophical rhetoric of his time in order to refute the 
philosophers in their own terms. Also, in al-Ghaz lPs time, people were 
inclined to consider the philosophers' arguments to be irrefutable. Another 
reason for his use of philosophical terminology may be because he wanted to 
highlight those philosophical points which he considered to be in line with 
religious teachings by explaining them together with proofs from the Qur'an 
and the Prophet's (p. b. u. h. ) sayings. Moreover, according to al-GhazälF, the 
views of Aristotle as expounded by al-FärhbF and Ibn SFnä are close to those of 
the Islamic writers. 1.52 Al-GhazälF, despite his reservations, included both al- 
FaräbF and Ibn Si nä among the theistic philosophers who believed in God and 
prophecy. 153 For example, the heart in al-F bPs view is the organ that rules 
over every other organ of the body. 154 Al-Ghazäli agrees with al-Färäbi but 
uses the term "heart" to mean the human soul, spirit or intellect and not the 
physical heart. Man, in al-Färäbi's view, has the highest rank in the sublunary 
world and from this position strives to link himself with the higher realm of 
the eternal being. '55 Ibn SFni also discusses the re-ascent produced by the 
creatures' love and desire for their creator. This love is felt only by a soul that 
is inclined towards religion. Al-GhazalF discusses the same process when he 
mentions man as being the subject of God's Law, and explains his special 
relation with God. The human being always wants to strive to fulfil his task of 
152 Abu- 1.1ämid al-Gbazäli, al-Mrmgidb, p. 78, Eng. trans., by W. Montgomery Watt, The 
Faith, pp. 37-38. 
153 Abu- Ilamid al-Ghazäli, al-Mungidh, pp. 72-73 and p. 113, Eng. trans., by W. 
Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 32 and p. 78. 
154 See al-Päräbi theory of soul, p. 197. 
135 Richard Walzer, the commentary in Al-Far8bion Tbc Perfect State p. 344. 
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drawing nearer to God. 
According to al-Färäbi, man has a natural disposition for thought., 56 of 
which an early stage is that of the passive (munfa`a/ intellect. His description 
of the faculty of reason shows an ascending scale of the nature of intellect: 
firstly the munfd`al, then the mustard (acquired) and lastly the fa`al (active 
intellect). Each of these constitutes a matter for the form above it. Finally, 
when this is complete and the whole becomes one, the active intellect dwells 
in man. 157 However, al-Färäbi also states that it is difficult for the human 
intellect to apprehend the real essence of the Supreme Being. The intellect 
therefore needs a particular training and the aspirant must make a special 
effort to establish the intellect as the ruling faculty in the human soul and to 
bring it to the degree of perfection. This is because the untrained human 
intellect is far too weak to even approach the overwhelming perfection of the 
Supreme Being. 158 Al-Ghazäli ranks the intellect just below the highest in the 
scale of human faculties. He places inspiration (the transcendental prophetic 
spirit) above the intellect, for the intellect alone cannot achieve certainty. For 
this reason he also approves the practices of the süff s. 
Thus, al-Ghazali does not merely refute; rather he weighs all the 
teachings of the philosophers in the balance of Islamic faith. Then, he 
incorporates those teachings of the philosophers which measure up to his 
standards, into his own systems. He modifies the teachings of the philosophers 
to make them conform to the Islamic religion. 
156 Richard Walzer, A! -Farähi on The Perfect State, p. 199. 
157 Ibid, pp. 197-211. 
159 lbid, p. 79. 
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Drawing on the above discussion, we may attempt a possible schema of the 
soul according to al-Ghazäli; 
Al-Ghazali 
1. Soul belongs to the world of decrees 
2. The rational soul is the ruling faculty 
3. Soul is indivisible essence, created, substantial 
4. Soul is not everlasting but immortal 
5. Body is matter and form. 
6. Soul is neither confined in nor separated from body 
7. Acquiring knowledge is the restoration of the original innate knowled e 
Conclusion: 
The above discussion shows that al-Ghazali treats the issue of nafs 
using a variety of approaches and multiple explanations. It is related to God, 
knowledge, and the intellect; moreover, his descriptions arc a mixture of a 
theological approach, a philosophical approach, and a snfi stical approach. But 
the fact is that all this is inevitable when one discusses metaphysical matters. 
The inconsistency of his manner of describing the soul and matters related to it 
in his different books has created problems: the variety of descriptions has 
created difficulties for those who want to put al-Ghazälf's views and ideas into 
systematic order. 
Nevertheless, the most obvious conclusion that can be drawn is that the 
terms soul (naA), heart, spirit and intellect refer to the same entity in al- 
Ghazäli's usage, i. e. the human soul. Thus, his concept of the human soul can 
be defined as that subtle tenuous substance, immaterial, spiritual in nature, 
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that is the perceiving and knowing essence of man, and in reality is man. The 
soul is created by Allah, capable of knowing Him, and is morally responsible to 
Him. So we have three interrelated concepts: knowledge, action and man's 
disposition. Since knowledge is only received by a soul which is pure and 
clean, this gives spiritual discipline an important place in al-Ghazali's theory of 
the soul. This matter will be further considered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. THE SPIRITUAL DYNAMIC ELEMENTS IN AL-GHAZALI 'S THEORY OF 
SOUL 
5.1. Definition: 
This chapter will address matters relating to the dynamic aspects of aI- 
Ghazali's theory of soul, particularly what is meant by spiritual dynamic; that is, 
what can be inferred from al-Ghazäli's teachings regarding the spiritual 
development of the individual. The chapter will discuss how al-Ghazäli's teachings 
can help this inner development, and show that al-Ghazali's teachings can have a 
counselling and motivating function. As has been discussed in the previous 
chapter, al-Ghazäli's theory of soul is related to his theory of knowledge: the 
human soul is the seat of knowledge. Thus, this chapter will also show the 
importance of knowledge to one's inner development. 
Al-Ghazäli's life also plays a very important role in explaining his view of 
spiritual development. In this regard, his al-Mungidh min al-((810 is the most 
useful source, allowing us to understand his own inner development, which can be 
used as the example or model in the discussion which follows. As we have seen, 
al-Mungidh can be justly considered as al-Ghazäli's own account of his spiritual 
development. ' 
Furthermore, of al-Ghazä1C's major works, the Ihyl' contains most of his 
1 See chapter 2 above. 
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teachings and is the best source for a discussion of his thinking on this subject. 
Froin the Ihyd , one can sec that al-Ghazäli set out to examine the psychological 
management of and stimuli which actuate the various aspects of spiritual 
development. In the Ihyd ; al-Ghazali expounds the significance of purifying one's 
own soul and reforming the self towards achieving God's blessedness. 2 
Al-Ghat li's exposition in his lhyä' covers the short-lived nature of life in 
this world, the eternity of the next world, the significance of faith and righteous 
actions, the cleansing of the soul and the elimination of the vices of the heart. Al- 
Ghazali sees these vices as the basis of all savagery in human conduct. Thus, when 
discussing the course that leads to salvation, he does not omit to describe the vices 
and virtues and their bases, at the same time revealing his acute insight into the 
inner workings of the human soul. For instance, al-Ghazdli always emphasises the 
inner meaning of the canonical duties required of every Muslim. The fourth 
section of the Ihyi' especially deals explicitly with the critique of the self and the 
method of self- examination. This section examines the ways in which man should 
assess his own vices and his inclinations towards them and how he should then 
overcome them. He stresses the preparation that man should make for the life to 
come. These matters will be discussed further in the following sections. 
5.2. The Dynamic Elements in al-Ghazäli's Theoryof Soul: 
As we have noted in the preceding chapter, in his discussion on nafk al- 
Ghazäli urges the necessity of contemplating one's existence and attributes, the 
purpose of this life and what is to come after this life ends. Such are the questions 
2 See chapter 3 above. 
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that man should ask himself while living in this world: if he manages to answer 
them correctly, he may be able to understand this temporary lif 3 e 
According to al-Ghazälf, once man realises that this life is only temporary 
and that there is a life to come which is more important, he will strive towards it, 
seeking what he needs for the next life rather than what he needs for this transient 
existence. Realising that he has only one earthly life, man will make use of the 
only chance he has to prepare for the next. As man's soul consists of two natures, 
the angelic and the animal, man has to strive to subdue his animal nature. 
Knowing that he is a unique creation should help man to understand and 
appreciate the power of God and his own weakness. And in realising his real 
purpose in this world, man becomes aware of his responsibilities. Thus man is led 
to search for real happiness. Al-Ghazäli explains what real happiness means and 
discusses the reality of human misery. 4 
In the end, the totality of man's knowledge is rooted in his knowledge of 
himself. He who truly knows himself might be said to know all other things. The 
highest attainment of knowledge is the knowledge of Allah, because the quality of 
the Divine Being is reflected in the human soul. Every heart is thus a 'microcosm' 
and a mirror. 
Man has been truly termed a "microcosm", or little 
world in himself, and the structure of his body 
Abu- I1amid al-Ghat ii, Kimiyi-i sa`idab, pp. 13-14, Eng. trans. pp. 17-18. Sec also above p. 
250. 
4 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kimiyi-isa`ädah, p. 14, Eng. trans. p. 18. 
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should be studied not only by those who wish to 
become doctors, but by those who wish to attain to a 
more intimate knowledge of God-. .5 
This is the key to the relationship between soul and knowledge in al- 
Ghazäli's theory ofnafs. Knowledge of one's self will lead to knowledge of God 6 
The true self is the core of being, and as one identifies more and more with his 
inner self, the more he comes to know God. 
Since, according to al-Ghazalf, man is composed of body and spirit, both 
must comprise what may be termed, in modern parlance, his personality. 
Personality thus includes both the outward and the inward form. But as the real 
essence of man is his inner soul or heart or spirit, man can only perceive realities 
with the inward eye. The human soul is enabled to see and perceive Divine Reality 
by means of the spiritual sense called intuition that goes beyond reason. In al- 
Ghazalf's case this sense was developed during his years as a 5&L Süff teaching 
combines both the theoretical and the practical in order to gain the desired goal. 
Purity of heart is the first step on the süfi way. And the end of it is the knowledge 
of God. Between these are the various stages of spiritual development. 
Al-Ghazäli describes the five faculties of the human soul in ascending 
order. As we saw in the last chapter, the human soul, according to al-Ghazt li is 
possessed of five faculties or spirits. They are firstly, the sensory faculty which 
S Abü Hamid al-Ghazal, Kimiyä-i sa'ädt p. 45, Eng. Irans. p. 27. 
6 Abü Hamid al-Ghazali, Kimiyi-i sa'idab, pp. 15-16, Eng. Irans. p. 19. 
7 Abü Hamid a1-Ghazidi, Kimiys-i sa'ädab, pp. 15-16, Eng. trans. p. 18-19. 
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receives information sent by the senses; secondly, the imaginative faculty which 
records and discriminates among this information; thirdly, the intelligential 
faculty (al-rrih al-`aqO which apprehends what is beyond the capacity of the 
sensory and imaginative faculties. Fourthly, there is the discursive faculty or the 
reasoning power (al--räi al-filer) which deduces fresh knowledge based on the data 
of pure reason. And finally, the highest power is the transcendental prophetic 
faculty (divine prophetic spirit) which belongs to the prophets and the saints. By 
means of this faculty, the soul receives the revelation of the invisible and attains 
to a knowledge of God. 8 
Al-Ghazäli jtstifies the possibility of the transcendental prophetic spirit by 
comparing the different capacities of the other spirits. For example, if it is 
possible that above the discriminating faculty and the senses there is the faculty of 
intelligence which can grasp what cannot be understood by the first two faculties, 
then above the intelligential spirit there can be another spirit that is yet more 
powerful and able to understand that which lies beyond the boundary of reason. 9 
Man may therefore experience the prophetic spirit if he tries earnestly: it is not 
impossible to achieve. If however, one cannot attain it, then he should try to 
understand it theoretically through syllogisms and analogies such as those 
provided by al-Ghazäli in hisMishkät al-anwxr. 
Consider the intuitive faculty of poetry, if thou wilt 
have an example of everyday experience, taken from 
those special gifts which particularize some men. 
Abu- Ilamid al-Gbazäli, Mishkii al-anwar, pp. 23-24, Eng. trans. pp. 144-148. 
Abu- I. Iämid al-Gbazäli, Misbki[ al-anwar, p. 24, Eng. trans. p. 147. 
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Behold how this gift, which is a sort of perceptive 
faculty, is the exclusive possession of some; while it 
is so completely denied to others that they cannot 
even distinguish the scansion of a typical measure 
from that of its several variations. Mark how 
extraordinary is this intuitive faculty in some others, 
insomuch that they produce music and melodies, and 
all the various grief, delight, slumber, weeping, 
madness, murder and swoon producing modes! Now 
these effects only occur strongly in one who has this 
original, intuitive sense. A person destitute of it 
hears the sound just as much as the other, but the 
emotional effects are by him only very faintly 
experienced, and he exhibits surprise at those whom 
they send into raptures or swoons. And even were all 
the professors of music in the world to call a 
conference with a view of making him understand 
the meaning of this musical sense, they would be 
quite powerless to do so. 10 
If one still cannot grasp the possibility of the transcendental prophetic 
spirit scientifically, he may at least have faith in it. As God says in the Qur'an, 
"Allah exalts those that have faith among you, and those who acquire knowledge, 
in their several ranks. "" Al-Ghazali himself declares "Scientific knowledge is 
10 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Mishkil al-anwar, p. 24, Eng. trans. pp. 147-148. 
" Al-Qur'an, 58: 11. 
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above faith, and mystic experience is above knowledge. The province of mystic 
experience is feeling; of knowledge, ratiocination; and of faith, bare acceptance of 
the creed of one's fathers, together with an unsuspicious attitude towards the two 
superior classes. " 12 
Al-Ghazali's theory of soul is closely related to his explanation of intellect 
('aql) because in his view the human soul is the locus of knowledge. In his Kilsb 
al-`ilr, al-Ghazäli discusses the intellect in a simpler way than in his other works. 
Four apparently distinct meanings of the term intellect are used interchangeably. 
Firstly, the intellect is the quality which distinguishes man from the other animals. 
By using his intellect, man is able to comprehend the theoretical sciences 
(nazariyah) and master the abstract (fikriyah) disciplines. Here, the intellect is an 
instinct (gharzah) by which the theoretical sciences are apprehended; it is like a 
light cast into man's heart, preparing him to investigate and understand the world 
around him. Hence, the intellect is not limited to axiomatic (daruriyah) 
knowledge. 13 
Secondly, the term is applied to that kind of instinctive knowledge which 
appears even in the infant, who discerns the possibility of possible things (js'izst) 
and the impossibility of impossible things (mustahilet): for example, that two arc 
greater than one and that an individual cannot be in two different places at the 
same time. In al-Ghazäli's opinion, this definition is right as it stands, but becomes 
erroneous if limited to axiomatic (dartiriyah) knowledge (such as the possibility of 
possible things and the impossibility of impossible things), '4 for such a limitation 
12 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Misbkil al-anmir, pp. 24-25, Eng. trans. pp. 148-149. 
" Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Kiteb al-`iln; I6yä, vol. I, p. 111, Eng. trans. p. 226. 
14 Another example such as the same thing cannot be both with and without an origin or 
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denies the instinctive nature of the intellect and holds that only axiomatic 
knowledge exist "15 
Thirdly, 'intellect' is applied to that knowledge which is acquired through 
experience; that is, knowledge (`uliun al-tajarub). 16 
Fourthly, the term is used to refer to that state when the power of the 
instinct develops to such an extent that its owner is able to exercise 
foreknowledge and consequently to conquer his appetite for immediate 
pleasures. 17 
The first kind of intellect is the foundation, the origin and the source of the 
other three. The second is the nearest to the first while the third is the result of the 
combination of both the first and the second, for it is through the unified power of 
instinct (native intellect) and axiomatic knowledge that empirical knowledge is 
acquired. The fourth type is the ultimate aim and the final fruit. The first and the 
second are native (bi al-tar) while the third and the fourth are acquired (bi-ai- 
iktisib). 18 Thus, the basic use of the term 'intellect' is that referring to the native, 
instinctive intellect, which is the origin of all forms of knowledge. These are 
inherent in the native intellect potentially but are later actuated by some cause. 19 
existent and non-existent etc. See Abü Hamid al-Ghazäff, Misbkit al-anwir, p. 8, fing. 
trans. pp. 91-92. 
15 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitib al-`i1; Ihyl' `ul&n al-din, vol. 1, p. 111, Eng. trans. p. 227. 
16 Abü Hamid a]-Ghazal!, Kitib &I-7/v; Ihyi, vol. 1, p. 111, Eng. trans. p. 227. 
17 Abü Hamid a1-Ghazali, Kitib al-'Au; Ibyi, vol. 1, p. 112, Eng. trans. pp. 227-228. 
'g Ab u- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitib al-`ilrq Ihyi, vol. 1, p. 112, Eng. trans. p. 228. 
19 Abu- If amid at-Ghazäli, Kitib al-`ilrn, Ihyi, vol. 1, pp. 112-113, lang. trans. p. 229. 
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According to al-Ghazali every human being is born with an inherent 
knowledge of reality and is thus, readily inclined to perceive it. 20 The intellect is 
similar to insight, 21 and he whose insight is keen will apprehend the truth and the 
essence of religion. 22 Therefore, it is not impossible to attain knowledge of reality, 
for it is latent within. One way of achieving such knowledge is the one al-Ghazälf 
himself followed, that is, the way of the süffs which consists of both theory and 
practice. By this means spiritual development attains the highest possible stage. 
Al-Ghazälf's four aspects of the intellect provide a sequential structure for the 
development of knowledge. 
All four interpretations mentioned above arc actually explanations of the 
intellect as knowledge. In his Kitdb `ajä'ib al-galb, al-Ghazali mentions two 
meanings of 'intellect', one of which denotes the human soul itself. Ultimately, 
however, all these meanings may be reduced to two closely related concepts, 
namely the human soul and knowledge. 
In his Mishksl al-anwar, al-Ghazäli maintains that there is in the mind of 
man an eye that is variously called intelligence, spirit, and human soul. In al- 
Ghazäli's view, this eye of the mind is better called a light, for it is free from the 
defects that a physical eye may have. Al-Ghazäli enumerates seven defects of the 
physical eye of which the eye of the mind is free: it sees others but not itself, it 
20 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, Kitib a! -`i1w, I6ye', vol. 1, p. 113, Eng. trans. p. 230. 
21 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kit$b a! -`ilrq Ihyai, vol. I, p. 113, Eng. trans. p. 231, A-fishkät 
a1-aawar, p. 5, Eng. trans. p. 83. 
22 Abü Ha-mid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb a! -`ila; Ihyä, vol. I, pp. 113-114, ling. trans. p. 231. 
23 See our discussion on al-Ghazäli's theory of soul. 
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sees neither what is very distant nor what is very near, it does not sec what is 
behind a veil, it perceives only the exterior surfaces of things but not their interior, 
it sees the parts but not the whole, it cannot see what is infinite, and lastly, it 
misinterprets what is does sec: for example, what is large may appear to be small 
(as when the sun seems to be the size of a bowl), what is distant may appear close 
and what is in motion may appear to be at rest. Al-Ghazäli therefore refers to the 
24 eye of the mind as light, for it transcends these seven defects. 
The intelligence also is a pattern or sample of the attributes of Allah. Thus 
the sample must correspond with the original, even though it is impossible to rise 
to the degree of equality with it. 25 But this may move man to set his mind to work 
toward the highest level that is possible for him to achieve. 
Even though the insightful eye (intelligence) transcends all the defects of 
physical sight, even one who possesses intelligence may nevertheless fall into 
error. According to al-Ghazalf, this is because his imaginative (khayil) and 
fantastic (wahmi) faculties often pass judgements and form convictions which he 
thinks to be those of the intelligence. But when the intelligence is separated from 
the deceptions of the fantasy and the imagination, error on its part is 
inconceivable and it sees things as they are. This separation is, however, 
supremely difficult and the perfection of the intelligence is only attained after 
2 death. Ci 
24 Sec Abu- Ilamid al-Ghazali, Mishkät a/-an wir, p. 5, Eng. trans. pp. 82-83. 
25 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Mishkil a/-anwnr, pp. 5-6, Eng. trans. pp. 84-85. 
26 Abu- Ifamid al-Ghazali, Mishkila/-anwar, p. 7, Eng. trans. pp. 89-90. 
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5.3. Human Knowledge and Divine Knowledge: 
Al-Ghazali's concept of knowledge plays an important role in this aspect of 
inner development. Al-Ghazali himself, being a learned man, always gives 
knowledge a place of honour and accounts it a vitally important part of human 
life. For example, he begins his Ihyä , which consists of forty books, with the 
Book of Knowledge (Kitdb al-`i/m). This not only emphasises the prime position 
given to knowledge by al-Ghazali, it also reflects the place of knowledge in Islam 
itself. Al-`ilm is an attribute of Allah: Allah is al-Rim - the Omniscient. Allah's 
knowledge far surpasses that of man, encompassing all phenomena in the universe, 
whether visible or invisible to man. No human knowledge can equal His 
knowledge. 
In al-Ghazali's view there are three distinct ways in which man's 
knowledge is different from that of Allah. "First, regarding the multitude of things 
known: although the things man knows are wide-ranging, they are limited to his 
heart, and how could they correspond to what is infinite? Secondly, that man's 
disclosure, while clear, does not reach the goal beyond which no goal is possible; 
rather his seeing of things is like seeing them behind a thin veil. i27 There are 
degrees of disclosure because, as inward vision is like outward sight, so there is a 
difference between what is clear at the time of departure at evening and what 
becomes clear in the morning light . 
28 Lastly, the knowledge which Allah has of 
things is not derived from those things, they are derived from it; but man's 
27 Abn Hämid al-Ghaz811, al-Magsad a/-asnä G'sharh ma `ini asrni' Allab al-hmný pp. 92-93, 
Eng. trans, by David B. 13urrelI and Nazih Daher, AbGbarili The Ninety-aioc Hrauliful Namc-c 
ofGO p. 80. 
28 Here al-Ghazali refers to desert travel which always takes place during the night hours. 
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knowledge of things is conditional upon and results from them: 
29 
Over and above the knowledge of things in themselves is the knowledge of 
the relationship of things with one another and ultimately with the Creator. It is 
this last relationship which is of great importance to a Muslim who wishes to love 
and glorify the Creator. It is this search for Truth that al-Ghazali refers to as the 
knowledge that can bring man to happiness in this world and the hereafter: the 
knowledge of complete and endless Reality and its relationship to the creation and 
to one's own self. 
And of course, the only source of this kind of knowledge is the Qur'an; in 
the Qur'an, Allah commands us to read and write30 and urges us to use our 
faculties of reasoning and intellect for the understanding of Truth. 31 The objective 
is to purify the hearts of believers. Al-Ghazali discusses the importance of 
knowledge in his Kildb al--`i! m in order to show how essential it is to a properly 
lived life. It is as if the chief purpose of life is to achieve knowledge, for it is the 
only means to secure happiness in both this world and the hereafter. Useful 
knowledge provides salvation at all stages of life and is also a source of self- 
development. 
The Qur'an is to Muslims a guide to a way of thinking. It covers various 
aspects including the ethical, historical and psychological; the ethical encompass 
29 Ahü Hamid a1-Ghazäli , a/-/tfagsad al-asai 
Gsharh ma'ini asrne' AUith al-husnA pp. 92-93, 
Eng. trans. by David B. Burrell and Naarih Daher, Al-Ghazili The Ninety-nine Reautilul Name 
of God,, p. 80. 
30 The Qur'an, 96: 1-5. 
31 Abül Ilasan `Ali Nadwi, I. s/arn and Knuw/cdgc; p. 5. 
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the basic principles of faith, action and morality that concern both the individual 
and society. More than this, however, the Qur'an provides a system for a complete 
way of life, guiding man to live such a way in this world that he may lead a 
blissful life in the hereafter. The Qur'an also covers the historical and 
psychological aspects of knowledge, telling of the fate of the nations that adhered 
to the norms given by religion as well as the fate of those that departed from 
them. In addition, the Qur'an not only shows us how to deal with the attitudes and 
modes of thinking of human beings, it also provides a way to search for the Truth 
and Reality. Basing his method on the Qur'an, man can make observations and 
adopt an experimental approach which is similar to the scientific approach of the 
present day. 2 The Qur'an is therefore the chief source whereby man attains a sure 
knowledge of things and their relationship with one another and with the 
Creator. 33 This is why al-Ghazali always bases his explanations on the truth of the 
Qur'an. In his Ihyä ; al-Ghazal[ draws on the Qur'an when discussing any matter, 
whether religious or secular. This is because the Qur'an covers every aspect of 
human life, even such practical matters as laws of inheritance, rules for marriage 
and divorce, questions of property and its rights, as well as ethical and religious 
proscriptions. 
It is most important to note here that all the ways of acquiring knowledge 
in Islam are but means of making the principle of Tawhid a living element in the 
intellectual and emotional life of mankind; this is actually the ultimate spiritual 
basis of Islam. Tawhid stands at the summit of the Muslim system of belief 
derived from the Qur'an. . 34 
32 For example, the verses regarding the creation of man, see note p. 228. 
33 Sec; Abel Hasan `Ali Nadwi, lslam and Kaowlcdgc; pp. 3-5. 
34 Fazlur Rahmaa, Islam, p. 36. 
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To attain knowledge of God is the goal of every Muslim, for whom 
striving towards this knowledge should be the central purpose and guiding 
principle of life. And for every Muslim, the supreme example remains the Prophet 
Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ). The Prophet Muhammad was the Lawgiver and thus his 
soul was in constant communion with God, whose knowledge encompasses 
everything. Thus, the Qur'an, which is the book of the words of God, provides a 
rational basis for the discovery of truth, for it holds all the knowledge of both the 
seen and the unseen. And, for the proper understanding of the message of the 
Qur'an, the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ) is the guide for every individual Muslim. Thus, 
besides the Qur'an, which is the supreme source, the Prophet's (p. b. u. h. ) traditions 
also play a secondary role in providing various useful kinds of knowledge. 
The Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) has transmitted the message of the 
Qur'an to humanity by instructing his followers in the understanding of the 
Qur'an. The Prophet (p. b. u. h. ) was the man whose life approached as closely as 
humanly possible to the ideal set forth in the Qur'an. 5 Hence, al-Ghazal[. in his 
discussions, gives the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) and other 
prophets' sayings beside the Qur'anic verses. 36 
Islam appears to emphasise two kinds of knowledge; one dealing with 
morality and ritual and the other dealing with internal self-discipline and the 
3s 'A'isha (may God he pleased with her) said, "The character of the emissary of God (may 
God bless him and grant him peace) was the Qur'an. " (Muslim, So/il al-tnusirria, 139). 
This means that the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. uh. ) was the perfect exemplar of the virtues 
expounded in the Qur'an. See also Faziur Rahmart, Islam, p. 33. 
36 For example, sec al-Ghazali's way of discussion in Kiläb a! -'ilnt, Ihyä"ulurn al-din. 
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purification of the heart. An example of this is given in the Qur'an: God asks 
Muslims not only to keep their actions pure but also to guard against evil 
thoughts. As God says in the Qur'an, "Whether you show what is in your minds or 
conceal it, God callcth you to account". 37 After the time of the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ), 
his companions continued to practise the self-discipline and uprightness which he 
enjoined. 
Thus it can be said that Muslims recognise there arc three aspects of 
knowledge: the knowledge revealed through the Qur'an, the knowledge of the 
understanding of the Qur'an obtained through the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ) and the knowledge obtained through inner purification and 
self-discipline based on the practice of the companions of the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ). 18 
Al-Ghazal[, in hisKildb al-`ilm discusses knowledge and matters related 
to it in the light of the three aspects mentioned above. 39 Al-Ghazhli follows this 
book with the Kitib gawä`id a/-`aqi'id, 40 in which he attempts to show that 
acquiring knowledge is the means to making the principle of Tawhid a living 
factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. 
Thus, al-Ghazäli answers the question, in what sense does human 
knowledge resemble God's knowledge? Now this question is connected to two 
37 AI-Qur'an, 2: 284. 
This can he seen from a1-Ghazali's way of discussion in his AitAb riyeidat al-nal..; Ih}'x' 
'ulirm al-din. See also, Fazlur Rahman, Islam, p. 129. 
39 Abu- 11amid al-Ghazäli, Ki/äb al-71m, Ibyrt, vol. 1, pp. 11-116, lang. trans. by Nabih 
Amin Faris, The Book ofKnowlcylgc; 
Lahore, 1974. 
40 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghaiäli, Kitäh yawä'id a/-'ayä'id, Ihyri ; vol. 1, pp. 117-166. 
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important points: one of God's attributes is knowledge and that true knowledge is 
attainable only by one who has knowledge of the divine cause or secret of the 
universe, as God is indeed the first and final cause of the universe. Thus, true 
knowledge is knowledge of God which is possible for human beings to attain only 
through revelation and prophecy. Knowledge of God (ma `rifah) is the end of all 
cognition and the fruit of every science (`i/m). This is agreed by all schools of 
thought. And although God cannot be known as other things are known, human 
beings are capable of achieving some realisation of His being 41 
It is God Who transmits knowledge and wisdom (hikmah). The Qur'an 
contains some matters that are humanly attainable and others that arc not. So it is 
the mark of a believer's faith to accept the matters in the Qur'an that are not 
perceptible by his intellect. A Muslim (believer) therefore accepts that the human 
intellect is limited. To believe the whole of the Qur'an requires faith. However, 
although belief in the revealed text is essential, the human intellect also has its 
place. The Qur'an is also full of references to nature in the form of clues (Hybt). 
These clues actually indicate God's wisdom. It is the task of the human intellect to 
discover this wisdom. 42 
Acceptance of the revealed text, i. e. the Qur'an, must come first; only then 
can the human intellect do its work. One should not place too great trust in the 
intellect as do the philosophers whose arguments al-Ghazal[ refutes. The 
philosophers are worshippers of reason; they perceive rational truth to be the real 
truth, of which other truths, including religious truth, arc mere images. On this 
a1 Abu- llamid al-Ghazali, Mrznn a! -`amaý p. 351. 
42 Al-Qur'an, 3: 191. 
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point the discipline of philosophy becomes detached from its Islamic element. Al- 
Ghazäli attacks the idea that philosophy is the repository of real truth. He 
approves of the way of Sufism because it is a path to true knowledge. As many of 
the experiences gained through süff practice transcend language, they must be 
'tasted' by the individual. AI-Ghazdli surely experienced this 'taste' himself for his 
claims to true knowledge derive from the way of Sufism. 43 Al-Ghazali contends 
that there is a real difference between the theoretical methods (luruq al-`ilm) of 
Sufism and the theoretical methods of both the theologians and the philosophers. 
For the s ifs, the first requirement in the acquisition of knowledge is to purify the 
soul of evil and whatever prevents goodness from taking root in the hcart. 44 
In his Kimiyä-i sa`ädah, al-GhazUli describes how one can overcome his 
lower nature and find happiness through the correct knowledge of self, God, this 
world and the next world. 45 He divides knowledge generally into two divisions: 
the detrimental and the useful. Detrimental knowledge is that which distracts 
from or retards the understanding of one's inner self. 
Al-Ghazäli discusses the importance of knowledge in most of his works. In 
his book titled Bidsyal al-hidäyah (The Beginning of Guidance), al-Ghazäli states 
that one should make sure that his intention to seek knowledge is genuinely for 
the sake of receiving guidance from God. Guidance is the fruit of knowledge. It 
has its beginning and ending, and its outward and inward aspects. To reach the 
43 See previous discussion in Chapter 2. 
44 Abu llämid al-Ghana , Moen al-`amai pp. 221-223. 
43 Refer to the previous chapter, AI-Gha i 's Theory of Soul. 
46 For details see Abu- }1imid a1-Gha7ili, Kitib aI- `ilrß Ibye , vol I, pp. 23-41, pp. 41- 
44. 
290 
ending one has to complete the beginning and to discover the inward aspect one 
has to master the outward aspect. 47 
The beginning of guidance is when one's soul is drawn to and submissive 
towards the search for knowledge. On the other hand, if one rejects the serious 
seeking of knowledge, then it shows that the part of his soul which is drawn to 
seek knowledge is the evil-inclined irrational soul. It has been roused to obedience 
`R to Satan. 
Al-Ghazäli goes on to divide seekers of knowledge into three types. 
Firstly, those who seek knowledge as their provision for the life to come are saved. 
Secondly, those who seek knowledge for worldly aims such as wealth, power and 
influence but at the same time are aware of ultimate truth are in jeopardy. Thirdly, 
those who seek knowledge as a means to gain wordly rewards but believe 
themselves to be true scholars are foolish and will peri sh. 49 
Al-Ghaztli points out that the third seeker of knowledge is unmindful of 
the words of God, "0 ye who have believed, why do ye say what ye do not do. " `0 
The reputation of such a scholar may make others follow in his footsteps and 
desire only the rewards of this world. Even though he may exhort men to obey 
God, his actual behaviour contradicts his preaching. And according to al-Ghazalf, 
human nature is more inclined to share in what is done than to follow what is said. 
47 Abu- Hamid al-Gbazäli, Bidiyal al-bidiyah, p. 17, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
TheFaitb, pp. 95-96. 
48 Abi 11amid al-Ghazali, Bidiyal al-hidiyab, pp. 17-18, Eng. trans. p. 96. 
49 Abi I, lamid al-Ghazili, Bidiyal al-hidiyab, pp. 19-20, Eng. trans. pp. 97-98. 
50 AI-Qur'an, 61: 2. 
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A man's conduct speaks more articulately than his words. Thus, this type of 
scholar actually cause God's servants to disobey Him. "' Al-Ghaiäli then 
admonishes the seeker of knowledge to be among the first group. He concludes 
that the beginning of guidance is outward piety and the end of it is inward piety, 
for only the pious are guided. Piety then entails carrying out the commands of God 
and avoiding His prohibitions. 52 
As we have seen, in al-Munqidh, al-Ghazäli mentions genuine religious 
leaders (`ulamä , singular `slim) possessing true knowledge. "The genuine `iliin 
does not commit a sin except by a slip, and the sins arc not part of his intention at 
all. Genuine knowledge is that which informs us that sin is a deadly poison and 
that the world to come is better than this; and the man who knows that does not 
give up the good for what is lower than it. " Most people's knowledge only makes 
them bolder in disobeying God Most High. But genuine knowledge increases a 
man's reverence and fear and hope. This is what keeps him from committing sin 
intentionally. 53 
The religion of Islam consists of two parts: the performance of what God 
has commanded us to do in this world and the avoidance of the forbidden. But to 
leave the forbidden is more difficult than to perform the commanded. To abandon 
the forbidden can be done only by the upright and pious. This is because only the 
upright is able to fight and set aside his appetite and desire. 54 
51 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazäli, Bidiyal al-bideyah, p. 20, ling. trans. pp. 98-99. 
52 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazati, I3idäyal al-bidäyab, p. 20, Eng. trans. p. 99. 
53 Abu- 1.1amid al-Ghazäli, al-Afungidb, p. 122, ling. trans. by W. Montgomery Wall, 
The Faith, p. 91. 
54 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazäli, Bidlyal aI-bidiyah, p. 59, Eng. trans. p. 145. 
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Human beings commit sin through the various parts of their bodies. But as 
these parts are the gifts of God, sin is the greatest ingratitude and betrayal of 
trust. Thus, according to al-Ghazali, human beings must be aware of the tasks 
appointed by God to each parts of the body. This is because, on the day of 
judgement, all the parts of a person's body will bear witness to his actions in this 
world. According to al-Ghazalf, there are seven major parts of the body that 
commonly commit sin: the eye, the tongue, the stomach, the genitals, the hand 
and the foot. Al-Ghazali then discusses the tasks that these seven parts have been 
created to perform. 55 
The eye was created solely in order that man may be guided by it, that he 
may be aided by it in respect of his needs, and that by it he may behold the 
wonders of the earth and the heavens in order to learn the signs of God Most High 
from them. And the eye (of a man) should refrain from three major things; namely, 
from looking at women that it is unlawful to look at (from looking at a beautiful 
form lustfully), from looking at a Muslim with contempt and from perceiving the 
disgrace or vice of a Muslim. 56 
The car was created that human beings might hear the word of God Most 
High, the traditions of the God's Messenger (p. b. u. h. ), and the wisdom of God's 
saints. Only in this way can they gain the knowledge that will bring them to the 
realm of enduring and everlasting bliss. The ear, therefore, must be kept from 
listening to what God disapproves such as heresy, slander, vain conversation or 
55 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Bidäya! al-bidäyab, pp. 59-60, Eng. trans. pp. 146-146. 
56 Abu- Eiamid al-Ghazali, Bidäyat a! -bidäyab, p. 60, Eng. trans. p. 146. 
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obscenity, for all these will bring one to destruction. 
7 
The tongue was created chiefly that human beings might frequently engage 
in the dhikrof God Most High and in reciting the Qur'an. It is also to be used in 
directing the creatures of God Most High to His way. In al-Ghazäli's view, the 
tongue is the part of a person's body that has the most power over him and over 
the rest of creation. Thus, it is important for human beings to gain the mastery 
over this particular part of his body. Al-Ghazäli then gives eight major 
transgressions of the tongue which must be guarded against: lying; breaking 
promises; backbiting; arguing or disputing; 58 self-justification; cursing; invoking 
evil on other creatures, and ridiculing or scoffing at others. 51) 
In respect of disputation, al-Ghazalf remarks that to make the truth evident 
to another is good, but this should be carried out by way of counsel in private and 
not through public disputation. 60 Al-Ghazalf also maintains that counsel has a 
distinctive form and character, it requires diplomacy and a particular technique. If 
not handled properly, it will turn to be criticism and may do more harm than 
good. 61 Here al-Ghazälf is concerned to stress the importance of exhortation and 
counselling, rather than disputation, in Islam. This point is one of many similar 
57 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazal , 
Bideyat a/-hidiyab, p. 60, Eng. trans. p. 146. 
SB Regarding the fourth matter - that is argument and disputation - Al-Ghazali refers in 
particular to the thelogians, whose nature is to dispute and argue on matters of theology 
and metaphysics. This seems to be related to al-Ghazali's attitude towards the science of 
kal z See Abe Hamid al-Ghazali, Bidäyal al-bidäyab, pp. 63-64, Eng. trans. pp. 150. 
151. 
59 Abu- k1 mid al-Ghazäli, Bidlyat al-bidayab, pp. 61-66, Eng. trans. pp. 147-153. 
60 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Bidayst al-bidiyab, p. 64, Eng. trans. p. 151. 
61 Abu-Iiämid al-Ghazäli, Bidiyal al-bidlyab, p. 64, Eng. trans. p. 151. 
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that suggest that al-Ghazäli's works contain advice on counselling and emotional 
care. 
The stomach should be filled with lawful food and be guarded from what is 
unlawful or legally doubtful. A1-Ghazäli warns that satiety can harden the heart, 
impair the intellect, and weaken the memory. It also makes the limbs too heavy 
for piety and for knowledge and thus strengthens the desires and aids the host of 
Satan. 62 
Al-Ghazrlf writes that a man must guard his genitals from contact with all 
persons except his lawful spouses and slave women. As a precondition of such 
restraint, he should first guard his eyes from looking at and his heart from thinking 
what is unlawful. Also he should refrain from filling his stomach with the 
unlawful or doubtful and avoid satiety for all these arc movers of desire and can 
become its seed-bed 63 
One's hands should be guarded from beating another Muslim, from 
receiving unlawfully, from harming another creature, from betraying trust, and 
from writing what is not to be said, for the pen can be considered as man's second 
tongue. `'' One also should prevent his feet from going to an unlawful place and 
6s from entering the court of a wicked ruler. 
62 Abu- llämid al-Ghazalf, Bidiyat al-hidiyah, pp. 66-67, Eng. trans. 153-155. 
63 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Bidiyat al-bidiyah, p. 67, Eng. trans. p. 155. 
64 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazni, Bidiyat al-hidiyah, pp. 67-68, Eng. trans. p. 155. 
65 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazal l, Bidiyat aI-bidiyah, p. 68, Eng. trans. pp. 155-156. Al-Ghaze1i's 
mention of the wicked ruler in particular seems to indicate that during his time, religious 
scholars tended to use their position and status as a means to obtain the favour of a ruler. 
Here, as in most of his works, al-Gha7ali emphasises the inner aspects of things. 
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Thus, one should guard every part of one's body from any act of 
disobedience to God Most High. This is because a person's eternal destiny depends 
on their conduct in this life. In order to protect the members of the body, one has 
first to purify his heart, for their acts are developed through its attributes. One 
must purify one's heart both outwardly and inwardly; hence, one must be inwardly 
pious, and not be content with mere bodily performance of the acts of devotion. 
The soundness of the heart will lead to the soundness of the whole body. 66 
Al-Ghazäli deals with the many blameworthy qualities of the heart and 
with the purification of the heart from its vices in the sections on Things 
Destructive and Things Salutary of his Ihyä'. But it is in his Bidxyal aI-hidävah 
that he particularly discusses the three evil dispositions of the heart that he 
believed were prominent among the religious scholars of his time. These are envy, 
hypocrisy, and pride or self-admiration. These three he considers the roots of all 
other evil dispositions. Al-Ghazäli warns those who wish to seek knowledge to 
purify their hearts of these three, otherwise they will not be able to preserve a 
sound intention. To pursue knowledge in order to dispute with and surpass others 
is the greatest cause of these vices and what results from them, and they easily 
take root in the hearts of those who love this world. And man has to take from this 
world only what is necessary to help him with regard to the world to come. '' 
A1-Ghazalf concludes that his discussion in Bidäyal al-hidbyah is only a 
small part of piety in its exterior aspect, which is, as the title states, the beginning 
66 Abü Hamid al-Ghazäli, Bidäyatal-bideyab, pp. 68-69, Eng. trans. pp. 156-158. 
67 See Abü EEämid al-Ghazäli, Bidäya[ al-bidäyab, pp. 69-67, ling. trans. pp. 159-167. 
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of guidance. He mentions that he deals more fully with the interior aspect of piety 
in his Ihyi: He further writes, 
When you have built up the interior of your heart in 
piety, at that the veils between you and your Lord 
will be removed, the light of mystic knowledge will 
be revealed to you, there will burst forth from your 
heart the springs of wisdom, and the secrets of the 
supernal realm will be made clear to you. 
The man who makes his religion a means to the 
gaining of this world, will lose both worlds alike; 
whereas the man who gives up this world for the 
sake of religion, will gain both worlds alike. " 
5.4. Al-Ghazäli's life as the model: 
Al-Ghazali's restless effort in searching for the Truth is among the 
qualities that make him one of the most renowcd scholars of the medieval period. 
As he himself recounts in his al-Munqidh, he had been seeking absolute certainty 
from his student days until his fame as a scholar was established. His search for 
certainly ultimately led him to abandon his eminent position at the Nizämiyah 
College for a life of seclusion and contemplation. He gave up the temptations of 
riches, honour and glory for the sake of searching for truth. That he succeeded in 
eradicating the love of these things from his heart is testimony that he had 
attained to an extraordinary degree a state of spiritual purity and moral 
68 Abu- Flämid al-Gha"r. äli, ßidäyat at-6ideya6, p. 77, Eng. Irans. pp. 167-168. 
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uprightness. 
His quest for truth ended with his affirmation of the ways of the süfi s as 
the best method of attaining true knowledge and certainty. As was mentioned in 
the previous chapter, al-Ghazali had been in contact with the teachings of Sufism 
in his childhood; thus he was going back to something familiar when he finally 
turned to the way of the . 5u-ff s. 
The fact that al-Ghazälf ultimately turned to Sufism to purify himself and 
gain spiritual strength proves that, of the four sciences examined in his a/- 
Munqidh, the way of the süff s favoured him with the certainty that he was looking 
for, through illumination and beatific vision. Thus, the influence of Sufism plays 
an important role in most of his writings on the purification of self and moral 
behaviour. 
In his Kitäb al-71M al-Ghazäli discusses the role of the person who has 
knowledge 69 What function should such a person have in society? He also 
discusses the qualities of the true scholar and his antithesis. A) The relevance of this 
can be seen from what happened to al-Ghazäli when he decided to end his solitude 
and went back to Ni shäpür. As al-Ghazäli considered himself to be the one chosen 
by God to revive His religion, he went back to teach and disseminate knowledge. 
But this time he said that he would preach concerning the knowledge which 
disdains worldly desire and success. 71 
69 Ab u- flämid al-Ghazat , 
Kitib al--`ilm, Jiyi, vol. I, pp. 74-78, Eng. trans. pp. 144- 
153. 
7° Abi Flämid al-Ghazäli, Ki[ib al-'ilg Ibyä ; voL 1, pp. 78-107, Eng. trans. pp. 154- 
220. 
7 Abu- tlnmid al-Ghazili, al-Mrmgidb, pp. 115-116, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery 
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Al-Ghazdlf's great desire to understand the teachings of the süff s regarding 
incontrovertible truth led to a transformation of his own psychological structure. 
He had come to believe that in order to understand Sufism thoroughly one must 
combine both theory and practice. 72 Al-Ghazalf, then, was determined to become 
an initiate. After becoming a practising 5u-ff, al-Ghazalf experienced stiff states 
during his period of seclusion. 73 These experiences showed him the structure of 
the path to the true faith. And psychologically speaking it shows that the activity 
of mind which transcends intellection is crucial in achieving the real truth in 
human life. 
The years passed in solitude, recollection, contemplation and remembrance 
of none but Allah, and under harsh and simple conditions, brought about the 
development of al-Ghazali's intuition and hitherto hidden faculties. His major 
work, the Jhyä, actually consists of a framework of the stiff teachings that are 
linked with human experience. And al-Ghazali's own life and experiences arc the 
model of this development of the inner self. This also can be seen from the 
organisation of the contents of this particular work. Al-Ghazalf places his 
discussion of knowledge at the beginning to show the importance of knowledge in 
human life. Then he proceeds with the discussion on faith. After that he comments 
on the various `ibddat, both obligatory and recommended, partly in order to show 
Watt, The Failh, pp. 83-84. 
n Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, al-Mrmyidh, p. 95, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
TheFailh, p. 56. 
73 Al-Ghazäli briefly discusses his A ff experiences in his al-Muogidb min a! -daläl. Ile also 
mentions that among the things that became clear to him from his practice of the .,.; Uff way, 
is the true nature and special characteristics of prophetic revelation. See Abü ltämid al- 
Ghazäli, al-MLwgidh, pp. 101-104, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith, pp. 63- 
66. 
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that he understands what is important for ordinary Muslims and as testimony to 
his own early experience. The following sections of the work, including the 
definition of nafs and the mysteries of the heart, the purification of the soul and 
how to restrain the desires, arc more representative of his later experiences even 
though he admits that his doubts began much earlier. 74 
AI-Mungidh also can be regarded as tracing al-Ghazäli s intellectual 
development. 75 It was written to answer those who asked him how he had arrived 
at his final view, 76 and recounts his spiritual struggles. It is also, as we have seen, 
a critique of the intellectual and spiritual climate of his time and place. 
Al-Ghazali's own legal and scholarly background, helped him to realise the 
limits of figh and of all purely intellectual endeavour. Scholarship and 
metaphysical speculation alone cannot provide a true understanding of reality, and 
may even be detrimental if used as a means to gain worldly influence. 77 
Al-Ghazal[ therefore decided to transform his way of life. His longing for 
the eternal led him to abandon his influential position and walk in the su-f way. 
His devotion and rigorous practice at last confirmed his belief and dispelled his 
doubt and confusion. He discovered that direct knowledge of reality which cannot 
74 See above, p. 18. 
75 His intellectual development is also important in giving us the way of inner development. fly 
doubling other sciences as ways to truth, al-Ghazäli chose the way of Sufism. In becoming a 
practising süfi, he went through stages of inner self purification. 
76 Abu- 11ämid al-Ghazäli, al-Mungidh, p. 55, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Faith, p. 17. 
77 Abu- IIämid al-Ghazäli, a/-Mungidh, p. 98, fing. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Faith, pp. 58-59. 
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be described but can be experienced; which cannot be taught but can be received. 
According to al-Ghazäli, by means of this knowledge, man can perceive what is 
true even beyond the boundaries of thought and sense. But those who have not 
been granted this immediate experience cannot understand what they really are. 
Al-Ghazäli regarded such knowledge as a miraculous grace and the beginning of 
prophecy. 
In general the man to whom He has granted no 
immediate experience at all, apprehends no more of 
what prophetic revelation really is than the name. 
The miraculous graces given to the saints arc in truth 
the beginnings of the prophets; and that was the first 
'state' of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him) 
when he went out to Mount Hirt+, and was given up 
entirely to his Lord, and worshipped, so that the 
bcdouin said, Muhammad loves his Lord 
passionately. Now this is a mystical 'state' which is 
realized in immediate experience by those who walk 
in the way leading to it. 78 
Sufi writings and teaching practices are actually methods by which man 
may experience direct knowledge and which consist of both theoretical and 
practical instruction. And this direct knowledge is connected with the perceptive 
or intuitive understanding. Intuition is developed in order to pass beyond the 
limits of reason. Hence, intuition can perceive and integrate what reason alone 
78 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, a/-Mungidh, p. 103, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Faith, pp. 64-65. 
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cannot accept; as al-Ghazäli himself said, among the things that became clear to 
him from his practice of the sU-f way was the true nature and special 
characteristics of prophetic revelation. 79 
Thus, al-Ghazali's life is a testament to both his spiritual and intellectual 
development. As he writes in al-Mungidh, 
It had become clear to me that I had no hope of the 
bliss of the world to come save through a God- 
fearing life and the withdrawal of myself from vain 
desire. It was clear to me too that the key to all this 
was to sever the attachment of the heart to worldly 
things by leaving the mansion of deception and 
returning to that of eternity, and to advance towards 
God most high with all earnestness. It was also clear 
that this was only to be achieved by turning away 
from wealth and position and fleeing from all time- 
consuming entanglements. 80 
After ten years spent in seclusion, al-Ghazdli came to realise that 
irreligious doctrines had spread and that the foundations of faith among the people 
had been shaken by the very ones who were supposed to guide them. He felt the 
time had come to end his seclusion and bring his people back to knowledge of the 
79 Abu- I . mid al-Gbazaff, &I-Mungid4 p. 104, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Faith p. 66. 
ß0 Abis Ilimid al-Ghazäli, al-Mrmgidh, p. 98, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Faith, p. 58. 
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truth but was not sure of his own strength; he needed the support of a pious ruler. 
But then, by the power of God Most High, came the invitation from the vizier 
himself asking him to go back to Nishapür to confront this religious problem. 
After consulting a number of men skilled in the science of the heart, and believing 
that he had been chosen by God to revive, he committed himself to take up the 
defence of the faith. 8' 
Although he returned to teaching, al-Ghazälf now worked with a new 
intention: to awaken people to the knowledge of the hereafter rather than to 
provide that by which worldly success is attained. He was now convinced of the 
value of what he was doing and prayed God the Almighty to guide him so that he 
might guide others. 82 
5.5. The Spirituality of al-Ghazal f: 
Al-Ghazäli always stresses the inner aspects of every matter he discusses; 
this is especially true of his comments on the acts of devotion. As we have seen, 
the Ihyä' brings together inner or süf experiences with orthodox Islamic belief 
and practices. Al-Ghazäli succeeds in clarifying the place of personal development 
and inner experience within Islamic teaching. 
Al-Ghazäli's teachings as elaborated in his Ihyi' can be generally 
understood as coming under the five pillars of Islam. These are the ritual practices 
ai Abu- I1ämid al-Ghazaii, al-Mungidh, pp. 114-116, ling. trans. by W. Montgomery 
Watt, The Failh, pp. 79-82. 
82 For details see Abu llämid al-Ghazäli, aI-Mungidb, p. 116, Eng. trans. by W. 
Montgomery Watt, The Failh, pp. 82-83. 
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instituted to help Muslims be continually mindful of their inner nature and to 
support them in fulfilling the message of the Qur'an. The five pillars arc: the 
confession of faith, the daily prayer, the giving of zakii, fasting, and the 
pilgrimage to Mecca. 
The confession of faith is: "There is no God but God and Muhammad is the 
Prophet. " A practicing Muslim must restate these articles of faith daily. R3 It is 
most important to understand their meaning. 84 
The daily prayer (yaläh) is recited five times a day. The prerequisite of 
prayer is cleanliness of the body and clothing, which also has an effect on the soul. 
When the body is clean, its purification is constructed in the soul, for according to 
al-Ghazäli this cleanliness can help enlighten the soul85 AI-Ghazäli as always 
concentrates on the internal aspects of the prayer which one must be aware of, 
otherwise it will not have the desired effect on the soul. Al-Ghazali argues that six 
characteristics must be present in a man's mind when he performs the prayer. The 
first of these is single-mindedness (khushü' ): the mind must be free from all 
things other than the act of prayer itself. Secondly, it is essential to understand the 
meaning of the verses recited in the prayer. Thirdly, one must magnify God and be 
completely submissive towards Him. The fourth necessary characteristic is fear of 
His punishment that will be incurred if the prayer be defective. Fifthly, man must 
hope for his reward from God The Majestic. Lastly, there is shame; that is, the 
83 That is, during the sallh. Each time a Muslim restates these articles, he renews his pledge 
towards God and confesses the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h. ). Ab-u 
IlRmid al-Ghazhli, Kithh asrar al-solah, Ihyi, vol. 1, p. 224. For del ails see Abu- 1.1amid 
al-Ghazal i, Klub gawe'ld al- `aqa `id, Ihys , vol. 1. 
a4 Abu- 1.1ämid a1-Ghazäli, Klub al--`ilm, Ibyä ; vol. 1, pp. 23-24, Eng. trans. pp. 31-32. 
85 Abu- 11ämid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb al-arbain, p. 24. 
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feeling that one is unable to perform the prayer as required. 
96 Prayer can be of 
benefit to the human soul in that it removes the evil effects of small sins, it 
nurtures good qualities such as humility, fear and hope and it draws man near to 
God through the worshipper's mindfulness of Him throughout the prayer. 117 
Regular prayer also can reorient the daily activities of the individual Muslim and, 
furthermore, reorient all the members of the community to their moral and 
religious concerns. 
As all things are from God, it is incumbent on man to give zakit (divine 
tax) each year. A wealthy man has to return a predetermined percentage of his 
wealth to the needy. When someone pays zakit, he is actually returning to the 
larger Muslim community what has come from them. Paying zaket is not merely a 
matter of dutifully giving back a certain percentage of one's wealth; it has a deeper 
meaning. By paying zakht one not only helps the needy. One also purifies his soul 
of the evil of acarice, increases his gratitude to God, and expresses obedience and 
love to Him. All these will lead him to long to meet God.! " 
Fasting (sawm) for a month each year (besides many other supererogatory 
fasts) helps the individual Muslim to remain aware of the conflict between the 
lower and higher natures. According to al-Ghazalf, there are three grades of 
fasting. The fasting of the common man (, sawm al-`awhmm) involves refraining 
from satisfying the appetite of the stomach and the gratification of sex for a 
period lasting from dawn until sunset. The fasting of the select (khawi ), i. e. the 
86 Ab u- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb asrar al-. rolab, Ibyä ; vol. 1, pp. 214-217. 
87 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb asrar al-soläb, Ihyä ; vol. 1, pp. 211-213. 
88 For a detailed discussion on takit see Abi Hämid al-Gha"r. äli, Kit lb =it&1-zakät, lbyä ; 
vol. 1, pp. 276-305. 
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pious (, sälihun) involves keeping the ears, the eyes, the tongue, the hands and the 
feet as well as the other senses free from that of which God disapproves. The 
fasting of the elite among the select such as the fasting of the prophets, those near 
to God (mugarrabin) and the most devout (ciddigin) is the fast of the mind from 
inferior thoughts and worldly worries; it is complete indifference to anything other 
than God and the hereafter. 89 
The outward aspect of fasting can be seen as simply the abstention from 
food and drink, the denial to the body what God prohibits, and sexual abstinence, 
but its inward aspect is much more important. The spirit of fasting lies in 
weakening the bodily desires: as they become weaker, the tendency to evil 
diminishes, and thus the potential for good deeds increases. Thus man is brought 
near to God. 90 Fasting, then, is meant to subdue the natural forces and break the 
hold of the passions, which are the tools of Satan. 
Lastly, every Muslim must undertake a hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, the 
Holy City of Islam. This act must be done at least once in his lifetime whenever he 
is capable of it. Besides the many external aspects of this act of devotion, al- 
Ghazäli also stresses the inner aspects and the deeper meaning of the pilgrimage. 
The pilgrimage is the time when all social or commercial interests are put aside. 
The pilgrim must devote himself totally to spiritual questions. Regarding those 
acts which constitute the external aspects of the pilgrimage including some for 
which the reasons are not clear to the human intellect (such as throwing stones, 
running and so on), according to al-Ghazäli the performance of such acts shows 
89 Abn Hamid a1-Gbazäli, KitBb asrar sl-sawrr; Ihyä ; vol. 1, p. 310. 
90 Abn 1{ämid a1-Gha. zäli, Kiteb asrar al-sawn, Ihyi ; vol. 1, pp. 311-313, llideyat al- 
hideyah, pp. 55-58, Eng. trans. pp. 142-144. 
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the obedience of man to what God has commanded. And in performing those acts, 
he succeeds in subduing his desire and passions. 91 
Thus, al-Ghazal 's teachings, especially in his major work Ihyri, invite man 
to live in accordance with the externals of the shari'a while understanding its 
inner aspects. His aim is always to interiorise the externals, educating his readers 
in the inner meaning and purpose of the rituals, and emphasizing the presence of 
both heart and mind in every act of devotion. 
Al-Ghazäli, then, insists that our personality and life actually consist of 
two dimensions: the outer and the inner. He describes the relationship between the 
body and the spirit, the form and the meaning and the surface and the depth of 
each devotional act. Al-Ghazäli shows how the five acts of devotion are not 
merely the observance of the prescribed rites but are the means whereby one is 
enabled to live in obedience to God and seek His pleasure. Al-Ghazäli attempts to 
show that every act, object and relationship is part of divine nature and that it is 
possible to realise this nature in every aspect of the daily practice of Islam. As we 
have seen, his experience of Sufism was a major influence on al-Ghazhf's concept 
of the inner meaning of every act, and led him to stress the correct practice of each 
act as well as the capacity of the act to transform a person's inner being if the 
observance is carried out as he recommends. 
Al-Ghazäli's study of fiqh had left him unsatisfied. In his view, what 
should be considered as useful knowledge is that which furthers a person's growth 
and contributes to the attainment of eternal life. Although he admits that there is 
For details discussion on bajj see Ab- Hamid al-Ghazali, Kileb asrara! -bail Ibyä, vol. 
1, pp. 318-359. 
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no division between religion and state and that jurisprudence is connected 
indirectly with religion through the affairs of this world, he considered that fiqh 
does not go `beyond the limits of this world into the next. ' 
... what the 
jurisprudent comes nearest discussing 
under works which pertain to the hereafter are 
four: 92 Islam, prayer, almsgiving, (doing) what is 
lawful and (abstaining from) what is unlawful. But 
when you examine how far the jurisprudent's 
speculation goes into these (four) you will find that 
it does not go beyond the limits of this world into 
the next. 93 
In regard to Islam, the jurisprudent discourses on what is sound or unsound 
as well as on its conditions. But he only pays attention to outward confession of 
faith; the heart does not come within his scope. 
Regarding prayer, the jurisprudent is entitled to give his opinion whether 
or not it has been correctly performed according to the prescribed regulations; he 
is not concerned with the single-mindedness of the worshipper during his prayer. 95 
But according to al-Ghazäli, one who is not in a state of single-mindedness 
92 Arabic text read three. 
93 Abü Hamid al-Ghazal , 
Kitab al-`ilk Ibyä , voL 1, p. 27-28, Eng. trans. pp. 40-42. 
44 Abü Hamid a1-Ghazäli, Kitib al-`ilrn, Ibyi, vol. 1, p. 28, Eng. trans. p. 42, Kitih 
astir al-sohl, p. 213. 
ss Abi Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitih al-`film, Ihyä ; voL 1, p. 28-29, Eng. trans. p. 43, Kitih astir al- 
solah, Ihyi, vol. 1, p. 213. 
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throughout his prayer destroys the usefulness of his prayer for the hereafter. 96 The 
presence of the heart is the spirit of the prayer itself. 97 
In respect of almsgiving or divine tax, the jurisprudent merely examines 
what satisfies the demand of the magistrate. Hence, in the case of one who has 
delayed payment of the alms until forced to pay by the power of the magistrate, 
the jurisprudent rules that the responsibility of the magistrate has been fulfilled. 98 
Concerning the lawful and the unlawful, avoidance of the unlawful is part 
of religion. But al-Ghazäli observes that piety (wara') also has grades. There are 
four degrees of piety. The first grade, which is the only piety of concern to the 
jurisprudent, is that piety which is required for right testimony. It consists in 
avoiding all that is clearly unlawful. Abandoning this piety disqualifies a person 
from bearing witness before a court, from being a judge or acting as a governor. 
The second grade of piety is that of the honest man which guards against the 
doubtful and so avoids ambiguous and misleading interpretations. The third grade 
of piety is that of the godly that entails refraining from perfectly lawful deeds 
because of fear that they may lead to unlawful ones. For example, one may avoid 
eating or drinking things which arouse the appetite for fear that this may stimulate 
his passion and lust and lead him to commit forbidden acts. Or one may be 
reluctant to discuss the affairs of other people for fear it may lead to calumny. 
Finally, the fourth grade of piety is that of the saints which shuns all things but 
vb Abu- Ijamid al-Ghazal f, Ku lb al-'iluý Ihyi; vol. 1, pp. 28-29, For details on the inner 
requirements of prayer see Abü IIamid al-Ghazäli, Kiu b asri'r aI-svIiA, Ihyä, vol. 1, 
pp. 211-229. 
97 Abü Eiätttid al-Ghazäli, KitAb astir aI-solch, »yä', vol. 1, p. 214. 
98 Abü Hamid al-Gbazali, Kitäb al- `ihn, Ihyä ; vol. 1, p. 29, Eng. trans. p. 43. 
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God for fear of expending one single hour of life on those things which do not 
bring one nearer to God, even though it is clear that they are not, and will not lead 
to, unlawful actions. 99 
It is important to note here that to act in conformity with the requirements 
of this first grade of piety - that which is within the scope of the jurisprudent - 
does not prevent sin being punished in the hereafter. "The jurisprudent does not, 
and should not, express an opinion regarding the things which allure and perplex 
the heart, or how to deal with them, but confines his opinion to those things which 
militate against justice. Hence the entire scope of the jurisprudent's domain is 
limited to the affairs of this world which pave the road to the hereafter. i100 
The above discussions are relevant to the topic in showing how al-Ghazali 
stresses the inner nature of the acts of devotion, and how he perceives them as 
affecting the inner development of the self. Thus, acts of devotion which result 
from fear and hope may lead to love of God. 10' 
The discussion on knowledge and the acts of devotion reflect al-Ghazäli's 
emphasis on the importance of both `ilm and `aural in attaining happiness. What is 
meant by happiness here is the otherworldly happiness which can be attained only 
if knowledge (`ilm) is joined to action (`amaO. '02 By knowledge al-Ghazali means 
99 Abü Ilamid al-Ghazali, Kitäb aI-`iIzn Ihyä, vol. 1, p. 29, Eng. trans. pp. 44-45. 
10° Abü Hamid al-Ghazali, Kitäb al-`i/m; Ibye, vol. 1, p. 29, Eng. trans. pp. 44-45. 
101 The emphasis on both the outward and the inner meanings of devotional acts shows the 
influence of Sufism in al-Ghazili's life. 
102 Ab u- Hamid al-Ghazali, Mizan a/-`ama/, pp. 194-197. 
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demonstrative knowledge and denounces lagild based knowledge I03 Tayrd is only 
necessary in the case of formal worship which has been fixed and determined by 
the prophets, for its manner and effectiveness cannot be understood from the 
intellectual explanation. The prophets alone understand those properties by the 
light of prophecy not of the intellect. 104 
`I/m and `ama/must be combined together in order to gain true happiness. 
This is, as we have seen, also the way of the stiffs, who brought together 
intellectual belief and practical activity. '05 Al-Ghazäli divides the science by 
which man can approach the hereafter into two: namely, the science of revelation 
(`i/m a/-mukdshafa) and the science of practical religion (71m al-mu'iu-ndla). By 
the science of revelation he means the knowledge or the revelation itself. And 
ordinary mind is incapable of understanding the reality of revelation. Hence, the 
prophets themselves only discuss them briefly and figuratively. On the other hand, 
the science of practical religion is merely a path which leads to revelation and it 
was mainly through that path that the prophets of God communicated with the 
people to lead them to Him. What al-Ghazal[ means by the science of practical 
religion is knowledge together with actions in accordance with that knowledge. 106 
103 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazali, a/-Mrmgidb, p. 64, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery Watt, 
The Faith, p. 26. 
104 Abu- Ilämid al-Ghazäli, al-Mzmgidh, pp. 110-111, Eng. trans. by W. Montgomery 
Watt, The Faith, p. 75. 
105 The practical activity consists in getting rid of the obstacles in one's self and in removing 
from the self its low and corrupt characteristics and vicious morals in order to make one's 
heart capable of attaining freedom from what is other than God and also capable of 
constant recollection of Him. Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, al-Mungidh, p. 95, ling. trans. by W. 
Montgomery Watt, The Faith, p. 56. 
106 Abn Hämid al-Ghazäli, Kileb al--`ilcr4 Ibyn ; vol. 1, p. 10, Eng. trans. p. 6. 
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Al-Ghazal further divides the science of practical religion into two: 
namely, the outward science (`i/m zähir) and the inward science (71m bilin). By 
the outward science, al-Ghazal[ refers to the functions of the senses; the bodily 
organs that perform the acts of worship or usages of life. And by the inward 
science he refers to what concerns the functions of the heart. It is thus related to 
the conditions of the heart and the qualities of the soul. The hearts belongs to the 
world of the kingdom 107 (`ä1am al-malakut) and is subject to praiseworthy or 
blameworthy influences. Thus, the science of practical religion is fourfold: it 
comprises the acts of worship, the usages of life, things which are praiseworthy 
and the things which are blameworthy. 108 
In his Mizan al-`aural al-Ghazäli divides knowledge into two: the 
theoretical and the practical. Theoretical knowledge includes the knowledge of 
God, His angels and apostles, and the physical creation and its many divisions, 
both heavenly and terrestrial. Practical knowledge includes the science of ethics 
which consists of the knowledge of the soul, its properties and moral traits, 
household economy and politics. The religious science of jurisprudence thus is 
related to the household economy or politics when it deals with transactions, 
marriage, penalties and taxation. 109 According to al-Ghazalf, the ethical science 
must start with the knowledge of the soul, its powers and properties, for this will 
help man in cleansing his soul and will ultimately bring him to the knowledge of 
God. "O Thus, al-Ghazälf's concept of ethics seems to be based on, st-jfi teachings; 
107 "the world of dominion" as translated by Nabih Amin Faris; it denotes the Attributes as 
opposed to' `slam al jabarrit ' (the world of almightiness), which denotes the Essence. See 
Nabih Amin Faris, TbeBookofKoowledge p. 7. 
1°8 Abu- Hamid a1-Ghazali, )Glib al-`ilrß Ihyi ; voL 1, p. 10, Eng. trans. pp. 6-7. 
109 Abü Ilämid al-Ghazäli, lýzäu el-`smaý pp. 353-355. 
110 Ab U- Hämid a1-Gha7äli, M'izia al-`ama4 p. 198-209. 
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for him, the main function of ethics is to cleanse the soul in order to gain the 
knowledge of God. 
Besides the acts of devotion mentioned above, which are obligatory on all 
Muslims, al-Ghazali also discusses the supererogatory devotional acts. The 
recitation of the Qur'an is considered as a supererogatory act of devotion. The 
recitation of the Qur'an may influence the soul to further generate the love of God 
in the self. In al-Ghazali's view, the recitation of the Qur'an is one of the best 
forms of worship if one studies it in order to understand and act upon what is 
prescribed in it. "' 
Praise (dhikr) of God is also regarded as a supererogatory devotional act. 
Praise of God includes the assertion of God's oneness (tahTlj, the glorification of 
God (tasbih), praising God the Almighty (tahmid) and seeking His forgiveness 
(istighuit). In order that this supererogatory devotional act should have an effect 
on the soul, it has to be performed with single-mindedness. 112 
Lastly, the invocation (du`ä') to God. A true invocation results from 
feelings of self-abasement and helplessness and the realisation of God's greatness. 
Although man may invoke in his own way, to use the invocations transmitted by 
Tradition (ma'thüra) is better. At-Ghazäli mentions many of these in his Kitrib a/- 
adhkär wa 1-da`awl!. If one follows the right methods in invoking God, virtuous 
For details of this matter see Abi Hämid al-Ghazili, Kitäb edäb liliwah &I-Qw-in, Ihye , vol. 
1, pp. 361-389. English translation by Muhammad Abnl Quasem, The Recitation And 
Interpretation of The Qur'än Al-Gbazifl s Theory, Malaysia, 1979. 
"Z For details see Abu- liämid al-Ghazäli, Kiteb &I-adbksr wa 1da`awät, Ibys , vol. 1, 
pp. 390-402. English translation by K. Nakamura, AI-Gbazäli Invocation And 
Supplication, Cambridge, 1990. 
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qualities, among which are submission and humility to God, arc produced in his 
soul. Also, by remembering God in invocations, the love of God is built up in the 
soul. "3 
Thus al-GhazälPs conception of the acts of devotion emphasises the inner 
aspect of each. The heart of man can be polished by means of the acts of 
obedience, and if the heart is pure and clean, it can reflect true reality. 
Conclusion: 
We can conclude from the foregoing discussion that al-Ghazäli's theory of 
soul is relevant to his dynamic view of the human personality. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, he believed that the traits of the character can be transformed, 
bringing the soul closer to God. Al-Ghazäli's life experiences and his writings 
should be seen in the light of this dynamic concept. 
AI-Ghazälf, who experienced and approved of the m5fi way, used words in 
order to explain this concept. But ultimately this experience transcends language. 
Therefore his explanation of such matters is sometimes obscure and unclear. 
For many reasons, süfi experience is not available to all Muslims. But al- 
Ghazälf was trying to explain this experience to the mass of Muslims. In order to 
do this he used not only his scholarship, learning and skill in logic and argument, 
but also had to rely on metaphor and verbal imagery, for example in his 
description of the heart's armies. Sherif in his Gha ifl Theory of Virtue writes 
113 For details see Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Ki! ab al-adbkir wa 1-da`awl!, Ihys , vol, 1, 
pp. 402-435. 
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concerning al-Ghazäti's distinction between transcendental and expressible 
knowledge, "In his view, the ultimate end of mysticism is the vision of God in the 
hereafter, and he regards this as belonging to the knowledge of revelation (`ilm al- 
rnukäshafa) which cannot be expressed or laid down in writing. What can be 
expressed, however, is the knowledge of devotional practice (`ilm al-mu`rimala) 
which shows the novice how to reach the ultimate goal. "' 14 
Also we can see that soul is crucial to al-Ghazäli's notion of personality for 
it is the essence of man; it is what makes the individual what he is. This can be 
seen from al-Ghazäli's own life. He gave up his fame and wealth for the benefit of 
his soul. The dynamic concept of the personality is inseparable from the necessity 
of drawing the soul towards God. Al-Ghazäli's experience led him to the 
conviction that the inner nature of man benefits from the sacrifice of worldly 
pleasures. His task was to convince the ordinary Muslim of this. 
Al-Ghazali, who was trying to reconcile Sufism with orthodox Islam, 
emphasises the great importance of the Qur'an and sunnah to everyday practice. 
He shows how the dynamic element in the acts of devotion can transform the life 
of the ordinary Muslim. For example fasting, zaket, and pilgrimage, if performed 
with an inward understanding, can lead the soul towards God. 
The significance of al-Ghazäli's theory of soul is closely related to this 
dynamic concept. His stress on the significance of the acts of devotion to the 
purifying of the soul is much related to his theory. His view of the function of the 
acts of devotion - that they are not mere outward observances but should be a 
114 Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, Gbazali's Theory of Virtue, p. 3. 
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means of transformation of the personality - hence his emphasis on mindful 
concentration in each act of devotion. Only the acts of devotion that arc 
performed in mindfulness will transform one's inner self, otherwise they remain 
mere mechanical performance. This concept of mindfulness applies to every act of 
devotion. In hajj, man has to perform all the practical acts in a state of 
mindfulness and humbleness towards God, otherwise they will not bring the 
desired result. In prayer, besides the mindfulness required throughout the prayer, 
the Qiblat also has the effect of concentrating all the powers of the personality on 
God and bringing about the unity of society (ummah). 
Among the acts of devotion, there are those acts which are not rationally 
justifiable but are performed because God has commanded us to perform them. For 
example, the running between satiand marwah during va 7 But the function of 
such devotions is that if one performs them in a spirit of total obedience towards 
God, their dynamic impact can be felt or 'tasted' by the ordinary Muslim. This 
complete submission can transform the individual's relationship with God. This is 
the significance of al-Ghazäli's theory of soul. When one hasrealised the meaning 
and purpose of his creation, he will be able to perform any act of devotion in total 
obedience since he knows how humble and weak he is before God. Therefore the 
function of such practices is not to show an individual's piety to his fellow 
Muslims, nor even to enable him to share in the life of the community of the 
faithful, but to transform his inner being. Mechanically performed, the acts of 
devotion will have no dynamic impact or transform the individual. This is the 
significance of al-Ghazal 's understanding offigh and his approval of süfy ways. 
Al-Ghazalf was confronted with the problem of making his experience 
available, in so far as this was possible, to ordinary Muslims. It was not 
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practicable for them all to spend years in seclusion. But the transformation he had 
undergone was also essential to their spiritual health and the health of their 
society. Hence his emphasis on complete mindfulness and obedience in the acts of 
devotion. His theory of soul is not a philosophical matter only: it underlies it 
method, and since he saw the snff way as the most effications method of cleansing 
the soul, by uniting Sufism and orthodoxy he tried to make this method available 
to ordinary Muslims. We can say that al-Ghazäli's theory of soul comes from his 
experience and conviction rather than from his interest in philosophy. It is not 
primarily a contribution to philosophy as a discipline, rather it is inseparable from 
his concept of salvation and personality. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. AL-GHAZALI 'S CONCEPT OF PERSONALITY: 
6.1. Definition 
Before discussing al-Ghazal 's concept of personality, it is important to 
define the key words that are concerned with the concept. There are several 
similar words which are near in meaning to each other. They are: character, 
identity, individuality, person, persona and personality. 
Character is i. "A consistent and enduring aspect of an individual's 
personality. 
ii. The integration of individual traits into a unified whole; 
personality. "' 
iii. "(ethics) the moral nature of an individual. 
iv. (psychology) a phase of personality comprising especially the 
more enduring traits which are of ethical and social 
significance. "2 
Identity is "the characteristic of an organism, sense datum, etc. such that it 
persists without essential change; "3 
Individuality is i. "the organised sum-total of characteristics in any organism 
which distinguish it from any other. 
1 Benjamin B. Wolman, Dictionary ofBehavioral Sciences, p. 58. 
2 Howard L. Warren (editor), Dictionary ofPsycbology, p. 42. 
3 ]bid, p. 130. 
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ii. that which distinguishes one person or thing from another. 
Individuality may be distinguished from personality in three ways: 
a) individuality may refer to any organism of a sufficiently complex structure; 
personality is strictly applicable to human organisms; 
b) individuality attaches itself to any trait, quality, or manifestation of 
behaviour (gait, voice, drinking, playing); personality relates to the whole 
complex of characteristics which make up the individual; 
c) individuality is a differentiating concept with little or no implication of a 
standard; personality implies a positive standard and therefore allows of 
evaluation. 114 
Person is "a human organism regarded as having distinctive characteristics and 
social relations. "5 
Persona is "a function-complex which has come into existence for reasons of 
adaptation or necessary convenience in relation to an object, but 
not identical with individuality. "6 
Personality is i. "the integrated organization of all the cognitive, affective, 
conative, and physical characteristics of an individual as it 
manifests itself in focal distinctness to others; 
ii. the general characterisation, or pattern, of an individual's total 
behaviour; 
iii. the field property of form of the individual's total behavior- 
pattern; 
4 Ibid, p. 136. 
5 Ibid, p. 197. 
6 Ibid. 
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iv. those characteristics of an individual most important in 
determining his social adjustments; 
v. (popular usage) the physical and effective qualities of an 
individual as they systhetically attract or impress others. " 7 
From the above modern definitions of the six similar words, it appears 
that two of them, character and personality, are relevant to the following 
discussion. The first two definitons of'character' and the first four definitions 
of personality are relevant. But before a final definition of al-Ghazali's 
personality is offered, let's start with some of his views on this matter first. 
Al-Ghazal 's discussion of personality does not depart from the 
Qur'änic concept. He does not despise man's physical nature, accepting that 
the mould of the creation of man is the best of moulds. 8 The dual nature of 
man consists of body and soul i. e. the physical and the spiritual. This dual 
nature of man is discussed by al-Ghazäli in four ways. Firstly he discusses four 
terms, each having two meanings. The terms are galb, nal. s, rib and `agl. 9 
These words are used interchangeably in the Qur'an. In the discussion al- 
Ghazäli holds that man must seek knowledge of himself in order to realises his 
nature for he who knows himself may be able to manage or direct his soul 
towards the ultimate goal of happiness in the hereafter. 
Secondly, al-Ghazalf discusses the purpose of creation which is to 
perform `ibädah towards God. Allah declares in the Qur'an that He created 
Ibid, p. 197. 
8 Al-Qur'an, 95: 4. See previous discussion p. 228. 
9 See previous discussion p. 220. 
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mankind to worship Him. 10 The acts of worship also must be carried out solely 
for the sake of God, otherwise they may be no use in the world to come. 
Thirdly, God has sent to mankind a model to follow. God sent the 
prophets to every generation of human beings and the Prophet Muhammad 
(p. b. u. h. ) is the last prophet. God has given mankind the best model of 
prophethood among mankind themselves to be followed by those who have 
hope in God and the hereafter. " 
Fourthly, throughout man's life, he will struggle with both the Devil's 
temptations and with forgetfulness. Both are human weaknesses. Thus, one 
reason that God sent His messengers to mankind is to remind them of their 
true nature. 
Fifthly, there is fluctuation in faith (imän). The condition of man's faith 
agrees with the condition of his nafs. Al-Ghazali refers to three levels ofnaIý. 12 
The pacified nafs (nafv al-mutma'innah), 13 the reproaching naf, (naA; al- 
lawwämah)14 which struggles to return to the right path, and nafs which is 
good enough to tell the person what is right and what is wrong. There is also, 
the nafs" prone to evil (nafs a1-ammärah). 15 Consequently, the condition of one's 
nafs is related to one's faith. The degree of faith determines the degree of soul. 
10 A1-Qur'an, 51: 56. This point can be inferred from al-GhaziG's discussion of the acts of 
devotion. See previous discussion pp. 302-305. 
" AI-Qur'an, 33: 21. This can be seen from al-Ghazäli's use of the tradition of the 
prophets in his arguments. See previous discussion p. 285. 
12 See previous discussion p. 223. 
13 AI-Qur'an, 89: 27. 
14 AI-Qur'an, 75: 21. 
15 Al-Qur'an, 12: 53. 
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Hence, by knowing the nature of himself, the purpose of his creation, 
having the models to follow and knowing his weaknesses, man might be able 
to manage and direct himself and, furthermore, direct the affairs of others in 
this world. As our nafs is a trust (amanah) from God, it has to be returned. To 
attain the happiness in the hereafter, the nafs must return in a good shape and 
pacified condition. 
Therefore, al-Ghazäli's concept of personality covers roughly these five 
basic central concepts; the Qur'änic concept of personality is spiritual rather 
than biological although terms such as 'heart' may be used. And based on the 
above discussion, a possible definition of personality according to al-Ghazäli 
can be that it is the sum of those constant and secure characteristics of an 
individual, both physical and spiritual, which are united to form an integrated 
individual. 
In simpler words, personality for al-Ghazälf means the sum total of the 
characteristics or traits of character of the individual. When a particular 
characteristic is discussed the term ' traits of character' will be used; on the 
other hand, when referring to the whole individual the term 'personality' will 
be used. Hence, this chapter proposes to study al-Ghazälf's theory of 
personality according to the above definition. 
6.2. The Qur'änic concept of happiness: 
Before proceeding to examine al-Ghazäli's thoughts on happiness, it is 
important to discuss the teaching of the Qur'an on this matter. In Islam, the 
concept of happiness is related to that of salvation. The terms used in the 
Qur'an for what is meant by the word 'salvation' are najit (salvation), far. 
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(success), faiib (prosperity) and sa `äda (happiness). 16 
The Qur'anic concept of salvation is most intimately connected with 
Islamic devotions. According to the Qur'an, there are two forms of salvation: 
the salvation that takes place in man's life in this world and that which takes 
place in the world to come. The salvation which takes place in this world is 
found in deliverance from all that threatens or impairs life, such as oppression, 
injustice, calamity, divine chastisement, and trouble and distresses of every 
kind. As God says in the Qur'an, "So when our decree issued, we saved Hud 
and those who believed with him, by (special) Grace from Ourselves: We saved 
them from a severe penalty. 1,17 This form of salvation is granted to man based 
on his faith, piety and devotions. '8 As God says in the Qur'an, "But We 
delivered those who believed and practised right eousness. i19 
The second form of salvation, namely, the salvation in the hereafter is 
found in the deliverance from misery or punishment and the attainment of 
happiness or reward from God. 20 As God says in the Qur'an, "But We shall 
save those who guarded against evil, and We shall leave the wrongdoers 
therein, (humbled) to their knees. "21 According to Muhammad Abul Quasem in 
his Salvation ofthe Soul and Islamic Devotions, 
This is the meaning usually understood when the 
16 Muhammad Abul Quasem, Salvation of the Soul and Islamic Devotions, p. 20. 
17 A1-Qur'an, 11: 58. See also 28: 25,17: 67,21: 76,11: 116. 
's Muhammad Abul Quasem, Salvation ofthe Soul and Islamic Devotions, pp. 19-20. 
19 A1-Qur'an, 41: 18, see also al-Qur'an, 11: 66. 
20 Muhammad Abul Quasem, Salvation of the Soul and Islamic Devotions, p. 20. 
21 A1-Qur'an, 19: 73, also see al-Qur'an, 61: 10,40: 41. 
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term 'salvation' is used in the Qur'an and 
Tradition. The phrase 'doctrine of salvation' or 
'concept of salvation' is also understood to refer 
to this meaning... This kind of salvation pertains 
to sam `iyyät or matters which are to be known 
from the Qur'an or the Prophet. It is the main 
concern of Islamic devotions.... 22 
There are two general features of the Qur'änic view of salvation in the 
hereafter. Firstly, salvation and its opposite, damnation, are of both the soul 
and the body. The concept of the dualism of man is implied in the Qur'tinic 
verses. Thus, the soul is considered to be the real person while the body is 
considered as only its necessary instrument. Hence, it is the soul that will be 
saved or damned, while the body will only follow the soul in this respect. 23 "ln 
the life of this world it is the soul which knows God or is ignorant of Him, 
which is drawn near to God or is veiled from Him; the body is only its 
instrument which the soul uses for its purposes. Therefore, it is the soul which 
will be saved or damned, and the body will also be so as being its tool which 
works for it. " 24 
Secondly, salvation and damnation in the hereafter occur in successive 
stages. The life of the hereafter begins at the moment of death. The stages 
begin with the grave period (barzakh period), 25 which ends when the Day of 
Resurrection dawns. Now begins the second period, that of Resurrection and 
22 Muhammad Abul Quasem, Salvation ofthe Soul and Islamic Devouions, p. 20. 
23 Ibid, pp. 20-21. 
24 Muhammad Abul Quasem, Salvation oftbe Soul and Islamic Devotions, p. 21. Also sec) 
Abn 11amid al-Ghazali, Kltäb dhikr al-maw! wa-mä ba`dahru lbye , vol. 6, p. 131. 
25 The Qur'an, 23: 100,25: 53. 
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Judgement; this itself consists of a few distinct phases. Lastly comes the 
period of dwelling in Paradise or in Hell. Salvation and damnation only take 
place in their full form during this last stage while during the foregoing stages, 
the experience of salvation and damnation is the foretaste of the final stage. 26 
6.3. A1-Ghazäli's Concept of Happiness: 
Happiness is the key feature of al-Ghazäli's concept of personality since 
it is what is sought in this world and may be attained in the next by faithful 
and mindful observance. But perfect happiness is attainable only to the fully 
realized soul in the hereafter. Nevertheless the more the personality is 
balanced, the more happiness the personality is able to experience as a result of 
its own condition and not of external contingencies. Therefore the pursuit of 
happiness in this sense is legitimate for al-Ghazali. 
Al-Ghazäli follows the Qur'än's division of happiness into two aspects. 
His concept of happiness consists of a negative and a positive aspect. The 
negative aspect concerns the pleasures of this world. In al-Ghazäli's view, this 
world is a market-place passed through by pilgrims on their way to the next. 27 
But man sometimes forgets his objective in this world and becomes deceived 
by worldly temptations, seeking only the pleasures they offer. In such cases the 
soul will remain in disgrace after death, 28 suffering pains which have their 
source in the excessive love of this world. 29 But it is important to understand 
that al-Ghazäli did not reject all forms of pleasure belonging to this world. He 
26 Muhammad Abul Quasem, Salvation of the Soul and Islamic I) votions, p. 22. 
27 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kimiyi-i sa`ädsh, pp. 71-72, Eng. trans. p. 43. 
28 Abu- llamid al-Ghazal[, Kimiyi-i sa `idah, pp. 75-7K, Eng. trans. pp. 45-47. 
29 Abü Hamid a1-Ghazäli, Kimiyi-i sa`idah, pp. 94-95, Eng. trans. p. 57. 
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mentions for example, knowledge and good deeds. Al-Ghazäli also holds that 
the enjoyment of marriage, food, clothing and certain other things are good in 
so far as it helps man to attain to the next world. 30 In other words, although 
true happiness for al-Ghazäli is otherworldly happiness (a1-sa`, idah a1- 
ukhräwiyyah), he also calls some worldly goods forms of happiness inasmuch 
as they are means to obtain this happiness. 
The damnation or salvation of the soul starts when one dies. Man is 
both body and soul. Death marks the incapacity of all man's bodily parts which 
were the tools of the spirit. But the spirit, which apprehends the sciences as 
well as the pains of sorrow and the pleasure of happiness may not be 
extinguished. According to al-Ghazal r, it is man's soul that constitutes man's 
real nature and it alone is immortal. 31 
Upon death, his state changes in two ways. 
Firstly, he is now deprived of his eyes, ears and 
tongue, his hand, his feet and all his parts, just as 
he is deprived of his family, children, relatives, 
and all the people he used to know, and of his 
horses and other riding-beasts, his servant-boys, 
his houses and property, and all that he used to 
own. 
32 
The meaning of death is quite simply the 
deprivation of a man's property consequent upon 
30 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazäli, Kimiyi-i-sa`idah, p. 79, Eng. trans. p. 51. 
31 Abu- Flämid al-Ghazäli, Kiteb dhikr al-mawt wa-mä badabtS p. 131, lhyi; vol. 6, 
Eng. trans. p. 123. 
32 Abu- I Iämid al-Ghazäli, Kitib dbikr al-mawt wa-WO ha `dahq Ihyi ; vol. 6, p. 131, 
Eng. trans. pp. 123-124. 
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his being pitched into another world which does 
not correspond to this. If there was anything in 
the world the presence of which had become 
familiar to him and in which he had found 
consolation and peace, then he will greatly 
lament for it after he dies, and feel the greatest 
sorrow over losing it. His heart will turn to 
thoughts of everything he owned: of his power 
and estates, even to a shirt which he used to 
wear, for instance, and in which he took pleasure. 
However, had he taken pleasure only in the Abü 
Hamid remembrance of God, and consoled himself 
with him alone, then his will be great bliss and 
perfect happiness. 33 
The second change in man's state when he dies is that upon death, 
certain things never disclosed to him during his life time may be revealed. The 
first to be revealed are his good and evil works such as will benefit or harm 
him. All his actions stand revealed before him so that he is dismayed by every 
sin which he beholds. All of this is revealed when his breathing ceases and 
before his burial. 34 These two are the indications of man's state at the time of 
death. And this damnation or salvation will then proceed in stages, starting 
with the grave period. 35 Then comes the period of resurrection and judgement 
which consists of different phases, and lastly the period of dwelling in Paradise 
33 Abü Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kit b dhikral-maw! wa-ms ha'dahq lhyi, vol. 6, p. 131, 
Eng. trans. p. 124. 
34 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazal[, Klub dhikr al-mawt wa-mä ba'dahz4 Ihyä, vol. 6, p. 132, 
Eng. trans. pp. 124-125. 
35 Sec Abü 11amid al-Ghazali, Part two of Klub dbikral--maws wa-mä ba`dabz4 /bye, 
vol. 6, pp. 136-144, Eng. trans. pp. 133-147. 
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or in Hell. In part two of his Kiläb dhikr al-maw! wa ma ba`dahu, al-Ghazäli 
gives a description of Hell, its terrors and torments. 36 He also recounts in detail 
the pleasures of Paradise, describing among other things its rivers, sounds, 
foods, drinks, nymphs, servants, palaces and colourful clothing. 7 In discussing 
all these matters, al-Ghazäli bases his account primarily on the Qur'an and the 
Traditions. 
The otherworldly life cannot be compared with this life. Man no longer 
has to be responsible for his actions: good and evil are no more. What man 
faces are the consequences of the actions, good and bad, that he performed 
during his lifetime in this temporary world: the consequences that will bring 
otherworldly happiness or otherworldly affliction. 
Al-Ghazäli emphasises that the highest happiness in the hereafter is the 
vision (ru yah) of God which is direct knowledge of Him. Al-Ghazäli describes 
the vision of God as the greatest pleasure which makes man forget the other 
delights of Paradise. It is the ultimate bounty compared to which all the 
splendid pleasures of Paradise are nothing. This is the highest and most 
particular category of otherworldly happiness. It is the lower and more general 
category of otherworldly happiness that is generally known as Paradise 
(jannah). 38 Even though al-Ghazäli looks upon the fulfilment of the divine 
36 Abu- I Iämid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb dbikr a! -mawt wa-mä ba `dabq Ibyn, vol. 6, pp. 
178-185, Eng. trans. pp. 219-231. 
37 Al-Ghazali's detailed discussion on otherworldly happiness occupies a large part of the 
second part of his Kitib dbikral-mawl wa-mä ba'dabq which presents a highly 
rhetorical account of happiness in the hereafter. See Ahü l1amid al-Ghazali , Kilaih 
dhikral-mawt wa mi-ba'dahq Ihyi, vol. 6, pp. 153-196, Eng. trans. pp. 171-249. 
38 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazal[, Kiteh dhikr a]-mawt wa mä-ba'dahu, ]hye; vol. 6, p. 196, 
Eng. trans. pp. 250-251. Al-Ghaznli also deals with this matter in the sixth book of tha 
fourth quarter of the Ibyi' (See ]Aye, vol. 5, Kitab al-mahabba wa']--shawy waY--uns 
wa7-ride, pp. 196-201). This point is also cited by Mohamed Ahmed Sherif in his txxok, 
Ghazal[ 's" Theory of Virtue pp. 167-168. 
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commandments as a necessary requirement for one to deserve otherworldly 
happiness, he also admits that God's mercy may bestow this happiness on any 
human being, whatever his past deeds. 39 This is actually the concept of 
optimism that the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ) encouraged individual Muslims to hold. 
Man must always ask for God's forgiveness for all his deeds' shortcomings, for 
God's mercy and grace overflow upon all that He has made. Thus, man must 
always be optimistic and hope that God may be merciful both in this life and 
the next. 40 
Generally, this positive view results from the correct use of this world 
as a means to the next. Obviously, according to al-Ghazäli, happiness can be 
attained through the correct knowledge of one's self, God, this world and the 
next world. His discussion of these matters can be found in his book Kimiyä-i 
sa`ädah. And it is also clear that, according to al-Ghazäli, true happiness is 
only to be found in salvation in the hereafter. 4' The question is, how can one 
attain this real happiness, which entails so much struggle and effort in this 
world? Actually, al-Ghazali himself has gathered for us in his various works all 
the information needed. His major work, the Ihyä, provides us with all that we 
might need in order to strive for happiness in the hereafter. In the fourth 
quarter of the lhyä ; titled 'The Ways to Salvation' (al-Munjiyit), al-Gharhli 
describes the various states and stages of man's spiritual development: ` 
39 Abü Hamid al-Gharälf, Kitib dhihr al-mawt wa mä-ba dabu, Ihye, vol. 6, pp. 
197-202, Eng. trans. pp. 252-261. Also mentioned in Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, Gbazäli's 
Theory of Virtue p. 167. 
°Ö Abu- 1.1amid al-Ghazäiº, glib dhikral--mewl wa mä-ba`dahq 4yä, vol. 6, p. 197, 
Eng. trans. pp. 252-253. 
4r Refer the previous chapter on soul. 
42 This quarter consists of ten books, which deal with repentance; patience and gratitude; 
fear and hope; poverty and asceticism; divine unity and dependence; love, longing, 
intimacy and contentment; intention, single-heartedness and sincerity; self- 
examination and self-account; meditation; and remembrance of death and the afterlife. 
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Basing his exposition on the ideas stated above, al-Ghazali emphasises 
the importance of knowledge as the primary means of attaining happiness, 
perceiving its role from a religious viewpoint. 
Al-GhazaIT's book Kimiya-i sa `ddah, which can be considered as the 
summary of the Ihyi, generally covers what is needed in order to gain true 
happiness. But his Ihye' presents in detail the information required. In this 
regard, the most important aspects that should be taken into consideration are 
knowledge, action, purification of the soul, spiritual development and ethics 
(akhläq). The practice of all these should be unified in order to achieve 
happiness. Al-Ghazäli explains knowledge in his Kitib al- 'ilm and his Kimiye- 
i-sa`hdah. His view of correct action may be found in his remarks on the 
devotional acts. 43 These two elements have been dealt with in the previous 
discussion. Thus, the other three matters remain to be examined in greater 
detail. 
The Ihyi, generally covers all the information required for the 
attainment of happiness in the hereafter, and its Book of Disciplining The 
Soul, Refining The Character and Curing The Sickness of The Heart (Klu b 
riyädat al-oafs wa-tabdhib al-akhleq wa-mu`slijat amrdd al-galb) can be 
considered as particularly relevant to the present discussion. In this book, al- 
Ghazälf discusses how the soul may be purified and disciplined and directed to 
the desired goal. This book actually covers all three matters: the purification of 
the soul, spiritual development and ethics. In order to explain the diagnosis and 
treatment of the sickness of the heart, al-Ghazalf divides this book into eleven 
43 Refer again to the previous discussion. 
44 This book follows the book on The Wonders of7be heart. It is the twenty-second took of 
the Ihyi' 'ulfnn al-din. See )Glib 'aji'ib al-ga1b, Ibys, vol. 3, pp. 171-210. 
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small sections. The following discussion, however, will not be structured 
according to the order of these sections, but will be arranged to suit the present 
arguments. 
6.4. Al-Ghazälf on spiritual training: 
Al-Ghazälf describes several symptoms by which the diseases of one's 
heart may be recognised. The human heart is created with a particular 
function, like the other organs of the body. The heart is supposed to seek 
knowledge, wisdom and ma'rifa (gnosis), and be mindful of God. Hence, when 
man's heart, which has been created to love God, is possessed by something 
which is dearer to him than God, it is actually sick. This disease of the heart, 
al-Ghazälf says, is difficult to cure, for one who suffers from it is hecdlcssý` 
But even 'fatal' diseases of the heart such as avarice can be cured. Al- 
Ghazali here recommends that the symptoms be treated by doing the opposite; 
that is to say, one who suffers from avarice should be encouraged to give his 
money to those who may justly receive it. But he must ensure that in doing so 
he always rejects the two extremes and balances his actions between 
'grudgingness' and 'prodigality'. If he (the patient) obtains pleasure from the 
mere act of spending money, prodigality has taken hold of him. Al-Ghazali's 
advice is clear: "Return to the practice of withholding your wealth, and 
constantly watch over your soul and draw inferences about your character from 
the evidence of what deeds it finds easy and which ones hard, until the 
connection between your heart and money is broken, and you incline neither 
as Even though one may become aware of this disease in his soul, he will find it difficult to 
treat. For instance, to obtain help from scholars (of al-Ghazüli's time) is also difficult 
for according to al-Ghazali the scholars themselves have been drawn toward 
worldliness. This is one of many criticisms of scholars that occur in al-Ghazali's Ihya 
Al-Ghana f, Kiläb riyädat al-nai, lbye , vol. 3, p. 189, Eng. trans. by T. J. Winter, 
AI-Ghazi i On Disciplining the Soul and Breaking the Two Desires, pp. 46-47. 
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towards giving it nor withholding it, since it has become as water to you, so 
that when you give or withhold it you do so for a needful purpose, and so that 
"46 giving your money does not seem preferable to you than its retention. 
But, al-Ghazäli acknowledges that it is difficult to keep to the straight 
path (al-sirät al-mustagim). Thus, man must always pray to God Almighty to 
preserve him in the straight path and always try his best not to stray too far 
from it despite the weakness of his resolution. For "whosoever wishes for 
salvation can only win it by means of righteous acts, which proceed solely 
from good traits of character. " Therefore every bondsman (`abd) has to know 
his attributes and qualities and then devote his energies to treating them one 
by one. 47 
Al-Ghazäli enumerates several ways by which man may discover the 
faults of his heart or soul. These ways constitute the practice of self- 
examination (muhäsaba). 8 Al-Ghazäli suggested four means by which man 
may learn about the sickness of his heart; his shaykh, his intimate friend, his 
enemies and lastly by observing the faulty deeds of others. 
Firstly, one may ask advice of a true shaykh who can see the hidden 
weaknesses of his soul. Or, secondly, he may have a true religious friend who 
can observe and comments on his faults. But al-Ghazäli admits that such 
counsellors arc difficult to find. Thirdly, al-Ghazali holds that one can know 
46 Abn Hamid al-Ghazali, Kiteb riyädal al-nals, Ibya, vol. 3, pp. 189-190, Eng. 
trans. pp. 48-49. 
47 Ab u- Hamid al-Ghazali, Kluäb riyädat al--nalss Thye'vol. 3, p. 190, Eng. trans. pp. 
49-50. 
as The advantages of self-examination are explored in detail elsewhere in the Ihyi-'(11<x)k 
Eight of the fourth quarter of the Ihyi : (See Ab- tumid al-Ghazali, Iliteh al- 
murdgabah wa 1- muhäsabah, Ihys , vol. 6, pp. 4-41. 
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his weaknesses through his enemies. In al-Ghazäli's view, the man of insight 
should be able to derive benefit from the criticism of his enemies rather than 
from his friends, who may indulge his faults. And finally, one can notice his 
faults by observing those of others. When one sees other people's faults, he 
should try to scrutinise his own soul and strive to cleanse it himself. This is 
actually the highest degree of self- discipline, for if man can recognise and 
uproot what he condemns in others there is no need for any external discipline; 
rather he is his own teacher. 49 
Now we come to ethics. Al-Ghazälf begins by citing the related sayings 
and traditions that the exemplar of a good character is the Prophet Muhammad 
(p. b. u. h. ). A good character is also among the heaviest things to be placed on 
the Scales (al-Minn) on the Day of Judgement. This show the importance of 
good character to Muslims. Al-Ghazalf also warns of the corruption caused by 
bad character. 50 Next, he discusses the essentials of good character rather than 
concentrating on its fruits. He examines the relationship between creation 
(khalq) and character (khuluq). In al-Ghazalf's view, creation refers to the 
outward aspect of man and character to his inward aspect. Man is composed of 
body and soul. Body perceives with the physical eyes (bsar) and soul 
perceives with the inner sight (basira). In this respect, the soul is greater than 
the body, 5' which is but a vehicle for the soul. 52 And both of these aspects are 
open to act in ways either ugly or beautiful. 53 
49 Abu- liämid al-Ghazali, Krlabrryidal aI-nabs, Ibyi, vol. 3, pp. 190-192, Eng. 
trans. pp. 51-55. 
50 For details see Abu- Il mid al-Ghazälf, Klub riyedai al-nafs, lhyi, vol. 3, pp. 
171-172, Eng. trans. pp. 7-14. 
st As God says in the Qur'an, "I shall create a man from clay; and when I have fashioned 
him, and have breathed into him something of my spirit, then fall ye down before him in 
prostration! ". (38: 71). 
32 Abu- ilärnid al-Ghazäli, M'u. en a/--`amaZ p. 211. 
53 Abi I, Iämid al-Ghazäli, Kitäb riyädal a! -pafs, Ibyi ; vol. 3, pp. I76-I77, ling. 
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The trait of character, whether good or bad, is a firmly established 
condition (hay'ah) of one's soul. And the actions which proceed from the soul 
do not require forethought. The good character trait is what conforms with the 
law (shari`a) and the intellect. Otherwise it is considered a bad character trait. 
According to al-Ghazal, the real character of man is what is firmly established 
(r 
. sikha) 
in his soul. In this case, according to al-Ghazälf, four aspects are 
involved. Namely, there is the doing of something beautiful or ugly, the ability 
to act, cognition of the act and finally, a condition of the soul by which it 
inclines to one side or the other and which renders the beautiful or the ugly 
more or less easy to doss 
Al-Ghazdlf distingtishes character (khu/uy) from action (h'b. 
Character is actually the term he uses for the condition and inner aspect of the 
soul. For instance, one who is generous might not donate his wealth for many 
reasons; there may be obstacles to his doing so. Similarly, the avaricious man 
might distribute his money with the selfish intention of giving himself a high 
reputation. Furthermore, character is not the same as ability since the ability to 
withhold or give is not relevant to the condition of the character. Although 
man has been created with the disposition (Ftra) to withhold or give, according 
to al-Ghazalf the disposition alone does not necessarily result in an avaricious 
or a generous character. Also, character is not dependent on cognition of the 
act for cognition pertains to beautiful and ugly actions in the same way. Rather 
character is to be identified with the condition in which one's soul prepares 
trans. pp. 15-17. 
53 Abu- II mid al-Ghat li, Kitebriyidat al-oafs p. 177, Ibyi; vol. 3, Eng. trans. 
pp. 17-18. 
ss Abu Ha-mid al-Ghazä(i, Kitib riyidat aI-nafs, p. 177, Ibyi, vol. 3, Eng. trans. p. 
18. 
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itself for giving or withholding. Therefore, character refers to the condition 
and inner aspect of the soul. 56 
Now, in order to have a good or beautiful character, there are four 
interrelated faculties which must be sound, in balance and in the correct 
proportion to each other. These are the rational faculty (quwwat a/-`i/m), the 
irascible faculty (quwwat al ghadab), the appetitive faculty (quwwat al- 
shahwa) and lastly the faculty which effects a just equilibrium between these 
three. 57 
The rational faculty is considered sound when it is able to distinguish 
and discriminate; for instance, between lies and honesty or beauty and 
ugliness. The fruit of a sound rational faculty is wisdom, which is considered 
by al-Ghazäli the chief of the good traits of character. 58 The rational faculty, 
however, exceeds its bounds when used for corrupt ends and it is then called 
'swindling' (khubth) and 'fraud' (jurbuzah), while its insufficient application is 
called 'stupidity' (balah). True wisdom, therefore, lies between these two 
extremes. 59 
The irascible faculty is considered sound when it moves within the 
boundaries set by wisdom. It is then called 'courage' (shuji`ah). When the 
irascible faculty loses its balance and inclines towards excess it is called 
56 Abu- Hamid a1-Ghazäff, Kitäb riyidlat al-nals, p. 177, Ibyä , vol. 3, lang. trans. p. 
18. 
57 Abü IIämid al-Ghazäli, Klu b riyädat aI-nafs p. 177, Ihyä , vol. 3, Eng. trans. p. 
19. This is Plato's trichotomy of the soul which occurs throughout the Muslim 
philosophical tradition. (Cited in a footnote of the sing. trans. by T. J. Winter, p. 19). 
58 As God says in the Qur'an, 'And whosoever is granted wisdom has truly been granted 
abundant good. " (2: 269). 
59 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazali, Kilabriyidal al-nafs, Ibyä, vol. 3, pp. 177-I78, lang. 
trans. pp. 19-20. 
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'recklessness' (tahawwur), while it is called 'cowardice' (jubn) and 'languor' 
(khür) when inclined towards weakness and insufficiency. The irascible 
faculty, then, has to be trained and well-disciplined in order to make it in 
conform to the principles of order. 60 
The appetitive faculty is sound when under the control of wisdom and 
submits to the command of the shari'a and the intellect. It is then called 
'temperance' (`iffah); but when it is moved towards excess it is called 'cupidity' 
(sharah), and 'indifference' (jwnüd when it is weak. It is clear that in respect 
of all three faculties, virtue lies between the extremes, which, according to al- 
Ghazäli, incline towards vice61 
It is the faculty to effect a just equilibrium which brings the other three 
faculties under the command of the intellect and the Shari `a. The intellect is 
the guiding counsellor and the faculty for just equilibrium is the actualising 
power which carries out its order. Unlike the other three, which may incline to 
extremes, the faculty for just equilibrium is subject to neither excess nor 
insufficiency. It does, however, have an opposite, which is called 'tyranny' 
(liii). Thus, the person who possesses all these virtues in balance is considered 
as having a good character (husn al-khuluq) under all circumstances. But of 
course most people's faculties show some imbalance; they arc therefore to be 
considered of good character only in respect of their balanced traits. 62 
Therefore, according to al-Ghazäli, the principal virtues (ummahät a/- 
6Ö Abü Hämid al-Ghazäli, Kilähriyidat a1-nafs, IhyB; vol. 3, p. 178, Eng. trans. p. 
20. 
61 Abu- Ilämid al-Gha, äli, Kitsb iiyidat aI-nafs, Ihys, vol. 3, pp. 177-178, ling. 
trans. pp. 19-20. 
62 Abu- II mid al-Ghazali, Kil briyidal al--vafs, Ihyi, vol. 3, pp. 177-178, lang. 
trans. pp. 19-20. 
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akhliq) or good traits of character are four: wisdom, courage, temperance and 
j ust ice. 63 
By'Wisdom' we mean a condition of the soul by 
which it distinguishes true from false in all 
volitional acts, by 'Justice' a condition and 
potency in the soul by which it controls the 
expansion and contraction of anger and desire as 
directed by Wisdom. By'Courage' we refer to the 
subjection of the irascible faculty to the intellect, 
while by 'Temperance' we have in mind the 
disciplining of the appetitive faculty by the 
intellect and the Law. It is from the equilibrium 
of these four principles that all the good traits of 
character proceed, since when the intellect is 
balanced it will bring forth discretion (husn al- 
tadbir) and excellence of discernment (jawdat al- 
dhihn), penetration of thought (thagäbat al-ray) 
and correctness of conjecture (ic bal al-Bann), 
and an understanding of the subtle implications 
of actions and the hidden effects of soul. When 
unbalanced in the direction of excess, then 
cunning, swindling, deception and slyness result, 
and when in that of defect, then stupidity (balah), 
inexperienced (ghimara), foolishness (hamq), 
63 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazni, Mizan al-`ama, p. 264. 
`i4 Inexperience here means an insufficient experience which is nonetheless combined with 
sound understanding. For instance, a man may be inexperienced in one matter and not 
in another. Abu- flimid al-Ghazil , 
Kiteb riyidal al-aaJs, 4yä, vol. 3, p. 178, Fng. 
trans. p. 21. 
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heedlessness and insanity65 are the 
consequences 66 
The same can be said of the trait of courage which gives rise to many 
other virtues. Among them are nobility (karam), intrepidity (najda), manliness 
(shabdma), greatness of soul (kasr al-nals), endurance (ihtimil), clemency 
(hilm) affection (tawaddud and many other praiseworthy qualities. On the 
other hand, when it is unbalanced on the side of excess which is recklessness, it 
gives rise to many other vices. Among them are arrogance conceit 
(badhkh), quickness to anger (istishrita), pride (takabbw) and vainglory (`ujb). 
And when unbalanced on the side of defect it leads to ignominy (mahrina), self- 
abasement (dhilla), cowardice (jaza` ), meanness (khasisa), lack of resolution 
(sighar al-naI) and holding oneself back from doing that which is right and 
obligatory. 67 
From the trait of temperance also arise other good traits such as 
generosity (sakhä ), modesty (hayä'), patience (sabi), tolerance (rnusamaha), 
and helping others (muss `ada). But when it deviates towards excess or defect, 
bad traits results, including greed (hire), immorality (hulka), flattery (malt'), 
and envy (4sad)68 
65 The diflcrcncc between stupidity and insanity is that the intention of the stupid man is 
sound, only his means of realising it are defective, since he is not possessed of a correct 
understanding of how to follow the way leading to his goal; the madman, on the other 
hand, chooses that which should not be chosen, so that the basis of his decisions and 
preferences is imperfect. Abü Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kitib nyidet a! -nafs, Ibye , vol. 3, 
p. 178, Eng. trans. p. 21. 
66 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazal, Kleb riyidat al-oafs, Ibyä, vol. 3, pp. 178, Eng. trans. 
pp. 20-21. 
67 Abu- ll mid al-Ghazali, Kitib iiyädat al-oafs, Ibyi; vol. 3, pp. 178-179, Eng. 
trans. pp. 21-22. 
es Abu- tumid al-Ghaznli, Kitäbriyädat al-nals, f yi; vol. 3, p. 179, Eng. trans. p. 
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Thus, all the other traits are the branches from these four fundamental 
noble traits: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. But only the Prophet 
(p. b. u. h. ) has attained a perfect equilibrium of these principal traits. As for 
other people, there are different degrees among them in terms of proximity and 
distance from the perfection of these four traits. The question arises, can these 
traits be changed by human effort? Al-Ghazäli believes they can: "Striving 
with one's wealth is generosity, which comes from controlling the appetitive 
faculty, while striving with one's self is courage which proceeds from the use 
of the irascible faculty under the control of the intellect and with just 
moderation. "69 
Furthermore, al-Ghazäli discusses the susceptibility of the traits of 
character to be changed through discipline or purifying the soul and refining 
the character. Al-Ghazäli objects to the claim that human traits cannot be 
altered and human nature is immutable and permanent. Al-Ghazäli argued that 
if traits of character can. not be changed, counsels, sermons and discipline 
would be of no value. But the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ) has said, "Improve your 
character! ". Even the animal can be tamed, how much more so the human 
being. 70 
Man is born with a sound innate disposition but with a deficient soul. 
Thus soul need to be completed. This is possible through training (larbiya), 
refining the character and taking the nourishment of knowledge as well as 
22. 
69 Ahü Ilämid al-Ghazäli, ICi'teb riyedat a! -nafs", Ihyä ; vol. 3, p. 179, Eng. trans. pp. 
22-23. 
70 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Kitih riyedat al-na/s, Ibyä , vol. 3, pp. 179-180, Eng. 
trans. pp. 24-25. 
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trying to retain its innate purity. 7' 
According to al-Ghazali, existent things are divided into two divisions. 
Firstly, the 'root and branches': man and his volition have no effect on this 
division of existence, which comprises phenomena such as the heavenly 
bodies, the earth, the stars and generally everything which is already complete 
in its existence and its perfection. Secondly, there are those existent things 
which are incomplete in form but have the potential to be perfected when the 
condition for this, which may be connected to the volition of man, is met. For 
example, a seed can become an apple tree if properly nurtured. In the same way 
anger or desire can become obedient and docile by way of self-discipline and 
struggle. 72 
But the success or failure of this struggle and discipline to alter human 
traits depends on two factors. Firstly, at the root of one's temperament lies the 
power of the instinct (ghariza) together with the length of time for which this 
temperament has been present. This is why, according to al-Ghazalf, the 
capacity for desire is the most difficult to deal with and the least susceptible to 
be changed and disciplined for it is the first thing to be created in a child. The 
second reason for the disparity between the traits in accepting alteration is that 
a certain trait of character may be reinforced as a result of acting frequently in 
accordance with it, obeying it, and considering it to be well and good. 73 
Furthermore, basing his argument on this second reason, al-Gharili 
71 Ab u- Ilämid al-Ghaza , Kittb riymdat al-nafs, Ibye 
, vol. 3, p. 186, Eng. trans. p. 
39. 
72 Abu- 1. lämid al-Ghazali, Kitihriyädat al-Hals, Ibyi, vol. 3, p. 180, Eng. trans. p. 25. 
73 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazal[, Kitäb riyidat al-na/, »yä', vol. 3, p. 180, Eng. trans. pp. 
25-26. 
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maintains that people are divided into four degrees: 
Firstly, the man who is innocent and without discernment - who, for instance, 
cannot distinguish a beautiful fair action from a foul one - remains with the 
disposition (fitra) with which he was created and is devoid of any doctrines. 
His desire was never aroused through the pursuit of pleasures. This kind of 
man, al-Gha7ali says, will respond to treatment in a short time. What is 
necessary for him is the instruction of a guide and an internal motivation that 
will provoke the spiritual struggle by which his character will be reformed. 
This type of man is simply ignorant. 
Secondly, a man may be aware of his bad acts but continues to do them, for 
they are committed under the influence of his desires which still controls him. 
In order to treat his traits of character, such a man has first to eradicate the 
habitual inclination to corruption which has taken firm root in his soul, then 
sow therein the quality of habituation to righteousness. This has to be done 
resolutely in order to profit by the effects of self-discipline. This degree of man 
is ignorant and misguided. 
Thirdly, the man that perceives his ugly trait of character as obligatory and 
right will not usually respond to treatment, though it is successful in a very 
few cases. This kind of man is ignorant, misguided and corrupt. 
Finally, there is the man who has been brought up to believe in and to work 
corruption, who believes, for example, that merit lies in murder and that crime 
can raise his status. This is considered the most difficult degree to ameliorate. 
7 Such a man is ignorant, misguided, corrupt and evil . 
`ý 
Al-Ghazal adds that the complete suppression of desire is impossible 
but maintains that it is possible to guard against it and control it. One should 
make every effort to retain the balance and moderation of his desire. Desire 
74 Abu- [. I amid al-Ghazali If, Kitib Hyi/at al--naps, Ibyä, vol. 3, pp. 180-181, Eng. 
trans. pp. 26-27. 
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was created to be useful in certain aspects of life: for example, if the desire for 
food ceases, death follows. However, traits which are unbalanced should be 
moderated by the influence of the intellect. This is actually the concept of 
'reforming the character' (taghyr al-khulq) as formulated by al-Ghazäli. If 
one's desire is not to dominate his intellect, he needs to undertake the 
treatment of self-discipline. Indeed, moderation is actually commanded by the 
shah `a. 75 Happiness (sa `äda) is obtained when one's heart is safe from the 
vicissitudes of this world and has been purified of both extremes. 
76 
Thus good character is acquired when equilibrium prevails in the 
rational faculty, brought about through sound wisdom, and when both the 
irascible and the appetitive faculties are submitted to the intellect and the 
shad'a This equilibrium may be achieved in several ways. The messengers of 
God attain it through divine grace. As man is born with an innate disposition 
(kamil frtri ), the messengers of God have been preserved in this disposition. 
As for other human beings, they may acquire good character through education 
or by associating with those who already possess it. 
77 
Alternatively one can acquire good traits by means of spiritual struggle 
and the exercise of right action. The soul has to be compelled to do good until 
it becomes confirmed in the practice 78 This illustrates the wonderful 
75 As God says in the Qur'an, "And those who, when they spend, are neither extravagant 
nor grudging; and there is ever a middle point between the two". (Qur'an, 25: 67). 
76 Abu- }timid al-Gha. ' 1, Kitsb riyädat al--nafs Jbys , vol. 3, pp. 181-183, Eng. 
trans. pp. 28-30. 
" Abü llämid al-Ghazäli, Kitebriyädat al-aals, p. 183, Ibys , vol. 3, Eng. trans. p. 
31. 
'R But this struggle must continue until the act is performed willingly, for the purpose of 
good traits is to set firmly in one's soul the love of God. The same is true of the acts of 
worship: they must be performed throughout one's life in order to truly purify the 
heart, for the purpose of the acts of worship is to influence the heart. (Aber llämid al- 
Ghaiili, Kileb riysdal al-oafs, Ibyä , vol. 3, pp. 183-184, Eng. trans. pp. 32-33). 
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relationship between body and soul. Every good action, if performed regularly, 
will affect the soul. This is because it is the true nature of the soul to incline 
towards wisdom, love, knowledge and worship of God. 
79 
According to al-Ghazali, denial of the soul's whims and desires is the 
only way to achieve happiness in the hereafter: "The essence and secret of self- 
discipline is that the soul should not take pleasure in anything which will not 
be present in the grave. " Man should restrict his desire to what is truly 
indispensable to him in this life. The heart must be occupied with the 
80 knowledge, love. meditation upon and devotion to God. 
Al-Ghazali says that the methods of discipline and struggle vary from 
one person to another, but the basic principle is that one must be aware of 
what he finds pleasurable. 8' And al-Ghazäli draws on his own experience to 
present a clear example of what is required. It is difficult to avoid the 
impression that he is referring to his own life when he writes: 
The man who rejoices in wealth or fame, or an 
audience receptive to his sermon, or a high 
position in the judiciary or the government, or in 
the great number of his pupils, should firstly 
renounce this thing in which he takes such 
pleasure and delight. Then, when he has 
renounced these sources of joy, let him remove 
himself, and keep watch over his heart until it 
79 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Kiteb riyädat al-na!, lbyn, vol. 3, pp. 184-185, Eng. 
trans. pp. 34-35. See also, Abu Ilamid al-Ghazal, b7zin al-'amal, p. 252. 
8° Abu- Hamid a1-Ghazali, Klub riyädat al-na! s, Ibyä ; vol. 3, p. 194, Eng. trans. p. 60. 
81 Abu- }. 1amid al-Ghazali, Kitäb riyädat al--naJs, Ibyä , vol. 3, p. 196, Eng. trans. p. 65. 
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occupies itself with nothing but the remembrance 
of God and meditation upon Him. Let him lie in 
wait for any desire or insinuation which might 
appear in his soul until he extirpates the stuff of 
which these are made; for every insinuation has a 
cause, and will not depart until that cause is 
destroyed. "' 
God has described the traits which characterise believers and 
hypocrites. Al-Ghazal cites a few of the many verses regarding this matter: 
God says, "The faithful have triumphed: who are humble in their prayers, who 
shun vain talk, are payers of the Tithe, who guard their private parts - save 
from their wives or those whom their right hands possess (for then they arc not 
blameworthy); but whosoever desires what is beyond that, such arc the 
transgressors. and who observe their pledge and their covenant, and who pay 
heed to their Prayers; such are the inheritors (of Paradise). i83 
As quoted by al-Ghazäli, God has said, "Those who repent, who 
worship, who praise, who fast, who bow, who prostrate, who enjoin what is 
right and forbid what is wrong, and who keep the limits ordained by God. And 
give good tidings to the believers! "84 
God (Great and Glorious is He), has said, "Those whose hearts feel fear 
when God is mentioned, and who, when the signs of God are recited to them, 
grow in faith, and who trust in their Lord; those who establish the Prayer and 
82 Abü II amid al-Ghazali, Kitäb riyidat al-naI l yä , vol. 3, p. 196, lang. trans. p. 65. 
83 The Qur'an, 23: 1-10. 
84 The Qur'an, 11: 112. 
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spend of that which We have bestowed upon them. Such are the true 
believers. i85 
And God says, "The bondsmen of the All-Merciful are they who walk 
gently upon the earth, and who, when the foolish address them, answer: 
... 
"g6 Peace...... 
By taking to heart the above verses one may examine and measure 
himself. The possession of these attributes betokens a good character while 
their complete absence is the sign of a bad one. If one possesses only a part of 
them, he should struggle to perfect the whole. And the finest test of good 
character is steadfastness in the face of suffering, because whosever complains 
of another's bad character reveals the badness of his own, for the mark of good 
character is to endure that which offends 117 
Al-Ghazali holds that as man is born with a pure heart, it is his parents 
who are responsible for the quality - good or otherwise - of his development to 
adulthood. The nurturing of good character by the parents will result in the 
attainment of happiness by the child as well as the parents both in this world 
and in the hereafter. Even the diet that he is given influences the growing 
personality of the child. The food must he from rightful sources and good 
nourishment is important. The first thing that should be watched over is the 
child's sense of shame, for the child will see that certain things are ugly and 
others arc beautiful, and begin to be ashamed of some things and not others. 
This means that the light of the intellect has dawned in him and will continue 
ss The Qur'an, 8: 2-4. 
86 The Qur'än, 25: 63. 
87 Abu- IIamid al-Ghazal l, Kileb riyealal al-nafs, Ibya , vol. 3, pp. 197-200, Eng. 
trans. pp. 67-74. 
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until he reaches adulthood if guarded and encouraged. 
88 
The capacity for shame that has developed in the child should be used 
for his further development and education. According to al-Ghazälf, the first 
trait that must be controlled is the greed for food: the child should be taught 
the right manner of eating. Then comes the teaching of other matters: dressing 
correctly; learning the Qur'an, the traditions, and tales of the devout; being 
prevented from acting secretly; the manner of sleeping; being warned against 
the excessive love of wealth; the correct way of behaving in front of others; the 
manner of playing, and respect for others. Later, when he reaches the age of 
discretion, the child should not be excused from the prayer and must learn to 
perform other obligatoions commanded by the shah `a. When the child does 
something wrong he should be counselled privately. 
89 All these aspects of 
sound upbringing are important for the child who, if they are neglected in the 
early years of his growth, will usually grow up to be ill-natured and immoral. 
On the other hand, the child who has been brought up soundly will come to 
understand in his adulthood the reasons which underlie these aspects of 
teaching. The most important thing to be realised is that worldly pleasure will 
come to an end and that all the abundance of this world should be used solely 
to enable man to worship God. 90 
Al-Ghazali always emphasises the need to be continually mindful of the 
barriers that lie between the self and the Truth. When one is struggling to 
purify his soul, four things weave a veil between him and the Truth: wealth, 
88 Abu- I"lämid a1-Ghazäli, Kitäb riyädat al-nafs, Ibyä , vol. 3, pp. 200-201, ling. 
trans. pp. 75-76. 
89 This shows a1-Ghazali's emphasis on the careful upbringing of children. He recognises 
that the manner of upbringing affects the personality. 
90 Abü Ijamid a1-Ghazäli, Klub riyedat al-oafs, 4yä', vol. 3, pp. 201-203, Eng. 
trans. pp. 76-81. 
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status (jäh), imitation and sin. 
91 The veil of wealth can be lifted by keeping 
only what is necessary. The veil of status can be cast aside by withdrawing 
oneself from any circumstances that may increase one's worldly reputation. As 
to imitation, it is important to eschew any fanaticism regarding one's own 
school of thought (madhhab). And the veil of sin can be removed by sincere 
repentance 
92 
Al-Ghazäli further suggests that one who has managed to pass through 
the four veils needs a guide or shaykh. It seems that al-Ghazäli has been 
influenced by the relationship between the shaykh and the aspirant in süfi 
practice. His recommendation stresses the importance of counselling between 
the shaykh and the aspirant which is similar to the counselling practice of our 
own time. Al-Ghazäli also advises that the aspirant must be kept in a 
stronghold of four things; solitude, silence, hunger and sleeplessness. 93 
In the second quarter of the Ihyä , entitled 'The Norms of Daily Life' 
(Adat), 94 al-Ghazäli discusses norms and ethics based on the example set by 
the Prophet (p. b. u. h. ). This quarter deals with the daily activities that a 
Muslim needs for his temporal existence and his devotion to God. 
91 The four things which al-Ghazal perceived to be barriers between an individual and 
the Truth were obstacles to his own search for Truth. This may be the reason for his 
emphasis. 
"Z Abü Ilamid al-Ghazali, Kitäb riyädat al-nafs, Ibyä , vol. 3, pp. 204-205, lang. 
trans. pp. 83-87. Forgiveness is being shielded from the harmful consequences of wrong 
actions and from the veiling of them. (For details on al-Ghazali's discussion on 
repentance, see Abu-Hamid al-Ghazali, Kitäb al-tawbab, Ibyä , vol. 4, pp. 234-308. 
93 See Abu- Hamid al-Ghazali, Kitib riyidat al-aals, Ihyi, vol. 3, pp. 205-209, lang. 
trans. pp. 88-100. 
94 This quarter consist of ten books. They concern the ethics of eating, the ethics of 
marriage, the ethics of earning a livelihood, the lawful and the unlawful, the ethics of 
companionship, seclusion, the ethics of travelling, spiritual audition and ecstasy, 
enjoining good and forbidding evil, and living as exemplified in the virtues of the 
Prophet (p. b. u. h. ). 
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Generally, according to al-Ghazälf, the path of struggle necessitates the 
opposing of one's desire. Then, when the desires are brought under control, 
what man should do is unceasingly occupy his heart with the remembrance of 
God. 95 Also, it is clear that goodness of character according to al-Ghazälf is the 
fruit of the severity of the pious and the self-discipline of the people of 
constant worship. The acts of obedience are essential to the well-being of the 
servant's heart, in the same way that food and drink are to the well-being and 
health of the body . 
96 On the other hand, the refusal to amend a bad character 
will result in vices and defilement. It is a mortal poison which distances man 
from God. But when one's soul is clean and pure, he is ready to receive the 
brightness of divine knowledge. What is important for man is the freeing of his 
soul from all impurities in order to come nearer to God. 
According to al-Ghazäli knowledge is the food of the soul and is 
praiseworthy in itself. Knowledge is an excellent means to the ultimate and 
eternal happiness. He writes in the Kit lb al-71m, 
The greatest achievement in the opinion of man 
is eternal happiness and the most excellent thing 
is the way which leads to it. This happiness will 
never be attained except through knowledge and 
works, and works are impossible without the 
knowledge of how they are done. The basis for 
happiness in this world and the next is 
knowledge. Of all works it is, therefore, the most 
vs Abu- Hämid a1-Ghazäli, Kitäb iiyidat aI-nafss Ibyi, vol. 3, p. 207, Eng. trans. p. 92. 
' Refer to al-Ghazäli's emphasis on the acts of worship in the discussion of the previous 
chapter. 
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excellent. And why not, since the excellence of 
anything is revealed by the quality of its fruit? 
You have already learnt that the fruit of 
knowledge in the hereafter is drawing near to the 
Lord of the Universe, attaining the rank of the 
angels, and joining the company of the heavenly 
hosts. Its fruits in this world, however, arc power, 
dignity, influence over kings, and reverence from 
all.. 97 
Also al-Ghazäli explains that knowledge of the way to the hereafter is 
only to be comprehended through the perfection of reason (`ayl), which is the 
noblest faculty of the human being. 98 Al-Ghazäli writes, 
It is further apparent that the religious sciences, 
which are the knowledge of the path to the 
hereafter, are comprehended through the 
maturity of the intellect; and, as we shall see 
later, clear understanding and clear intellect are 
the highest attributes of man, because through 
the intellect the responsibility of God's trust is 
accepted, and through it man can enjoy the 
neighbourhood of God. w 
97 Abu- l1amid at-Ghazäli, Kitäb al-ilm Ibyä, vol. 1, p. 21, Eng. trans. p. 26. 
98 Abu- Hamid al-Ghazäli, Kiteb al-`ibm Ibyä , vol. 1, p. 22, Eng. trans. p. 29. This point 
also 
has been mentioned by Mohamed Ahmed Sherif in his book GhvAli's Theory of 
Virtue. See Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, Gbazali's Theory of Viet tu:, p. 12. 
99 Abu- Hämid a1-Ghazaii, Kitnb al--Slm, Ibyi; vol. 1, p. 22, Eng. trans. p. 29. 
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As we have seen, al-Ghazälf in his Kitäb `ajä'ib al-gaIb100 insists that 
the rational (`agliyyah) sciences are not adequate in themselves to achieve the 
purification of the soul, although al-Ghazälf does not deny their importance. 
Therefore, according to al-Ghazälf, the rational sciences have to be completed 
by the religious sciences. 
Ethics, then, has an important place in al-Ghazali's discussion of 
happiness. It is clear that a good character can be attained by disciplining the 
soul. Sherif in his Gha iffs Theory of Virtue writes, 
In all his works ethics appears as an important, if 
not always the central, issue", '(" and goes on to 
observe "In his quest for truth in the Dclivcrcr, 
Ghazäli emphasises that knowledge of any thing 
in any way must be evaluated in proportion to its 
usefulness in leading man to those moral states 
that make possible the attainment of ultimate 
happiness. Thus, ethics provides the link between 
knowledge and action and is the indispensable 
means for attaining man's highest end. 102 
Al-Ghat 1f's süfi experience led him to assert that the ultimate 
100 In this book al-Ghazäli divides the sciences which reside in one's heart into two 
divisions, namely; the rational ('agliyyab) sciences and the religious (shar'i}yah) 
sciences. He further divides the rational sciences into the necessary or inborn 
(darraiyya) and the acquired (muklasabah). The acquired sciences are further divided 
into the worldly such as medicine and mathematics, and the otherwordly such as the 
science of the states of the heart ('i1m abwil al-galb), the knowledge of Geil, His 
attributes and creation. Man needs both the 'agliyyah and shar'iyyah in order to 
achieve his perfection. See previous discussion pp. 259-260. 
ºoº Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, GbazWi's Tbemryo! 'Vir[rk; p. 2. 
102 Ibid, p. 3. 
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knowledge is that of revelation, which is inexpressible. But the aspirant may, 
through knowledge of devotional practice, attain the noble character which 
will render him fit for the vision of God in the afterlife. 103 Thus, Sufism is 
related to al-Ghazäli's ethical theory for the discipline of character training is 
essential to it. 
According to Sherif, however, al-Ghazäli's ethical theory is not only 
related to his , uff doctrine, rather al-Ghazäli views ethics itself as a süli 
discipline. This can be inferred from his discussion on the sources of 
knowledge. 
According to him, knowledge is either acquired 
through education and instruction, or occurs 
without acquisition. The former is called 
reflection (i`tibär). The latter is called inspiration 
(Uhäm) when its source is not known (this is the 
knowledge of the mystic saints) and revelation 
(wahy) when its source is known to man (this is 
the knowledge of the prophets). i('4 Now, while 
men of wisdom occupy themselves with 
reflection and seek to acquire knowledge through 
inquiry beginning with observation of physical 
phenomena, the mystics engage only in the 
purification of their souls and the refinement of 
their character so that knowledge may shine in 
their hearts through inspiration. Therefore, ethics 
103 Ibid. 
104 See previous discussion p. 257, cited in Mohamed Ahmed Shcrif, Ghavadi's Thcvey of 
Virl uc p. 15. 
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is the main or essential ingredient in the mystical 
approach to knowledge. 105 
Also, in his al-Risila al-laduniyya, al-Ghazäli perceives the science of 
ethics (`ilm al-akhliy) as man's obligation towards his own soul or self. He 
places the science of ethics under the practical knowledge which is the second 
aspect of religious knowledge, namely the branches (furl' ). b06 Hence, al- 
GhazälPs ethics and his Sufism cannot be separated. 07 
Al-Ghazali ethics is a theory of moral virtue. Virtue is indeed a specific 
and central aspect of al-Ghazali's theory of ethicsi08 This is the reason why, 
throughout his discussion on the disciplining of the soul, al-Ghazhli 
concentrates on the definition and analysis of the virtues and vices, as in his 
analysis of the 'mothers of character' or the principal virtues: wisdom, courage, 
temperance and justice. These virtues assist the realisation of the ideal in the 
human character. 
The Kitäb riyädat al-nafs wa-tahdhib al-akhlsq wa-mu`Rajat amrid al- 
ga1b is the part of the Ihye' most relevant to the present discussion, for in it al- 
Ghazäli elucidates the significance of purifying the soul and reforming the 
morals in order to achieve blessedness and happiness. The book covers the 
transitory nature of this world as well as emphasising the qualities of the next. 
105 See previous discussion pp. 108,226, cited in Mohamed Ahmed Sharif, Gbazeli c TbcYvry of 
Virtue, p. 15. 
106 Abu- Hämid al-Ghazali, al-Risila al-laduniyya, pp. 63-66, Eng. trans. pp. 352-358. Also 
cited in Mohamed Ahmed Sheri l; Gbazirl 's Theory of Vint uc; p. 16. 
107 A1-Ghazäli holds that the philosophers' discussion of ethics is borrowed from the wtis. 
See Abn Hamid al-Ghazäli, a! -Mungidh, p. 81, Eng. trans. by W. Montgome-Ty 
Watt, The Failh, p. 39. 
108 Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, Gbaz's Theory ofVirtur, p. 22. 
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Al-GhazälPs exposition also incorporates the significance of the faith1° 
(knowledge) and of righteous deeds, and of the cleansing of the soul and 
extermination of the vices of the heart which al-Ghazäli considers to be the 
inner foundation of all the brutality in human behaviour. He enumerates the 
different types of human weaknesses and vices, explaining their causes and 
tracing their origin. He then proceeds to propose measures for the subjugation 
of the earthly desires and impulses from which the vices are born. Al-Ghazali's 
way of describing the vices and virtues and his advice on discovering of the 
direction that can lead to salvation show him to be a careful educator with 
great insight into the inner properties of the human soul. 
For al-Ghazal gradual training in ethics is related to the gradual 
progress of the personality. Al-Ghazäli views such a progress in term of 
performing devotional acts, giving up evil, the acquisition of the four chief 
virtues which together form a good character, all of which constitute 
purification of the soul from the base vices which are obstacles on the path to 
God and, finally shaping the soul with all the beautiful virtues. The key to the 
removal of the vices is to oppose them through knowledge and action. Al- 
Ghazali's theory of personality is directed towards the well-being of the 
individual. Its major concern is man's individual spiritual salvation and the 
attainment of the happiness in the hereafter. Through his analysis of the human 
soul and its moral cultivation through knowledge and action, al-Ghazili sets 
out to examine the innate psychological personality and the impulses actuating 
ethical behaviour. 
Therefore it may be concluded that the subject matter of al-Gha ali's 
concept of personality is the human soul (nafs). His discussion concerns 
tov By the incorporation of the purification of the soul, al-Ghazali shows that it is through 
the `life of the heart' that faith can really be acquired. 
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characteristics and cognition in terms of spiritual qualities and faith. In the 
treatment of human conduct the causes of behaviour are more important than 
the effects. Thus, the spiritual aspect is the most important. It is the spiritual 
component that must subdue and control the desire or the animal components 
in order to produce a balanced personality. 
This also can be seen in how he differentiates between creation and 
character. He relates character to the 'internal' aspect of mangy 10 which is his 
major concern, as the condition of the soul is what makes the individual. 
According to al-Ghazäli the human being is basically made up of two 
components: a material body and non-material spirit or soul. The unity of these 
two components brings into existence observable behaviour whose functions 
are discernible. Man cannot be understood when reduced to either one of these 
components to the exclusion of the other, or when the interaction between the 
two components is ignored. But, since the soul is greater than the body, and 
the body is merely the vehicle of the soul, it is the soul which actually makes 
the individual who he is. A phrase which may be used now to encapsulate al- 
Ghazäli's idea of personality in the light of the above discussion is the 
'personality of the soul'. The control of desire is important in its positive 
development. Also, the influence of the intellect on the system of self- 
discipline which controls desire is equally important in developing their 
interrelationship. Hence, the determining factors in man's search for happiness 
and self--realisation are his control over his desire and the equilibrium of his 
mind in following the shari `a. 
We can thus establish a brief schema of al-Ghazair's concept of 
personality. It is based upon the following main points: 
110 See above p. 331. 
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1. Faith (knowledge) and action must work together. 
2. The purification of the soul is the means of building and maintaining a virtuous 
character and thus a balanced personality. 
3. Al-Ghazäl 's concept of personality is firm) grounded in his ethical teachings. 
4. Happiness in the hereafter is the key feature of his concept of personality. 
5. Character traits can be altered; human nature is not immutable. 
6. The causes of behaviour are more important than its effects. 
7. Character refers to the inner aspect of the soul. 
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CONCLUSION: 
Comparison of the theories: 
Before moving to the conclusion, it is necessary here to recapitulate the 
salient points of the theories discussed in the study in order to show where al- 
Ghazal 's thought is similar to, and where it departs from, that of the other 
theories. 
Al-Ghazalf, Plato, Plotinus, al-Färäbf and Ibn Sfnä all make a clear 
distinction between soul and body. All their theories hold that soul is a special 
form of existence quite dissimilar from any other. Aristotle, while not allowing 
a clear separation between soul and body, still implies that they arc in some 
way different; although he views soul as not independent from body, he sees 
soul as separable from body as the matter of a physical object is separable from 
its shape. 
The theories of all these thinkers give a special place to the soul. Al- 
Ghazäli perceives the soul as belonging to the world of decrees or the 
indivisible world; Plato perceives it as belonging to the spiritual or mental 
world. Aristotle, on the other hand, though he does not perceive all the 
faculties of soul as coming from outside, does consider the intellect as a part of 
the soul which comes from outside. 
The body is perceived as the lower element in man. According to al- 
Ghazali, the body is not evil in itself but it subjects to corruption and 
destruction. It is a composite of matter and form, and earthy. Plato takes a 
similar view, perceiving the body as material, perceptible and belonging to the 
world of flux. Plotinus has an even stronger negative view of the body; for him 
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the body is unreal because it is material and all the vices are the result of the 
soul's attachment to the body. Both al-Färäbi and Ibn Sim perceive body as 
matter. Aristotle again has a slightly different view: for him the body is neither 
purely physical nor totally part of the outside world. 
Al-Ghazäli perceives the soul as having two natures: spiritual and 
animal. The significance of this view is the recognition that there is a conflict 
within the human soul. Plato's notion is similar in the sense that he maintains 
that the soul is tripartite. Aristotle, on the other hand, perceives the various 
powers of the soul as composing a hierarchical system. Al-Farabi also 
recognizes different faculties within the soul, while Ibn Sinä holds the soul to 
be a unitary substance whose faculties cannot function independently. Plotinus 
again has a distinctive view: he does not admit that the soul may be affected 
by bodily changes. 
Although there are clear differences between the theories, all of them 
take the same position in declaring soul to be the real essence of man. The soul 
according to al-Ghazäli is the 'rider' of the body; it is the ruling element. Plato 
perceives the body as slave to the soul; again, it is the soul that rules. Aristotle 
puts forward a different argument which nevertheless implies that soul is 
above body. He perceives the soul as the origin of the characteristics and the 
different functions: nutrition, sensation, thought and movement. The soul is 
the final cause of human behaviour. Al-Faräbi sees the rational faculty of the 
soul as the ruler of all other faculties. Ibn Sind views the soul as that which 
organises and gives the bodily organs their definite character. And although 
Plotinus' arguments arc quite different the implication is the same: the soul is 
the essence of man. According to Plotinus, the differences in human experience 
are to be ascribed to the different states of the soul; therefore the soul is the 
ultimate source of all man's various behaviours and experiences. 
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All these theories recognise the importance of knowledge and are 
concerned with the attainment of truth. This means that all of them accept the 
possibility of attaining true knowledge through the activity of the soul, as well 
as the existence of God. Al-Ghazali emphasises the importance of knowledge 
possessed by the soul in the search for God. Plato states that the best soul will 
lead the universe, and for him the Gods are good. Aristotle stresses the 
goodness of the soul, which gives good things their value. Plotinus is more 
concerned with the contemplative life of the soul. According to him, the 
contemplation of reason is higher than action. The contemplative life of the 
mind starts from the contemplation of nature: thus the soul shares in the 
intellect's contemplation of mind. He asserts that union with God is the goal of 
the spiritual and philosophical life. Al-Färabi also discusses real knowledge, 
which he defines as what is true and certain at all times. It is through reason 
that ultimate happiness can be attained. Reason is the agency that governs the 
sublunary region and is the ultimate principle of all being. This position is 
similar to al-Ghazäli's. Ibn Smä also adopts this view. According to him, the 
theoretical intellect is concerned with the pure cognition of truth. Thus, all the 
theories are concerned with the special ability of the soul as it relates to 
knowledge and God. 
All the theories state that mind or reason or intellect is part of the soul 
or one of the soul's faculties or powers. The soul is thus the seat of knowledge. 
The philosophers however differ in their perception of the nature of human 
knowledge. Al-Ghazali contends that acquiring knowledge is actually the 
process of the restoration of original innate knowledge. Plato also perceives 
learning as a process of recollection, and claims that human beings possess 
innate knowledge. Aristotle in contrast holds that there is no innate 
knowledge. Plotinus describes recollection as a process of the intellect's 
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discovery of its own nature and structure rather than the discovery of 
something external to itself. For al-Faräbi, knowledge of a thing may be 
achieved by the rational faculty or by the faculty of representation or sense- 
perception. Ibn Sina also denies that knowledge can be separated from the 
soul. He perceives knowing as the most distinctive activity of the human 
being. He divides the human rational soul into two: the practical intellect, 
which is the source of human behaviour, and the theoretical intellect, which is 
concerned with the pure cognition of truth. 
Although al-Ghazal[ maintains that the human soul is eternal in his 
discussion on the nature of the soul that proceeds from the command of God, 
in his book The Alchemy of Happiness he contends that the human soul is 
created and not everlasting. Despite a certain lack of consistency, it is clear 
enough that his view is that the soul does not perish when the body dies, and 
will return to its earthly body on the Day of Judgement. In this respect al- 
Ghazäli ultimately always follows the Qur'änic concept of the soul, which 
states that the true nature of the soul is unknowable to all save God: only He 
knows the reality of the soul. 
Al-Färäbi, on the other hand, believes that it is only the intellectual 
part of the soul that is immortal, while Ibn Sind holds that the human soul is 
immortal because it is immaterial, and thus corruption cannot affect it. The 
three Greek philosophers, Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, also have fairly similar 
opinions on this matter. However, whereas Plato perceives the soul as 
immortal, for Aristotle only the Active Intellect is immortal. Plotinus again 
has a distinct view: the soul is real but its mode of being is temporary. The 
significance of these differences of view lies in their implications for the 
condition of the soul after bodily death. 
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Soul is created, according to al-Ghazäl. But Plato claims that the soul 
is pre-existent. Aristotle regards soul as the first actuality of body. For 
Plotinus there is only one Soul. Al-Färabi perceives the soul as form which 
perfects matter. Ibn Sinä regards soul as of the order of form. 
Al-Ghazäli defines the human soul as indivisible essence, not 
everlasting, spiritual, substantial, simple, having life in itself, enlightened, 
comprehending, acting and moving, having two natures, and able to be 
destroyed. Plato defines the soul as divine, immaterial, imperceptible, 
immortal, self-moving and the source of all other motions. Aristotle defines 
soul as not purely a spiritual being, a cause of movement and a set of powers. 
Plotinus maintains that there is only one Soul, which is reality although its 
mode of being is temporary. Al-Farabi defines the soul as form which is 
constituted of faculties. Ibn Sina defines the soul as the entelechy of a natural 
body. 
Political relationship between citizens is central to Greek philosophers, 
in particular for Plato and for Muslim philosophers such as al-Färäbi in the 
discussion of the human soul. As appeared in the present study, al-Färäbi 
relates his discussion on the human soul with politics. 
' For al-Ghazäli, this is 
also a great importance because the central concept in his discussion of the 
human soul is the relationship with God, and so also he has the Qur'änic 
concept of the human soul. It is not the philosophy that interests him but the 
relationship of soul to God. He expresses this in philosophical terms, 
sometimes in metaphor, exhorting his fellow Muslim to follow the true path 
examplified by the prophet. This is the significance of his theory of soul. 
1 See p. 204. 
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Al-Ghazäli wrote against Neoplatonism not because he was particularly 
interested in the subject but because of the prominence of this philosophy in 
his own age and the harmful effect it had on the people. If his purpose had been 
to gain academic influence, he would have succeeded. But academic 
reputation, however high, would not give him any meaning in life. His purpose 
of writing the Ihyi' and the Mungidh was to show the soul's activity and its 
purpose was to obey and please God. Therefore, by his own standards none of 
his work was written for his own glory but for the glory of God, i. e. to help and 
save his fellow Muslims. If his work has only resulted in fame among the 
scholars, then he would have failed in his purpose to educate and bring his 
fellow Muslims, from ignorance to the truth. Al-Ghazäli wrote for different 
readers, laymen or intellectuals but all his writings were for the same purpose. 
Of all the theories, it is obvious that that of al-Ghazäli is the most 
concerned with the spiritual aspect. For example, he writes concerning the 
Devil's temptation of the soul and also uses the images of the soul's spiritual 
armies. But he is unique among the philosophers in this respect. Plato, in his 
discussion, differentiates between the World soul and the human soul. 
Aristotle is concerned to explain all the capacities which are possessed by 
living beings. Plotinus, on the other hand, places great stress on the 
contemplative life of the mind, and can be regarded as emphasising the 
spiritual aspect more than do the other two Greek philosophers. 
Final Conclusion: 
This study has attempted to demonstrate that al-Ghat li was a 
medieval scholar who can also be regarded as one of the early Muslim 
"specialists on soul", and that his originality consists in part in his acute 
understanding of the psychological aspects of the human soul. By examining 
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other theories of soul including those of the major Greek philosophers, the 
distinctiveness of al-Ghazäli's psychological explanations becomes obvious. 
He explained the Qur'anic teachings on soul and combined them with 
those ideas from Greek philosophy which did not contradict the teachings of 
the Qur'an. This effort was necessary in order to correct the reliance of the 
intellectual leaders of the society of his time on the Greek philosophers' way of 
syllogistic reasoning, for these men - scholars and clerics - were very much 
influenced by Greek thought, and looked for logical explanation in all matters. 
Al-Ghazäli tried to take into consideration this desire for philosophical 
explanation. But while using the philosophers' own methods al-Ghazäli 
emphasised Qur'änic logic. He maintained that philosophy is limited, and 
cannot provide ultimate or complete answers to every problem. The present 
study has attempted to show the truth of this assertion. It is clear, however, 
that al-Ghazäli used philosophical method not for its own sake, but to re- 
educate his society regarding the vital importance of revelation. Thus he could 
never approve those philosophical ideas that contradicted Islamic teachings. 
The central position of revelation as the primary source of knowledge he 
affirmed absolutely. Philosophical language is used in order to discuss 
revelation with a remarkable clarity and incisiveness in such a way as suited 
the interest of the people, whether scholars or laymen. 
What makes al-Ghazälf's study of the human soul particularly 
interesting is that it was rooted in his spiritual crisis. In looking for Truth, al- 
Ghazälf found his answer in Sufism. The stimulating feature about his ideas 
regarding Sufism specifically and his teachings generally is that they arc based 
on his personal experience. His ultimate acceptance of the süf way came after 
z See chapter 2. 
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a long spiritual struggle and intensive study of the major sciences of theology, 
philosophy and the teachings of the Batinites. Another distinctive point about 
his way of Sufism is that it is the combination of insights gained from the 
Qur'an and sunnah and his snff experience. His s Uff experiences enabled him to 
transform the commandments of Jurisprudence into living obligations whose 
meaning could radically alter personal existence. Al-Ghazal[ succeeded in 
elucidating the rationale behind orthodox worship. He emphasises the 
engagement of both body and soul in the service of God and His worship. He 
stresses that, rightly performed, worship would draw people near to God; their 
efforts should focus on how to accomplish this. Al-Ghazal[ gives equal weight 
to the importance of both faith and action in achieving the desired goal of life: 
that is, happiness both in this world and the hereafter. This insistence on the 
balance of faith and action is a result of his own experience of Sufism. He 
argues that Sufism is not merely a matter of concepts or of knowledge; rather 
it is a unification, a synthesis, of the theory and practice. The significance of 
his süff experience is the resulting desire to safeguard fellow Muslims and to 
ensure their happiness in the hereafter. So the relevance of al-Ghazali's theory 
of soul is to enable him to educate others in the fullest sense of the word to 
lead them to closeness to God and the happiness in the hereafter. 
In order to attain the desired result of worship, al-Ghazäli declares, it 
is necessary to cleanse the sou13 What issues from the heart affects the senses 
in their acts of worship and daily life. The origin of the acts of worship lies in 
the attributes of the heart. Praiseworthy works are the result of praiseworthy 
characters as blameworthy works are the result of blameworthy characters. Al- 
Ghazäli thus makes clear the relationship between the senses and the heart. As 
health and illness are of the body, good and evil are of the heart. The human 
3 See the discussion regarding the dynamic concept of the acts of worship, chapter 5.1. 
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being is created for a purpose, which is above all to worship God (`ibsdab). 
This concept of worship also includes the obligation to know God. 
Al-Ghazäli's discussion of the soul is closely related to his view of 
knowledge. This includes the ways of acquiring knowledge, the sources of 
knowledge and the reality of knowledge. The noblest knowledge is the 
knowledge of God. In knowing his own soul, man may develop his knowledge 
of God. Al-Ghazal F, during the period of his spiritual crisis, sincerely sought 
the Truth, which he finally found through the siirt way of acquiring knowledge. 
As al-Ghazäli tells us, his scepticism started when he was young and grew 
increasingly intense until he was over fifty, when he was finally convinced by 
the süff way. His experience shows that it is psychological needs that make 
man fall in love with whatever he happens to know. 
Al-Ghazäli insists that the human soul is the essence of man; thus it 
constitutes the real human personality. The present study has shown that for 
al-Ghazäli the human personality is founded on the state of the soul. The inner, 
spiritual state is of the greatest importance in determining the human 
personality. The disciplining of soul, then, is a vital human activity which 
must be pursued constantly throughout one's life. Only by continual discipline 
can the internal obstacles to the transformation of the personality be 
overcome. Among them are human desires and the temptations of evil. Thus 
al-Ghazäli, emphasising the internal aspect of the human personality, considers 
both what corrupts and destroys the good as well as what generates it. Human 
behaviour depends on the spiritual state of the individual, according to al- 
Ghazäli's conception, for the personality includes both the physical (outward) 
and the spiritual (inward) self. The differences among individuals result from 
the restless struggle inside the self. This is explained by reference to the three 
stages (ahwäl) of the human nail; al-nafs al-mutma'innah, al--nafs al- 
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Jawwamah and al--nafs al-ammärab bissü' 
Al-Ghazali, without forgetting the revealed teaching that the reality of 
the soul is unknowable to any save God, explains the meanings of four terms: 
gaib, rtih, nafs and `aq/. 4 Each of the terms, al-Ghazäli contends, denotes two 
meanings, where the second inner meaning of each may explain to some extent 
what soul is. According to al-Ghazali, the terms heart, soul or self, spirit and 
intellect, when used in relation to the soul, convey two meanings. One refers to 
the material or physical aspect of man: in other words, to the body. The other 
meaning refers to his non-material, intelligential or spiritual aspect: in other 
words, to the soul of man. From the ethical point of view, the first meaning 
denotes the aspect of man from where his blameworthy qualities originate. 
They constitute the animal powers of man. Although the animal powers arc 
attached to the bodily aspect of man, it does not follow that al-Ghazäli intends 
to defame the human body. On the contrary, 'Man is created in the best of 
moulds' but without true faith and `ibidah, he becomes worse than the beasts 
(The Qur'an, 95: 4-5). The second meaning of each term denotes the inner, 
unseen reality and the spiritual substance of the soul. It is the reality or the 
very essence of man. 
Al-Ghazali describes three levels of the human soul. When the soul 
inclines towards the right direction, it will reach the level of calmness in the 
remembrance of God and endure in the knowledge of Him. This soul will 
ascend towards the highest level of the angelic horizon. The Qur'an refers to 
this soul as al-nafs al-mutma'innah. When the intellectual powers and the 
animal powers of the soul are engaged in constant battles this soul is called al- 
nafs al-lawwamah. The soul at this level may obey and be loyal to God if it is 
See chapter 4.3.1. 
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drawn towards its intellectual powers. On the other hand, it may be dragged 
down to its bestial nature if the animal powers are victorious. Thus, soul at this 
level witnesses the alternate ascendancy of the animal powers and the 
intellectual powers. Finally, the third level of soul which the Qur'an calls al- 
nafs al-ammrirah bi 7-sü'is the state of soul that incites to evil. 
Al-GhazalPs usage of the word heart (galb) does not refer to the 
physical heart. Rather it portrays the emotive link between cognitive and 
volitional desire. Al-Ghazäli expounds on the role of the heart and its influence 
over human behaviour. Al-Ghazäl 's concept of heart includes its capability of 
acquiring knowledge, being the focal point of fitrah and the support to the 
spiritual functions that are the link to God. The health of one's heart is 
significant for it leads to the continual remembrance of God. Once this is 
achieved, man's behaviour will be according to the ways prescribed by God. 
This in turn creates a good personality and harmonious life. On the other hand, 
if one's heart is sick, its spiritual relationship with the Creator is adversely 
affected. This results in an excessive attachment to worldly matters as well as 
disorderly and inconsistent behaviour. 
Al-Ghazali conceptualises the dynamic elements of the human soul. 
The human being is made up basically of two components: a material body and 
a transcendent non-material spirit or soul. Human behaviour is the result of the 
dynamic interplay between these two components. Of these two basic 
components, the nafs (soul) is the aspect of the human being that constitutes 
what is referred to as 'a person'. Thus the soul constitutes the actual 
personality of man. The wholeness of the human personality is perceived from 
its various characteristics. 
The very nature of the human body is defined by its persistent need for 
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material gratification. Thus the body tends to more readily be the focus of 
attention. In his desire to satisfy his bodily needs, man usually oversteps his 
bounds. This situation may lead to an obsession to gratify the material desires 
of the body. By God's grace, the spiritual aspect of man can help to 
counterbalance these potentially destructive tendencies. This is because the 
spiritual aspect of man links the human being to his Creator. From the present 
study, it can be seen that al-Ghazal connects this link with his theory of 
knowledge. A person who forgets his spiritual calling submits himself to the 
accumulation of worldly possessions and clings to material satisfactions. 
Recognising that he had been enslaved by worldly matters, al-Ghazäli 
abandoned his professorship at Baghdad. 
Al-Ghazali's theory of knowledge is very much connected to his own 
spiritual crisis. His division of the levels of knowledge is closely related to his 
own experiences. He regards the highest level of knowledge to be `i! m a! - 
mukäshafa, which is transcendental in nature. The lowest level of knowledge is 
faith based on tagrd The absolute certainty that al-Ghazäli: was looking for 
belongs to the highest level of knowledge. His disillusion with the lowest 
level, tagll4 was the major cause for his famous spiritual crisis. Al-Ghazali 
came to doubt all knowledge based on authority such as that of parents and 
teachers, and then all sources of knowledge whatever, including reason. He 
finally became convinced that there is another faculty, higher than reason, 
which is a source of certain knowledge, namely al-kashf (unveiling). This 
'unveiling' includes inspiration, insight and vision as means for the attainment 
of true knowledge. The highest level of acquiring knowledge transcending 
reason is prophecy: it is this level that was earnestly sought by those al- 
Ghazäli refers to as süfs. This view can be considered as al-Ghazälis response 
to those philosophers who perceived reason as the highest faculty in attaining 
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knowledge, for true knowledge can only be gained through al-kashf. 5 
The concept of human nature according to revealed knowledge is that 
man is born with an innate nature called fitrab. This innate nature is neutral, 
clean and good. But as human beings gain awareness of their existence, they 
become open to worldly influences through their life processes. Thus the 
significant reason for God's revelation and the work of His prophets is to 
remind human beings of their purpose in this life. The role of God's messengers 
is to transmit the revelation of God containing the covenant of tawhid Hence, 
whoever sincerely tries to keep his innate frtrahwill easily witness the truth in 
the revelation. On the other hand, when fitrah has become clouded by the 
attachment to material needs, a person may resist the acknowledgement of the 
truth. 
Whoever then has tried to respond to the call of his undefiled frtrah will 
be counted among the faithful and consequently observe God's commandments 
in this present world. They are among the people who lead a good life in this 
world and therefore will be rewarded with the ultimate success (fa/rah) or 
happiness in the hereafter. On the other hand, those who have spoiled their 
innate frtrah are among the disbelievers; they will go astray and experience 
misery in this world as well as in the hereafter. This signifies the concept of 
the hereafter from the Islamic perspective. The concept of the afterlife is 
central for it is where the final account will happen: whether bliss or otherwise. 
It was his consciousness of the truth of this concept of the afterlife which 
finally led to al-Ghazäli's decision to leave Baghdad. 
Al-Ghazäli elaborates on how to discipline the human soul in his book 
5 See the discussion in chapter 4.3.3. 
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Disciplining the Soul And Breaking the Two Desires in his magnum opus Ihyä' 
`uhim al-&n. 6 By virtue of his detailed analysis of the methods of discipline 
presented in this particular book of the Ihyä , al-Ghazalf can be regarded as one 
of the most acute of the medieval Muslim psychologists and theorists of 
personality. Al-Ghazälf discusses the modification of behaviour by reference to 
two major aspects, namely the outer and the inner. The inner aspect includes 
the cognitive faculty. Thus his psychology is closely connected with his theory 
of knowledge. For al-Ghazälf, spiritual discipline involves the development of 
the intellect as well as the character. His discussion in Kitäb riyädat al-nafv 
covers all aspects of the human personality. He is concerned with the entire 
span of human development: his discussion includes the period of larbiyah 
(rearing) the children. His ideas on this subject have much in common with 
present-day developmental psychology. Also, his description of the alliance 
between shaykh and disciple, apart from acknowledging the influence of 
Sufism, shows some similarity with the affiliation between the counselor and 
the client in the modern counseling session, the main difference being that this 
alliance's success is derived from a deeply rooted faith in the existence of the 
divine. Self-mortification and discipline are the prerequisites of attaining 
transcendental knowledge. The concept of disciplining the soul in al-Ghazalf's 
scheme refers to an activity. This corresponds with his emphasising of both 
knowledge and action in the attaining of happiness. 
When considering al-GhazalPs concept of human nature, it is important 
to remember that the essence of man and his defining characteristic is his 
spiritual aspect. What weighs most heavily is man's relationship with his 
Creator. However, although God sent man into this life for a spiritual purpose, 
certain worldly needs are not to be regarded as illegitimate. Thus, man's needs 
6 See the discussion in chapter 5.2.3. 
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according to the Islamic perspective may be categorised under two main 
divisions: spiritual and worldly. But worldly needs are legitimate only in so far 
as they help to lead man to an intimate closeness to God. Hence, it is 
important to maintain a sound spiritual life. 
The sustained, sound and profound sense of relatedness to God is thus 
necessary for a balanced personality, according to al-Ghazäli. The failure to 
uphold this relationship may lead to failure and an imbalanced personality, 
which may in turn lead to an obsession with material gratification. If 
prolonged, this condition may ruin one's fate in the hereafter. This is what 
happened to al-Ghazal[ himself. His spiritual crisis to a large extent was due to 
his attachment to worldly affairs during his professorship in Baghdad. He 
realized that, in order to regain his spiritual balance it was necessary to rebuild 
and strengthen his spiritual bond with God. He ultimately became convinced 
of the need for the purification of the soul and its significance for the creation 
of a fully integrated personality. 
According to al-Ghazäli's understanding of human nature, man's 
indifference to God results in the failure to fulfil his basic human needs. In 
other words, the human spiritual need is not satisfied. Since the human soul 
innately recognises and longs for a kinship with God, the failure to satisfy this 
need will result in an imbalance of the personality. On the other hand, if the 
spiritual need of man is fulfilled, he will profoundly experience the connection 
between himself and God. The constant effort to maintain this relationship 
will ultimately make man feel deeply connected with and dependent on God as 
the ultimate source of all good in this life and beyond. Al-Ghazal experienced 
this himself, as he tells us in his al-Mungidh. What is distinctive in this 
experience, its complete clarity and certitude, can only be understood by those 
who actually gain it. There arc no adequate words to describe this experience: 
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it can only be alluded to in image and metaphor. 
From the present study it is clear that al-Ghazäli's Ihyi 'W Fun al-din 
reflects all aspects of this relationship. 7 For example, al-Ghazäli includes a 
discussion on ridä' in the 1 iy . When the relationship between man and God 
is fully established and realized, there will be approbation (ri(6) in his life. In 
difficult times, he will comprehend that his faith in God is being tested. 
Understanding this, he will succeed in overcoming the difficulties. Al-Ghat li 
was in this situation himself when he was unsure whether to abandon his 
solitude and go back to resume teaching. In such a situation man should ask 
help from God. On the other hand, in times of easy affluence and control over 
his life, he should not disconnect his relationship with God nor be proud of his 
blessings. What he should do is to use these bounties in a correct way as he 
will be accountable on the Day of Judgement. 
For those who are spiritually developed, life's calamities arc tolerated 
with patience, perseverance and hope. Here we sec the importance of al- 
Ghazälis emphasis on ethics. Sound ethics result from faith in God. Man's 
feeling of closeness to God ensures his ability to cope with the difficulties of 
this life. Thus, the quality of this spiritual relationship or degree of closeness 
to God is vital in human life in order to achieve a balanced personality. 
As the present study has shown, spiritual development is the core of 
human life according to al-Ghazäli. In contrast to the other concept ualisat ions 
of the human soul, al-Ghazälr's views emphasise the spiritual. Although there 
are similarities between Greek philosophy and al-Ghazäli's psychological 
system, al-Ghazäli's views are distinctive regarding the sources of knowledge. 
For him, as we have seen, the primary source of knowledge is revelation. The 
See the discussion in chapter 3. 
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similarities occur more in the style of discussion and sometimes the terms 
used. However, the other philosophers reduce the sources of knowledge to 
reason and logical inference. In our own time, some secularists and clinical 
psychologists have reduced the sources of knowledge to sense data. In contrast 
to the methods of modern philosophy and science with regard to the sources 
and methods of knowledge, al-Ghazili maintains that knowledge comes from 
God and is acquired through the channels of the sound senses, true report based 
on genuine authority, sound reason and intuition. The highest levels of 
authority are the Qur'an and sunnah. The fundamental basis of al-Ghazali's 
psychology is revealed knowledge and it is within this framework that al- 
Ghazili formulates his psychological discussion of man. At the same time, al- 
Ghazälf shows that by intuition man can achieve direct and immediate 
apprehension of religious truths, of the reality and existence of God. With 
reference to intuition, this is granted only to those who have lived in the 
experience of religious truth by sincere and practical devotion to God. Al- 
Ghazili himself experienced this by following , Laff way. Hence, the most 
fundamental difference between al-Ghazali's view of the human soul and that 
of both Greek philosophy and its Muslim apologists revolves around the way 
of understanding the meaning of reality and truth. 
It is clear that all the views on human nature which we have examined 
agree in perceiving man as the 'rational animal' (al-hayawan al-ni(iq). Man is 
unique in that he possesses an intellect (`aqn. It is an innate faculty of 
knowing that apprehends and formulates meaning. This is a conscious entity 
that also has been identified by al-Ghazälf with the other three terms: gall, nih 
and `aql. The intellect is then a spiritual substance by which the rational soul 
recognises truth. It is the reality that underlies the definition of man. 
According to al-Ghazal 's concept of human nature, what is most 
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important is the relationship of man to God. This relationship is the most 
essential and significant in human life. It determines how man behaves in this 
world, and thus also determines his relationship with everything in the 
universe. Hence, this relationship affects the quality of human existence. 
Continuous spiritual purification (tazkiyat al-nafs) is a necessary clement in 
maintaining this relationship of man with God. In other words, the condition 
of spiritual purification affects the form of this relationship. In order to have a 
good life, one has to have a balanced life and personality. The balanced 
personality takes into consideration both its physical and its spiritual aspects. 
Happiness is not defined in terms of worldly achievements solely, rather it 
identifies the hereafter as the real state of being. This is the state that 
ultimately counts: hence the great significance of the hereafter in the Islamic 
perspective. 
In sum, man has a dual nature. He is both body and soul. Man's purpose 
is to do `ibädah to God. This conforms with his essential nature (fitrah) created 
for him by God. Man also has two types of soul: the higher, which is the 
rational soul and the lower, which is the animal soul. It is the rational soul that 
knows God. The rational soul must assert its supremacy and exert its power 
and rule over the animal soul which is subject to it and which must be rendered 
submissive by it. By means of knowledge, moral excellence and good works, 
man is capable of attaining to the angelic nature. This is because his innate 
nature is fitrah and his real essence originates from the worlds of dominion (al- 
malakcit). This submission of the animal soul to the rational soul ensures the 
balanced personality. What is needed then is constant effort to resolve this 
conflict. Herein lies the importance of spiritual discipline. The spiritual 
component is vital to al-Ghazalr's concept of personality. It is indeed the 
essence of the personality for it is what produces human cognition and 
behaviour. This study has defined the relationship between two important 
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aspects of al-Ghazal 's thought, namely his theory of soul and the concept of 
personality and has demonstrated their importance in his teachings. In doing 
this, the most important aspects related to the soul and personality, that is, 
knowledge, ethics, and the disciplining of the soul, have been taken into 
consideration. 
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